Telling presences: narrating divine epiphany in Homer and beyond. by Stevens, Alexander David.
Telling presences: narrating divine epiphany 
in Homer and beyond 
Alexander David Stevens 
Pembroke College 
Dissertation submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Cambridge 
June 2002 
Alexander Stevens 
Telling presences: narrating divine epiphany in Homer and beyond 
This thesis argues that ancient Greek narratives of encounter between gods and mortals cannot 
be understood simply in terms of constellations of recurrent descriptive features or in terms of 
the iterability of type-scene or ritual. Divine epiphanies are moments of disruption or anti-
structure which provoke strategic, structuring responses, not least in narrative and ritual. But 
these responses do not subsume the potential that remains at the intersec tion between gods and 
mortals. Contestation over power, authority and legitimacy is constitutive of epiphany. 
In the first section I examine problems caused by scholarly concern for 'authentic experience' in 
treating epiphany-accounts in general and Homeric epic in particular. I propose an 
alternative focus on how sense, both as perception and as significance, is actively produced in 
such contexts: narra tivisa tion and ritualisation offer experiences-in-themselves in which 
people participate to make sense and significance in the world. The cultural currency of such 
narratives depends not on their relation to religious experiences or religious belief as such, but 
on the ways that such narratives engage their audiences in exploring the difference of gods 
from mortals and the ramifications of this difference for human existence in the world. 
In the second section I consider a succession of moments in the Iliad and the Odyssey, first to 
destabilise the notion of divine epiphany as a self-evident category or paradigm, second to 
..._ 
explore the vital importance of three ques tions: what constitutes divine presence and absence, 
how they are manifested, and how they might or n1ight not be recognised. The expression of 
divine presence in figurative terms in Homer does not reflect a metaphorisa tion of divine 
power, but is constitutive of the problematic play of divine presence and mortal recognition. 
The consequences of recognising or failing to recognise this play of presence and absence can be 
profound. Even when contemplating the 'body' of the gods, problems of perception and point-
of-view are operative. Viewing divine epiphany as an interplay of presence and perception 
points to the importance of the specific constituting frames of presence and absence. 
Contestation and realisation of authority and legitimacy are crucial concomitants. I explore 
the ends of the Odyssey and Ilind in terms of the authority of gods to end our narratives and 
the potential for mortals to generate specifically human meanings in and around these ends. 
In my conclusion I look beyond Homer briefly to consider the ongoing place of narratives of 
divine epiphany in Greek cultural contexts. How significance is generated in relation to the 
presence and absence of the gods remains a central question, and the disruptive tropes of 
epiphany play a crucial role . 
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The Iliad is cited from M. L. West (ed.) (1998-2000). The Odyssey and Homeric 
Hymns are cited from Allen (ed.) ([1908] 1917) and Allen (ed.) (1912) . Editions of 
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F. Sokolowski (ed.) (1969), Lois sacrees des cites grecques, 
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supplement, Paris. 
H. Liddell, R. Scott, H . Jones et al. (edd.) (1940), A Greek-
English Lexicon, 9th ed., Oxford. 
W. Dittenberger (ed.) (1915-1924), Sylloge Inscriptionum 
Graecarum, 3rd ed., Leipzig. 
G. Stallbaum (ed.) (1825-1826), Eustathii Commentarii ad 
Homeri Odysseam, 2 vols., Leipzig. 
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Homeri Iliadem Pertinentes, 4 vols., Leiden. 
'Acnn8o<fl6pos- 6 ~ALOS' avE:~aLVE TTOAEiJ.WVTa') 
I(L. am) TO ~a 8os Tf]S' GTTTJALQS j.llcl VUXTEpL8a TPOI-WYIJ.EVT] 
XTUTTT]GE TTClVW GTO <Pws- aav T~ aaha mivw GTO GKOUTapL" 
«'AaLVT]V TE 'AaLVT]V TE ... » . Nci 'Tav ain~ 6 ~aaLALclS' Tf]S' 'AaLVT]S' 
TTOU TOV yupEUOUiJ.E TOGO TTpOGEXTLKcl GE TOUTT] T~V aKpOTTOAT] 
yyt(oVTa') KclTTOTE iJ.E Tcl 8cixTUAci j.la') ~V a<flf] TOU TTclVW aTls TTETPES'. 
Shieldbearer, the sun climbed warring, 
and from the depths of the cave a startled bat 
hit the light as an arrow hits a shield: 
'"AaLVT]V TE 'Aatvllv TE ... " Would that it were the king of Asine 
we've been searching for so carefully on this acropolis 
sometimes touching with our fingers his touch upon the stones. 
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Seferis, The King of Asine. 
1. Are we experienced? 
The problems of reading divine epiphany 
Have you ever been experienced? ... Well, I have. 
Jimi H endrix, Are You Experienced? 
That which has been rent asunder should be reunited-narratives of interactions 
between ordinary mortals and extraordinary beings, and the traditions of the 
latter, should be taken as an integral part of the way the Greeks made sense of the 
anomic, related to those things they considered apart from ordinary reality, and 
legitimated their own secular arrangements. 
C. Rober t Phillips, Ill, 'Misconceptualizing Classical Mythology ' 
Gods in the world? 
4 
There is a well-known incident early in the Odyssey where Athene has been 
accompanying Telemakhos in the guise of Mentor but suddenly departs <Pr1vllL 
ElBOf.LEVll, 'like a lammergeyer' .1 In this bizarre moment-Bcif.L~OS' 8' Ef..E TTavTas-
'Axmous--both the immediate perceptions of the characters present at the scene 
and the privileged perspective of the audience on the presence of Athene are 
disrupted by the form in which she departs: her 'likeness' blurs the boundaries 
of metaphor and actuality, and audience and characters alike are left to wonder 
just what they should have seen in the departure of the goddess. Questions 
arise. How are we to read such a narrative of divine (dis)appearance? What are 
Od. 3.371-373. For further discussion, see below, pp. 138-146. 
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the boundaries of being and seeming in relation to the presence of gods? More 
generally, how is the distinction between divine presence and absence to be 
realised? And what are the consequences for mortals of the divine potential to 
subvert the basic order of human being-in-the-world in such a way? In short, 
what could it mean for gods to become manifest in the sensory world of 
humans? In fact, much of the rest of Odyssey 3 is taken up with Nestor's 
exemplary demonstration of the reciprocal opportunities that such a moment 
of disruption offers, through processes of narrative and ritual in which Nestor 
explores and constructs avenues of meaning within which Athene's disruptive 
departure takes fuller shape: the disruptive effects of Athene's departure and 
the generation of significance here go hand in hand. This dynamic of structure 
and anti-structure is the central problem that this thesis seeks to explore, in 
particular the connection, but not identification, of epiphany with narrative and 
ritual. 
More questions are prompted by a story about a certain Sostrata of 
Pherai that was inscribed on one of the stelai located in the sanctuary of 
Asklepios at Epidauros:2 
L:waTpcha <I>Epal!a nap]EKUTJOE .3 a[Ulm EiJ. navTl. E-ouaa cpopci8av Els To Lapov 
acpLKOj.lEVa EvE[Kci]8Ev8E. Ws 8£ oveE-v EVVTTVLOV E:vapy[E-Is EWpT], TTUALV OL Ka8E 
aTTEKOiJ.L([E]To. iJ.ETci 8£ TOUTO OVIJ.~o/..fjaa( TLS' TTEpl. K6pvovs aUTUL KaL TOLS' 
E[TTO!J.E]VOLS' 1!8o~E TciV olj;LV EUTTpETTTJS' av~p, OS' TTV80jJ.EVOS' nap' aUTWV T[as 
8vanp~~(as TciS' avTwv EKEA~aaTo 8EiJ.EV Tav KALvav, E-cp' i'ls Tav L:waTp[ciTav 
EcpE]pov. fTTELTa Tay KOLALUV UUTUS' avax[aas ECaLPEL TTAfj8os ([wucp(wv 
TTUj.l]TTOAV, [8u]E no8avL TTTfjpas. avvpcil);as 8£ TU[v y ]a aTE pa Kal TTO~aas u[ YL fj] 
TciV yvvaLKa TQV TE TTapoua(av TciV UUTO[U TT]apEVEcpUVL~E 0 'AaKAUTTLOS' KUL 
'(aTpa EKEAETO an[o]TTEIJ.TTELV ELS' 'EnU8a]vp[ov.] 
Unusually, what this story tells is the initial failure of Sostrata's incubation in the 
sanctuary of Asklepios itself. But a subsequent encounter on the road home 
leads to roadside surgery, and this seemingly chance encounter turns out to be 
an appearance of Asklepios: Tav TE Tiapovcri.av Tav ai.JTo[D TilapEVE</>avL~E 6 
'AcrKI-.amos-.4 In this way, Sostrata's story tells of the transition from divine 
absence to divine presence that opens up the problematic of reading divine 
epiphany still further. In particular, this alternative instance of Asklepios's 
healing intervention implicitly fractures the ritual model of divine-mortal 
2 
3 
4 
IG IV2, 1, 122.26-35; no. 25 in the sequence of inmntn preserved as IG IV2, 1, 121-124. Text 
as in LiDonnici (ed .) (1995), 104. Date: late 4th cent. BCE. For further discussion, see 
below, pp. 169-172. 
Note Scullion (2001), 119-120: in place of <I>Epa([a nap]EKUTJOE, read <I>Epa'L[nsl EKUTJOE. 
Compare Herzog (1931), 78-79: 'Da es keine Inkubationsheilung unter Kontrolle des 
Hieron ist, sondern eil1e freie Epiphanie. 
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contact through dream encounters that is the central practice in the Epidaurian 
sanctuary: epiphany here transcends the ritual frame . Yet conversely, the story 
also sets up an authoritative relation between the god's appearance and the 
more accessible ritual environment of his sanctuary, through the god's demand 
that his epiphanic performance be integrated within the familiar ritual frame 
when he orders offerings sent to Epidauros. In this way Asklepios's presence 
subverts the conventional practices of his cult even as it functions as guaranteed 
demonstration of the effectiveness of this same cult. As such, the full import of 
this story of divine appearance and ministration depends upon the initial 
unsettling absence of the god from the very frame designed to facilitate the 
encounter. We must ask: how is it that both divine presence and divine absence 
can be central to the generation of authority in such an encounter? Should we 
situate ritual before or after epiphany? Can there then be a grammar of 
epiphany? What is the significance of narrative like this in the contexts of ritual 
activity? Setting this story side-by-side with Athene's appearance in the Odyssey 
highlights the spread of the problematic of reading divine epiphany across the 
range of narrative as 'literature' to narrative in the contexts of ritual as 'actually 
practiced'. 
Questions such as these point to a range of problems in reading the 
appearances and disappearances of gods. What is at stake are basic aspects of 
how humans t:mderstand themselves and their activities in relation to the 
world, and thus, more specifically, within the frameworks of value that order 
that world. This thesis will consider how narrative accounts of the modalities of 
divine presence are deeply implicated in how people situate themselves in 
relation to the worlds in which divine presence is to operate. Above all, the play 
of divine presence and absence raises questions about how power and 
potentiality are constituted in these worlds. 'Divine epiphanies' have 
consequences for the formulation of statements about power, knowledge and 
existence-especially insofar as these are conceived in terms at once dependent 
upon and yet radically distinct from those in which humans characterise their 
own nature and capabilities. 
In the present study, it is a basic contention that stories and ideas about 
the play of divine presence and absence in and around the perceptual field of 
m01·tals offer explorations of the possible eo-implication of humans and 
superhuman agents in the world-where the world is understood in its cosmic, 
7 
ordering sense. Such narrations and explorations are always value-laden.s 
Stories and ideas of this sort tend to be called 'religious' in modern Western 
contexts, but, in view of the potential consequences that such stories and ideas 
entail for the worlds in which people dwelt it is an unsurprising truism that this 
'religion' means many things. Close delimitation proves difficult: dispute over 
the definition of religion is a frequent cause for dissension among those who 
claim to be studying it.6 The ongoing prominence of religion and religious 
practices as cultural and geopolitical forces of the utmost significance remains a 
profound challenge, especially since this significance suggests the impossibility 
of circumscribing religion's scope even in this modern age. Consider an 
example relevant to a recent bloody European conflict:? 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina ... the Virgin appeared in 1981, at Medjugmje, a Croatian-
speaking village of 250 families. Since then more than twenty million pilgrims 
have visited it, despite the land mines and the sniper fire, and it has been given 
credit by no less an authority on such matters than the [former] president of 
Croatia, Franjo Tudjman, for "the reawakening of the Croatian nation." 
The prominence of religion in the political culture of Croatia reflects many 
factors, but the key role of this narrative of divine presence in the 
'reawakening' of a nation is made possible not least because religion is closely 
implicated in the processes by which we articulate value and order in our 
worlds.s To identify the possibility of powers beyond those we claim for 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Compare Lincoln (1999), 146-147, on the (Lmdeveloped) insight of Durkheim and Mauss 
([1901-1902]1963), 77-78, that myth offers taxonomy (thus hierarchy, ideology) in 
narrative form. For the omnipresence of narrative, see e.g. Abbott (2002), 1-11; Prickett 
(2002); on narrative and religion, see esp. Flood (1999). 
For ancient religion, see now Bremmer (1998). On the 'problem of definition', see J. Z. 
Smith (1982), esp. x-xi; Saler (1993); McCutcheon (1995); Idinopoulos and Wilson (edd.) 
(1998); J. Z. Smith (1998); Flood (1999), 42-64; Platvoet and Moledijk (edd.) (1999). For a 
survey of the formal types of definition applied, see B. C. Wilson (1998). Note 
Charlesworth (1997), 3: 'We are locating the concepts rather than defining them.' 
Pelikan (1996), 3. The Catholic Church remains officially cautious about these 
apparitions; see e.g. the letter of Archbishop Tarcisio Bertone, dated 23 March 1996, as 
displayed at <http:/ /www.medjugorje.org/church2.hh11> [last accessed 5 June 2002], a 
website devoted to the promotion of pilgrimage to Medjugorje and a campaign for 
official recognition. Medjugorje is a site of contestation between the Vatican (Bertone is 
Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Vatican body 
responsible for doctrinal orthodoxy, formerly called the Holy Office, i.e. the Sanctum 
Officium Inquisitionis), the local diocese, the Franciscan order and the laity. See Bax 
(1995) for what is at stake, not least power and influence in local communities but also 
the economic and spiritual concomitants of the pilgrimage market; compare also 
<http:/ /www.medjugorje.org/medivl.htm> [last accessed 5 June 2002]. 
See esp . Asad (1993), 36-37: 'The argument that a particular disposition is religious 
partly because it occupies a conceptual place within a cosmic framework appears 
plausible, but only because it presupposes a question that must be made explicit: how do 
authorizing processes represent practices, utterances, or dispositions so that they can be 
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ourselves is also to identify ourselves, our strengths and our weaknesses (our 
fears), in terms that transcend any boundaries between the personal and the 
political.9 What is said about the one profoundly implicates the other. 
Pragmatically speaking, religion reflects and impacts upon many aspects 
of human activity.1o In this respect, it is relevant that Greek does not speak of 
'religion' as such with some equivalent compendium term, at least in the archaic 
and classical periods, but only of more particular activities and qualities which 
we subsequently identify as religious. 11 One recent approach concurs with this 
Greek particularisation in stressing that religion is not a 'unitary cognitive 
phenomenon', but is composed of various 'repertoires of representations' 
which extend into non-religious contexts. 12 As such religion has ramifications. 
The uncertain breadth and depth of the term underlines the consequences 
implicit in choices about what we intend to study religion as. 13 Perspectives 
multiply across the fields of cultural and social specialisations: religions as 
mystic experience, as representations of society, as complex consequences of 
individual psychological development, as historical realisations of the nexus 
between institutions of authority and the processes of economics and politics, as 
manifestations in the world of a 'sacred' theological truth, as symbolic cultural 
systems, as cultural viruses, as sociological reward systems, and so on. 14 Such 
choices, for whatever reasons they are made, significantly transform the studies 
of religion that result. Processes of selection are in themselves unavoidable and 
' 
are in one sense desirable in providing a manageable corpus of data, but they 
tend to polarise the conceptual field of religion in potentially obscuring ways. 
A prominent paradigm in the study of Greek religion builds on just such 
a basis: 'Ritual and myth are the two forms in which Greek religion presents 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
discursively related to general (cosmic) ideas of order? In short, the question pertains to 
the authorizing process by which "religion" is created.' 
For how religions 'cluster around particular compounds of limitation', e.g. death, see 
Bowker (1973), 64. 
It is in relation to its pragmatic contexts that the usefulness of the term 'religion' is 
defended, on a level with 'art', 'politics' and the like: see e.g. Strenski (1998); Flood 
(1999), 47-49. 
See Rudhardt ([1958]1992), 11-12; Burkert (1985), 271. 
See Boyer (1999) . 
For this question, see esp. Saler (1993); S. Gill (1998b). 
Of course, this is in no way exhaustive; I nominate some influential contributions from 
varying perspectives: Schleiermacher ([1799]1996); W. James (1902); Weber ([1922] 
1965), (1948), 267-359; Durkheim ([1912]1995); Freud ([1913]1955), ([1927]1961), ([1930] 
1961); R. Otto ([1917]1950); Eliade ([1957]1959); Geertz (1966); E. 0. Wilson (1978); 
Dawkins ([1979]1986); Stark and Bainbridge (1987). 
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itself to the historian of religion.'15 Between these two more or less loosely 
defined aspects of the putative entity, Greek religion, one might suppose a 
degree of equality, as two sides of the same coin. 16 In practice, this is not the 
case. Indeed, divisions between ritual and myth, and all that such divisions 
might be held to imply about (Greek) religion as a whole, have been prominent 
battlegrounds in the field over the last century or so, usually formulated in 
terms of the priority of one over the other.17 It is ritual which tends now to be 
presented as the primary, authoritative-and hence the properly 
'religious'-manifestation of Greek religious activity.18 Accordingly the ritual 
activities of concrete social entities are held to be the primary part of real 
religion.I9 Myth is reduced to the status of elaboration.20 Religion is thus 
physically, as much as conceptually, located in and around social groups or 
institutions, among which the polis is fundamental, on a Durkheimian basis. 21 
'Experience' in the form of cultic activity, and the explicit or implicit belief which 
is held to lie behind it, becomes the major focus in the study of religion, and any 
associated discourse is evaluated as religious mostly on the basis of its 
proximity to such cultic experience. Fundamental here is a distinction between 
events, 'what actually happens', and discursive representations, 'how things are 
told' and thus transformed and misrepresented. This distinction becomes a 
major conceptual dichotomy in the study of ancient religion. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Burkert (1985), 8. 
On the terms and their use, see Calame (1991); Versnel (1993), 15-88; Calame (1997) . 
See esp. Versnel (1993), 15-88; also J. Z. Smith (1987), 101-103. 
As noted by Scullion (1994), 76. For illustration, see e.g. Burkert ([1972) 1983), xv, 29-34; 
Burkert (1985), 8-9: 'ritual establishes and secures the solidarity of the closed group ... 
the truth of a myth is never guaranteed and does not have to be believed ... the 
importance of the myths of the gods lies in their connection with the sacred rituals for 
which they frequently provide a reason'; 54: 'An insight which came to be generally 
acknowledged in the study of religion towards the end of last century is that rituals are 
more important and more instructive for the understanding of ancient religions than are 
changeable m.yths'; on 54-55, Burkert lays out a psychological conception of the 
workings of religion centred around 'sacred ritual' in terms that are similar to Otto 
([1917) 1950). For this type of formulation as a nineteenth century legacy, see Bremmer 
(1998), 13-14; Calame (1990), 21-22. Bremmer (1998), 16-17, 23, comments on the evident 
influence of Robertson-Smith on Burkert and compares Robertson-Smith (1889), 19: 'So 
far as myths consist of explanations of ritual, their value is altogether secondary' . 
For what 'ritual' can mean in classics, see esp. I. Morris (1993). 
There have been important counters to this prioritisation: see Could (1985) and 
Easterling (1985), who stress above all the multiplicity of the entity 'Greek religion ' . 
For a critique of the conceptualisation of myth as 'dramatic embroidery' on history, see 
Sourvinou-Inwood (1991), 244-246. See also Calame (1990), esp. 23-24; Buxton (1994); 
Sourvinou-Inwood (1995); Feeney (1998); and compare Scullion (1994), 118-119: 'In the 
study of human culture much of what is most essential and distinctive in any individual 
or group is directly accessible only in the products of their imagination'. 
See Parker (1996), 1. For the polis in Greek religion, see esp. Connor (1988); Davies 
(1988), 368-388; Sourvinou-Inwood (1988); Sourvinou-Inwood (1990); Aleshire (1994) . 
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Now this split between actual events or practices and the discourses 
associated with them may not be so much of a methodological hurdle in the 
historically framed study of religious institutions qua institutions. But this 
strategy may not be so useful in the present context, where it is at least a 
pervasive complication-and perhaps a telling pointer-that instances of divine 
epiphany in archaic and classical Greek contexts come to us in narrative guises, 
be they historicat epic, dramatic, epigraphic, pictoriat whose form complicates 
any access to 'actual events'. 22 This present study is focused on textual 
narratives, and particularly the Homeric epics, which feature generic allegiances 
quite distinct from any that might be considered proper to an objectivising 
observation of instances of divine appearances to mortals or, indeed, proper to 
the direct testimony of participants in such an event.23 From the outset the 
forms in which such divine appearances come to us are not framed so as to 
represent the 'experience' as such but instead to tell a story about divine 
appearance in a wider context, and thus to explain events, to find meaning, to 
locate this meaning in time and space, to give names to gods and to mortal 
outcomes, to uncover antecedents, to advertise responses, and in general to 
manage the aftermath of a moment of particular intensity, provocation and 
disruption. This framing reflects the place of religion in the social realm of 
language, intersubjectivity and culture. So how are we to respond to such 
narratives of gods in the world? 
22 
23 
• • 
Even visual media like vase-painting do not present 'actual events': on religious 
experience and art, see Carpenter (1997), 70-79. Compare a related issue, namely the 
reading of archaic art as 'experience' of Homer, see Lowenstam (1997); Snodgrass (1998) . 
On visual narratives more generally, see Stewart (1987); and compare Goethe's 
observation, 'man sollte sich nicht etwa bey dem Bild denken, sondern man sollte das 
Bild denken und in demselben alles sehen' as quoted and discussed by Snodgrass (1982), 
3-5. 
Supposing for the sake of argument that such forms present 'unmediated' experience; the 
issue is often left unconsidered, as e.g. by Franks Davis (1989), 30-32: 'Mystics and 
ordinary believers from non-Christian religious traditions have generally been 
reluctant to give the world autobiographical accounts of their experiences, and as a 
result, pure, straightforward auto-descriptions are rare' . For this complaint in a Greek 
context, see Mikalson (1983), 4. Contrast Watts and Williams (1988), 18-23, esp. 23: 
'What is particularly interesting is exactly how religious people move from raw 
experience itself to a religious articulation of that experience'. A better formulation 
again avoids the dichotomy between 'raw experience' and its 'articulation' by 
recognising, with Bourdieu (1977), that cognition is already a 'social activity', 
grounded in the instantiation of hnbitus in practice: see Ingold (2000), 157-171, esp. 162-163. 
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narratives of gods in the world? 
22 
23 
---.. 
• • 
Even visual m edia like vase-painting do not present 'actual events': on religious 
experience and art, see Carpenter (1997), 70-79. Compare a related issue, namely the 
reading of archaic art as 'experience' of Homer, see Lowenstam (1997); Snodgrass (1998) . 
On visual narratives more generally, see Stewart (1987); and com.pare Goethe's 
observation, 'man sollte sich nicht etwa bey dem Bild denken, sondern man sollte das 
Bild denken und in demselben alles sehen' as quoted and discussed by Snodgrass (1982), 
3-5. 
Supposing for the sake of argument that such forms present 'unmediated' experience; the 
issue is often left unconsidered, as e.g. by Franks Davis (1989), 30-32: 'Mystics and 
ordinary believers from non-Christian religious traditions have generally been 
reluctant to give the world au tobiographical accounts of their experiences, and as a 
result, pure, straightforward auto-descriptions are rare'. For this complaint in a Greek 
context, see Mikalson (1983), 4. Contrast Watts and Williams (1988), 18-23, esp. 23: 
'What is particularly interesting is exactly how religious people move from raw 
experience itself to a religious articulation of that experience'. A better formulation 
again avoids the dichotomy between 'raw experience' and its 'ar ticulation' by 
recognising, with Bourdieu (1977), that cognition is already a 'social activity', 
grounded in the instantiation of hnbitus in practice: see Ingold (2000), 157-171, esp. 162-
163. 
11 
'Religious experience'? 
A typical strategy in reading narratives of divine appearance has been to focus 
upon the status-which is to say, the authority-of narrative as a document of 
'religious experience'.24 Consider a fascinating example of this search for 
experience from the broader study of Greek religion. The Periegesis of 
Pausanias has been, since the work of Harrison, Frazer and Farnell, a central 
evidential source for Greek religious activity, and thus for Greek religious 
belief: '[ w ]hat we think about Pausanias affects what we think about everything 
else to do with Ancient Greece'.25 Pausanias's apparently guileless descriptive 
work has functioned, despite occasional gestures at potential problems, both as 
material and model for the historian of Greek religion in giving a largely static 
and institutional account biased toward the classical period.26 Significantly, its 
authority in this respect depends very much on its apparent directness as a 
record of experience: as Alcock puts it, 'the narrative of the journey is presented 
experientially, very much from Pausanias's personal vantage point, with the 
reader told what they would "see" if they were present to look for 
themselves'.27 This experiential account extends into first-person religious 
experiences, as when Pausanias attends the oracle of Trophonios at Lebadea, or 
relates the fact of his initiation at Eleusis and the dream which has stopped him 
from describing the Eleusinium.28 Here then is a narrative which apparently 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Conversely, for authority understood as an effect, not a property, see Lincoln (1994). 
Thus Henderson (2001), 222, rewrites Harrison on Greek religion. For Pausanias's value, 
see e.g. Buxton (1994), 6: 'the richest single literary source for Greek ritual and many of 
its accompanying stories'. For Pausanias's role in 'a "scientistic" detail-cult', as 
Henderson (2001), 218, puts it, compare Fraser (ed.) (1898), vol. 1, xiii-xv, xxv-xxvii, 
lxvi-lxviii: 'a description at once so minute and so trustworthy'. Likewise, Geffcken 
([1920]1978), 1, gives a 'Concise survey of the nature of religious experience during the 
second and early third centuries [CE]' that takes its 'point of departure' from the 
'witness' Pausanias whose book 'reveals what was the sum total of religious 
consciousness that had remained inalienable in Greek living and thinking' . Pritchett 
(1998), 55, approvingly quotes Festugiere: 'Pour ce voyage vers la Grece primitive, 
Pausanias sera notre guide' . 
See Alcock (1993), 173. 
Alcock (1996), 245. Compare Elsner (1992), 12: 'No other pagan author ... emphasized so 
insistently the personal and experiential nature of seeing what one sees in the order one 
travelled in order to see it' . For positive valuations of Pausanias as a guidebook, see e.g. 
Fraser (ed.) (1898), vol. 1, xxiv; compare Pritchett (1998); Pritchett (1999). On 
Pausanias and travellers, see now Beard (2001). 
Trophonius: Paus. 9.39.5-14, esp. 14: ypci<j>w 8£ OVK clKOTJV aA>-.a ETEpovs TE l 8wv KQL 
auTos TWL Tpo<j>wvtwL XPllaciwvos. Eleusinium: 1.14.3; and note 1.38.7 on Eleusis itself. 
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allows us not only to see Greece in physical terms, but also to behold Greek 
culture and religion in action through a participant's eyes: Pausanias is 
'experienced' as a source for the history of Greek religion. 
More than this, Pausanias's narrative presents contemporary religious 
experience as contiguous with the Greek past in a way that coincides very well 
with the scholarly narrative of Greek religious conservatism underlying the 
perceived usefulness of Pausanias's descriptions as evidence for earlier 
periods.29 The perception of direct links between the past and present of 
Greece, and more particularly of an essential congruence between such past and 
present experiences, is a response that Pausanias's text encourages. For 
instance, the Persian invasion and the later invasion of Greece by the Gauls are 
closely linked in Pausanias's narrative, particularly by the divine aid given to 
the Greeks by various gods and heroes.30 This congruence in the theology of 
war is made explicit by Pausanias when discussing a victory trophy in the 
vicinity of the sanctuary of Poseidon in Mantinea, commemorating victory over 
the Lacedaimonians under Agis:31 
cpavf]vm 8£ Kal. Tov Tioan8wva UIJ.UVovni acpwLv i:!cpaaav o'L MavnvEis, Kal. 
TOU8E EVEKU TpOTTaLOV E"TTOL ~aavTO avci8T]Ila TWL Tioan8wvL. TTOAEIJ.Wl 8£ Kal. 
av8pwrrwv cj>6VOLS' rrapELVaL 8EOUS' ETTOLT]Gav IJ.EV OGOLS' TQ T]pwwv EIJ.fAT]GEV Ev 
'l ALWL rra8~1J.aTa <'il8nm 8£ urro 'A8T]va[wv ws 8EOL acpwLv E-v Mapa8wvL Kal. 
EV LaAaiJ.LVl TOV Epyou IJ.ETUGXOLEV' Ei<8T]AOTaTa 8£ 6 ra>..aTWV aTpaTOS' 
arrw>..cro E-v ~EA.cj>o'Ls urro ToD 8EoD wl. E-vapyws urro 8m116vwv. oihw Kal. 
MavnvEDaw ETTETaL ovK avEv ToD Tioan8wvos TO KpaTOS' yEv£a8m acpw[. 
Pausanias turns first to the Homeric epics in articulating a continuum of divine 
battle-appearances that runs from Troy, through classical Athens and on to the 
events surrounding the defence of Delphi against the Gauls.32 The examples 
which Pausanias cites are redolent with the ideology of Greekness and the place 
of the Homeric epics in this list is programmatic. But Pausanias's narrative of 
29 
30 
31 
32 
For similar 'silences' in Pausanias, see Foccardi (1987). These instances and this silence 
are overlooked by I. Rutherford (2001), 42-43. 
On the impression of the past as recent in Pausanias, see Bowie (1996), 213-216; Cherry 
(2001). For religious conservatism, see e.g. Habicht (1985), 154: 'Pausanias' beliefs are 
conventional; they do not differ from, for instance, those of Herodotus, writing six 
hundred years earlier'. 
Marathon: Paus. 1.28.4, 1.32.4-5; cf. 10.8.7. Against the Gauls: 8.10.9, 10.22.12-23.11 . See 
Alcock (1996), 256-257; also Swain (1996), 340-341, with Paus. 7.15.6 on the Roman 
slaughter of Arcadians in the place where the Arcadians abandoned the Greeks against 
Philip in 338 BCE. 
Paus. 8.10.8-9; ci ted from Rocha-Pereira (ed.) (1973-1981). On this battle, not mentioned 
elsewhere, c. 250 BCE?, see Habicht (1985), 101-102; Cm·tledge and Spawforth (1989), 
40, 240 n. 6. 
On the divine defence of Delphi, see esp. Champion (1995). 
I' 
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continuity in the theology of epiphany is by no means unique. For example, we 
can compare the Lindian temple chronicle, a 99 BCE collation of votive offerings 
from heroic times onwards, and of appearances of Athene in defence of Lindos 
from the Persian wars onwards. This collection parallels, in an epigraphic form 
and in close association with a particular religious site, other more and less 
'scholarly' collections of E-m<Pavnm being made elsewhere.33 Pausanias's 
historical turn in contextualising his own narrative by appeal to a tradition of 
divine appearances thus has parallels: his scholarly activity is a counterpart of 
this compilatory project to advertise the continuity of Athene's patronage of 
Lindos and her temple sanctuary. But the implicit narrative of Pausanias's text 
goes further than a simple historical turn. Pausanias highlights certain links 
between exemplary past events and experiences that remain possible in the 
present, as when he testifies to a supernatural feature of the site of the battle of 
Mar a thon:34 
EVTaD8a ava naaav VVKTa Kal 'Lnnwv XPE)l.ETL(OVTWV KaL av8pwv )l.GXO)l.EVWV 
€anv ala8Ea8m · KaTaaTijvm 8E E<; E-vapyfj 8Eav E1TLTT]8E<; )l.EV ovK €anv lhwL 
auv~VEyKEV, UVT]KOWL 81: OVTL KaL aA.Aw<; GU)l.~UV QUI( EGTLV EK TWV 8GL)l.OVWV 
6py~. 
Pausanias sets up an implicit parallel between the historical experience of 
supernatural aid in exemplary Greek battles against foreign invasion and the 
present possibility of experiencing a supernatural recording, so to speak, of one 
of these battles.35 In this way the religious dimension of these important events 
33 
34 
35 
Lindos chronicle: Blinkenberg (ed.) (1915), (ed .) (1941), 149-199. See Chaniotis (1988), 
52-57; Higbie (2001), esp. on the Homeric connections of the votives. Compare the 
Epidaurian stelai as described by Paus. 2.27.3-4; for these as E-m<f>avnm, see Herzog 
(1931), 49, and Chaniotis (1988), 22, despite Jacoby (1923-1958) Ill B (suppl.), vol. 2, 520 
n. 4. On the meaning of the term, see esp . Versnel (1987); cf. Nock (1957) on Pax (1955); 
Nock ([1972]1986), 154. The term does not appear in the 'religious sense' until the 
Hellenistic period; see SIC 398, 18: 278 BCE, Apollo's defence of Delphi against the 
Gauls. For such collections, see Jacoby (ed.) (1923-1958), Ill B (suppl.), vol. 1, 652 
(apropos the 'An6>-->--wvo<; E-m<f>avnm of Istros); van Straten (1976); Pritchett (1979), 1-
46; Chaniotis (1988), 53; Kyriazopoulos (1997) . For the use of inscriptions by ancient 
writers, see Higbie (1999); conversely, for the use of antiquarian works in the 
com.pilation of the Lindian temple inscription, see Higbie (2001), 110. 
Paus. 1.32.4. See Alcock (1996), 252-253: this is part of the 'memorial landscape' of 
Marathon. 
Note the warning attached by Pausanias: this experience is dangerous if tested. 
Pausanias could have found a precedent for such dangers at Marathon in Hdt. 6.117, 
where an Athenian hoplite sees a supernatural figure at work against the Greeks and 
becomes blind as a consequence. The 8aL)l.OVE<; whose anger is involved in Paus. 1.32.4 are 
presumably the 'ghosts' of the dead, but the word indicates a heroic s tatus, like those 
heroes who fought at Delphi against the Gauls in Paus. 8.10. 9: imo ToD 8EoD wL 
E-vapyw<; imo 8m)l.6vwv; 10.22.12-23.11. See Fraser (1898), vol. 4, 24, on 6.6.8; Farnell 
(1921), 76-77, 362-363; Brelich (1958), 90; Kearns (1989), 55. 
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in the experience of Greek identity is something that continues to be accessible, 
at least in some form. 
For Pausanias, this religious continuity was no doubt yet another 
justification of his overall project: to explore mivTa Ta 'Ef...AT]VLKci, to show what 
it might mean for a Creek-speaker from the Greek east during the imperial 
period to be consciously 'Greek' in Greece itself.36 A recent characterisation of 
Pausanias as a pilgrim has been criticised on the grounds that a pilgrim is by 
definition 'someone who believes in full before going'.37 But such a definition 
does not seem particularly productive in this context, whatever 'believing in 
full' might entail, when confronted with Pausanias's systematic exploration and 
exposition of the religious terrain of Greece.38 Just so, for the student of Greek 
religion it is precisely the synchronic and diachronic continuities evoked by 
Pausanias's exploration of the Greek world that result in the seductive quality 
of his Periegesis as a curiously experienced text. In this respect, as explorer and 
experiencer, Pausanias becomes simultaneously a source of evidence and a 
model of inquiry for those who trace his footsteps. The conceptual role of 
experience in evaluating religious discourse plays itself out in two ways, both as 
an implicit guarantee of authenticity and as a reflexive confirmation of the 
primacy of such experience in the study of ancient religion. 
Arguably Pausanias recognised some aspects of these authorising 
cultural strategies at work in his own text, when he offered the following 
observation:39 
36 
37 
38 
39 
TOUTOLS' 'EAI.:fwwv EYW TOLS' MyOLS' apx6iJ-EVOS' iJ-EV TllS' auyypa</>~S' EUT]8LUS' 
EVEiJ-OV TTAEOV, ES' 8E: TU 'ApKa8wv TTpOEAT]AU8ws rrpovOLav TTEpl UUTWV TOLaV8E 
EAaiJ-~avov · 'EAI.i]vwv Taus VOiJ-L(OiJ-EVous ao<f>ous 8L' alvL yiJ-aTwv rra\m Kat 
ouKETL EK TOU n';8tos AEynv TOUS' Myous, Kal. TU ELPlliJ-Eva o0v ES' TCJV Kp6vov 
ao<f>l.av r:lva( nva ELKa(ov 'EAI.T]vwv. TWV iJ-EV 8~ f:s TO 8r:'Lov ~KOVTwv TOLS' 
dplliJ-fVOLS' XPllGO!J-E8U. 
Paus . 1.26.4. See Elsner (1992), 5: 'a guide to the formation of Greek religious identity as 
a form of resistance to the realities of Roman rule'; Elsner (1994), 246-247; Price (1999), 8. For the broader question, see now Goldhill (ed.) (2001). 
Thus Swain (1996), 342 n. 50, criticising Elsner (1992); and compare Arafat (1996), 10-11. See now I. Rutherford (2001). 
'Pilgrimage' is formulated in Greek contexts in terms of travel to religious sites: see 
Dillon (1997), xv-xvi; I. Rutherford (2001). For a pointed example of a 'sceptical 
pilgrim', see IG IV2, 1, 121 [ = Edelstein and Edelstein (1945), no. 423], no. 3: a<f>l.Kno rro\. 
Tov 8r:ov t.KETUS' .. . arrl.o-Tn TClLS' l6.iJ-aaw; the man is dubbed "ArrwTOS' after his 
healing. For this 'didactic' function, see Dillon (1994); I. Rutherford (2001), 49. 
Paus. 8.8.3. See Veyne (1988), 95-100; I. Rutherford (2001), 47. 
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The experience of Arkadia has apparently transformed Pausanias's perspective. 
It is undoubtedly important for us to recognise the significance of such 
formulations within Pausanias's often surprisingly complex narrative of Greek 
cultural formation, but equally we must wonder if it can be legitimate to adopt 
such transformational strategies in our own exploration of Greek religion. It 
was this prospect of Pausanias's experience and an ensuing deflating 
disappointment that supposedly led to Wilamowitz's deep hostility towards 
Pausanias when he tried to use Pausanias's text as a guidebook to the region of 
Olympia.4D Pausanias can be praised for drawing his readers so deeply into his 
Greece, with his mix of travelogue, art criticism and cultural pilgrimage, but we 
cannot become 'Greeks' ourselves in this way, however seductive the prospect 
of such an experienced guide may appear. 
Just as Pausanias's text remains a crucial resource from which to excerpt 
'experienced' facts about Greek religion, so an evaluative dependence upon 
experience is elsewhere a characteristic method of reading texts relating to 
religion, even such apparently unambiguous 'religious' texts as hymns and 
prayers. For example, the corpus of hymnic poetry which we call the Homeric 
Hymns is generally held to be compromised in religious terms by its lack of 
cultic context and demonstrable cultic use.41 One recent treatment of the subject 
suggests that 'the context of their performance seems distinct from worship 
proper'; but e25actly what worship proper is remains less clear, except as 
marked by a direct physical association with cult centres.42 Cultic context and 
cultic use are here conceived, not unusually, as distinct from the probable use of 
at least some of this material along with the longer Homeric epics in Greek 
festival contexts.43 This principle is generalised across the corpus of archaic and 
classical poetry, and thus one can write of 'cult poetry', 'hieratic poetry', 'cult 
hymn actually performed at a festival of Apollo', 'sacred texts', and allow that 
40 
41 
42 
43 
See Habicht (1985), appendix 1, esp . 170-175. For Pausanias and the guidebook 
experience of Greece, see now Beard (2001). 
See e.g. J.-M. Bremer (1981); Furley (1995); J.-M. Bremer (1998b). Compare Clay (1997), 
489: 'One thing ... is fairly clear: while sharing many features with prayer and cult 
hymns, our Hynms show little connection with ritual practice.'. This becomes the 
rationale for the OITtission of the Homeric Hymns and the hymns of Kallimakhos from 
Furley and Bremer (2001), vol. 1, ix; Faulkner (2002) expresses concern, but accepts the 
basic distinction; Frohder (1994) considers the smaller hymns in distinct terms. Most 
recently Garcia (2002), esp. 5-8, sees the Homeric Hymns generally as 'symbolic action' 
within a ritual context. 
Furley (1995), 29-30. Compare Pausanias on cult-hymns, whose contents he tends to 
avoid revealing: see N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1974), 11. 
For the Homeric hymns in festival contexts, see Parker (1991) . 
16 
the dramatists may include 'faithful copies of hieratic poetry' when needed.44 In 
contrast to such 'hieratic poetry' (or copies thereof), a 'non-cultic' fate befalls a 
large array of poetic texts which utilise hymnic forms, from Hesiod through 
Sappho and Alkaios, Pindar, through to Kallimakhos.45 In such cases, Bremer 
comments, 'the poetic intention has made the cultic convention serve a non-
cultic purpose'.46 But if drama, for example, can go some way towards 
recreating 'worship proper' (or a 'faithful' copy of it), how might such 
distinctions function in practice?47 What we might take to constitute 'worship 
proper' in such an analysis is apparently the antithesis of 'poetic intentions'. 
Yet-admirably but somewhat confusingly- it turns out to be Furley's stated 
intention to restore a broad range of verbal (including poetic) discourse to a 
position of greater prominence within the context of Greek religion:48 
One frequently encounters statements to the effect that Greek piety was a question 
of honorific deed rather than belief in, or profmmd cogitation on, aspects of the 
sacred. Greek hymns tell against that position. 
More than this, Furley argues that such hymn texts show how 'worship 
entailed subtle and linguistically refined communication with deities'.49 But it is 
not enough for such texts simply to evidence the verbal texture of 
communication in order to count as worship as such.50 Instead they remain 
dependent upon their proximity to ritual experience for their authenticity as 
documents of worship: cultic contexts make clear the status of texts as 
'experienced' ---religion.51 This physical proximity acts as a guarantee of 
authenticity, as a kind of barometer of 'religiosity', so to speak. 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
Furley (1995), passim; for dramatic copies, note esp. 37: 'a cult hynm ... serves as a useful 
control to see how closely authors in more literary genres adhere to conventional modes 
of worship.' 
For criticism of this fate, especially as it applies in Hellenistic contexts, see Hunter 
(1996), 48-49. Particularly provocative in their presentation of 'cult' are the mimetic 
hymns of Kallimakhos, on which see esp. Henrichs (1993). 
J.-M. Bremer (1981), 213; cf. Furley (1995), 30: 'A number of lyric poems ... are closely 
modeled on cult poetry, although the poems themselves express personal concerns'. 
Thus hynms from tragedy and comedy are included in Furley and Bremer (2001). 
Compare Garcia (2002), 7, on the simultaneous desire and difficulty of firtding criteria 
to distinguish the Homeric Hynms from the hymns of Kallimakhos as evidenced in 
Burkert (1994) . 
Furley (1995), 31-32. By contrast Depew (2000), 255 n. 8, 'cannot agree ... that "belief in, 
or profound cogitation on, aspects of the sacred" is relevant to the study of (at least 
early) Greek hymn'. But for Furley's approach, compare Hunter (1992), 29, downplaying 
divisions between religious and secular, non-literary and literary. Such concern over the 
devaluation of discourse comes in the wake of an earlier reaction to the devaluation of 
action as contrasted with thought: see Bell (1998), 206, 218 . 
Furley (1995), 45; cf. now Furley and Bremer (2001), vol. 1, 6-7. 
For the 'enunciation' of the Homeric Hymns in this respect, see esp. Calame (1995). 
See Furley and Bremer (2001), vol. 1, x, on the arrangement of their material: by cult 
centre. 
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In a similar fashion, a recent discussion of Greek prayer begins by 
insisting on the importance of the extra-linguistic context of prayer in terms 
which reflect the prioritisation of experience in religious contexts:52 
The function and characteristic form of an ancient Greek prayer must certainly 
have depended upon elements inseparable from the occasion of its utterance. 
In some sense this must be a truism, yet in practice the dependence of words 
upon context is difficult to demonstrate in straightforward terms.53 For 
example, the undeniable association of prayer with marked locations-as 
Depew puts it, '[s]uch locations promise, in ways that secular space does not, 
the future presence of the god'-is not an absolute relationship: Greeks did not 
have to go to a sanctuary to pray, however effective such or similar marginal 
spaces may have been in assisting the success of prayer.54 Likewise, the 
relationship between prayer and acts of sacrifice is complicated, and prayer is 
conceivable without immediate sacrifice.55 Verbal form and function are 
important in their own right, as Depew herself demonstrates, when she 
explores the performative aspect of the language of prayer as it creates an 
interpersonal context for itself and for the request that is being made, between 
the addresser and the (divine) addressee.56 This is the text's 'pragmatic 
function' .57 This interpersonal context- above all the presence of the god to 
hear the prayer-may be enacted through verbal means, and the facility to 
enact such a context for its utterance demonstrates a basic creative potential of 
such 'magical',speech to do things, on some level, with words.58 A performative 
approach to such language, in the wake of Austin, can be criticised for ignoring 
the social production of authority, since, as Bourdieu observes, 'the language of 
authority never governs without the collaboration of those it governs'.59 But 
the problem with prayer is how to delimit the authorising context of an 
utterance whose ostensible function is communication with entities beyond 
mundane contexts of social interaction. Who is ultimately in a position to 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
Depew (1997), 229. 
For the problem, compare Tambiah (1968), 176: 'very often (but not ahvays) if the 
ethnographer questions his informants "Why is this ritual effective?" the reply takes 
the form of a formally expressed belief that the power is in the "words" even though 
the words only become effec tive if uttered in a very special context of other ac tion'. 
Depew (1997), 236. For 'free' prayer, see Pulleyn (1997), 164-165. 
See Pulleyn (1997), 31-38. 
See esp. Depew (1997); Day (2000); Depew (2000). 
Compare J.-M. Bremer (1998a), 135-136. 
Doing things with words: Austin (1962). 'Magical' speech: Tan1biah (1968) . For the 
potential of speech in Homer, note e.g. Od. 19.457-458, ETTaOL8fjL 8' aLiJ-a KE>..mvov [ 
i!axE8ov (on ETTam8i], see Graf (1995), 37); more broadly, see Martin (1989). 
Bourdieu (1991), 113; cf. Bourdieu (1977), 21. 
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authorise my prayer apart from the god ?60 Prayer is an illocutionary act qua 
ritual but it gestures precisely towards a perlocutionary outcome: by praying I 
have gained a god's attention.61 Bergren explicates a version of this ostensive 
process in the 'sacred apostrophes' that come at the beginning and ends of 
Homeric Hymns:62 
The claim of the apostrophizing voice is that of a "motivated signifier": to 
indicate the signified not by arbitrary connection, but by its natural semiotic 
constitution. The effect of "sacred apostrophe" would therefore be the re-
presentation of the "transcendental signified", divinity itself. In exchange for the 
prize, the hymnist offers nothing less than an epiphany of the god. 
For the hymnist, the audience forms a third party in a triangular act of 
communication, whose role is as witness and participant in the capacity of the 
hymnist to make the god present.63 For the prayer-maker, the communicative 
act is constituted more as a reflexive expression of reciprocity between two 
parties, even if it may also have an audience. But in both cases poetic (creative) 
intentions and that kind of worship which entails 'subtle and linguistically 
refined communication with deities', to recall Furley's phrase, may be said to 
meet. The ostensive capacity of words to make such communication possible is 
similarly utilised by texts whose contextual origins are quite divergent: literary 
prayers and inscribed prayers from sanctuary contexts are often functionally 
equivalent in this respect.64 It is true that, in the Greek context at least, literary 
prayers seemJo spell things out more explicitly, but this is a different question 
from their mobilisation of the verbal communication 'technology' of prayer as 
such.65 If we are to authorise one such text over another because the former 1S 
inscribed on a votive offering associated with the physical remains of a 
sanctuary, then we participate in a specific institutional history that reflects our 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
This question is already explored in the Homeric epics, through the privilege of the 
epic narrator. Note esp. Od. 3.51-62, where Athene, in the guise of Mentor, prays to 
Poseidon as she is instructed by Peisistratos and then fulfills the prnyer herself: 3.62, 
ain~ rrcivTa TEA.n'na; on this, see further below, p. 143 n . 393, and see also my discussion 
of I/. 6. 286-312 below, pp. 123-125. 
In practice, Austin's categories of performatives are not mutually exclusive: see e.g. 
Tambiah ([1973] 2002), 352. 
Bergren (1982), 85-86. 
See esp. Bergren (1982), 85; the apparent unawareness of this article in Day (2000), 
Depew (2000) and Garcfa (2002) is surprising. Garda (2002), 29-34, usefully sums up 
arguments for this presence as the specific xcipLs- of the hymn, signalled in lhe greeting 
xa'LpE at the end; cf. Depew (2000), 74-75. See also Bakker (2002), 72-73, on the 
'instative' function of [J.V~O'OiJ-aL at HomHyn111Ap. 1. 
Thus e.g. Depew (1997), 242-243. 
For example, see Pulleyn (1997), 16-38, and Parker (1998), 107, on 'if ever' formulae in 
literary prayers. Perhaps a better term than 'technology' would be 'technique', by 
which to designate skill, a specific competency; for this distinction, see Ingold (2000), 
315-316, 401-402 . 
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dependence upon objective evidence of experience.66 When we suggest that 
only a cultic context can confer real authenticity on religious discourse, then 
ritual activity has entirely subsumed religion. 
These different examples show the importance of experience as a 
touchstone of religiosity within the history of Greek religion. The consequences 
of the reading strategies we adopt in reading such 'experienced' discourse are 
not trivial. I emphasised above how Pausanias's place as a model text in the 
study of Greek religion depends in part on how Pausanias deploys narratives of 
present experience in order to reinforce the experiences related by his 
narratives of the past. Yet when this particular ancient project of cultural 
exploration is juxtaposed with modern scholarly versions of how to evaluate 
religious discourse, certain similarities emerge. It is as if, by privileging 
objective evidence of actual practice, the subjective experience of Greek religion 
can be uncovered as something that we too can participate in, albeit by proxy, 
in a manner for which Pausanias functions conveniently both as model and 
material. Here an observation of Sally Humphreys is perhaps apposite: with 
William James and Freud pointing the way, scholars of Greek religion of the 
period from Wilamowitz through Nock and Festugiere to Nilsson produced a 
response that 'was intuitive and predominantly aesthetic, rather than 
historical'.67 By means of experience a path towards uncovering the core of 
religious belief Js to be mapped out, perhaps even to meet the long tmsatisfied 
desire to uncover what the internal religious life of individuals was actually like: 
thus Mikalson can write that '[w]hat we should most welcome, of course, is a 
"confessional" literature in which individuals spell out their own religious 
beliefs'. 68 In this desire we see demonstrated the central importance of what we 
choose to read religion as. What is happening in such accounts is a slide from 
experience understood in some relatively objective sense, 'what actually 
happened', into experience in a subjective sense, which can then be explicated as 
belief-QED. 
Other consequences flow from this approach. If attention to experience 
seems to offer a perspective on an interior state of mind, private to a particular 
individual and thus fundamental to what religion might be thought to be, then 
as a consequence narratives that are more obviously forms of creative cultural 
expression, not least the narratives of poetry and drama, are negatively valued 
66 
67 
68 
An invaluable instance of such institutional history is Parker (1996). 
Humphreys (1978), 20. 
Mikalson (1983), 4; with Feeney (1998), 24 n. 41, compare Yunis (1993), 71, on Mikalson's 
'real religion': an 'incoherent formulation'. 
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because of their perceived remoteness from religious experience as such.69 
Anything that hints at a (creative) formation that is not firmly tied to the 
contexts of such experience takes on a suspect status qua religion, especially 
against the background assumption that belief grounded in experience is the 
central identifying feature of religion.7° Reading for experience in this way has 
been a particular subject of advocacy in certain sectors of religious studies: 
some argue for a 'pre-cultural' experiential continuity behind mystic experience; 
others would derive from the apparent immediacy of such experience, 
especially as relayed in autobiographical narratives, an epistemic immed!acy to 
serve as potential proof of (divine) existence.71 Against such positions stand 
those who point out that experience is everywhere mediated through our 
cultural formation, or, in Bourdieu's terms, our 'history turned into nature' and 
forgotten as such.72 But still the lure of the immediacy of experience remains 
strong. To put the problem in an (over)simplistic form: where history pursues 
the objective status of institutions and events, and where anthropology is 
intersubjectively grounded in the personal interaction between fieldworkers 
and their subjects, the study of religion, by contrast, and especially the study of 
religion in historical contexts, stands uncertainly between history and 
anthropology in pursuing the objective status of (past) subjective experience. 
This paradigm of 'experienced' reading is particularly significant in the 
present context ~ecause the appeal of experience as a basic point of reference is 
strong when reading narratives of divine appearance.73 That is to say, the 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
In Greek contexts, see e.g. van Straten (1995), 7-9; cf. Mikalson (1983); Mikalson (1991) . 
For criticism of the 'popular/literary' antithesis, see Parker (1985); Parker (1997). For 
reflections on what reading might look like in the absence of 'literature' as a category 
of exclusion arld seclusion, see Goldhill (1999). 
An influential form.ulation is Geertz (1966), 25-26: 'The basic axiom. underlying what we 
may call "the religious perspective" is everywhere the same: he who would know must 
first believe'; for a critique of the specifically Christian history of these key terms, see 
Asad (1993) , 40-54. On the difficulties inherent in taking 'belief' as a straightforward 
category of inquiry, see esp. Needham (1972); Sperber (1985a), 45-48; Lopez (1998b); J. z. 
Smith (1998), 270-271; Saler (2001). For the privileging of 'belief' in ancient religion as 
a Christianizing assum.ption, see Price (1984), 10-11; compare Buxton (1994), 162-163. 
See e.g. King (1988); Franks Davis (1989); Forman (ed.) (1990); Forman (1993); Shear 
(1994) . 
See Bourdieu (1977), 78-79, for this characterisation of 'habitus'; cf. Gadamer ([1975] 
1989), 346: ' the inner historicity of experience' . For specific critique of the notion of 
unmediated religious experience, seeS. Katz (ed.) (1978); S. Katz (ed.) (1983); Proudfoot 
(1985); S. Katz (ed.) (1992); Sharf (1998); Bagger (1999); Yamane (2000). In non-
Christian contexts, see e.g. Sahlins (1995) on the Hawaiian 'experience' of Cook; and 
Sharf (1995), who offers what Lopez (1998a), 264-265 n. 16, calls 'a powerful critique of 
the rhetoric of experience' in the institutional practice of Buddhist studies. 
For overviews of epiphany in the Greek context, see Pfister (1924); Weniger (1924); Pax 
(1955); Pax (1962); Wachsmuth (1975); Versnel (1987); Mussies (1988); H enrichs (1996); 
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implications of such narratives make them significant propositions about the 
world and it is tempting to posit behind such accounts an originary experience 
of some sort by which to underpin their authenticity, by reference either to 
'what really happened' or to the belief that underlies the account. We fall 
somewhat unreflectively under the 'spell' of the text, which, in Pucci's words, 
'lures us to read and to make sense of the story as though we were really 
present at the events'.74 And so Pfister, in his still fundamental account of Greek 
epiphany, explicitly conceptualises divine epiphanies in terms of experience and 
its representation, even as he acknowledges the difficulties that confront a 
reading of the material in terms of lived experience, or 'subjectiv wahre 
Visionen': 75 
Der Glaube an diese Form der gottlichen OffenbarLmg gehi::irt zu den GrLmdformen 
religii::isen Denkens und Glaubens .. . w1d ist allen Vi::ilkern gemeinsam. Aber ebenso 
auch das religiose oder visionare Erlebnis selbst, das diesen Glauben hervorgerufen 
hat. Dieses, d. h. subjectiv wahre Visionen, von visionar veranlagten Personen 
geschaut, mussen wir auf GrLmd der Flille der E[piphanie]-Berichte auch fur die 
Griechen aru1ehmen, wertn es auch kawn mi::iglich ist, auch nm wenige der WIS 
Ltberlieferten E[piphanien] als subjectiv wahr nachzuwesen ... 
At a later point, Pfister discusses these problems of experience and 
representation at greater length, and the difficulties that they present:76 
Ob es dann aber weiterhin moglich ist, auf GrLmd dieser antiken Berichte einen 
SchluiS auf das religiose Erlebnis zu machen, das jene Menschen bei den Visionen 
hat ten, ist ' eine Frage flir sich. Ihre Beantwortung hangt abgesehen von der 
typischen Gleichfi::irmigkeit der Berichte, die das Erkem1en eines individuellen 
Erlebnisses erschweren, hauptsachlich von der Stellung ab, die der Forscher jenen 
antiken Berichten gegenl.iber hinsichtlich der Frage der historischen Wahrheit 
einnimmt. 
Pfister continues by noting the undoubted possibility of such visions, at least as 
far as comparative material can show. This is clearly quite important to Pfister 
because such experiences are taken to be ultimately responsible for the material 
with which his article deals, even if problems remain:77 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Ohne tatsachlich Visionen ware auch die Fulle der antiken E[piphanie]-Berichte 
kaum erklarbar. Aber in dieser groiSen Masse ... zu unterschieden, \•veld• von ihnen 
wirklich als Visionen geschaut worden waren und welche nm in der legendarischen 
Graf (1997b). Of these, Pfister (1924) remains the common point of reference; but Versnel 
(1987) represents the most sophisticated discussion. 
Pucci (1987), 119. From a different perspective, compare Feeney (1991), 2, on 'novelistic 
conventions of reading'. 
Pfister (1924), col. 281. 
Pfister (1924), col. 316. 
Pfister (1924), col. 316. 
Oberlieferung exis tieren, halte ich h.ir unmoglich. Die meisten jener 
"legendarischen E[piphanien]" konnen wirkliche Visionen gewesen sein, also 
"subjectiv wahr" sein; bei keiner ist es mit Sicherheit zu erweisen . 
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This for Pfister is due again to the nature of the tradition. Figures such as 
Aristides and others present themselves as prone to such visions, but stylisation 
destabilises the relationship with reality; thus:78 
Der Frage, ob das Damaskus-Erlebnis des Paulus subjectiv wahr ist, laf.S t sich eher 
diskutieren, obwohl wir es auch hier mit einem typischen Bericht zu tun haben; mit 
demselben Recht konnte m an auch die Berufung Hesiods auf dem H elikon h.ir w ahr 
halten, obwohl dem weider, von anderem abgesehen, d as typischen Verhaltnis des 
Dichters zm Muse entgegens teht. Wir begni.igen LULS also hier einstweilen damit, 
d arzus tellen, wie nach der Oberlieferung die Wirkung der E[piphanie] auf die 
Menschen war. 
Pfister posits 'experience' as the basis of accounts of divine epiphany, while at 
the same time he can see that it is more or less unreachable: the only thing left 
to do is describe the tradition and its variety according to generic criteria, and 
this thoroughly descriptive approach is why Pfister's article remains 
fundamental in the scholarship, especially as a resource for parallels. The 
practically-focused interpretative framework offered by Pfister is to divide 
'epiphany' into four groups: 'epic epiphany', 'mythical epiphany', ' folktale 
epiphany', and 'legendary epiphany'_79 These groups are distinguished by 
generic form, but also by their various relationships in temporal terms to the 
...._ 
historical period; the first three categories are definitively situated 'in der 
Vorzeit', yet divine epiphany is not limited to this:80 
Die bisher behandelten E[piphanien] spielen alle in der Vorzeit; sie treten l.ULS in 
Mythen, Marchen, l.md epischen Dichtw1gen entgegen . Aber der Glaube an die 
Moglichkeit go ttlicher E[piphanie], an die sichtbare Wirksamkeit l.U1d Hilfe der 
go ttlichen Wesen war auch in der spateren Zeit noch stark genug ... 
This group of 'legendary epiphanies' is distinguished in particular ways, 
especially in having evident links to cult, whether as cause or effect .s1 Yet in 
apparent conflict with his generic model, Pfister goes on to observe that many 
of these later legendary epiphanies are very similar to epic epiphanies, 
78 
79 
80 
81 
Pfister (1924), coll. 316-317. 
Pfister (1924), col. 282. 
Pfister (1924), col. 292. 
Pfister (1924), col. 293: 'Die Beziehungen zum kultisch-religiosen Leben des einzelnen 
sind bei den legendarischen E. sehr viel enger als bei den oben besprochenen drei 
Gruppen von E.' . Taken as characteristic is Hdt. 6.61, an appearance of Helen in a 
sanctuary at Therapne: 'Diese E. ist verschieden von der bisher betrachteten drei 
Gruppen . Sie wird in historischer Zeit bestimmt angese tzt ... Die Erscheinw•g is t eine 
Folge des Gebets und geschieht am Ort des Kultes.' 
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especially in battle contexts, and he draws explicitly on Pausanias in pointing to 
this similarity, before going on to list examples from Herodotos and others.s2 
The particular passage of Pausanias that Pfister draws on is the one that I 
quoted above in discussing Pausanias's mobilisation of past and present 
experience in the delineation of Greek identity. 83 In light of my discussion there, 
the citation of this passage by Pfister raises questions about his categories: how 
is it that some instances of epic epiphany and legendary epiphany are so 
similar? What does this relationship imply? In Pausanias this similarity has a 
clear rationale, since the generic distinctions being made by Pfister do not 
apply. While Pfister himself does not explicitly follow this Pausanian reasoning 
through, it is implicit when he posits religious experience as the ultimate basis 
of the full variety of epiphany accounts.84 In the final account, while Pfister's 
analysis acknowledges the difficulty of reaching through to the subjective 
religious experience that he posits as the basis of epiphany accounts, at the 
same time he draws a set of distinctions in generic terms which aim at 
differentiating various degrees of relationship with historical cult and religious 
practice. This secondary, pragmatic strategy calls upon experience in another 
more objective guise and it thus provides Pfister with an apparent route of 
escape. As such, the entire problem remains framed in the terms that I have 
suggested above are dominant in reading religious discourse: to study 'divine 
epiphany' comes down to a question about the objective status of subjective 
experience. 
Pfister does not embark upon trying to wmnow out 'real religious 
experience', even if this is the basic orientation of the framework that he offers. 
But to spell out the real consequences of this orientation, consider the example 
of Dietrich's well-known and often cited treatment of divine epiphany in the 
Homeric poems. Dietrich characterises his subject matter thus: 85 
Surprisingly accounts in Homer of actual divine manifestations are far from clear. 
They lack method of procedure, so to speak. The circumstances of the epiphany not 
only vary greatly, but they tend to be confused, contradictory even at times, and 
quite frequently impossible to visualize .. . In short the descriptions of epiphanies 
are imaginative rather than plausible in the majority of instances . 
This reading wants from the text a set of reconstructable and consistent 
visualisations as proof of the 'plausibility' of Homeric epiphany. Dietrich implies 
82 
83 
84 
85 
Pfister (1924), col. 293. 
Paus. 8.10.8-9; seep. 12 above. 
Pfister (1924), col. 316, quoted above, pp. 21-22. 
Dietrich (1983), 54. 
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that by means of such plausible visualisation one may demonstrate or disprove 
a grounding in reality. This process of visualisation is taken as the touchstone 
by which to discriminate between what is authentic, which is to say properly 
part of lived experience, and what is merely 'imaginative'. The negative 
conclusion that Dietrich reaches itself forms part of an argument which seeks to 
demonstrate the essential superfluity of the manifestations of the gods in 
Homer, as a largely poetical extension of a more fundamental process, namely 
a 'mental' perception of divine power at work.86 The criterion of experience 
which some have located in the objective contexts of religious discourse, as I 
discussed above in the case of hymns and prayers, is in Dietrich's account 
substituted by the audience's own subjective experience of plausible 
visualisation. 
This experience-by-proxy, whereby the audience fill m for the absent 
originator of the image, functions for Dietrich as a reference point by which 
these epiphanies are found to fall short as 'viable theological concepts'.87 But 
viable for whom exactly? Dietrich comes up against an apparent circle of 
dependence between Homer and Greek religion at large with some uneasy 
consequences:ss 
It turns out ... that, with few exceptions, Homeric epiphanies can best be described 
as picturesque extensions of the more usual working of divine will. To that extent 
epiphanies were poetic invention, although it seems distinctly odd that such a 
mode of divine intervention could be generally accepted without being based m 
religious faith ... It seems that the Greek view of epiphanies involved "double 
standards". On the one hand in post-Homeric times epiphanies were taken for 
granted, but on the other invariably conceived in epic terms. 
These conclusions are unsettling to Dietrich not least because it is actually an 
important strand of his work that there is a demonstrable continuity of religion, 
specifically in types of religious experience, to be found in Greece from the 
earliest periods, including the influence of Homer over religious conceptions il1. 
the archaic and classical polis.89 In fact, this continuity is another version of the 
view that Pausanias presents il1. his discussion of divine appearances, namely 
86 
87 
88 
89 
See Dietrich (1994), esp. 72-73: 'The word epiphany is something of a misnomer 
therefore in Minoan religion as much as in Homer for describing divine intervention in 
human affairs.' Compare Dietrich (1997), 3-4, where the 'general rule' is of indirect 
commtmication. 
Dietrich (1983), 67. 
Dietrich (1983), 69-70. 
See e.g. Dietrich (1986), 180-181. 
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that there is congruity between past and present 'Greek' expenence. Thus 
confronted by the oddity of Homeric epiphany, Dietrich writes at one point:9o 
This epic idea of feasible but unlikely divine epiphany continued in Greek 
literature and beyond [with a] tenacious hold over popular imagination. 
'Beyond' in this instance is illustrated by Dietrich with the 'ludicrous incident at 
Lystra' as told in Acts, where Paul and Barnabas are mistaken for Zeus and 
Hermes.91 Dietrich's unease here gives way to ridicule of an apparent instance 
of 'popular' belief in a supposedly implausible epic epiphany. But in so doing 
Dietrich unwittingly ventriloquises the foundational polemics of Acts as his 
own.92 One should ask instead at what point exactly the 'double standards' that 
Dietrich alleges are supposed to have originated? To suggest that the non-
theologically-viable products of Homeric imagination can nonetheless become 
part of the religious life of later periods itself calls into question the conception 
of theological viability with which the analysis began. If the failure of the proxy-
experience of plausible visualisation disqualifies these epiphanies as 
authentically religious, how exactly did they manage to overcome this 'in post-
Homeric times'? This method of evaluating Homeric epiphany through the 
rationalising prism of plausible visualisation seems to falter at precisely this 
point: 'it seems distinctly odd ... '. The recurrent problem can be recast in 
Pfister's terminology: how is it that such 'epic' epiphanies can become 
'legendary' or cultic epiphanies? 
Such an approach to the religious aspects of the Homeric poems in terms 
of experience and its concomitant, belie( is not of recent origin. A key article by 
Jmgensen in 1904 pointed out some distinctive differences in the ways that the 
poetic narrator and the characters represent the gods in the Odyssey.93 Others 
subsequently put Jmgensen's observations to use in various ways.94 Ehnmark 
summarises an influential view:95 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
Here we are no doubt concerned with the conscious use of a special stylistic device. 
Jorgensen [sic] supposed it to be a conventional literary artifice, but this theory 
ccumot be upheld . On the contrary, Homer, in order to achieve realism in his 
Dietrich (1997), 3-4. 
Acts 14.8-18. 
Compare esp. Acts 14.13-15, where Paul and Barnabas, hearing of the prospective 
sacrifices in their honour, cry out: "av8pEs-, Tl Tai.ha TTOLELTE;''. 
J0rgensen (1904). For its influence, see Clay (1983), 22-23; Pelliccia (1995), 251 and n. 251. 
See esp. Nilsson (1924), 376-377; compare Nilsson (1967), vol. 1, 218-219. For the 'classic' 
status of Nilsson (1924), see Tsagarakis (1980), 57 n. 2. J0rgensen's insight has also been 
developed in narratological terms: see Griffin (1986); de Jong (1988); Winterbottom (1989); de Jong (1997). 
Ehnmark (1935), 65-66. 
characterization, has evidently attempted to give a psychologically correct 
description of the way in which men think and talk. According to Heden, who was 
the first to show the importance of Jorgensen's discovery for the study of Homeric 
religion, it furnishes us with a means of distinguishing between the purely poetical 
treatment of the gods and the living religious faith which the poet took for 
granted in his audience, or, in so far as he was deliberately archaizing, in the 
Trojan heroes. 
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The experience, characterised in terms of faith or belief, that lay behind this 
psychological realism thus became a means by which to distinguish between 
the properly religious and non-religious material in the Homeric text.96 The 
depiction of the gods in Homer became polarised, between this psychologically 
realistic experience ('faith') on the one hand, and on the other those elements 
deemed to belong to the 'purely poetical treatment of the gods'. These latter 
elements are precisely those which came to be stigmatised as 'Gotterapparat', 
or 'Gottermaschine'; as Bremer comments, dissatisfaction with this aspect of the 
Homeric poems in terms of religion mirrored dissatisfaction with the device as 
poetry.97 Thus Nilsson concluded in the following terms:9s 
Das [i.e. gods as personal 'Schutzgotter'] ist die letzte Anwertdung der 
Gottermaschine tmd zugleich die der dichterischen Gestaltung geHihrlichs te, 
indem sie, zur abgenutzen tmd stets bereiten Forme! herabgesunken, den Hauptreiz 
der Dichtung, die Darstellung des Menschlichen, verdrangt und mit dem leeren 
Gerassel der Gottermaschine ersetzt. 
Bremer point~ out that this polarising approach achieved canonical status when 
it entered the pages of Schmid's Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, until, at 
least, the work of Lesky.99 Of course, the approach took varying forms. 
Ehnmark, for instance, adopted the basic polarity but modified its operation so 
as to include specifically anthropomorphic conceptions of the gods more 
centrally in his analysis; but the basic point remained: lOO 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
To this belief [in personal individualised gods] the poet's own description adds 
nothing of religious value and for that very reason does not clash with it. For a 
correct appreciation, from the point of view of religion, of the poetic treatment of 
the gods it is essential that due regard should be paid to the fact that it was 
Compare Nilsson (1967), vol. 1, 218-219: 'Es herrscht ein deutlicher Unterschied 
zwischen der hergebrachten mythologischen Form des Epos und dem wirklichen 
Glauben des homerischen Menschen, den der Dichter in den Reden seiner Personen dem 
Leben abgelauscht hat.' 
J.-M. Bremer (1987), 31-32. 
Nilsson (1924), 390. 
J.-M. Bremer (1987), 32 and n. 2; Lesky (1961). 
Ehnmark (1935), 103. 
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nothing of religious value and for that very reason does not clash with it. For a 
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Compare Nilsson (1967), vol. 1, 218-219: 'Es herrscht ein deutlicher Unterschied 
zwischen der hergebrachten mythologischen Form des Epos und dem wirklichen 
Glauben des homerischen Menschen, den der Dichter in den Reden seiner Personen dem 
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J.-M. Bremer (1987), 31-32. 
Nilsson (1924), 390. 
J.-M. Bremer (1987), 32 and n. 2; Lesky (1961). 
Ehnmark (1935), 103. 
largely devoid of religious significance, since to the Greeks mythology was not a 
sacred history, the object of faith in the modern sense of the word. 
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Ultimately, this analysis is not so different from Dietrich's in privileging certain 
criteria, here 'psychological realism', there 'plausible visualization', as a means 
of gaining access to 'faith' or 'belief' as experienced by 'Homeric man'. The 
specifically Christian lineage of key terms like 'faith' should be noted. What 
results is a way to extract some aspects of the Homeric poems as virtual 
artefacts of Homeric experience, so as to be able to fit these remains into a 
putative continuity of Greek 'belief', which is to say, Greek religion; the surplus 
can then be discarded as merely poetical.1°1 Leaving aside for a moment the 
problematic implications of taking belief as the central category of Greek 
religion, it is clear that this method consists of an attempt to uncover 
authentically religious aspects of the Homeric poems by reference to a 
continuity of experience supposedly underlying the epics themselves. 
Of course, Homeric scholarship has covered much ground smce 
Nilsson.102 But a conceptual emphasis on experience in approaching the status 
or authority of the Homeric texts as 'religious' continues to be influential,103 
This can be the case even when, as Erbse has done, traditional valuations of the 
gods in Homer in terms of religion are turned on their head.104 For Erbse the 
'Gotterapparat' 1s entirely necessary, not because it reflects religious 
experience-it does not: 'Es ist kaum moglich ... den Dichter fUr ein bloiSen 
Nachahmer des sogenannten Volksglaubens zu halten'105-, but because it is an 
essential component in representing the mental experience of Homeric man:l06 
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Die epischer Dichter benotigte die Cotter, weil er von Menschen, die noch keine 
Freiheit des Handelns kannten, nur mit ihrer Hilfe sinnvoll erzahlen konnte. 
Compare Nilsson (1924), 376: 'Wollen wir die wirkliche Religion der homerischen 
Menschen erfassen, mussen wir tms nach der anderen Seite wenden tmd die durch Mythos 
und dichterische Form entwickelte Fortwucherung zunachst fallen lassen.' See van 
Wees (1992), 7, for criticism of the similar methodology of those who seek historical 
source material in Homer by discarding the supernatural and the implausible. 
For a brief overview relevant to the Homeric gods, see pp. 49-50 nn. 11-15 below. 
See e.g. Tsagarakis (1977), vii-xviii, esp. xvi: 'The problem for the modern reader is to 
know what exactly existed in contemporary religion in terms of concepts of divirte 
power'; and xviii, where the hope expressed is 'to establish reasonably well if and to 
what extent Homeric man's concepts of divine power are based on actual religious 
beliefs of ordinary Greek worshippers.' 
Erbse (1986), 295-307. 
Erbse (1986), 4. 
Erbse (1986), 299; note J.-M. Bremer (1987), 43-44. 
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There are positive consequences: the Gotterapparat is redeemed as such within 
the poetic priorities of the narrative. But this is achieved only in terms of its 
relationship with this Homeric mode of mental experience:107 
In Wirklichkeit verlieren die Gotter ihren Sinne (tmd damit die Berechtigung 
irhrer Existenz) tiberall dort, wo sicl1 nicht mehr zm Erganztmg w1d Flilu·w1g der 
Menschen da sli1d. 
Erbse's approach draws upon a particular genealogy of human mental 
experience, namely Snell's The Discovery of the Mind, and it is this narrative that 
underpins his reading of the Homeric gods as 'real' only insofar as they connect 
with the specific mental experience of Homeric Greece. The urge to ground 
Homeric representations of the gods in actual experience of some sort thus 
persists as an authorising criterion, and material that does not connect with this 
experience is relegated in a familiar fashion:10S 
Ihr himmlisches Treiben ist ohne diese ihre eigentliche Funktion nm beschwingte, 
aber ziellose Heiterkeit ... in so lieblichen Bildern ihrer Isolienmg sli1d die Gotter 
nur nocl1 eli1 schoner, aber nutzloser poetischer Traum. 
In Erbse's analysis, the Homeric gods in some places are only a 'poetic dream', 
but in others are intrinsically grounded in Homeric psychology. But that the 
gods may function anywhere as a psychological mechanism is itself ultimately 
dependent upon the belief of Homeric man, 'daiS sie das Wirken der Cotter an 
sich und anderen erleben'.109 Insofar as the Homeric gods possess any 
legitimacy in~ Erbse's reading, it is as documents of this psychological 
experience. 
Another approach to the problematic status of the Homeric poems as 
religious discourse is exemplified by Emlyn-Jones's thoughtful article on the 
Homeric gods.l10 The emphasis there is on taking the gods 'seriously', 
whatever this means exactly, above all because the authority of the epic poet 
and the authorising belief of the audience of epic meet at such points. m It is in 
the resulting mediation between poetry and belief that Emlyn-Jones locates 'the 
reality of the Homeric gods for their Greek audiences', a reality which he also 
seeks to demonstrate by appealing briefly to the physical remains of cult as 
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Erbse (1986), 300. 
Erbse (1986), 300. 
Erbse (1986), 4. 
Emlyn-Jones (1992), 91-103. 
Emlyn-Jones (1992), 96. For such 'seriousness', see esp. Griffli1 (1980), 144 and n. 1, where 
he takes as a chapter epithet a comment by Marg (1956), 2: 'Es ist eigentlich kaum zu 
umgehen, Homer religios ernst zu nehmen'; the paragraph contli1ues: 'Sch[rade]s Buch 
ist erhillt von der Vorstellung, daf5 die homerischen Gedichte religiose Zeugnisse ersten 
Ranges sli1d, daf5 sie voll sind von Religion. Mit Recht.' 
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they might relate to the Homeric poems.112 Homeric representations of the 
gods once again function as religious insofar as they relate to 'actual religious 
beliefs', recalling Tsagarakis's formulation, but in a marked difference from 
Tsagarakis the relationship is not a univalent one.113 The Homeric poems 
participate directly in the 'poetically mediated Greek view of the gods', and 
consequently the process envisioned is a dynamic one. This seems to have 
potential. But where to go from here? For modern readers of the gods in 
Homer, Emlyn-Jones holds out a challenge: 
[Om] inheritance makes it quite hard for us to grasp the reality of the Homeric 
gods for their Greek audiences-to take an "imaginative leap" into a culture for 
which the polarities described above did not exist, or at least not to a great extent, 
and not for the majority of listeners. 
The authorising process mediating poetry and belief, within which Emlyn-Jones 
locates the reality of the Homeric gods, depends upon a particular vision of the 
cultural context: 'for the Greeks of Homer's time, poetry was not apart from 
religion, but the essential medium of human knowledge about the gods'. 114 But 
are we then just to take it on faith, so to speak, that Homer is somehow more 
or less synonymous, pars pro toto, with archaic and classical Greek religious 
conceptions of the gods and thus with what was 'believed'? This is what is 
implied by the caution Emlyn-Jones expresses about Feeney's truism that 'the 
experience of Homer's poetry is not simply commensurate with the experience 
of religion'.115-And in practice, by the end of Emlyn-Jones's article, the potential 
dynamism between the authority of poetry and the authority of belief has 
somehow been left to one side, and instead Homer is virtually superimposed 
on 'religious belief'. But Feeney has rightly criticised the assumption that 'there 
was a golden age when poet and audience, poetry and religion, art and 
experience were all in seamless accord'. 116 The question remains: can the 
dynamism towards which Emlyn-Jones points be more fully explored? What is 
missing in these accounts is an explicit understanding of how a dynamics 
between 'poetry' and 'belief' might actually function. 
If I have lingered over treatments of Homer here it is not only because 
this thesis is centrally focused on the Homeric texts. More than this, the 
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'Reality': Emlyn-Jones (1992), 103. Remains of cult: 99-100. 
Tsagarakis (1977), vii-xviii; as quoted above, p . 27 n . 103. 
Emlyn-Jones (1992), 103. 
Emlyn-Jones (1992), 99; for the context of Feeney's remark, see Feeney (1991), 4 n. 4: 'his 
[i.e. Erbse (1986)] fundamental point, that the experience of Homer's poetry is not 
simply commensurate with the experience of religion, is theoretically irrefutable'. 
Feeney (1991), 3; cf. Feeney (1998), 23. 
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Homeric texts constitute a basic litmus-test of the larger question of religious 
discourse in Greek contexts. How are scholars to deal with these archaic texts, 
themselves peculiarly 'authoritative' in the terms outlined by Herodotos, for 
example, but which are nonetheless 'poetic' in a creative sense?117 These texts 
both for themselves and for their ongoing importance within Greek culture 
raise insistent questions about the status and nature of religious discourse: how 
we choose to read Homer and related texts like the Homeric Hymns deeply 
implicates how we approach Greek religion in its broader manifestations.us 
Characteristically, the treatment of the depiction of the gods in Homer has 
tended to be polarised in terms of an opposition between religious or 
psychological experience-read also 'faith', 'belief'-and the 'purely poetical 
treatment of the gods', to borrow Ehnmark's words. There are alternative 
strategies to this pursuit of experience: for instance, Pucci has some provocative 
and sophisticated observations to make on Homeric epiphany and its 
'innuendos'.119 But what has not been satisfactorily explained is how these 
Homeric epiphanies actively relate to their broader cultural contexts. This is not 
a question of ' literature and life', but one of how various levels of cultural 
expression interact with one another. 12° For this we might compare Sourvinou-
Inwood's approaches to Greek culture, or Feeney's astute consideration of 
related questions in his Literature and Religion at Rome.121 Both exemplify in 
different forms the search for ways beyond the strait-jacket of traditional 
dichotomies when considering how religious or mythological discourse relates 
to religion in other cultural guises. But there remains a basic desideratum, 
exemplified by the point at which Emlyn-Jones's analysis breaks off: namely a 
more sophisticated understanding of how the cultural practices that the 
Homeric epics represent-'traditional' poetry, performed and transmitted in 
central contexts of social interaction-engage with these ongoing contexts of 
performance and reception, not least in matters of religion. I will return to this 
problem directly in the next section of this chapter. 
Here I want to offer some reflections on why the various approaches 
explored above revolve so centrally around 'experience' as a determinant of 
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Hdt. 2.53. 
The considered omission of the Homeric H ynms and the h ynms of Kallimakhos from 
Furley and Bremer (2001) is just such a consequence. See above, p. 16 n . 47. 
Pucci ([1985] 1998d); Pucci (1987), esp. 110-122; Pucci ([1988] 1998b). 
Compare M. Clarke (1999), esp. 229-284, for how ' the dynamics of mythical image-
making' might be explored in terms of levels of cultural expression, but internal to the 
epics themselves; see my review, Stevens (2001). See also Peradotto (1997) on the 
Homeric poet and ' tradition' . 
Sourvinou-Inwood (1991), esp. 3-23; Sourvinou-Inwood (1995); Feeney (1998), esp. 12-25. 
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religious authenticity. The historical role of Pausanias's 'experienced' narrative 
in the study of Greek religion is clearly one facet of this preoccupation. But in 
specific relation to narratives of divine appearances, it is significant that Pfister 
concludes his discussion of this issue with the 'calling' (or 'vocation') of Paul and 
Hesiod.122 This odd pairing exemplifies an important feature of the history of 
classical studies, namely how cross-implicated the study of Greco-Roman 
antiquity has been in exploration of the authenticity and authority of Biblical 
texts.123 Exemplary in this history was Wolf's use of Eichhorn's Einleitung ins 
Alte Testament as model in the formulation of the 'Homeric Question': from 
Wolf's views on the development of the Homeric text further implications 
emerged for the authority of the Biblical text.124 To adopt a position on the 
composition of Homer became to imply a position on the history of the Old 
Testament in particular, and thus: '[t]he final large cultural element that 
rendered the Homeric Question such a lively area of controversy was its 
relationship to the Bible.'125 In this respect, when scholarly accounts of divine 
epiphany in antiquity turn out to privilege experience as the means by which to 
determine their place inside or outside Greek religious history proper, it is 
arguable that the conceptual categories brought to bear are influenced by a set 
of questions about divine epiphany in particular, and about religion more 
generally, that owe much to the Western tradition's encounters (especially after 
the Reformation) with the authority of the Bible and with the New Testament 
narrative of incarnation, witness, and revelation. 
The reaction of Thomas to the report of Jesus's epiphany is perhaps an 
underlying model here, insofar as scholarship has tended to resort to questions 
about experience and belief in order to read accounts of divine epiphany. 
Thomas's doubt constitutes a framing question already written into the text of 
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Pfister (1924), coll. 316-317: 'das Damaskus-Erlebnis des Paulus .. . die Berufung Hesiods 
auf dem Helikon'; for fuller context, see above, p . 22. 
Compare Bolgar (1958), 313: 'The study of Greek was h eld to involve a new approach to 
the Bible, which apart from all questions of heresy constituted an open threa t to 
existing academ.ic methods. If philologists were competent to solve questions of faith, 
logicians were in danger of losing their influence.' Some prominent figures: on Valla's 
Annotntiones to the New Testament, see e.g. D'Amico (1988), 16-17; on the work of 
Erasmus, combining classical languages, scholarly criticism and 'veritas evangelica', 
see e.g. Pfeiffer (1976), 74-78; Rummel (1985), 89-102; D'Amico (1988), 32-38; and for 
controversies in English scholarship over the text of the New Testament involving 
Bentley among others, see e.g. Reynolds and Wilson ([1968]1991), 186-187; Haugen 
(2001), 156-160. 
For Wolf, see Grafton, Most and Zetzel (1985). Compare Graziosi (2001), 246-247. 
Turner (1997), 142-144; cf. Grafton, Most and Zetzel (edd.) (1985), 20-26. 
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John, and as such it offers a preemptive hermeneutic within which audiences 
are invited to respond:126 
ewf.las 8E: Els E-K Twv 8w8EKa, 6 A£YOf1Evos L'>t8uf1os. ovK ~v f.LET' avTwv oTE 
~A8EV 'I llCJOVS. EAfYOV o0v UVTWL o\. GAAOL flU8llTUL . 'EwpaKUflEV TOV KupLOV. 6 
8E: El rrEv avTo"Ls · 'Eav fl~ '(8w E-v m"Ls XEpal.v avTou Tov Tvrrov Twv ~Awv Kal. 
~clAw Tov 8aKTuMv flOU Els Tov Tvrrov Twv ~Awv Kal. ~clAw flOU ~v XE"Lpa Els 
~V TTAEUpav UVTOV, ov fl~ TTLCJTEUCJW. Kal. we· ~flEpas OKTW TTCtALV ~aav ECJW 
o\. f1U811Tal. avToD, Kal. 8wf10.S f.LET' avTwv. EPXETUL 6 'I llCJoi)s Twv 8upwv 
KEKAELCJf.LE"vwv, Kal. E'aTll Els To flEaov Kal. EL rrEv· Elpf]Vll VflLV. El m AE-yn TWL 
8wf10.L, <PE"pE Tov 8clKTuMv aou w8E wl. '(8E Tas XELpclS flOU, Kal. cpE"pE ~v 
XELPcl CJOU KQL ~clAE Els T~V TTAE:Upav flOU, KUL flll ytvou GTTLCJTOS QAAQ TTLCJTOS. 
The peculiarly embodied form of this interaction between Jesus and Thomas 
offers a proxy experience that serves as a paradigmatic response to the doubt 
expressed by Thomas: cpEpE T~v XE1p6. crou KaL ~aAE Els T~v TIAEupav f.LOU, Kat 
f.LTJ YLVOU QTILO"TOS' a/.._Aa TILO"TOS'. This proxy experience itself models the New 
Testament narrative of incarnation in precise terms.127 In this respect, the text 
teaches a particular Christian hermeneutic of how experience overcomes doubt 
and becomes belief, even if it would be better not to have doubted at all.128 
Accordingly, if Reformation thinkers moved the emphasis for the authorisation 
of Christian scripture and practice away from an institutional grounding in the 
authority of the Church towards a grounding in a newly personalised 
experience, then they were responding to a reading of the Gospel itself.l29 It is 
just such a pa1:adigm that is Versnel's target when he asks the question, '[w]hat 
did ancient man see when he saw a god?', and in order to make his point about 
'the essentially ambiguous nature of ancient-if not all-epiphany phenomena', 
he pointedly begins and ends with the New Testament conversion narrative 
par excellence, namely Paul on the road to Damascus.13° While some have 
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Jolm 20.24-27; cited from Tasker (ed .) (1964). 
See Scarry (1985), 214-220, esp. 215: 'Belief comes not, as so often in the Old Testament, 
by being oneself wounded but by having the wound become the object of touch ... in the 
Gospels we begin with the body of God and move relentlessly toward the more extreme 
materialization, the exposure of the interior of Jesus in the final wounds of the 
crucifixion.' The precise terms of this incarnation remained a subject of theological 
dispute, as e.g. in controversies over the nature of the Eucharist: see Wagner (1986), 96-
125; J. Z . Smith (1987), 99-102. 
Note the conclusion that Jesus draws, John 20.29: AEYEL avTwL 6 'I naoDs, "On i:wpaKas 
f1E, TTETTLCJTEUKas; flUKclpLOL o\. fl~ L86vTES wl. maTEvaavTES. Compare Lopez (1998b ), 
22: 'When one looks up belief in the Encyclopedia of Religion, one finds the instruction: 
"see Doubt" .... [U]nder "Belief" in The New Catholic Encyclopedia, one is advised to 
"see Faith".' 
Compare the post-Reformation 'shift to belief as the defining characteristic of religion' 
with the shift towards the personal: see J. Z. Smith (1998), 270-271, and Winquist 
(1998), 226-227. 
Versnel (1987), 42. 
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explicitly approached the archaic and classical Greek material as precursors to 
epiphany in the New Testament-with the benefits that no doubt accrue from 
greater attention to the cultural contexts of these later texts- this practice of 
conceptual cross-referencing is more widely spread.131 To this extent, 
treatments of Greco-Roman epiphany have featured certain assumptions about 
epiphany and the telling of it which reflect priorities that stem directly from the 
central cultural position of Biblical narratives in Western cultural life over the 
last 500 years. No doubt more could be said in a more nuanced way on this 
topic. But it is not too much to say here that this concentration, when we read 
religious discourse, on experience in both social and individual forms owes 
much to the prominence within formative Western cultural narratives of 
possibilities for intrusion into the world from without and of questions about 
how people may be able to recognise and experience such possibilities for 
I 
themselves. Historically, the New Testament narrative of incarnation, witness 
and revelation has been a key problem in the (religious) history of Europe and 
the Americas. But even now personaC institutional and governmental concern 
with such phenomena as Marian visions and UFO encounters are striking 
evidence of continued cultural concern with the authenticity and authorisation 
of narratives of encounters with the distinctively 'other' .132 It is appropriate to 
bear the conceptual implications of such concerns in mind. 
If I am -here seeking to problematise experience as an analytical category 
when it comes to divine appearances, I do so to underline that this 
preoccupation with 'experienced' texts may in fact derive from specific 
conceptual pressures developed in very different cultural contexts from those in 
which these texts in question were actually produced. Religious experience, 
understood in an originary sense, and/ or beliet understood as a grounding 
131 
132 
For explicit approaches, see Pax (1955); Brenk (1994). 
For UFOs, see e.g. Levvis (1995); Saler, Ziegler and Moore (1997); Lieb (1998); Saler 
(2001), 47-48. Pollsters say 1 in 4 American adults 'avowedly believe that extra-
terrestrial beings have actually landed on Earth': Saler, Ziegler and Moore (1997), ix; 
compare the X-Files as 'fiction' with the documents on the 'Roswell incident' released 
w1der freedom of information legislation by the American Federal Bureau of 
Investigation: <http:/ /foia.fbi.gov/ unusual.htm> [last accessed 4 June 2002]. On the 
place of Marian and other visions within the Catholic Church and the 'set of doctrinal 
and pastoral criteria for distinguishing the genuine from the illusory', see Pelikan 
(1996), 78; Wiebe (1997), 28-30. For internal perspectives, see above, p. 7 n . 7, on 
Medjugorje; also Rahner (ed.) (1975), 1806-1807 s.v. 'Visions', and the 'Theological 
Commentary' by Cardinal Ratzinger, appended to the material on the controversial 
'Message of Fatima' released by the Catholic Church in May 2000, especially the 
sections headed 'Public Revelation and private revelations-their theological status' 
and 'The anthropological structure of private revelations': <http :/ /www.vatican.va/ 
roman_ curia/ congregations/ cfaith/ documents I rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message-
fatima_en .html> [last accessed 4 June 2002]. 
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reality, need not be taken as the basic reference point of religious discourse. The 
example of Pausanias's seductively 'experienced' text highlights the perils of 
assuming that experience is necessarily anything more than a strategic effect 
implicitly or explicitly directed at particular ends, especially when it comes to 
such topics as the appearance and participation of gods in the world. Likewise, 
the questions that remain when external contexts are privileged over internal 
constituency in particular forms of religious discourse, such as hymns and 
prayers, point to the specific institutional consequences of taking external 
evidence of experience as the key marker of authentic religion. The pursuit of 
authentic experience continues to arise in various forms in scholarship dealing 
directly with the discourse of epiphany, for example in the Homeric epics, 
without due consideration for the consequences of taking 'experience' as the 
evaluative basis of the study of religion. What I want to do now is to turn to the 
specific problem of the Homeric epics, and to develop a narrative 
understanding, grounded in a hermeneutic of performance and reception, of 
how such poetry might participate in religious discourse, as understood not on 
the basis of originary experience but in terms of an active exploration of 
meaning and sensation in the world. 
• 
• • 
Narration, creation and participation 
The problem of experience m the scholarly literature on religious discourse 
reflects deep uncertainty over how to ground verbal discourse, especially 
poetry and related 'fictions', in reality. Positing an ur-experience, or, more 
weakly, the experience of belief, are apparent ways out of this problem, but 
they reduce such verbal discourse implicitly or explicitly to the level of 
representation. I have explored above some of the conceptual difficulties that 
this strategy brings with it in the study of religion. What I want to consider now 
is how speech and poetry as a subset of speech structure a progression through 
time, and thus constitute 'experiences' in themselves. What opens up here are 
two distinct uses of 'experience', the one a residue or result, the other a process; 
these uses can distinguished in German by the two terms, 'Erlebnis' and 
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'Erfahrung', and the productive consequences of this distinction are 
fundamental to Gadamer's hermeneutics.133 In particular, Gadamer has shown 
that this distinction is key to understanding what verbal discourse can offer its 
participants, beyond a reductive view of language as representation and 
denomination.l34 This general point about verbal discourse applies particularly 
to traditional epic narrative in view of the peculiar position this mode of speech 
occupies in its cultural contexts. In this way, the Homeric epics can be 
understood as active explorations in poetic speech of the modalities and 
significance of 'being-in' a world of heroes, gods, battles, honour, homecoming 
and revenge, and not as 'art' or 'literature' in the sense that such things are 
understood to constitute a distinct domain at one remove from the world. In 
later Greek contexts, such as in the case of Pausanias whose Homeric 
perspective on divine battle interventions I have discussed above, it is clear that 
the Homeric poems were in the first instance texts that participated, especially 
through their prominence in educational contexts, in the complex making and 
moulding of the Greek world and its ways.135 Aspiration to such a role is 
fundamentat in my view, to the traditional poet's craft from the beginning. 
Two recent developments in scholarship on Homeric poetry are 
particularly useful in articulating ways to connect the cognitive (speech, 
narrative, image) with the cultural (performance, audience, participation, 
authority). The first is the analysis, notably by Bakker, of epic poetry (even in 
its current written form) as (a transcript of) speech, a flow of verbal discourse 
through time.136 Conceiving epic as speech offers specific impetus to attempts 
to found the understanding of Homeric 'orality' on firmer cognitive grounds.137 
Where Bakker has attended to the language and syntax of the Homeric epics as 
a kind of special speech, others have pursued similarly framed projects in 
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On Gadamer's German usage, see the translators' preface to Gadamer ([1975]1989), xii-
xiv; for experience as 'one of the most obscure [concepts] we have', see Gadamer ([1975] 
1989), 346-362. For the distinction, see also Ingold (2000), 98-100. 
See Gadamer ([1975]1989), esp. 383-389. 
For Homer and Greek education, see Buffiere (1956), 10-13; Havelock (1963); Marrou 
(1965), 31-41, 246-247; Goldhill (1986), 139-142; Lamberton (1997), 41-43. Compare also 
Rudhardt (1988), 48-49: 'L'oeuvre destinee a charmer ou a instruire dans differents 
domaines peut, en matiere religieuse, avoir autant d 'autorite qu 'un texte liturgique'. 
See esp. Bakker (1993), (1997); Bakker and Kahane (1997). Compare Reichl (200Gb), 23: 
'Classicists and medievalists tend to see traditional epics like the Iliad or the Chnnson 
de Rolnnd as texts only ... But as oral epics ... they are not primarily texts but speech 
events.' By contrast, Feeney (1991), 1-4, writes of epic's depiction of the gods as 'a form 
of speech with its own definitive and characteristic modes', but in practice treats it as 
'a problem of fiction'. 
Martin (1989), 1-10, is fundamental. 
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relation to Homeric ep1c as a kind of special storytelling.138 The central 
motivation is to understand how such poetry is cognised, in performance-
reception, as a flow of speech through time, whether at the level of verbal 
texture or with more extensive attention to larger structures within Homeric 
narrative, such as the type-scene. 
The second relevant perspective is the refocusing of attention, notably 
by Nagy, onto the mimetic aspects of the (epic) poet's performance, in terms of 
the presentation of speech and action within the frame of the performer-
audience interaction.139 A key point here is that such mimesis is not 
representation, but presentation or enactment in a more direct sense.140 'Past-
experience' is always beyond grasp, but the generation in the present of 
'experience-of-the-past' through the active communicative processes of 
memory and speech is always potentially at hand. This again is Gadamer's 
distinction between experience as residue and experience as process. The 
specific preoccupation of Greek epic with memory of the past framed in the 
present tense is not accidental.l41 Moreover, the conceptual gains to be derived 
from Bakker's focus on speech become particularly evident within this 
performative frame. Nagy puts it thus in his introduction to Bakker's Poetry in 
Speech: 'Homeric discourse represents itself as the verbalization of a heroic 
world that is literally visualized by those very special agents of divine 
memory.'142 P~tting these approaches together offers a means of relating the 
constituency of the text itself directly to the contexts in which and for which this 
performance-poetry was generated.143 Further than this, it opens up the 
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See esp. Minchin (2001) . 
For concise statement, see Nagy (1996b), 60-61, 84-86. See also Detienne ([1967]1996); 
Thalmann (1984); Ford (1992). 
See Ford (1992), 196: 'In some sense epic reanimates the heroes, restoring them to action 
and speech'; Bakker (1993), 18-19; Nagy (1996b), 61: 'In line with this pattern of 
thinking, a Homeric narration or a Homeric quotation of a god or hero speaking within 
a narrative are not at all representations: they are the real thing.' For 'enactment', see 
Silk (1995), 126: 'Enactment does not evoke existence outside language, so m.uch as our 
belonging to that existence.' 
For memory and Greek epic, see esp. Ford (1992), 53: 'The function of this memory is not 
simply preservation of the past but a psychological experience, to change the present 
frame of awareness'. See also Vernant ([1965]1983), 75-105; Detienne ([1967]1996), 39-
52; Nagy ([1979]1999), 17; Thalmann (1984), 146-151; Dickson (1995), 70-72; Bakker 
(1997), 78-79; Bakker (2002), 67-70 . 
Nagy (1997a), ix. 
Without becoming tied to a particular time and place; but for a intriguing reading of 
Homer in Athens, see Haubold (2000), 145-196, building on Cook (1995); more broadly, 
see esp. Herington (1985). Note Bakker (1993), 3, on the philological acceptability of 
working from 'observable properties' of the Homeric text to its performance context, and 
not the other way around. There has been much written for and against the implications 
of orality for the text of Homer as we possess it; see recently Janko (1990); Bird (1994); 
37 
possibilities (and constraints) of our continued engagement with Homeric 
poetry as (belated) audiences of the (crystallised, one-sided because written) 
communication of Greek epic performance-poetry: Homer 'speaks' to us 
also.144 
A third perspective is also relevant, drawn this time not from classical 
studies but from what might be termed 'ecological' anthropology. Traditional 
story-telling, it is argued by Ingold, constitutes not a cultural modelling of the 
world in representational terms, but a means of directing the attention of 
participants (performer and audience) further 'into the world'; that is to say, 
such narratives 'amount not to a metaphorical representation of the world, but 
to a form of poetic involvement' or 'dwelling' in the world.145 Ingold puts it 
thus:146 
Far from dressing up a plain reality with layers of metaphor, or representing it, 
map-like, in the imagination, song, stories and designs serve to conduct the 
attention of performers into the world, deeper and deeper, as one proceeds from 
outward appearances to an ever more intense poetic involvement. 
This perspective gives specific impetus to situate the approaches of Bakker and 
Nagy in relation to a fundamental aspect of Greek epic poetry, namely the 
uncovering of the past in the present as a revelation of the constitution of the 
world between the 'then' and the 'now'-as a process of aletheia. 147 This 
unconcealment, which amounts to a kind of invention of time in the relation 
---between present and past, is particularly apparent in the Hesiodic poetry that 
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Lord (1995); Nagy (1996b); Nagy (1997b); Nagy (1997c); Powell (1997); Janko (1998a); 
Janko (1998b); Nagy (1998); Nagy (1999a); M. L. West (1998); M. L. West (1999); 
Finkelberg (2000); Janko (2000); Lord ([1960] 2000); Nagy (200Gb); Due (2001); Graziosi 
(2001), 248-250; Nagy (2001); Nardelli (2001) . Much remains dependent on hypothesis 
and framing assumptions in lieu of direct evidence, but I find Nagy's evolutionary model 
for the fixation of the Homeric poems intuitively appealing within the limits of our 
evidence: this entails multiple, ongoing performance contexts within a hardening 
tradition that passes through a particular 'bottleneck' in 6th and 5th century BCE 
Athens: see esp. Nagy (1999b). 
Relevant here is the subtle discussion by Ingold (2000), 401-404, of writing 'as the 
graphic counterpart to speech'; note esp. 404: 'Since we speak ... with the whole body, 
and not just with the voice, the relation between speech and writing is not so much 
between a sonic reality and its visual representation as it is between the communicative 
bodily gesture and its graphic inscription.' The bodily practices (or disciplines) of 
speaking, hearing, writing and reading are entirely integral to communication on this 
understanding, as illustrated e.g. in the anecdote about the classicist who suggested 
that to 'know Greek' meant to be able to read Plato with your feet up by the fire; 
compare Bourdieu (1977), 93-94: 'Bodily hexis is political mythology realized, em-
bodied, turned into a permanent disposition, a durable manner of standing, speaking, 
and thereby of feeling and thinking.' 
See Ingold (2000), 56-57, 208, 361. 
Ingold (2000), 56. 
See esp. Detienne ([1967) 1996), 39-52. 
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deals with the periodisation of the cosmos in starkly schematic terms.148 But this 
process is also (if differently constituted, and competitively so) a rationale of the 
two archetypal manifestations of the Greek heroic past, the Iliad and the 
Odyssey. The epic past is not a separate world from the present, for all the 
differences of its constitution as 'then' and 'there' opposed to the 'now' and 
'here' of performance; the epic past is instead what lies behind and beneath the 
world as it is now. Against such a backdrop, the Western concept of 'fiction' 
that so bedevils our understanding of what stories ('literature') are, is better 
conceived as a specific development in traditional story-telling. 149 Where all 
story-telling conducts attention deeper into the world, fiction is predicated upon 
a reflexive awareness of the (selective) framing inherent in this process, not as a 
limitation but as an opportunity for conscious manipulation of the direction of 
attention in this way. What results is the enactment of (fictional) worlds within 
the world, and fiction is thus an implicit claim about the potential of human 
imagination, which is to say, about the potential for humans to act intentionally 
in (partial) awareness of the modalities of their own 'dwelling' in the world.15D 
But this activity is different from traditional story-telling only in a particular 
opportunistic attitude towards the process of framing brought into play as 
performers set about directing their attention into the world. By contrast, the 
Greek epic poet's recourse to the Muses claims to overcome this selectivity 
through the Muses' access to 'everything'.151 The poet's claim amounts to an 
implicit claim to- 'truth' as aletheia, as unconcealment, even as the poet gives 
(inevitably) a selective account:l52 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
TTATj8Uv 8' OUK av €yw l-lV8~<JO!-laL ou8' OVOi-1-~VW, 
ou8' d i-1-0L 8f.Ka 1-lfv yA.wcmm, 8f.Ka 8f: <JTOI-laT' ELEV, 
490 </Jwv~ 8' appTJKTOS', XciAKfOV 8E. 1-lOL ~Top EVflTj' 
El 1-l~ 'OA.vl-lmci8Es- MovaaL, 11u)s- al yL6XOLO 
Apart from the Theogony and Works nnd Dnys, note esp . the Hesiodic Cntnlogue of 
Women, frr. 1, 204 MW, for the inscription of this periodisation into a genealogicat 
generational framework; cf. Fowler (1998) . 
For fiction and the history of Greek verbal discourse, see esp. Finkelberg (1998), but 
Finkelberg sees a hmdamentat teleological transition from a 'poetics of truth' to a 
'poetics of fiction', where I would see a messier set of developments within a wider 
conception of story-telling; cf. the comments of Morgan (2000). Contrast Feeney (1991), 3: 
'The problem of how to read gods in epic is a problem of fiction before anything else' . 
On imagination, see Ingold (2000), 417-418. Note also Scarry (1985), 167, for 'imagining 
as a boundary condition of intentionality'; and Kapferer (1997), 4-5: 'by intentionality I 
merely mean that human beings are directed toward the ever-shifting horizons of their 
existence ... the intentionality of human beings is a dynamic force of their being-in-the-
world'. The imagination should not be opposed to the real: see Kapferer (1997), 231. 
Esp. l/. 2.485: vw'Ls- yap 8wt ECJTE, ncipwTE. TE, 'LaTE. TE ncivm. 
If. 2.488-492 (M. L. West (ed.) (1998-2000) deletes 2.491-492). On this invocation, see 
esp. Ford (1992), 72-73, 76-77. 
8uyaTEPES', l-lVT]GULa8' oam UlTO "I ALOV ~A.8ov. 
apxous aD VT]WV EpEW vfias TE lTpOlTaaas. 
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Not even a prodigious multiplication of the organs of speech could overcome 
the selectivity of narration and naming without the 'memory' (f.l.VTJGaLa8') of the 
Muses, divine daughters of Zeus. But conversely, through this unconcealment 
of the past in the memory of the Muses, the epic poet finds access to the world 
as present in its past-ness, even as the exigencies of the poet's own practice 
impose limits in the telling. 
This claim of access is strategic and competitive. Nagy's focus on the 
poet's performance underlines the competitive framework within which the 
narratives of Greek epic take shape, not least in the development of 
'Panhellenic' epic traditions.153 The competing 'world-views' that are generated 
by particular traditions of Greek epic poetry can be understood as reflections of 
this framework of poetic performance. As such, the narrative world-view of a 
particular epic performance is an integral strategic effect of the competitive 
poetic 'leading-out' into the world of a performer's and an audience's 
attention. 154 Such strategic effects are always implicit in the web of possibilities 
for significance that traditional poetry generates: such 'traditional referentiality', 
to use Foley's term, is a concomitant of the verbal texture of epic poetry.155 
Within this larger construct of traditional Greek poetry, the discrete story-
traditions embo ..... died in our texts of the Iliad, Odyssey, Theogony, Works and Days 
and so on, amount to an institutionalisation, in increasingly distinct forms, of 
particular narratives that explore the world at various stages in the formation 
of the present in the pasP56 It is in this institutional sense that the Homeric 
epics as we have them constitute narrative explorations in poetic speech of the 
modalities and significance of being in a world with a heroic, 'epic', past. 
If poetry like the Homeric epics offers explorations of being-in-the-world 
that amount to a process-experience, and thus cognition, of the past in the 
present of narration, how can this approach be focused more specifically in 
relation to the presence of gods in the world? A specific problem here concerns 
153 
154 
155 
156 
See Nagy ([1979]1999), (1990). 
See Bowker (1995), 145: the m.ultiplication of cosmologies within particular traditions 
reflects their contextual role, namely 'to display the cosmos as an arena of opportunity'. 
See esp. Foley (1991), (1997), (1999) . 
See Nagy (1990), 60-61; compare the 'species of rhapsody' outlined by Pavese (1998), 84-
86. Similarly, linguistic differences point to the generic conditioning of formal language 
within and between such traditions, and not the intrinsic earliness or lateness of given 
passages in their context, as has been argued e.g. in relation to similes; for this 
fundamental point, see Householder and Nagy (1972), 22-23; compare now Bakker 
(2001) on the augment in similes. 
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what often seems to be the most difficult aspect of putatively 'religious' 
discourse, namely the extent to which it invokes aspects of the world which 
'violate people's ideas of what commonly takes place in their environment'.157 
The relevance of this question in the context of divine appearance is immediate: 
even if people regard divine presence as frequent in the world, the ways in 
which that presence is characterised are nonetheless at odds with what is 
otherwise 'normal'-that is what makes it something worthy of note. If, with 
Bourdieu, people misrecognise the limits of the organisation of their lives as 
'natural', what are people doing when they cognise things as 'unnatural' in this 
way?158 
One recent trend in the study of religion approaches religious discourse 
with a particular focus on cognition.159 Boyer in particular uses a combination of 
ethnographic material and cognitive theorising to explore the contention that 
religious discourse is compelling precisely because it is odd.160 In Boyer's view, 
this oddness is not the result of the cultural 'distance' of observers from their 
subjects, or because religious discourse is inherently fantastical or cast in some 
mode of thought (or mentalite) that is definitively removed from the everyday; 
instead, 'when people develop non-intuitive, culturally-transmitted explicit 
conceptions of some non-observable domain of reality, they tend to create 
principles that go against their own intuitive principles'.161 'Non-observable' 
might be better ___ glossed as not simply observable, in line with the approach 
outlined above to the potential for aletheia or unconcealment offered by story-
telling (but not only story-telling) as a way of directing attention deeper into 
the world. But it is key to Boyer's approach that these distinctively 'non-
intuitive' elements function alongside 'normal' intuitive expectations, and as such 
are developed according to the same cognitive strategies which people put into 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
Boyer (1994), 35. 
Bom·dieu (1977), 97. 
See esp. Lawson and McCauley (1990); Boyer (1994); Sperber (1996); Andresen (ed .) 
(2001a). For an overview, see Andresen (2001b). There are important points of contact 
between this recent cognitive work on religion and the subtle discussions of Bov,rker 
(1973), (1978), but also crucial differences: see Bowker (1995); Flood (1999), 57-64. In 
classical studies, Lawson and McCauley (1990) and Boyer (1994) are noticed positively 
by Kearns (1999), 200, in the course of a review of Burkert (1996), which she describes as 
'dis tinctly old-fashioned' . But Burkert's work is read among comparative religionists, 
not least for its attention to 'experience' turned into sociobiological heritage; thus 
Burkert (1996) is recommended by Boyer (2001), 381, and for a review symposium on 
Burkert (1996) in a comparative religion journal, see Braun (ed.) (1998); Saler (1999). 
Boyer (1994). 
Boyer (1994), 112; cf. Sperber (1994), 55. Against the invocation of 'mentalities', note 
Lawson and McCauley (1990), 172, but see esp . Lloyd (1990) . 
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play in the more mundane contexts of their lives.162 That is to say, alongside the 
base fact of anomaly and contradiction, the uses which people make of these 
anomalous elements actually serve to confirm their hermeneutic potential 
within people's ongoing experience of the world: people judge in their practice 
that these elements direct their attention productively. Boyer characterises the 
quasi-evolutionary survival of religious ideas in terms of an optimal tension: 
'certain combinations of intuitive and counterintuitive claims constitute a 
cognitive optimum, in which a concept is both learnable and non-natural'. 163 
This complex of the intuitive and the counterintuitive amounts to a practical 
logic with which to engage the complexity of being-in-the-world. Herein lies 
the ongoing vitality of religious discourse in human life, and its variable yet 
characteristic concern with aspects of reality beyond those normally accessible, 
not least beings whose powers extend far beyond the limits of normal human 
capacities. 
What is especially significant to me in such an approach is that it need not 
formally implicate the question of where such anomalous conceptions take 
their ultimate starting-point, a question that otherwise recurs insistently as a 
means of either valorisation or derogation.164 What Boyer in fact intends, as his 
recent popularisation of his academic work spells out, is the latter: to limit 
religion to the status of a by-product of human cognition.165 But while the 'how' 
162 
163 
164 
165 
Compare e.g. the conception of super-agents in anthropomorphic terms: Barrett and Keil (1996); Barrett (2001); Guthrie (2001). 
Boyer (1994), 121. Compare Lawson and McCauley (1990), 7-8; Sperber (1994), 54. See 
also Bowker (1973), 82: 'Precisely for this reason, the threats of implausibility are 
virtually coexistent with the actually projected ways through, and for this reason also 
the actions and words which surround, for example, burial, become deeply connected (ritualized) with possible supports of plausibility.' It is important to distinguish the 
quasi-evolutionary model of cultural transmission involved here from biological 
evolution; see Sperber (1985a), 31 : 'Unlike genes, viruses, or bacteria, which normally 
reproduce, and only exceptionally undergo a mutation, mental representations have a 
basically unstable structure: the normal fate of an idea is to become altered or merge 
with other ideas; what is exceptional is the reproduction of an idea ... To put it 
differently, the strict reproduction of an idea should be seen as a limiting case: the 
degree zero of transformation.' Alternative approaches to human culture might stress 
the practice involved in cultural transmission: ideas are always encompassed by 
contexts of engagem.ent, or, with Bowker (1995) and Flood (1999), 59, the specificity of 
human significance. 
Compare Lawson and McCauley (1990), 1: there are two central groups in the study of 
religion, one manifes ts 'awe in the presence of signals of transcedence', the other 'an 
irrelevant preoccupation with the derogation of the truth content of religious beliefs '; 
Lawson and McCauley seek an alternative; cf. Flood (1999), 32. 
Boyer (2001), 378: 'Whoever designed religion, or designs each religion, seems to have 
uncanny prescience of what will be successful with human minds. But there is of course 
no designer, and no conspiracy either. Religious concepts work that way, they realise 
the miracle of being exactly what people will transmit, simply because other variants 
were created and forgotten or abandoned along the way.' This amounts to a tautology. 
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of Boyer's cognitive epidemics explains religion as an integral part of cultural 
life, this cannot discount the myriad specific moments of human participation in 
the world: the autonomy of ongoing cultural life that Boyer argues can only be 
a relative autonomy, and it cannot rule out, for example, the possibility of 
specific points of (anomalous) contact between gods and mortals,166 The 
ultimate origin, the 'real referent', of a given instance of religious discourse may 
potentially be located in divine revelation from on high, or in the historical 
contingency of the founder of a given cult, or in the 'subjective' psychological 
experiences of an individuat or in the creativity of a particular archaic Greek 
poet, or indeed in the existing cultural and social environment of a given group; 
yet, crucially, the cognitive processes with which people engage these aspects of 
their being-in-the-world are not as a consequence beyond reach. The 'origins' 
of religion are not something that needs to be accounted for in order to 
characterise religious discourse, regardless of how important such origins may 
be in particular cultural contexts, or indeed within the methodological 
framework of various approaches to the study of religion. As such, this is an 
approach to religious discourse that is not focused on 'religious experience' in 
an originary sense, conceived as an authorising external referent underlying 
any truly 'religious' religious discourse, but instead on the ways that people 
manage all their participation in the world. Gadamer' s distinction between 
experience as residue and experience as process is reproduced once again. 
This approach to religious discourse is grounded in the processes of 
living and telling in similar ways to the approach to Greek epic poetry that I 
outlined above. So what sort of an exploration of these anomalous ideas do the 
narratives of Greek epic offer? Narrative on this understanding offers not a 
representation of experience-as-residue, but experience-as-process in the very 
act of narration, in which both performers and audiences jointly participate in 
exploring sense and significance. In such narratives the counterintuitive aspects 
of religious discourse that Boyer has identified play a crucial role as evocations 
of structuring response, of making 'sense' as both perception and significance. 
The singularity of the counterintuitive is preserved as anti-structure within the 
overall structuration of experience that narrative comprises, in which poet and 
audience together lead out their attention into the world. I will go on in the 
second chapter of this thesis to consider the exploration of the presence of the 
166 
For criticism of such approaches as inadequate to the specificity of people's lives, see 
Bowker (1995), 98-107. 
Compare Bowker (1973), 16: 'a priori, in behavioural terms alone, the possibility cannot 
be excluded that God is the origin of the sense of God-a possibility which to Tylor, 
Durkheim, and Freud was simply inadmissible'. See also Bowker (1995), 116. 
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gods in terms of this dynamic of structure and anti-structure-of making 
'sense' (both perception and significance) and of being confronted by 
awareness of an inability to make 'sense'. Anti-structure does not mean a 
transcendent 'object' underlying religious phenomena and experience, as in the 
religious phenomenology of Otto and van der Leeuw, but instead a culturally 
framed point of engagement with the possibility of disruption in the world.167 
Prickett quotes one Johann Baptist Metz: '"The shortest definition of religion: 
interruption"' .168 A classicist might quote Solon as told by Herodotos: To 8E'Lov 
nav E-ov <j>8ovEp6v TE Ka't. TapaxcWEc;-.169 But compare also Gill: 'To recognize 
something as a center or originating event is not to locate a hierophany, a point 
of rupture, but to participate in a mode of human creativity'.17D The sense of 
estrangement that such disruption carries with it is not a theme confined to 
encounters with gods, but wherever such estrangement arises the ramifications 
are potentially religious in their scope.171 It will be my contention at the close of 
the second chapter that Iliad 24 already explores such religious potential in the 
encounter between Akhilleus and Priamos: neither of them are gods, at least so 
far as their mortality hangs heavy over the entire exchange, but their encounter 
constitutes a moment of disruption within the overall story of the war that 
amounts to a mutual epiphany with a crucial role in the ending of the Iliadic 
narrative itself. 
This focus on religious discourse, and story-telling in particular, is not 
...__ 
intended as a displacement of other forms of religious activity in the world. 
Particular forms of activity are more and less central in relation to particular 
contexts and constraints of performability. For example, the physical structures 
of sanctuary sites, as specific shapings of the world in terms of human and 
divine that are realised in the landscape itself, constitute items of central 
importance in the institutional history of Greek religion, particularly insofar as 
they structure the territory of the city and its boundaries.172 Likewise, rituals of 
sacrifice, as carried out within the social environment of a particular city-state, 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
R. Otto ([1917] 1950); van der Leeuw (1938) . For a critique of this 'phenmnenology of 
religion', see Flood (1999), 96-99. 
Prickett (2002), 261, 
Hdt. 1.32. Compare Redfield ([1975]1994), 247, on the Ilind : 'Neither do we, as we 
stand with the poet, see the gods as fixed foundations; they are more like recurrent 
dilemmas.' For Solon's comment in context, see e.g. Lateiner (1989), 202-203; Arieti 
(1995), 50-51; Thompson (1996), 14-16; Romm (1998), 60-63; Harrison (2000), 35-37. 
S. Gill (1998b), 305. 
See esp. Levinas ([1961]1991), ([1986]1998) for a transcendental e thics based on the 
phenomenology of the other. 
See Kearns (1992); Alcock and Osborne (edd.) (1994). 
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are of particular importance as communal presentations of communication with 
the gods. 173 These activities are not, however, necessarily distinct qua 'religious' 
from, for instance, the 'imagined' versions of sacrifice that form a central 
obsession of fifth-century Athenian tragedy, even if they are distinct in the 
particular conditions of their performability. All are cultural expressions that 
could be called religious, and all are something that people really participate in, 
even if the modes of this participation take different forms. In particular, it is 
entirely feasible for one such expression to influence and shape another, as part 
of the continuum of cultural life. By way of illustration, compare for a moment 
Seaford's remark at the beginning of his Reciprocity and Ritual about a 
seemingly obvious difference between Greek poetry and Greek ritual, namely 
that '[t]he Iliad represents, but does not perform, the funeral of Patroklos' .174 
But just what does this distinction entail? Seaford's book is methodologically 
oriented around close reading of the 'performance' of ritual alongside the 
developing city-state's 'representation' of ritual in epic and tragedy; 
'performance' and 'representation' specifically come together in the evolution 
of hero-cult, and ritual thus plays a fundamental role in the cohesion of 
society.17S I would frame the problem differently, from a perspective that is 
both less teleological and less committed to a Durkheimian view of religion as a 
hypostasis of society: Iliad 23 does in some sense 'perform' the funeral of 
Patroklos, not in the terms of an opposition between performance and 
representationr but instead in the only way it is now possible to 'perform' the 
funeral of Patroklos (and not a second funeral of Patroklos). That is to say, it is 
not the performance of Patroklos's funeral in the specific sense of an event 
which took place in a particular place and time (on the plain of Troy generations 
ago), nor a representation in the specific sense that it simply replays this 
historical event; but it is itself an enactment of the funeral of Patroklos, in an 
exemplary form, created and expressed in the medium of traditional verbal 
performance (epic). Obviously such an exemplary funeral has conditions of 
performability distinct from, for example, those of an inscribed and carved 
cenotaph marking the death in battle of an individual Athenian in 394/393 BCE, 
173 
174 
175 
See esp. Xenophon, Hell . 2.4.20-21; also Sourvinou-Inwood (1988); Sourvinou-Inwood 
(1990); Parker (1996) . 
Seaford (1994), xiv . 
See e .g. Seaford (1994), 186-189. The interrelation of representation and performance 
through ritual is also fundamental to Seaford (ed.) (1996). This intense preoccupation 
with the cohesiveness of ritual gives a teleological bias to what might be better 
characterised in terms of dynamics; compare Seaford (1994), xiv: 'because ritual is the 
expression of cohesion and control, it always moves ... towards a positive conclusion'. 
But see Kapferer (1997), 287-297, for an exemplary discussion of the destructive 
potential in the ritual dynamics of power. 
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but the two may quite legitimately be read together: institutions like the 
Athenian epitaphios agon and epitaphios logos show us the potential for such 
'historical' and 'mythical' religious activity to interact. 176 So too, the funeral of 
Patroklos as enacted in Iliad 23 may be read as a part of the broad continuum of 
Greek religion that encompasses the specific historical practices of rituat so long 
as the specific contexts of performability are given appropriate consideration.l77 
When it comes to religion the conceptual boundaries that are often set up 
around verbal discourse, and narrative ('literature') in particular, should be 
treated with caution in favour of an increased focus on the conditions of 
performability of any text or action, or any set thereof . 
• 
• • 
In this introduction, I have outlined some important aspects of the problem of 
reading epiphany as religious discourse. By setting aside questions of 
'experience' or 'belief as the primary legitimating factors in examining forms of 
religious expression, we can respond more fully to the specific challenges that 
the full variety of religious expression encompasses. In this light we might 
more profitably regard cognition (sensation, presence) and culture (significance, 
understanding, authority, commitment) jointly as potential problems within 
religious discourse, as inclusively conceived, rather than as criteria by which to 
delimit religious discourse as a category of exclusion. If 'epic epiphany' 
remained a recurrent conceptual frame for exploring and understanding the 
possibilities of divine presence in the face of changing circumstances, it did so as 
a legitimate part of the continuum of religious expression, and one that offered 
specific advantages in facilitating the exploration of exemplary issues of divine 
and mortal (co)existence within the world above and beyond those afforded by 
176 
177 
See Clairmont (1983), 209-212, nos 68a and 68b; and 219-221, no. 68A, for the Dexileos 
relief, and on the public commemoration of those who fell in this battle: the Dexileos 
relief constitutes 'a private memorial over a kenotaph beside the assumed existence of a 
public men1orial' . Supposedly, the epitnphios ngon at Athens was first instituted at 
the time of the Persian wars; see Clainnont (1983), 22-24 citing Diodorus 11.33.3; thus it 
would represent the adoption of a widespread 'mythical' model familiar from Iliad 23 
in a newly insitutionalised form . Against this, Loraux (1986a), 37, 53 n. 80, notes that 
the absence of a 'theology' of battle in the Athenian epitaphioi logoi is a marked point 
of discontinuity, with one (minor) exception in Lysias Epitnphios 58. 
For such caution about Patroklos's funeral in terms of contexts of performability, 
compare Clainnont (1983), 7. 
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other forms of religious expression. The creativity of processes of 
understanding, telling and acting, is, according to this view, fundamental to 
religious activity, and not a distortion of 'pure experience'. Religious concepts, 
experiences, practices, and the conceptualisation of the relations of gods with 
humans in the world, are all created and creative in this sense, despite the 
differing performance constraints that may be operating in particular cases. 
Accordingly, the dynamic relationship between 'historical' and 'imaginative' 
forms of religious representation becomes explainable as that between different 
instances of a more general process of articulating how the world might be. 
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2. Sense and presence: 
relating divine epiphany in Homer 
Questions relative to God are not resolved by answers in which the interrogation 
ceases to resonate or is wholly pacified. 
47 
Levinas, Of God Who Comes to Mind. 
The unanswerable question Kierkegaard repeatedly asks is, How can the other 
speak and be heard without ceasing to be other? 
M. C. Taylor, About Religion. 
First steps 
In approaching divine epiphany in Homer, first steps are significant. Much has 
been written before now about the gods in Homer; much has depended upon 
the chosen frame of investigation. Questions of how to read Homer's gods 
have been raised in acute forms at least since Xenophanes and Herodotos, and 
such questions have had fundamental effects. Are we to read Homer's gods as 
part of a literary genealogy, or as a chapter in the history of religions, or again 
as reflecting a stage in the emergent psychology of the Greeks (and by 
implication, Western civilisation), or as what?1 It is perhaps unsurprising that, 
despite the deep familiarity of the Homeric material, the gods and their 
For early readers of Homer's gods, see e.g. Hdt. 2.53 with R. Thomas (2000), 274-281, and 
Xenophanes: see below, p. 105 n . 225. More broadly, see Pfeiffer (1968), 3-15; Lamberton 
(1986), 10-48; Feeney (1991), 5-56. 
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modalities have remained intensely contested topics.2 In the previous chapter I 
argued that we should dispense with certain assumptions that have 
underpinned discussion of narratives of divine appearance, in particular the 
recourse to 'experience' as an evaluative touch-stone. A point I make there 
should be underlined: narratives of gods and mortals in the Homeric poems are 
not representations that stand or fall by their putative relationship with some 
form of experience 'out there'; they are realisations or enactments of the gods 
that are experiences in themselves.3 The operative model of poet and audience 
that I want to stress is one of active participation in an imaginative and 
experiential project. In this chapter I will shift the focus of my attention onto the 
Homeric text itself and explore the consequences for reading Homer's gods that 
stem from this approach. 
Above all, I do not want to approach 'divine epiphany' as if it were a self-
evident category of investigation, especially of typological investigation. The 
dominant conceptual approach to divine appearances in Homer is typological, 
as influentially formulated by Pfister.4 Insofar as the disruption that such 
appearances bring with them is acknowledged, it is naturalised by Pfister within_ 
frames of similarity and regularity as a complication of narrative genre and the 
differential degrees of distortion and creativity that these entail. The cross-
cultural and diachronic comparative approach of Pfister is a common one in the 
----study of ancient religion, but the terms in which the investigation is 
framed-similarity, repetition, typology-are question-begging.5 Two sections 
of Richardson's commentary on the Homeric Hymn to Demeter exemplify this 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Compare e.g. the 'aes thetic' issues raised in comparing or contrasting the Homeric gods 
and more 'monstrous' NE material: for an older version, see Murray (1934), 120-145; more 
recently Griffin (1980), 172-178, joined the fray singling out for criticism Kirk (1970); 
Griffin received a stout rejoinder in Lynn-George (1982), esp. 243-244. Compare Griffin 
(1977) for a similar vision of Homer as aesthetically distinct from the epic cycle; there 
too he downplays what monstrousness there is in Homer. By contrast, the Homeric 
poems arguably depend upon these 'others' as the background against which monstrous 
traces must be understood, as both allusive presence and elusive absence (the importance 
of these traces was underlined to me by Michael Clarke); for a related set of arguments 
modifying Homer's 'uniqueness' in terms of a relative opposition of local and 
Panhellenic, see Nagy ([1979]1999), 7-8 §14n4; Nagy (1990a), 122-142; Nagy (1990b), 71-
72 and n. 99. 
See above, pp. 34-46. 
Pfister (1924); cf. above, pp. 21-23. 
On the importance of difference to comparative studies, see J. Z. Smith (1982), 35: 'We 
are left with the dilemma shrewdly stated by Wittgenstein: "But isn't the same at 
least the same? ... " Comparison requires the postulation of difference as the grounds of 
it being interesting (rather than tautological) and a methodical manipulation of 
difference, a playing across the "gap" in the service of some useful end.' On Smith's 
comparativism, see S. Gill (1998a); Urban (2000). 
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approach in a striking form, in which he blends insights gained from the 
morphological study of Homeric type-scenes together with the typologies of 
the characteristics of divine epiphany drawn up by Pfister.6 The persistence of 
such models is marked. Even Vernant, in the midst of a fundamental article 
about the disconcerting 'superbody' of the gods, and directly after observing 
that there is no 'single standard scenario' for divine apparitions, nevertheless 
feels the need to 'venture a typological schema of the forms assumed by the 
gods when they make corporeal appearances'? I will consider in greater detail 
below some of the uncertainties that arise in relation to category-based 
approaches. My basic point is that from the start such strategies are aimed at 
delimiting divine epiphany as a discrete, identifiable event, within the twin 
frames of characteristic typology and the patterning of type-scene analysis. As 
such, possibilities for disruption, non-regularity and the tmusual are contained 
from the outset. But the problem of 'divine epiphany' is not least a question 
about interruption of mundane frames of reference, about counterintuitive 
aspects of the world and about the recognition of such possibilities.s The set of 
relations that is informed by the opposition human/ divine, in Homer no less 
~han in various other areas of Greek cultural activity, is predicated upon going 
beyond mortal, mundane frames. 9 The potential for the presence and activity of 
gods to disrupt mortal existence is a fundamental aspect of this relationship and 
the annihilating thunderbolt of Zeus is one of its most prominent tropes.1o The 
question is how to frame discussion so as not to foreclose this disruptive 
potential. 
In adopting as a frame 'divine epiphany', one thing at least seems to be 
implied, namely that a basic question will be about divine presence. But 
specifically what this divine presence might be thought to be, how it might be 
manifested, how it might be recognised, are questions that immediately 
complicate the basic terrain. Such questions are fundamental problems in 
relation to the boundaries of what we might consider 'epiphany' to be. Our 
responses to them have specific consequences for the studies which result. For 
example, some have followed Nilsson in the attempt to reduce questions of 
divine presence to a function of certain (disputed) aspects of human motivation 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
Richardson (ed.) (1974), 207-211 and 252-256. 
Vernant ([1986]1991a), 42. 
Recall again the quotation, by Prickett (2002), 261, of one Johann Baptist Metz: "'The 
shortest definition of religion: interruption"'. For the counter-intuitive in religious 
discourse, see above, pp. 40-41. 
See esp. Vernant ([1986] 1991a). 
See below, pp. 150 n . 420. 
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and decision-making. 11 For others Homeric epiphany is evidence for the 
historical development of early Greek religious experience.12 Some have 
adopted a focus more closely restricted to the internal parameters of the 
Homeric text and how the gods function in relation to the narrative and 
thematic structure of the Iliad and Odyssey.13 Others have focused in detail on 
the mechanisms of divine appearance and disguise in the Homeric poems.14 
Needless to say, there is overlap among these approaches. I would emphasise 
one relatively recent approach in which the appearances of the Homeric gods 
are signs to be read and interpreted in ways similar to those deployed in 
contexts of omens and divination.15 The stress on active hermeneutics in this 
orientation, and on the processes of reading, both internal and external to the 
epic itself, is a key feature that I will develop in relation to the presence and 
activity of the gods within the Homeric poems. 
Ami<;i all this scholarly work certain choices have had pervasive effects 
on the investigation of divine epiphany. As J. Z. Smith writes: 'For a student of 
religion concerned with generic matters, choice is everything' .16 In the first 
section of this chapter, I will consider two approaches that are broadly 
representative of the strategies adopted in relation to divine appearances, in 
order to highlight the centrality of the problems that I have posed above, 
namely what divine presence might be thought to be, how it might be 
manifested, how, it might be recognised. The approaches I examine take their 
start from different but related points, one from a categorical proposition about 
what a divine epiphany is, the other from a particular instance of what divine 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
In the wake of J0rgensen (1904) and Nilsson (1924), much work continues or disputes this 
line of discussion: see particularly Dodds (1951), 14ff.; Snell (1953); Lesky (1961); 
Nilsson (1968), vol. 1, 218-219; Tsagarakis (1980); Hooker (1990); Hammer (1998). For 
overview, see Graf (1991). 
See recently Dietrich (1994); Burkert (1997); Dietrich (1997). For epiphany in Minoan 
contexts, see e.g. Hagg (1983), (1986). Analogous to this approach is the role the gods 
have played in analytic criticism as indexes of compositionallayers: see the critique by 
Calhoun (1937) . 
See now Pucci (2002); other notable discussions include Ehnmark (1934); Elmmark (1939), 
3-69; Schrade (1952); Chantraine (1954); Otto (1954); Kullmann (1956); Whitman 
(1958), 221-248; Severyns (1966); Lesky (1968), esp. 725-740; Tsagarakis (1977); Griffin 
(1980); Clay (1983); Schein (1984), 45-66; Emlyn-Jones (1992); Redfield ([1975]1994), 
225-247; Heiden (1997). 
Particularly useful are Kullmann (1956); Willcock ([1970] 1978b); Richardson (ed.) 
(1974), 207-211, 252-256; Clay (1974); Fauth (1975); Bushnell (1982); Dietrich (1983); 
Pucci ([1985]1998d); Murnaghan (1987); Pucci (1987); Pucci ([1988]1998b); W. Smith 
(1988); Pelliccia (1995), 77ff., 273ff. On the related question of gods as birds, see below, 
pp. 136-137. 
See particularly Willcock ([1970]1978b); Bushnell (1982); Pucci ([1985]1998d); Pucci 
(1986); Murnaghan (1987); Pucci (1987); Pucci ([1988]1998b); C. G. Thomas (1996). 
J. Z. Smith (1987), xi-xii . 
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epiphany is taken to be. In this examination I want to stress the problematic 
consequences that stem from occlusion of the questions that I have highlighted 
above: too often questions about divine presence, its modalities and its 
manifestations are assumed to possess fairly self-evident parameters. In my 
view, this is far from being the case. 
From this starting point I will move on to consider in greater depth the 
focal questions that I have outlined above. Each of these questions directs 
attention in a certain way at the modalities of divine presence in the Homeric 
poems. Central to my analysis is the capability of language to express ideas and 
images in relational terms and thus to embody things and states which elude 
expression il'l more straightforward denominational terms. But this relational 
language functions precisely in a communicative context: Homeric poetry is 
speech and as such involves the active participation of audiences ll'l the frames 
within which such ideas and images are to be understood and gain significance. 
I want to draw particular attention to how the presentation of divine presence 
il'l Homer repays closer attention to how things are told, to whom and by 
whom. The potential difference of various vantage-points il'l and on the 
text-narrators, characters and audiences-is particularly important in the play 
of divine presence. The critical focus directed towards such issues in narratology 
offers important insights, since this approach is entirely oriented towards 
questions of placem~nt and perception: inequality of perspectives between the 
various internal and external participants in the text/narrative/ story is a central 
dynamic.17 As Lowe points out, a narratological perspective puts a particular 
emphasis on reading as a hermeneutic activity.18 It seems to me that it is vital to 
carry over this emphasis into the reading of divine appearances to allow for the 
complex emergence in a given narrative of multiple perspectives, each of which 
is not the 'whole story' and thus holds out the possibility of being 
supplemented. These twin prospects of incompleteness and supplementarity 
are crucial to the investigation of divine epiphany in the Homeric text. 
r 
17 
18 
I do not make system.atic use of (any particular) narratological terminology, but note 
Genette ([1983]1988), 8: 'th e mechanics of narratology ... at its bes t is distinguished by a 
respect for the mechanisms of the text.' For narratology and Homer, see de Jong (1987), 
(2001); and esp. Lowe (2000) with his game-like model of narrative. On the figure(s) of 
narrator/poet, seeS. Richardson (1990); Doherty (1995); Rabel (1997) . On the basic 
distinction between narrator- and character-speech, esp. in the case of Akhilleus, see 
e.g. Whitman (1958); A. Parry (1972); Reeve (1973); Griffin (1986); de Jong (1988); 
Martin (1989); de Jong (1992); Crotty (1994); de Jong (1997). 
See Lowe (2000), 12-14. 
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From the outset, then, a basic caution about delimitation and 
categorisation informs my approach to questions of divine presence and its 
modalities in the Homeric poems. In place of an emphasis on things and 
characteristic typologies, I prefer to think in terms of process and structuration. 
Narrative is an obvious process to consider in relation to accounts of divine 
interaction with mortals. But, more than this, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, my interest in narrativisation of gods and their appearances lies in the 
particular facility that narratives possess for exploring-that is to say, for 
realising, objectifying, and one may even say 'creating'-beyond-human 
aspects of human being-in-the-world. Such realisations of gods-in-the-world 
may be startling at the moments of their creation; but they may also constitute 
a compelling set of images within ongoing contexts of cultural transmission and 
inculcation of the 'sense' of presence.19 The afterlife of Homeric epic, and 'epic 
epiphany', bears eloquent witness to this. 
• • 
' Epiphany as category and paradigm? 
I suggested above that if one thing is implicated in a consideration of divine 
epiphany in Homer it is the question of divine presence. But what such presence 
might be, how it might be manifested, and how it might be recognised are 
questions that are much less self-evident. In order to explore the implications 
that certain choices might have for this problematic, I want to consider two 
approaches to divine epiphany: one starts from a categorical proposition; the 
other begins from a particular instance. Both are respectable methods; both 
yield results. But I want to suggest that there are ways in which each of these 
19 Compare Bourdieu (1977), 124: ' ... the socially informed body, with all its tastes and 
distastes, its compulsions and repulsions, with, in a word, all its senses .. . [including] 
what might be called the sense of limits and the legitimate transgression of limits, 
which is at once the basis of the ordering of the world ... and of the ritual actions 
intended to authorize or facilitate the necessary or unavoidable breaches of that order.' 
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approaches might in practice have served to conceal some important points 
about the modalities of divine presence. 
In the first scenario, the investigative approach takes its start, whether 
implicitly or explicitly, from a categorical observation: 'an epiphany is [fill in 
desired characteristics]'. Hooker at one point spells out the subtext of much 
written on epiphany when he refers to 'an appearance with the properties of 
terror and wonder that make it a true epiphany'20 The phrase used by Hooker 
here, 'true epiphany', recurs in similar forms: compare Kullmann's 'eigentliche 
Epiphanie'. 21 This impulse to frame investigation in terms of typologies or 
taxonomies is a common one in the history of the study of religious materials, 
due in part-perhaps perversely-to the fact that such materials often display 
features which seem at first glance to blur or transgress categorical boundaries. 
Categorisation and typology in such contexts is the exertion of control over 
disruptive and disorienting material.22 Scholarly writing about Greek religion is 
no exception, and it is frequently framed from the outset by a delimitation of its 
subject matter in categorical terms. To cite just one recent example, itself a very 
useful study of a relatively neglected area, consider Larson's recent book on 
Greek nymphs: 'In order to be able to discuss the roles and functions of 
nymphs in Greek culture, we must be able to distinguish them from other, 
similar figures.'23 Thus Larson's first chapter is entitled 'What is a nymph?', and 
is framed in on!ological and taxonomic terms. Yet, despite the admitted fact that 
the material Larson is scrutinising renders problematic the delineation of a 
taxonomy of 'nymph', the categorical task itself is not held up to scrutiny.24 A 
basic question that must be confronted in just such a case is whether a term like 
vuf-Lcpll, which is used across a range of religious, sexual and social contexts, 
should be understood in the first instance as denoting a taxonomic category at 
all.25 One might instead confront its larger range of usage and meaning, and 
how it operates in a fashion that is more relational than denominative, as an 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Hooker (1990), 32: 'Hardly has the poem begun than Apollo appears in answer to 
Chryses' prayer: an appearance with the properties of terror and wonder that make it a 
true epiphany'. 
Kullmann (1956), 93: 'We1m wir jetzt zu der eigentlichen Epiphanie der Cotter kommen, 
ist es vor allem notwendig, uber die Gestalt zu sprechen, in der die Cotter unter den 
Menschen erscheinen'. 
Compare a recent comment by Andresen (2001b), 12: 'As with religious experience in 
general, some authors attempt to typologize mystical experiences, though many of these 
typologies appear somewhat arbitrary, based on limited observation'. See above, p. 7 n. 
6, on the categorical problem presented by 'religion' itself. 
Larson (2001), viii. 
See Larson (2001), 3-8. 
See esp. Winkler (1990), 181ff.; also Calasso (2001), 30-34. 
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actively relating and 'ordering' term to be used with performative force m 
response to contextually specific needs. 
The case is similar with divine epiphany. Even Pietro Pucci, who has been 
particularly anxious in his work to stress the potential for 'reticence' in the 
depiction of divine appearances in Homer, adopts from the start a normative 
definition of epiphany as 'the unexpected self-revelation of a god by means of 
shapes and signs that are recognizable and identifiable to a human being who is 
wide awake', a definition which both determines the contours of his own 
discussion of epiphany and sets out exclusionary boundaries in respect of what 
material it is legitimate to consider.26 Behind such definitions is a scholarly 
genealogy that goes back at least to the treatment by Pfister of epiphany in 
terms of a descriptive typology of the generic and characteristic forms through 
which the appearance of gods is articulated.27 A categorical and typological 
perspective of this sort has the double effect of foregrounding some and 
excluding other clusters within the potential body of material that might be 
brought to bear on the question of divine epiphany. 
This genealogy may also encompass the investigation of oral-poetic 
type-scenes in Homer. Here the 'divine visitation' has a place, specifically in 
reference to the not infrequently attested rhythm of divine motivation and 
preparation, journey from Olympos, arrival, communication and departure.28 I 
26 
27 
28 
The definition continues, Pucci ([1985]1998d), 71, n .3: 'I thus exclude dreams, oracles, 
divine manifestations such as thunder, any divine presence or companionship that is 
constant or potentially constant (as when Circe becomes the lover of Odysseus), and 
miraculous or m.agical visions of gods (like that which Athena makes possible for 
Diomedes) that are not self-revelations'. More recently, Pucci (1994), 15, in weaker 
terms: 'when the divine beings intervene among mortals and are perceived as being 
there (epiphany)' . 
That this focus on 'true' or 'eigentlich' epiphany goes back in form if not in terminology 
to Pfister (1924) (who is singled out by Kullmann (1956), 93 n. 3) seem.s clear fron1 how 
Pfister concludes his terminological discussion after surveying of the history of the word 
E-m<jlcivna in Greek, col. 281: 'In diesem Artikel gebrauchen wir also das Wort E., dem 
bei uns wohl meist i.iblichen Sprachgebrauch folgend, in etwas engerem Sinne als die 
Griechen das W ort E-m<jlcivna, namlich fur diejenige Form der gottlichen Offenbarung, 
bei der das t.ibermenschliche Wesen, ein Gott, ein H eros, ein Totengeist personlich 
sichtbar unter den Menschen erscheint' . Other discussions of 'epiphany' in the Greek 
context have taken fuller accom1t of the usage of the Greek term, E-m<jlcivna, though it is 
non-classical in its 'religious' senses: see e.g. Pax (1955), and Pax (1962), but Pax adopts 
the terms 'to tale' and 'partielle Epiphanie' to divide up the field once again. Versnel 
(1987) discusses the issue with clarity; note esp. 52: 'the term epiphaneia denotes two 
things: the personal appearance of a god and his miraculous deeds ... the two aspects of 
one indissoluble unity, of which now the one, then the other may dominate the 
description'. 
For 'divine visitation' as type-scene, see Edwards (1992), 309-310, with bibliography. 
See also Pucci ([1988]1998b), 87-88. The study of type-scenes was begun in earnes t by 
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raised earlier one particular example of the specific integration of Pfister's 
typology with type-scene analysis of this sort, in the form of Richardson's notes 
on the first and second 'epiphany' scenes in the Homeric Hymn to Demeter.29 
Within such type-scene analysis, basic schemas emerge in contexts of 'divine 
visitation' .30 The structure of this particular schema involves movement from 
Olympos to the mortal world, and accordingly it seems already designed to suit 
considerations of divine epiphany that make capital out of the play of intrusion 
in instances of divine appearance, a god entering the mortal sphere. What such 
a schema does is to focus questions of divine presence along certain corporeal 
lines, since it is an adaption on both conceptual and linguistic levels of more 
general schemes of movement, arrival and communication within the mortal 
world, and it is not perhaps surprising that such schemes of divine visitation are 
not commensurate with the range of material that might be considered in 
relation to divine presence and its manifestations. There is in fact a significant 
issue concealed in this seemingly uncontroversial play of movement and 
intrusion. While it is possible to cite instances of divine appearances to mortals 
that are articulated in corporeal terms closely related to the mortal corporeal 
code, other instances make much freer play with the relationship between the 
presence of the gods and the 'body' of the gods.31 The temptation is to focus on 
those instances which seem to give the fullest version of the scheme and to reify 
them into an essential type from which all others derive by subtraction, 
whether in terms. of a less coherent mapping together of corporeality, form and 
presence, or in terms of the simple omission of stages or features that appear 
within the schema in other places. But this temptation should be resisted. 32 Most 
notably, what such schemes overlooks is the central problem of corporeality 
and perception in contexts of divine presence, as a direct result of adapting 
schemes that apply to situations where the parameters of mortal corporeal 
presence are a given and never a problem. Consequently, the possibilities for 
gestures towards transcendence within such a model are reduced to an extra set 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Arend (1933), but without the benefit of Parry's work on orality in Homer: see Parry 
([1936] 1970b ). Among recent work, see esp. Foley (1990), eh . 7; Foley (1999), esp. eh. 6; 
and now, with a cognitive emphasis, Minchin (2001), esp. 32-72. 
N. Richardson (ed.) (1974), 207-211 and 252-256; cf. above, pp. 48-49. 
Compare e.g. Sowa (1984), 251; Fli.ickiger-Guggenheim (1984), 11-12; Garcia (2002), 15. 
On divine corporeality, see below, pp. 93-125. 
On the methodological status of type-scenes, see esp. Nagler (1974). For the dangers of 
reifying types and patterns in such contexts, see Dickson (1990), esp . 66-69; and Edwards 
(1997), 274, on the particular value of Nagler's approach in terms of Gestalt: it 'is a 
very salutary reminder that whether in the case of formulae, type-scenes, or story 
patterns, one must beware of the tendency to identify one form (perhaps the commonest) 
as a model or prototype upon which the others are based'. Compare also Foley (1999), 
83-84: the units of type-scene analysis are 'pliable multiforms', not memorized data. 
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of definable characteristics which apparently evidence the 'supernatural', and 
these characteristics are more or less superimposed onto more familiar mortal 
corporeally-articulated schemes of journey, arrival and communication.33 The 
impulse towards reification tends to obscure what is revealed by more sensitive 
analyses of the Homeric text in terms of type-scenes, or type-scene-like 
structures. Compare, for instance, Minchin's recent 'script' analysis: often what 
is of most interest in the functioning of scripts is their disruption-'how novel 
developments in_ the narrative routine may be achieved when script-based 
expectations are not met' .34 It seems crucial to me to formulate an approach to 
divine epiphany that addresses more centrally the rhetoric that surrounds the 
presence of the gods and its manifestations, namely that the gods exceed and 
overflow normal bounds-that they transcend mortal frames. 
To put a particular example to the test, I wonder how Pucci, for instance, 
would prefer to categorise Athene's spectacular descent in Iliad 4, given how 
strictly he circumscribes 'divine epiphany' in the definition I have quoted above. 
The descent of the goddess in this passage is like a shooting star or meteor, and 
it provokes amazement in both Greeks and Trojans alike and a general 
response as if to an omen.3s 
~fj 8f: KaT' 0UAUfl TTOLO Kap~vwv at~aaa. 
75 OLOV 8' clCJTEpa ~KE Kp6vou mhs- ayKUAOfl~TEW 
~ vavTT]LCJL TEpas- ~E: aTpaTwL EVpEL A.awv, 
~ 
AGflTTp6v, TOV 8£ TE rroAA.ot arro amv8fjpES" 'LEVTaL, 
TWL ELKUL' ~-L~EV ETTL x86va naAA.as 'A8~VT], 
Ka8 8' 1!8op ' E-s- flECJaov· 8cifl~OS' 8' EXEV daop6wvTas-
80 T pwcis- 8' \. rrrro8ci f1-ous- Kat E-DKV~f1- L 8as- 'Axmous-. 
cll8E 8£ TLS' dTTECJKEV t8wv ES' TTAT]CJLOV aAA.ov· 
·· ~ p' a l'ms- rr6AEflOS' TE KGKOS' Kat <f>uA.oms- atv~ 
fCJCJETaL, ~ <f>LAOTT]TG fl-ET' clfl<f>OTEpOLCJL TL8T]CJLV 
ZEVS'' OS' T' av8pwrrwv Tafll llS' TTOAEflOLO TETUKTGL; 
85 WS' apa TLS' e'LTTECJKEV 'Axmwv TE Tpwwv TE. 
This spectacular descent IS the first step that Athene takes as she provokes 
Pandarus into breaking the truce; she will perform this subsequent action 
disguised as Laodokos without any moment of self-revelation. Is this 
33 
34 
35 
As e.g. N. Richardson (ed.) (1974), 208, esp . 252: '1. Supernatural stature and 
appearm1ce. 2. Loss of old age. 3. Beauty "breathed around". 4. Divine fragrance from 
the goddess's clothes. 5. Divine radiance from her body, filling the house like 
lightning. 6. Hair flowing down over her shoulders. 7. Fear and speechlessness of the 
onlooker.' See also Severyns (1966), 33-43, for a similar list of characteristics. 
See Minchin (2001), 45-49; quotation on 49. 
I/ . 4.74-85. 
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spectacular descent an epiphany? It is not exactly in line with the terms of 
Pucci's definition, with its stress on self-revelation, recognizability and 
identification, for all that it is certainly unexpected. Athene's descent is 
apparently perceived by the watching Greeks and Trojans 'like' a semantically 
ambivaleri.t wonder, whose precise import they can refine only down to the 
alternative possibilities of war or peace.36 This sequence reveals a certain slide of 
perception across the putative boundary of the simile itself: the meteor is a 
TEpa') in the terms of the simile; but it is also precisely as a TEpa') that the Trojans 
and Greeks read it ambivalently in the following lines.37 Yet if all this is so, why 
then is this passage brought up in relation to divine epiphany in Homer? 
Richardson, for example, explicitly cites this passage in considering 'the two 
main points [arrival and departure] at which deities tend to reveal 
themselves'.38 This is not just a scholarly reaction: the Homeric Hymn to Apollo 
adopts a similarly meteoric mode in describing the god's epiphany at his 
temple.39 The question remains: is this an epiphany or not? 
At least two specific issues are critical here. In the first place, how 
'deliberate' is this particular appearance of Athene? It is the implication of both 
Richardson's formulation above ('tend to reveal themselves') and Pucci's 
definition of divine epiphany ('unexpected self-revelation') that divine 
intentionality and agency are defining components of divine epiphany. But it is 
also true that theEe are instances of divine presence recognised by mortals 
where the modes of revelation cast a degree of ambivalence over how 
intentional, or how reflexively acted out, 'self-revelation' might be taken to be: 
the 'leakage' of Aphrodite's divine body in Iliad 3 in the gaze of Helene and the 
curious traces of Poseidon's divinity that Aias son of Oileos recognises at the 
beginning of Iliad 13 are two notable examples.40 Just so, on one reading of the 
text in this present instance, the power and speed of Athene's descent seem to 
have created their own atmospheric effects. There are other possible instances 
which might be considered in this connection, such as the lengthy sequence of 
divine-mortal interactions that occur in Iliad 5 in the wake of Athene's removal 
of the mist from Diomedes' eyes. It is as if to avoid such complications that 
Pucci specifically excludes this sequence from his consideration of epiphany: for 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
ll. 4.82-84. 
Compare de Jong (1987), 134: 'it appears that the descent is also focalized by the Greek 
and Trojan soldiers'. 
N. Richardson (ed.) (1974), 208, on 188-190. 
HomHymnAp. 440-445; see Alien and Sikes (edd.) (1904), on HomHymnAp. 441, 442. 
Aphrodite and Helene: Il. 3.383-446. The departure of Poseidon from the two Aiases: 1/. 
13.62-82. On these, see below, pp. 112-119. For 'leakage', cf. Lateiner (1995), 84. 
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Pucci this sequence is in the realm of the 'magical' or 'miraculous', not of the 
epiphanic.41 But what could it signify for a god to be involved in an 
unintentional 'epiphany'? Just as the sequence of encounters in Iliad 5 explores 
the possible modes of interaction between mortals and gods in unexpected 
ways that I will discuss later, so here too the notion of a more or less 
unintended 'epiphany' can be understood to cast a valuably different 
perspective on the modalities of divine presence in the Homeric poems. 
In the second place, it is unclear to what extent the events involved m 
Athene's descent have been recognised by the Greeks and Trojans as resulting 
from the presence of a god at all. Is it possible to imagine that an 'epiphany' 
might go more or less unrecognised as such? In certain respects this example 
possesses characteristics that are central to the descriptive typologies of 
epiphany as a phenomenon, especially in the reaction of profound 
astonishment, 8cq1.~os-, among the Greeks and Trojans, and in its description as a 
form of bright light.42 But Athene's visible descent is not explicitly recognised 
either as Athene or as a god by the Greeks and Trojans. It is useful to compare 
various scholarly reactions; consider what Kullmann thinks this passage reveals 
about Homer:43 
Das entscheidend Homerische ist, daB die gi:ittliche Epiphanie nicht mit der 
meteorologischen Erscheimmg gleichgesetzt, sondern nm mit ihr verglichen wird . 
Der urspri.ingliche Glaube wird dagegen jede derartige meteorologische Erscheil1Lmg 
' als Epiphanie eines Gottes haben. 
This observation, whatever else might be said about its take on the relationship 
between epiphany and meteorological phenomena, has the specific virtue of 
raising the question of comparison, as against identification, in the case of a 
god's presence: in Kullmann's view, Homer opts for comparison of the god 
with a star over the presumably less sophisticated mode of identifying the god 
as a star. But Kullmann does not consider how this distinction might operate in 
relation to the different perspectives that the Greeks and Trojans and the 
audience of the epic have on the event. Dietrich, by contrast, does raise the 
41 
42 
43 
See above, p. 54 n. 26. 
For the association of 8cii-i~OS' and epiphanies, see esp . Pfister (1924), col. 317; also 
Ehnmark (1934), 16-18; Clay (1983), 167££.; Constantmidou (1994), 11-12; Lateiner 
(1995), 45-46. For 'light' as a feature of epiphany, see esp. D. Bremer (1975), 5-7; Brenk 
(1994); compare e.g. Od . 19.33-43, with Rose (1951); Pfeiffer ([1956]1960); Burkert 
(1997). 
Kullmann (1956), 90-91. Compare Stockil1ger (1959), 20 n. 15; also Mi.ilder (1930), 28-29, 
on Od. 3.382-384 and I/. 10.292-294, for another distinction in terms of Volksglaube, this 
time between the Iliad and Odyssey. 
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central issue of perception, though he rather elides from view the fact that the 
description is cast initially in the form of a simile:44 
Homer can describe divine epiphanies in the form of natural phenomena which are 
perceived as such by the people .. . Although the goddess assumed the appearance 
of the Trojan hero Laodocus before addressing Pandarus, there is no doubt that the 
epiphany itself occurred in the form of a bright star as which she was seen 
descending from the sky. 
But, interestingly, Dietrich's observation that 'Homer can describe divine 
epiphanies in the form of natural phenomena which are perceived as such by 
the people' seems to imply that any epiphany as such here ('the epiphany itself') 
occurs more for the audience than for the Greeks and Trojans who in Dietrich's 
view perceive Athene's descent as a 'natural phenomenon'.45 If this is to be 
called an 'epiphany' in the sort of terms that Pucci adopts, would it not be 
necessary to be more clear about precisely for whom this is to be the case? In a 
similar fashion, it remains unclear whether Richardson has considered exactly 
who is party to this revelation, even as he assimilates this example into his 
schema as an instance of divine self-revelation. It with Pucci, we were to 
foreground recognisability and identification as criteria for epiphany, then the 
question must be added, recognisability and identification for whom? In this 
example, at least, questions such as these are more complex than the appeal to 
self-revelation, recognizability and identification as a defining criteria might 
initially suggest. ..._ 
Still, something that is at least akin to 'epiphany' seems to be taking place 
here, as Richardson and others suggest.46 Of particular importance in this 
respect is how the narrator specifically identifies the presence of the goddess for 
the audience of the epic. Comparison might be made with Athene's appearance 
as a rainbow in Iliad 17;47 or again with the appearance of Apollo near the Greek 
camp in Iliad 1, which Hooker, for instance, calls a 'true epiphany' despite the 
fact that there is no immediate witness or recognition of this appearance other 
than the narrator and the external audience of the epic.48 But in this meteoric 
instance the audience are in fact in a position to answer the interpretative 
44 
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Dietrich (1983), 56. 
The designation 'natural', with its overtones of objectivity, is not helpful in such a 
context; what the Greeks and Trojans see is in fact aTE-pas-, a phenomenon of a very 
different order within a very different frame of reference. Alongside Dietrich's glossing 
of this as 'natural', note what Kullmann implies with his 'meteorology' . 
Compare Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/. 4.78-84. 
Athene as portentous rainbow: Il. 17.547-552; this is compared with Athene as star by 
Kirk (ed.) (1985), on Il. 4.78-84. 
Apollo as plague-bearer: I/. 1.43-52; see Hooker (1990), 32; cf. above, p. 53 n. 20. 
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dilemma verbalised by the Greeks and Trojans in response to what they can see 
of the goddess's presence, since the audience have already been told what Zeus 
and Athene intend. In this way, Athene's spectacular descent invites responses 
from all present, but responses that are based on differently privileged degrees 
of perception. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the 'epiphany', 
such as it is in this passage, resides in this complex of interpretative responses. 
Clearly recognition is an important issue in relation to divine presence, 
and to this extent recognition is intimately implicated in divine appearances. But 
should recognition be thought of, as it is by Pucci, as a definitive boundary 
condition? Perhaps, in view of the circle of interpretation that the text sets up in 
this passage between the reaction of the Greeks and Trojans and the possible 
reactions of the audience of the epic, the primary point we should draw out 
from this example is that the question of recognition is better thought of as a 
problem inherent to contexts of divine epiphany than as a possible boundary 
criterion by which to include instances within, or exclude them from, 'divine 
epiphany' as a category. The slide of focalisation in the text between the simile 
proper and the narrated reactions of the Greeks and Trojans points on a formal 
level towards this precise problem: who sees, what is seen, and how perception 
takes place are absolutely live issues in relation to divine presence. Perception, 
misperception, recognition and failure of recognition are central parts of the 
problem of divine, epiphany. 
So, just where might a categorical approach draw a line around divine 
epiphany as an event? What exactly are the limits of 'true epiphany' within a 
categorical approach? And, accordingly, where to begin? Questions such as 
these go right to the heart of the matter. I have foregrounded this example in 
order to destabilise the premises of a categorical approach. This instance 
evidently does operate within the parameters of the type-scene of 'divine 
visitation', insofar as it follows the rhythm of divine motivation, descent with 
simile, and disguised appearance upon arrival next to a mortal.49 But considered 
as an epiphany it is altogether less than straightforward. The two points I have 
focused on both relate to how one might hope to define divine epiphany 
without thereby truncating the possibilities of divine presence that the Homeric 
poems offer. For what the inequalities between the perception and knowledge 
of the characters in the Homeric poems and those of their audience create is 
precisely an opportunity to foreground the modalities of divine presence. 
49 I/ . 4.69-73: Zeus motivates Athene's action; 74-79: Athene descends with simile; 86-92: 
Athene arrives in disguise next to Pandaros. For 'divine visitation', see above, pp. 54-56. 
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By contrast, another response to the question of what starting point to 
adopt in considering divine epiphany in Homer has been to take a particular, 
relatively 'explicit' instance as somehow paradigmatic or exemplary-as a 
concrete prototype of 'epiphany': this is the second of the two scenarios I 
mentioned above. The trajectory of investigation may then flow outwards from 
this central point. Even in exploration of the further reaches of what might 
seem relevant to divine epiphany, the paradigmatic instance or prototype can 
still function as a fundamental point of secure reference. This has been the case, 
for example, with the appearance of Athene to Akhilleus in Iliad 1.50 Various 
themes of possible significance in the consideration of the interaction of men 
and gods in Homer have been developed in specific reference to this scene, 
especially in relation to the Homeric 'psychology' of decision-making and 
divine intervention. Within this broader process specific expectations have been 
derived from the dynamics of this particular encounter about the way epiphany 
works in general in Homer. Scholarly approaches here have divided into two 
broad groups. One focuses on the fact that Athene is visible to Akhilleus alone, 
and concludes that the main significance of 'epiphany' is psychological; 
forthwith this does away with any questions about the precise modalities of 
divine presence, by suggesting that epiphanies are more or less to be 
understood as poetic elaborations of interior psychological processes.51 I have 
questioned aspects of such an approach to Homer in the previous chapter; I will 
leave the issue--to one side here.52 The other main approach, more orthodox in 
recent times and more pertinent to this discussion since it understands divine 
epiphany as a category of its own and not as a refraction of some other thing, 
takes its starting point from the observation that, since we are told in tmusually 
concrete terms that Athene tugs Akhilleus' hair, she must therefore be 
considered 'really' present. In such a view, this is 'perhaps the most remarkable 
of all corporeal interventions by a god or goddess in the Iliad';53 or again, 'the 
intervention itself ... is elaborated in graphic detail that leaves no room for 
50 
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53 
11 . 1.193-222. See particularly Nilsson (1924); other discussions of this scene specifically 
in the wake (pro or contra) of Nilsson include Dodds (1951), 14ff.; Snell (1953), 30££.; 
Whitman (1958), 185, 231, cf. 220-221; Russo and Simon (1968), 488-489; Tsagarakis 
(1980); MacCary (1982), 6-10, 171-172; Fowler (1987), 6; Hooker (1990) . 
See esp. Nilsson (1924). Others develop more sophisticated versions of this line of 
reasoning, but s till by reference to psychology and not to the presence of the goddess: see 
Dodds (1951), 14-15; Snell (1953), 35-36; Russo and Simon (1968), esp. 488-489; MacCary 
(1982), 6-10, 171-172. These readings are a development of the 'a llegorical' methods of 
Homeric commenta tors: see e.g. Eus ta thius 82.9C 84.35f. van der Valk; see further 
Lamberton (1986). 
For some specific criticisms, see Pucci ([1985]1998d), 77-78. 
Thus Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/. 1.197. 
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doubt concerning the physical reality of the the divine presence ... [and thus] the 
dramatic elaboration ... obliges us to accept the objective reality of the 
intervention'.54 So far, so good for epiphany it might seem, since the 
foregrounding of this unusual detail has the apparently convenient effect of 
rendering unnecessary further questions about the modalities of divine 
presence in this instance: by the pull on Akhilleus' hair the 'real physical 
presence' of the goddess is made explicit, even if Athene herself cannot be seen 
by anyone other than Akhilleus. Within the terms of such a reading, the 
category divine epiphany in relation to Homer is understood as having a 
relatively unproblematic central point of reference, namely in the 'real physical 
presence' of a god . 
Yet what is this real physical presence?55 The passage is a striking one, 
with several visually expressed details, particularly Akhilleus's fair hair, and the 
dread flashing eyes:56 
CJTi'j 8' om8Ev, ~av8i'js 8£ KO!J.T]S' EAE TIT]AELWVU, 
o'(wL cpmvO!J.EVT], Twv 8' c'±AA.wv ou TLS' 6piiTo. 
8c1iJ.~TJaEv 8' 'AxLkus, !J.ETU 8' hparrn'· aintw 8' l:yvw 
200 TiaAA.ci8' 'A8T]VUlT]V' 8ELvw 8€ o'L oaaE cpciav8Ev. 
The passage has often seemed reassuringly straightforward in its tactile and 
visual orientation. But for all her tactility, the goddess herself remains 
somewhat elusive at the point of contact. This meeting between the goddess 
' 
and hero takes place precisely when Athene stands behind Akhilleus, and it is 
objectified only in terms of Akhilleus's hair; the goddess's 'body', by contrast, 
or more specifically her hand, remains implicit in the pragmatics of the action-
verb, /:!)..c, rather than being made explicit at the moment of contact.57 This is 
followed by the narrator's observation that Athene appears to Akhilleus alone, 
which introduces a visual element into this moment of interaction between 
goddess and mortal. But it is also the case that when the narrator offers this 
comment about her respective visibility and non-visibility the goddess still 
stands behind the hero. Then Akhilleus reacts, turns, and recognises the 
goddess. Dread eyes flash. Is it this that Akhilleus perceives? And is this by 
implication what the audience should also see the goddess in? 
54 
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Thus James (1996), 221. Compare Tsagarakis (1980), 78-79; Hooker(1990), esp. 28-32; 
Constantinidou (1994), 12. 
For this question applied to the 'true form' of the Homeric gods, see esp. Vernant ([1986) 
1991a); W. Smith (1988) . 
I/. 1.197-200. 
On the hands of the gods, see below, pp. 77-82. 
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Pucci, in his stimulating re-examination of the detail of this passage, has 
argued for the fundamental reticence of even this 'most explicit' of Homeric 
epiphanies.ss For Pucci the figure of Athene here is a complete blank, since in 
his view, as a result of the supposedly 'irresolvable' reference of o\. in Il. 1.200, 
even the flashing eyes might not be hers:59 
Without the certainty that it is Athena who is described with those terribly 
flashing eyes, the goddess's presence remains for the reader a blank presence, with 
no imaginable form. 
More frequently readers of the scene take it to be the case, without discussion, 
that the phrase refers to Athene. 60 One ancient commentator states that the 
connective particle here functions as explanatory-D 8( avTL ToD yap-and this 
is the basis on which this line has been read as explanatory of Akhilleus's 
recognition of the goddess, and therefore on which the o\. is taken to refer 
possessively to Athene.61 But an alternative case has been argued now again by 
Robertson, namely that the eyes in question are those of Akhilleus.62 The most 
recent discussion of the passage by Pulleyn concludes agnostically, but fairly, 
that 'there is no conclusive argument either way', and in doing so reinforces 
Pucci's assertion that there is a significant ambiguity of reference. 63 Read in this 
way, the flash of dread eyes is an image that may belong indeterminately to 
Akhilleus and to Athene at this moment of recognition. A desire to visualise the 
goddess at this crucial point of the Iliad must remain frustrated to this extent: if 
particular readers and particular audiences wish to pin the eyes down to Athene 
or Akhilleus this reveals more about their desire to see the goddess or the hero 
than it does about the potential play of the text. In a certain sense, what the 
narrative achieves at this point is to demonstrate the real force of the narrator's 
assertion that the goddess is not visible to anyone other than Akhilleus. 
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Pucci ([1985]1998d), 69: 'one of the most explicit epiphanies in the poem'. 
Pucci ([1985]1998d), 74; and on the reference of o'L, comparing I/. 19.16-17 where 
Akhilleus' eyes blaze, note 74 n . 11: 'the ambiguity [of o'L in 11. 1.200] is irresolvable'. 
See e.g. Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/.1.200. For a survey of the positions adopted by 
translations and commentaries on this passage, see Robertson (1999). 
Sch. bT on I/. 1.200; cf. e.g. Willcock (ed.) (1978a), on If. 1.200. But on epic 8€, see Bakker 
(1997), 62-72, esp. 71-72: 'de discretizes (presenting two ideas as two different steps in a 
speech or as two items in a catalogue)'. The ambiguity of o'L was canvassed by Leaf, but 
not with the same intent as Pucci, since i.J.1 either case Leaf still operated on the 
understanding that the eyes were Athene's: 'o'L may refer to Athene-her eyes gleamed 
terrible; or to Achilles-terrible shone her eyes on him.': Leaf (ed.) (1900-1902), on I/. 
1.200, compari.J.1g I/ . 19.17. 
Robertson (1999). 
Pulleyn (2000), 179-180 on I/. 1.200. 
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But what in fact are the modalities of Akhilleus's recognition of Athene 
here?64 Beyond the question of the flashing eyes, Pucci is right to suggest that 
Athene's presence here is largely blank so far as the audience are concerned: in 
Pucci's terms, much 'remains in the sphere of the unexpressed'.65 Akhilleus 
recognises-aiJTl.Ka 8' Eyvw-Athene, but what he sees remains concealed from 
the audience, just as it remains concealed from the rest of the Greeks.66 The 
verbal focus here is on the moment of recognition, ainl.Ka, but the mode of 
perception itself is not so clear. It is certainly the case that the aorist Eyvw recurs 
repeatedly in contexts of the recognition of a god by a mortal.67 Some instances 
specifically highlight the mode of perception by the addition of a sight 
expression. Compare Aineias's recognition of Ares in Iliad 17: Eyvw EmivTa 
L8wv.68 In an instance such as this the mode of recognition is qualified in visual 
terms. But other examples encompass a mode of recognition that is not visually 
oriented in this same way, particularly in contexts of divine disguise or omen: 
<PPECJL 8' aeavaTT)V 8EOV Eyvw, the narrator says of Telemachos in Odyssey 1.69 In 
these instances, focus is directed more towards the fact of recognition than to 
any particular perceptual modality.7° In the present case, the visuality of 
Akhilleus's recognition of the goddess remains tantalisingly underdetermined: 
beyond the ambiguous flashing eyes, there is no further explication of this 
moment of recognition, only an image that expresses its immediacy. 
The ongo_~ng debate over the referent of ot in this scene 1s itself 
testimony to the importance of this image at this crucial narrative juncture m 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
For the multiple responses of ancient commentators to this same question, see sch. bT on 
I/ . 1.199-200. W. Smith (1988), 169-172, stresses the modality of yLyvwaKw in this and 
related examples: 'the moment when the penetrating gaze of a shrewd mortal senses the 
divine nature'; for discussion of YLYVWGKW and opaw in contexts of epiphany, cf. 
Tsagarakis (1980), 72 and n . 56; Dietrich (1983), 65-66. 
Pucci ([1985]1998d), 74. 
On the limitation to Akhilleus alone, see Prier (1989), 61-62: 'The others are not part of 
his experience or the phenomenological condition it represents. Everyone only looks for 
himself (hornto) and sees nothing.' 
See LfrgE, s.v. yLyvwaKw, esp . I, 1b, 2a and 2b . 
I/. 17.334. Compare HomHymDem 94-95: ou8E- TLS' av8pwv I Elaop6wv YL yvwaKE 
0a8v(wvwv TE yvvmKwv; 111: ov8' i!yvwv· XUAETTOL 8E 8EOL 8VT]TOLGLV opa.aem; also Od. 
13.312: apya\E-ov GE' 8Ea, yvwvm 0POTWL avnaaavn, I KUL iJ.clA' ETTLGTU!J.EVWV GE yap 
avTTjv TWVTL EtaKELS'. For sight expressions and the phrase avTLKa 8' i!yvw, see L/ . 
14.153-156, 17.84-85. 
Od. 1.420; in contexts of omens, see esp. HomHy111Herm 213-214: olwvov 8' E:v6n 
TavvaLTTTEpov, avTLKa 8' l!yvw I </JTJATJTJ'jv yqawTa t.LOS' TTa"l8a Kpov[wvos-; cf. Od. 
2.159: opvL8as- yvwvm; again contrast the visually expanded version at Od. 15.531-532: 
ou TOL GVEV 8EOV ETTTUTO 8E~LOS' opVLS'. I i!yvwv yap !J.LV E:aavTa l 8wv olwvov EOVTa. 
The <jJpE-VES' at Od. 1.420 must not be taken as indicating an interiorised and disembodied 
'mind': see esp. M. Clarke (1999), 73ff., 83ff. What is underlined by this taking place 'in 
the <jJpEVES'' is the physical-emotionnl aspect of this moment of recognition. 
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the Iliad. Without dispute what the image offers is an encapsulation of emotive 
vision of a peculiarly intense sort. But it is also an encapsulation which seems to 
operate indeterminately both as the moment of vision (looking at) in which 
Akhilleus's perception of the goddess takes place and as the moment of vision 
(being looked at) by which he recognises the goddess for who she is. The 
combination of the immediacy of Akhilleus's recognition and the intense 
emotion captured in the flash of dread eyes replays the frequent correlation in 
the Homeric epics between emotion and the moment of perception.71 The 
important difference is that this moment of recognition specifically evokes a 
visual reciprocity. What this image offers is a mutuality of dread gaze between 
the hero and the goddess, in a moment of extraordinary intensity. 
Comparison with another moment of similarly intense gaze involving 
Akhilleus points to the fundamental importance of the gaze in Homeric poetics, 
and of Akhilleus's gaze in particular.72 But this comparison is also revealing 
insofar as it points to what seems to have been occluded in the encounter 
between Akhilleus and Athene, namely an objectified mode of perception, 
which is exactly what the highly visualised representation of the arms of 
Akhilleus offers in this instance. At the beginning of Iliad 19, Thetis brings to 
Akhilleus the divinely made armour in which he will return to battle. As Thetis 
places the armour in front of Akhilleus, it is characterised in multi-sensory 
terms: Ta 8' avE-~eaxE 8ai.8a\a navTa.73 Edwards in his commentary suggests 
that there is an 'effective imprecision' in the object of the Myrmidons' vision 
71 
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On the correlation of emotion and the moment of perception, see Turyn (1929), 33-43. 
On the language of sight and appearance in Homer, see esp. Prier (1989), 25-67. For the 
general point that eye expressions 'index' emotion in Homer, see Holoka (1983); also 
Lateiner (1995), 43, 89, with the further point that 'Homer uses the gazing eye and 
avoidance of eye contact in attention-focusing protocols' . The climactic scenes of the 
Iliad centre upon the gaze of Akhilleus and Priamos: see esp. I/. 24.628-633, cf. 476-484, 
and Crotty (1994), 101-102. But note also the avoidartce of mutual gaze by Odysseus and 
Penelope at Od. 23.89-95: Odysseus looks down, Kchw 6p6wv, waiting for Penelope to 
'see' him, rron8E:yj..LEVOS' E'L TL j.lLV E'Lrrm ... E:rrd 'L8Ev 6<jl8a\j..Lo"Low; Penelope's own gaze 
fluctuates between recognition and non-recognition: Otj;EL 8' clAAOTE j..LEV j..LLV EVWTTG8LWS' 
E-al8taKEV, I aAAOTE 8' ciyvwaaGKE KGKQ xpot t 0Lj.lGT' EXOVTa; on this passage, see 
Goldhill (1991), 16-17. For an astute discussion of one neglected instance, see Prier 
(1980), esp. 179-180 with n. 4 (reworked as Prier (1989), 31-32). Entirely fitting given 
this Homeric focus on the gaze is the afterlife of Homer in Greek visual culture: see esp. 
Zeitlin (2001). 
I/. 19.12-13. On 8al8a\a in Homer, see Leumam1 (1950), 131-133; Frontisi-Ducroux (1975), 
35-44; S. P. Morris (1992), 3-35, esp. 4: 'far greater powers of connotation than specific 
denotation.' A 8al8a\ov is a crafted object in its visually evident, skilled elaboration, 
and has associations with the vocabulary of light: see esp. Frontisi-Ducroux (1975), 41 -
42. ForS. P. Morris (1992), 35, the word in Homer evokes 'glamour, power, and danger'; 
cf. Frontisi-Ducroux (1975), 64-82. 
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and fear, since Thetis herself has just arrived in their midst beside Akhilleus.74 
But what is most significant is how the arms themselves constitute an objectified 
token of divine power and craftsmanship; in their overwhelming detait the 
arms entirely obviate any need to explore further the appearance of Thetis at 
this point.?S The goddess is elided in these moments behind the hyper-
objectified visuality of the arms themselves. Of course, it is this clash of metal 
and the variegations of light that come from the armour's decoration that cause 
the Myrmidons to avert their gaze so as not to see, but only at the point when 
the armour has already become experientially apparent to all in its aural and 
visual dimensions .76 Akhilleus alone meets the flash of the armour with the 
flash of his own gaze, in a intense moment of reciprocity between the hero and 
the divinely-made armour: E:v 8E o\. ooaE I 8nvov uno ~A.E<j>apwv ws- El af.A.as-
E:~E<j>aav8Ev.77 The play of sound (cwf.~paxE) and sight (8al8aA.a) that provokes fear 
and makes the Myrmidons avert their gaze, is for Akhilleus reciprocally 
constituted-his eyes themselves flash as if in response-and he holds the 
armour in his hands and gazes upon its variegations with joy: TEpnno 8' E:v 
XELpEGO"LV EXWV 8EOU ayA.aO.. 8wpa. I al.rrc1p ETTEL <j>pEa'LV ~LO"L TETapTTETO 8al8aA.a 
A.Evaawv.78 Each of these are moments of intense emotion, both for the 
Myrmidons and for Akhilleus himselt and these intense emotions are 
encapsulated above all in the play of vision, in the directing or averting of the 
gaze. But crucially the play of vision here depends precisely on the objectified, 
visualised nature of the arms. The variegations of the great shield have been 
explored at length in the preceding book of the Iliad, and just as there the 
audience's imaginative eye has attended to the shield in obsessive detait so here 
the effect of this wondrous decoration upon its viewers within the frame of the 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
See Edwards (ed.) (1991), on 19.13-17. For the Myrmidons' reaction at I!. 19.14-15, 
Mup,_u86vas- 8' apa TTclVTaS' EAE TpOflOS', OUOE TLS' ETAT] I QVTT]V ElaLOEELV, af.A' 
hpwav, Edwards compares Hektor's reaction to Akhilleus as he approaches like 
Enyalios, with light blazing from his armour, 11. 22.136-137. 
Contrast Od. 24.47-57, cited by Edwards (ed.) (1991), on 19.13-17: 'The description of 
their fear is dramatically expanded when the goddess comes with the Nereids to mourn 
her dead son'. 
Compare Logue ([1981-1994] 2001), 196: 'And as she laid the moonlit armour on the sand 
I It chimed ... I And the sound that came from it I Followed the light that came from it 
I Like sighing I Saying: I Made in Hea ven. ' 
11 . 19.16-17. For the association of Akhilleus and a£>-as- /auyf], cf. I/ . 18.205-214, 19.374-
380, 22.25-30, 22.134-135, and Prier (1989), 46-50, esp. 48, who characterises I/ . 19.16-17 
in terms of a 'transfer of power through light and wrath from the arms of Achilles, a 
transfer that is, after all, the primary effect of the Shield itse lf.' See esp. Whitman 
(1958), 137-147, on the association of Akhilleus with fire and light. 
ll . 19.18-19. 
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epic is explored.79 Later again in Iliad 19, it is the shield itself that flashes out 
across the sky: we:; crrr' 'AxLAA.f]or:; CJaKEO<:; CJEAar:; al8f:p' 'LKQVEV I KQAOU 8m8aA.f:ou.80 
Here the flash from Akhilleus's head brought about by Athene in Iliad 18 
becomes a self-generated property of the shield itself in an altered iteration of 
the previous line. 81 In Akhilleus's recognition of Athene in Iliad 1, there is 
nothing like this objectified play of light and vision. Instead the flashing eyes 
function as a token of a mutual gaze, but one in which the audience of the epic 
cannot quite participate. 
So what the play of the flashing eyes in this passage ultimately reveals is 
another Homeric take on inequalities of perception between the characters of 
the epic and the epic's audience. The 'real, physical presence' of the goddess 
exists for Akhilleus, not for anyone else. We wonder what Akhilleus sees, and in 
doing so we confront the constraints that the narrative imposes upon our 
vision. Pucci makes this point, but with a particular twist that I find less 
sa tisfactory:82 
But what is it that Achilles sees? The Athena promakhos ... ? The text allows us to 
imagine so, if we wish, but it seems to me that the "not-said" in om passage 
signifies precisely that the poets of this text knew no more than they tell us about 
the form in which Athena appears. It is impossible, in other words, that the 
reader is h ere being invited to imagine the figure of the goddess as she is 
represented, for example, in her role as promakhos . ... The text does not invite us to 
imagine tha t, the characters see and know more than we do. 
Is it necessarily the case that the text 'does not invite us'? To my mind, the 
situation is, if not exactly the converse, certainly complementary to that which I 
outlined above in the case of the spectacular descent of Athene in Iliad 4. There 
the goddess' presence behind the portentous sign was known by the audience 
but not by the Greeks and Trojans, and the audience were implicitly invited to 
complete the interpretative task that the Greeks and Trojans began but could 
not complete. Here the situation is reversed in certain respects: while both the 
audience and Akhilleus know that this is Athene, the goddess actually appears 
79 
80 
81 
82 
For the complex dynamics of the ekphrasis of the shield, see Becker (1995). For the 
recurrent desire both in antiquity and more recently to reimagine the shield in very 
different terms, see esp. Taplin ([1980) 1998), 97-98. 
Jl. 19.379-380. The whole simile, 19.374-380, compares a flash of light from the fire of 
mountain shepherds appearing out at sea to sailors. Moulton (1977), 15, comments on the 
'unparalleled' concentration of fire comparisons a t this point; d. W. C. Scott (1974), 66-
68. 
See I/ . 18.203-214, esp 214: we; cm' 'AXLAAijoc; KEcpaAijc; fJEAac; al8f:p' 'LKaVE. See Edwards 
(ed.) (1991), on 19.379-383. 
Pucci ([1985] 1998d), 74-75. 
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to Akhilleus alone: o'(wL <PmvOfl.EVfl, Twv 8' aA.A.wv ou ns- 6pciTo.83 The audience 
knows, but cannot see; Akhilleus does not know in the first place, but 
recognises as soon as he turns about to face Athene. The only response left to 
the audience is to imagine how Akhilleus himself perceives the goddess, which 
in turn underlines the suggestive brilliance of the flashing eyes as a partial yet 
somehow sufficient marker of the interaction between Athene and Akhilleus at 
this point. Accordingly, if in that previous instance the categorical boundaries of 
divine epiphany seemed to be open to question, in this case the precise 
modalities of the 'real physical presence' that are presumed to lie behind a 
supposedly paradigmatic epiphany seem actually to be far less certain from the 
audience's point of view than is sometimes assumed. 
Just as in Athene's meteoric descent, inequalities m knowledge and 
perception between the characters of the epic and the epic's audience play a 
significant role here. The specific focus in this instance is the play of divine 
presence between 'physicality' and 'blankness', and the consequent problem of 
how sight relates to perception in contexts of divine presence. I have criticised 
aspects of Dietrich' s approach to divine epiphanies in Homer in the previous 
chapter, but it is in one sense a distinct virtue of this approach to have begun 
from a related question about the modalities of the presence of the gods in 
Homer in relation to perception and sight, even if Dietrich's subsequent 
conclusions are problematic because of his pursuit of 'plausible visualisation' as 
-... 
a means to distinguish the 'religious elements' in Homeric epiphany from the 
merely picturesque.84 I would not want to follow Dietrich down that particular 
path, but it does appear that to ask questions about perception and divine 
presence in such contexts is an important step. As these problematic examples 
show, how divine presence is and is not (partially) perceived is a significant 
problem of divine epiphany. The perceptual modalities of divine presence run 
counter to intuitive expectations about presence and appearance in various 
ways. Accordingly, it is not the case that the question of divine presence can 
function merely as a limiting condition for divine epiphany, as a means to 
determine actual epiphany from the merely picturesque use of language, or 
indeed, with Dietrich, as a means to test epiphany as a 'viable theological 
concept' .85 The questions which I highlighted at the beginning of this chapter 
must remain central to discussion if the modalities of divine presence and 
appearance are not to be cut short. 
83 
84 
85 
I/. 1.198. Pucci ([1985] 1998d), 73, considers this line in relation to the epic audience. 
Dietrich (1983), esp . 54; see above, pp . 23-25. 
Dietrich (1983), 67. 
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What I would argue, then, is that questions of presence, its manifestation 
and perception must not be foreclosed. These questions do not circumscribe the 
boundaries of divine epiphany, but are fundamental problems implicated at 
every point of intersection between gods and mortals . In the approaches to 
divine epiphany that I have discussed above, such problems have tended to be 
glossed over as the more or less self-evident basis on which discussion may 
proceed. A categorical approach truncates the potential of divine presence in 
certain ways, and in particular the potential of presence to be seen but not 
recognised; it is my contention that the limits of 'epiphany' in such contexts 
cannot so easily be drawn. There is, as Vernant observed, no 'single standard 
scenario' for divine appearances, for all that some aspects of divine presence 
show recurrent features and granting that moments of divine presence may 
often take place within certain type-scene structures.S6 What remains 
fundamental, even in these contexts, is the elusive potential of divine presence. 
Accordingly, the alternative strategy that I want now to pursue is to keep those 
questions which I outlined at the start-what divine presence might be thought 
to be, how it might be manifested, how it might be recognised-centrally 
positioned in my discussion. These questions cannot be simply subsumed 
beneath definitional parameters, whether explicitly in the case of those 
discussions which take their starting point from a categorical observation, or 
implicitly in the case of discussions which proceed outwards from a relatively 
'explicit', and therefore central, instance of divine epiphany . 
• 
• • 
The long arm of Zeus ... 
How then to begin a discussion of Homeric epiphany? In one respect. what I 
will do is similar to the paradigmatic approach that I discussed above in relation 
to the appearance of Athene to Akhilleus, since I will start my exploration of the 
modalities of divine presence in the Homeric poems with a particular example. 
86 See above, p. 49 n. 7. 
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But this discussion will differ in one crucial respect. This key difference is that I 
will begin with an example in which the question of divine presence is far from 
self-evident. Insofar as the appearance of Athene to Akhilleus has tended to 
appeal to scholars for its upfront-and therefore 'real'-physicality, and insofar 
as this scene has ftmctioned accordingly as a secure point around which 
discussions of divine presence have been built, the consequent mode of inquiry 
is inevitably one that is built up from a quasi-definition-in this instance 'real' 
physicality-around which other material is then structured, even if the inquiry 
itself is not always framed explicitly in definitional terms. In such a case, this 
centering point functions as a de facto definition of divine epiphany. By 
contrast, I want to approach divine epiphany from the margins, in accordance 
with the supposition that divine absence and presence are key problems il1 such 
contexts. Precisely by testing the margins of what might be possible, I hope to 
follow a more hermeneutic approach to the dynamics of divine presence, 
instead of determining il1 advance, whether explicitly or implicitly, what divine 
presence should constitute in any particular instance. 
It is from this basic question of divine absence and presence that I will 
begin. Closely related but somewhat differently framed are questions about 
how divine presence might be manifested and recognised. I will consider each 
of these questions more or less in turn, in relation to a number of passages that 
exemplify distinct_points about the modalities of divine presence in the Homeric 
poems. These passages are offered not as paradigms of 'epiphany' as such, but 
as examples which illustrate specific challenges in the play of divil1e absence and 
presence. In this way, instead of pursuing a central paradigm of epiphany, I 
want to frame epiphany il1 terms of this set of recurring questions, the 
exploration of which shows how epiphany might be more profitably viewed as 
a relational process operating across the play of absence and presence and the 
perception of them, than as a momentary and objectifiable event. 
It constitutes almost a truism in studies of the gods il1 Homer that Zeus 
himself never intervenes il1 person on the Iliadic battlefield il1 any form, 
disguised or otherwise, and accordingly that there are no epiphanies of Zeus. s7 
Nonetheless, at the beginning of Iliad 8, Zeus descends from Olympos to Ida, 
having forbidden the other gods to take an active part in proceedings; the 
following books contain various examples of intervention by Zeus in support of 
Hektor and the Trojans, often by means of 'natural' phenomena, such as the 
87 See e.g. Taplin (1992), 134: 'Zeus is never entirely frivolous. It may be related to this 
that he never participates in propria persona in battle, unlike the other gods.' 
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thunderbolt that prevents Diomedes from routing the Trojans and which is 
recognised for what it is by Nestor, or the bloody rain with which Iliad 11 
begins.88 One passage in this sequence of interventions of Zeus is particularly 
relevant to questions about the modalities of divine presence, and above all to a 
consideration of the boundary between the absence and presence of gods. It is 
one of two instances, in de Jong's words, 'where Zeus himself directly 
intervenes, rather than through Hera, Athena or some other god'.89 In this case 
Hektor makes for the Greek ships like an eagle through a crowd of birds, and 
Zeus pushes him on from behind 'with his long arm':90 
690 a>-.>-.' WS' T' 6pvt8wv TTETET]VWV alno') a'L8wv 
E8VO') EcpOp!-lilTUL TTOTU!-lOV TTapa ~OGKO!-lEVQWV, 
XT]VWV fi yEpavwv fi KUKVWV oouhxoodpwv, 
WS' "EKTwp '(8uaE VEOS' KuavorrpwLpoLo 
clVTLO') al~U')' TOV OE ZElJ') WpGEV [WGEV Arl oma8EV 
695 xnpt 1-16.>-.a wya>-.11L, (:\TpuvE 8£ >-.aov a1-1 ' ainwL. 
What interests me particularly about this passage is how Zeus's action here is 
expressed, which raises in a challenging form the question of how divine 
presence and power might be imagined to function. As a result of the lack of an 
explicit statement of Zeus's presence in the passage under discussion, some 
have been led to conclude that the expression is 'an anthropomorphic 
metaphor', just a figure of speech, and they leave the matter there.91 But what 
might the ram!_fications of describing this as a figure of speech, or similar, 
actually be in such a context? This question is cast into particular relief here, 
because this figure of speech itself comes in the wake of a developed simile 
88 
89 
90 
91 
Zeus to Ida, I/. 8.1-52; thunderbolt in front of Diomedes, 8.130-144, and cf. the earlier 
thunderflash in front of the Greeks, 8.75-77; bloody rain, 11 .52-55, cf. 16.459-461. On the 
unusual events of Ilind 8 see Fenik (1968), 219ff. For the structural importance of Ilind 8, 
see now Willcock (1995), building upon Reinhardt (1961), 138: 'Das unentbehrlichste 
Buch zwischen dem ersten und dem sechzehnten ... ist das achte'. 
See de Jong (1987), 71; the other is Zeus breaking Teuker's bow-string at I! . 15.459-464. 
Nilsson (1968), vol. 1, 370, characterises I/. 15.690-695 as an obvious gaffe ('Entgleisung') 
on the part of the poet; see Lesky (1961), 27, for criticism. 
I/ . 15.690-695. 
See e.g. Leaf (ed.) (1900-1902), on Il. 15.694, who calls it 'an anthropomorphic metaphor 
which strongly contrasts with the actio in distans of t..Lo') v6o'), [at 15.]242', but Leaf 
concludes that 'we have no right to suppose that Zeus has descended from Ida and is 
present in person on the battlefield'. Compare Willcock (ed.) (1984), on I/ . 15.694: 'Zeus 
is not to be thought of as physically present in the battle, in spite of xnp\. wy6.AT]L'; 
also Gross (1970), 367, who conm1ents: 'In diesem auBergewohnlichen "Eingreifen" des 
Gottes darf man gewifS das Bemtihen des Dichters sehen, das gottliche Wirken 
moglichst anschaulich zu gestalten'; but note 374: Homer is an 'umsichtiger Gestalter ... 
der diese kleinen Mittel benutzt, urn die gottlichen Machte anschaulich vor dem Auge 
des Lesers erstehen zu lassen.' 
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whose subject, the flight of an eagle, is itself associated with Zeus's power to act 
in the world.92 
Appropriately enough, there is evidence at this point in_ the textual 
history of the Iliad of a philological response to uncertainties of this sort, namely 
in the alternative Aristarchean reading ciJaEv against the vulgate c1paEv.93 Janko 
comments here: 'Aristarchus' text c10Ev . . . makes more vivid (or indeed 
grotesque) the image of Zeus's "long arm". But the vulgate c1paEv ... smooths 
this metaphor for Zeus's power and is apt' .94 Janko's reasoning here is 
revealing to the extent that it is formulated as a choice between emphasizing or 
attempting to domesticate ('smooths') the problematic expression. The choice 
for Janko is apparently clear: he would prefer what would be the 'grotesque' 
long arm of Zeus to be a mere metaphor for Zeus' s power. But is this an 
adequate response to the problems that the text offers us here? What this 
philological choice conceals is precisely the 'theological' problem of how Zeus's 
action is to be conceived. At such a moment, are smoothness and aptness 
necessarily the most appropriate criteria to invoke? 
I would suggest not. Above all, the image of Zeus' s long arm here directs 
us to the difficulty of maintaining a consistent distinction between the exercise 
of divine power and the actual presence of a god. Precisely what is lacking for 
reading Zeus' s long arm in terms of metaphor is a secure point of comparison. 
Given that the divine body is a 'superbody', in Vernant's terms, a body whose 
most obvious characteristic is that it defies corporeal codes, there are no a priori 
grounds for saying that Zeus's arm could not reach down from Olympos .95 
Compare the way the head of Eris reaches up from the battlefield to heaven in 
Iliad 4:96 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
See esp. the omen at I/ . 24.314-321; see below, p. 136 n . 357 and p. 161. 
West (ed .) (1998-2000) follows the vulgate, as does Leaf (ed.) (1900-1902) . Monro and 
Allen (edd.) ([1902]1930) follow Aristarkhos, as often; for this tendency, see Janko 
(1990), 330; also Nagy (1996b), eh. 5; Nagy (1998) . 
Janko (ed.) (1992), on 693-5. Janko goes on to compare Akhilleus's expression for Zeus's 
protection of Troy: ZEiJS' XELpa i:T]v UTTEpEGXE, I/. 9.419-420; cf. below, p . 75. 
See Vernant ([1986]1991a). 
I!. 4.439-445. For the various personified appearances of Eris, see Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/. 
4.440-441; Erbse (1986), 28-29. For Eris on the shield of Akhilleus with Kydoimos and 
Ker, see 11. 18.535-540: E-v 8' "EpLc;-, E-v 8E- Kv8oLf1-0S' OflLAEov, E-v 8' 6A.ol'] Kf]p, I aA.A.ov 
(wov i:!xovaa VfOlJTUTOIJ , aAA.ov QOVTOV, I QAAOIJ Tf8VT]WTa KUTG fl-08ov flAKE TT080LLV" 
Elfl-U 8' l!x' clflcp' Wfl-OLGL 8a<pOLVEOV a'Lfl-UTL cpWTWIJ. I WflLAfOIJ 8' WS' Tf (woL ~POTOL ~8' 
Efl-UXOVTO, I VEKpous- T' aAA.f]A.wv l:!pvov KUTUTE8VT]WTU') . M. L. Wes t (ed.) (1998-2000) 
deletes 535-538; it is argued that these lines are interpolated from [Hes .] Aspis 156-159: 
see Edwards (ed .) (1991), on 18.535-538, in support of Lynn-George (1978); but for 
criticism of the aesthetic argument here, see M. Clarke (1999), 234 n. 6. Even if Eris's 
presence on the ba ttlefield is expressed here differently from 11 . 4, this does not 
iilpac 8E- Tovs- j.lEV "ApT]S'. TOVS' 8E- yf-auKwms- 'A6fwTJ 
440 M'L116s- T' Tj8E- <t>6~os- KUL "EpLS' UllOTOV 11-Cilau'La, 
"Ape OS' av8po<f>6voLO KUOL yv~TT] E:TapT] Tc. 
fj T' 6>-l YTJ 11-E-v npwTa Kopvaanm, aim1p i!nn Ta 
oupavWL EOT~pl~c KclpT] KUL ETTL xeovl. ~alvn . 
fj aqJLv Kat TOTe vcLKOS' OllOLLOV Ell~aAc llEaawL 
445 EPXOj.lEVT] KU6' Oj.lLAOV, o<(>EAAOUaa OTOVOV av8pwv. 
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Eris reaches proportions that are as 'grotesque' as the long arm of Zeus, as her 
transformation of the action on the battlefield finds an objectified correlate in 
her physical transformation. Similarly Ares will cover a vast expanse when he is 
knocked down by Athene in Iliad 21:97 
TWL ~clAc 6oDpov "ApT]a KaT' avx£va, AUOc 8E- yu'La. 
i:TTTa 8' ETTEOXc TTEAE6pa TTEOWV, EKOVLOE 8E- xalTaS', 
TEVXEcl T' aj.l<f>apci~T]OE" y£AaaaE 8E- Tiaf-Ms- 'A6~VT] 
Ares here himself plays out the fall of the warrior in anthropomorphic form, 
but on a larger scale. Just as is the case in the transformations of the gods into 
various shapes, the ontological distin.ction between actuality and metaphor, 
between 'being' and 'being like' in cases such as this, is difficult to sustain with 
reference to the fluid forms of the gods.98 Accordingly what is at issue in 
reading the long arm of Zeus as metaphor or grotesquery is not simply the 
alternative texts waEv or wpaEv, but a larger set of expectations about the ways 
that divine physicality, power and presence might be thought to relate to one 
another in the Homeric poems. 
Janko's preference for a metaphorical reading is not a preference that is 
shared by all. Lesky, for one, concludes that it isn't possible to decide whether 
the poet wants his audience to see Zeus at work in bodily fashion, 'leibhaft', or 
not; that is, whether to be conscious of the thrust of Zeus's mighty hand, or 
simply to regard the frequent motif of the helping god as being given a 
particular imagistic emphasis at this point.99 Lesky compares Athene's 
reinforcement of Akhilleus's battle cry with her own voice in Iliad 18:100 
97 
98 
99 
100 
constitute a falsification of either image. To Clarke's observation 'that in the Shield of 
Achilles itself there is a parallel for the appearance of divine figures who would not 
normally be visible to mortals, since in the siege scene an army is lead by Ares and 
Athena ... (XVIII.518-19)', add the observation that just as Eris, Kydoimos and Ker are 
active in this siege which features Ares and Athene, similarly when Eris appears in I/. 
4 in the compan y of Deimos and Phobos this is also in the immediate context of activity 
by Ares and Athene, I/. 4.439-440. 
I/. 21.406-408. 
See esp. Bushnell (1982); Pucci (1987), 110-122; W. Smith (1988) . 
Lesky (1961), 27. 
I/. 18.217-218. 
E'v8a cnos ~va', c'maTEp8E 81: TiaAAUS' 'A8TJVTJ 
cp8E"y~aT'· 
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In the adverb, c.mchEp8E, lies a certain ambivalence about the precise nature of 
Athene's action at this point: from where does she add her voice to Akhilleus'? 
Edwards regards c.mchEp8E as indicating that Athene is physically removed, that 
is, she does not stand beside Akhilleus in adding her voice to his shout.101 But 
nevertheless the entire point here is that the presence of Athene's voice at least 
makes the shout distinctly divine in its dimensions, even as Akhilleus' own cry 
is expressed in a line beginning used elsewhere, as Edwards notes, only of Here 
and Athene herself.102 The action of the god creates something of an eddy of 
uncertainty in the correlation of presence and power. Further along the scale 
from this judiciously non-committal approach by Lesky is the response of 
Erbse, who reads the long arm of Zeus in unequivocally concrete terms as an 
example of exquisite magnificence: 'Die Vorstellung ist von erlesener 
GroiSartigkeit'.103 Erbse takes his cue from an ancient commentator on this 
passage: the scholion first offers a comment on Zeus's hand in terms of a 
metaphorical image or expression: AELTTEL TO w:;, ol. 8E Tf]L 8uvaiJ.EL; but then it 
offers a more concrete alternative: fl EKTTAT)KTLKOJJ TO Tf]S' cpavTaala:;, d ~ XELp 
TOU LlLOS' IJ.EXPL Tf]S' YllS' cp8aJJEL 8JJT)TO\J w8oDaa.l04 To which Erbse adds his 
comment: 'So ist es in der Tat'. 105 In Erbse's view, Zeus's devotion for Hektor is 
expressed in the concreteness of the image, as Zeus comes almost to identify 
himself with Hektor as the representative of Zeus's plan. Thus Erbse sees in the 
long arm of Zeus a moment of physical contact between the Olympian and 
Hektor that is for him a significant expression of a certain movement within the 
overall narrative frame of the Iliad-so far is this from constituting a merely 
metaphorical image of Zeus's power. 
In each of these accounts of this particular image, much seems to be at 
stake. This is the case not least because of the aesthetic reactions that the image 
provokes. In addition to the respectively negative and positive reactions of 
Janko ('more vivid (or indeed grotesque)') and Erbse ('GroiSartigkeit') that I 
quoted above, one might further compare Ameis, Hentze and Cauer: 'eine 
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103 
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Edwards (ed.) (1991), on 18.217-218. 
Il. 5.784 (Here) and 11.10 (Athene). 
Erbse (1986), 220: 'Welche AusmafSe mufS dieser Weltenherrscher haben, wenn er mit 
seiner Hand vom Himmellangen und den wild fechtenden Helden seinem Ziel 
entgegenschieben kann, aus Besorgnis, der letzte Schritt konne dem Sterblichen aus 
eigener Kraft nicht gelingen! Die Vorstellung ist von erlesener GrofSartigkeit'; cf. Janko 
(ed.) (1992), on 15.693-5: 'wrongly Erbse, Cotter 220' . 
Sch. bT on I/. 15.695. 
Erbse (1986), 220. 
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grobsinnliche Vorstellung'-a 'grossly sensual' image.106 Why such strong 
reactions? It is certainly the case that the image of a god's hand is by no means 
unique to this instance.107 For the hand of Zeus, particular comparison is made 
with an expression that occurs twice in Iliad 9, where in Akhilleus's phrase, 
repeated by Odysseus, Zeus is said to hold his hand in protection over Troy, 
f.LcXA.a yap E-8Ev Eupuona ZE{Js- I XE1pa ETW i.mEpE:crxE.108 This image has prompted 
similar reactions to the long arm of Zeus. Mostly it is domesticated as a mere 
expressionJ09 Or else it provokes unfavourable characterisations for its 
potential physical dimensions: Kullmann calls it 'eine "groteske" Steigerung' .110 
For Gross, this need only be the case if the hand were to be regarded as real, 
rather than as 'ein Bild flir die Macht des Zeus', and he goes on to makes further 
comparison other images of a god's, especially Zeus's, hand 'held over' which 
he likewise wants to read 'als Zeichen der Macht Schutz und Rettung' .111 
Revealingly, Gross leaves out of account at this point of his analysis the hand of 
Apollo 'held over' Aineias to protect him against the onrush of Diomedes in 
Iliad 5, and this omission seems due in no small part to the non-physical, 
imagistic way in which Gross wants to read this protective hand of Zeus.112 In 
this instance, by contrast, Apollo's hand is resolutely physical in its 
dimensions-yL YVWCJKWV 0 o\. aUTOS' i.mELPEXE xE1pas- 'A TTOAAWV I ... Tp'ts 8E: OL 
ECJTucpE:A.L(E cpanvrw acrn\.8' 'An6AA.wv-and it is as such that Gross will shortly 
after refer to it.113 One further example adduced by Gross in reference to the 
hand of Zeus is also revealing. This is a passage from Exodus, where in a 
curious sequence Jahweh protects Moses from seeing his face with his hand in 
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Ameis, Hentze and Cauer (edd.) (1913-1930), on 11 . 15.694f.; cited by Erbse (1986), 220. 
Note also Zeus's self-described iJ.EVOS KGL XELPES c'iarrToL at I/. 8.450; see Gross (1970), 
366-367, and cf. LfrgE, s.v. c'iarrTos: it is suggested that the word was understood by the 
successors to Homer via folk-etymology with arrTOiJ.UL, and thus taken to cmmote Zeus's 
remoteness: 'ist der freundschaftlichen und furchtbefreienden Geste des XELPOS 
arrTECJ8m, XEI.pa AaiJ.PcivELv unzuganglich'. Gross (1970), 367 n. 6, observes that the 
adjective c'iarrTos is used only of Zeus's hands among the gods (elsewhere it is used of 
heroes' hands); this use is precisely in a context where Zeus is threatening the other 
gods. See also now Felson (2002), 46 n. 13. 
I/. 9.419-420 = 9.686-687. See Kullmatm (1956), 134; Gross (1970), 367-368; Janko (ed.) 
(1992), on 693-5. 
Thus Hainsworth (ed.) (1993), on I/. 9.420, declares: 'The protective hand of Zeus is an 
easy metaphor ... though more typical of Near Eastern thought than Greek.' 
Kullmann (1956), 134. 
Gross (1970), 367-368, connects UTTEPEXELV XEI.pa with the use of UTTEPEXELV of the sun, Il. 
11.735, and morning star, Od. 13.93, despite the fact that those instances are 
intransitive; alongside the Il. 9 instances cf. I/. 4.249, 24.374, Od. 14.184. 
Gross (1970), 368, refers to this passage further down the same page. 
I/. 5.433, 437. For a transitive use of UTTEPEXELV with reference to another (non-human) 
body part, see I/. 2.426: cmMyxva 8' c'ip' GiJ.TTElpavTEs UTTELpqov 'HcpataTOLO (on the 
fire-god here, see M . Clarke (1999), 266-267). 
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terms that are strikingly concrete; for Gross, this too could have been a 
'groteske Vorstellung', except that again 'es geht auch hier nur urn ein Bild ftir 
das gnadige Eingreifen Jahwes'.114 Here again the choice between the literal and 
the figurative, between the actual and the metaphorical, is formulated in 
aesthetic terms, between a grotesque actuality and a mere image-the 
transition for this god is from 'grotesk' to 'gnadig'. This is an aesthetic choice 
with significant theological dimensions.115 The theological agenda seems fairly 
plain with regard to the hand of Jahweh, but what about in discussions of 
Zeus's hand? Just what might the aesthetic issues involved in Zeus's long arm 
stretching down from Ida to the battlefield be thought to connote in this 
respect? Gross's next paragraph begins with reference to the hand of Apollo in 
the Iliad 5 passage quoted above: 'Eine leibhaftige gottliche Hand ist dagegen 
mit der des Apollon gemeint'.l16 By contrast with the long hand of Zeus, in the 
case of Apollo a 'real, bodily hand is meant'. Perhaps with gods other than 
Zeus, the supreme Olympian, the stakes are not so high. 
Precisely what the 'sensual nature' of the image of Zeus's long arm 
draws attention to is the potential for physical and emotive contact between 
god and hero. It is the particular strength of Erbse' s reading of this image to 
have emphasised this point, even if I will offer below a different reading of the 
narrative ramifications of this divine push in the back. Other reactions to this 
image in aesth~tic and theological terms have perhaps served to obscure this 
physical and emotive aspect of the question of divine presence. But one of the 
more interesting features of this image is not so much that it reflects an 
anthropomorphising conception of how a god might act, but that there takes 
place in the slide between Zeus's acts of divine will and his action 'with long 
arm' a process of emergent objectification: the power of Zeus emerges into 
quasi-physicality. This image is not 'just a metaphor', a poetic image in a weak 
sense, but is more than this, namely a particular presentation of the workings of 
a god in terms that can be 'felt'. The long arm of Zeus on such a reading is not 
simply a cognitive symbol for Zeus's will-the long arm of Zeus as 'good to 
think with'; more than this, it is a sensorially active, bodily objectification of 
Zeus's power as a subjective agent within the Iliadic world. If one is still to 
speak of metaphor, this is metaphor in a peculiar form, in which the 
114 
115 
116 
Exodus 33.22-23 The passage is of interest precisely for the features that are 
downplayed by Gross (1970), 368. 
For the palpable relation between divinity and monstrousness elsewhere in the OT, see 
Beal (2002), 47-55, on Leviathan and God in Job; cf. G. Steiner (2001), 40-41, on the 
'hypertrophy of aesthetic values' in God's answer to Job from out of the whirlwind. 
Gross (1970), 368. 
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impertinence of the image is undermined by the potential of a god to 
substantiate it.117 An image such as this brings with it a sense of emergent 
corporeality to the presence of the power of the god, a certain emphasis on the 
potential physical consequences of such 'metaphorical' contact between a mortal 
and the power of a god. 
The most obvious instance of the powerful physicality of a god's hand is 
Apollo's blow to Patroklos's back with his downturned hand shortly before that 
hero's death in Iliad 16:118 
O"Tf] 8' om8EV, TTAf]~EV 8£ flETcl<j>pEVOV EUpEE T' WflW 
XELPL KUTUTTPTJVEL 
The effects are profound. Patroklos's eyes reel: aTpE<jJE8lVT)8Ev 8E o\. oCJCJE.119 His 
helmet is knocked off: TOU 8' cmo IJ.EV KpaTOs- KUVET)V ~QAE <Pci~OS' , A TIOAAWV .120 
The sound and image of the helmet rolling away under the feet of the chariot-
horses offers another externalised and sensorially oriented realisation of 
Patroklos' s distress: 121 
~ 8£ KUALV80f1EVTJ Kavax~v EXE TTOO"O"LV u<f>' 'LTTTTWV 
au\wms- Tpu<f>a\na, f.LLav8TJaav 8£ E'8npm 
a'Lf.LUTL KUL KOVL TJLO"L' 
Matching the sound of the helmet is the image of its crest mired in blood and 
dust, in the physical elements of the battlefield. Patroklos's spear shatters in his 
hand: nav 8€ OL .___EV xd.pECJCJLV a:yrl 80ALXOCJKLOV EYXOS' I ~pL8u IJ.Eya CJTL~apov 
KEKOpU81J.EVOV.1 22 Patroklos's shield falls to the ground: aimxp cm' WIJ.WV I clCJTilS 
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119 
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121 
122 
For the complications of metaphor, see e.g. Goldhill (1984), 21: 'the apparent solving 
cannot fully repress or totally solve the enigma ... Derrida expresses this potentiality of 
metaphor in characteristic style: "metaphor is the moment of possible sense as a 
possibility of non-truth'"; here 'non-truth' corresponds to divine transcendence of normal 
frames, as in an arm that could reach down from Ida to push Hektor on. 
I!. 16.791-792. Fenik (1968), 217, compares Poseidon's bewitchment of Alkathoos at Il. 
13.434-444; but this obscures the specific physical modalities of Apollo's impact upon 
Patroklos . 
11. 16.792. For the boldness of aTpE<j>EBlVTJOEv, see Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.791-2. 
I/. 16.793 . 
If. 16.794-796. For the alliteration of consonantal stops in the dactylic run of 794, see 
Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.794-5. For the powerful externalised objectification of 
Patroklos's distress compare Janko (ed.) (1992) on 16.791-804: 'The poet dwells on this 
moving detail as if it stands for the hero's own head lying in the dust', with further 
parallels given on 16.794-800. For this externalised substantiation of pain, see Scarry 
(1985), esp. 15-16, where Scarry cites the Homeric recognition of pain-in-the-weapon, as 
in the arrow 'freighted with dark pains', I/. 4.117: 'at the external boundary of the 
body, it begins to externalize, objectify, and make sharable what is originally an 
interior and unsharable experience.' Compare Weil ([1956] 1983), 3: 'To define force-it 
is that x that turns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing.' 
If . 16.801-802. 
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avv TEAaflWVL xaf.lal TTEO"E TEpflLOEO"O"a.123 Apollo causes Patroklos's breastplate to 
be loosened: AUO"E 8E- o'L 8wpllKa ava~ b.LO') u'Los- 'ATT6A.A.wv.124 With the loosening 
of the breastplate, Patroklos's wits are overcome and his joints dissolve: Tov 8' 
aTll cppE-vas- ElAE, A.U8Ev 8' uTTo cpai.8Lfla yu'La, I aTf) 8E Tacpwv .125 The final 
element of this sequence, aTT] 8E: Tacpwv, speaks precisely of a state of profound, 
existential loss, of a crucial suspension of Patroklos' status as an agent on the 
Iliadic battlefield, and of his reduction to a state of profound passivity.126 Each of 
these stages comes as a consequence of Apollo's initial blow, the full 
amplification of which is reached only with the blow to Patroklos's unprotected 
back by Euphorbos as a doublet of Apollo's earlier blow.127 Patroklos's 
unmaking is expanded in the pathetic image of Euphorbos retreating back into 
the crowd as Patroklos himself-marked by another apostrophe, TiaTpOKAEES' 
'L TTTTED-stands 'naked' in military terms in the midst of battle.128 It is likewise 
significant that the explication of the significance of the armour itself-for 
Patroklos, for Hektor, for Akhilleus-is brought within the frame of the effects 
of Apollo's blow, and thus comes not as a digression or parenthesis, but as an 
integral part of Apollo's unmaking of Patroklos's ability to participate in 
combat,l29 In an instance like this, the use of the hand might well reflect on one 
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129 
11 . 16.802-803. 
ll . 16.804. 
ll. 16.805-806. See Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.804-5, for the parallelism of 'loosening'. 
Prier (1989), 89-90, discusses TE-8rrrra, Tacpwv and the use of the latter in the phrases 
Tacpwv av6poUCJE and CJTfj OE Tacpwv: 'an experience that ... induces an involuntary 
physical movement or some other action, a powerful externally induced response that 
sometimes turns the "this" into a dazed animal' . The correlation of physical action 
(av6povaE, CJTfj) with loss of agent-status underlines the sudden emergence of the person 
as an object of (self)contemplation in their object-like state. On the physicality of 
8c'q.t~os-states, cf. Lateiner (1995), 45-46. 
The lines are parallel: I/. 16.791, aTij 6' om8Ev, TTAfj~Ev oE: uncippEvov EupE-E T' c!iblJ!!; 
If. 16.806-807, Q.Tfj OE Tacpwv. om8EV OE uncippEVOV 6~f'L ooup\. I c!i!JWV jJ.ECJCJT]YlJS' . 
Higbie (1990), 168, points out that iJ.ETacppEvov is 'completely localized' in this position 
but the phrase om8Ev oE: iJ.ETacppEvov never recurs . I would add that the coordination of 
om8Ev and iJ.ETcicppEvov recurs only at 16.791 . For Euphorbos as a doublet of Paris in the 
killing of Akhilleus: see Muhlestein (1987), 78-81; Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.808-811; 
Dowden (1996), 54 n. 38. 
'Naked': I!. 16.814-815, ouo' lJTTfjJ.ELVEV I Tlci.TpOKAOV YViJ.VOV TTEp E-6vT' E-v OT].LOTfjn; on 
yviJ.v6v, see Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.812-17; for a psychoanalytic reading of the 'naked' 
warrior, see MacCary (1982), 152-156. Apostrophe: 1/. 16.812, cf. 16.787, !fv6' apa TOL, 
Tlci.TpOKAE, cpcivT] ~L6Tmo TEAEvT!'J. There is a series of apostrophes of Patroklos in I/ .16: 
see A. Parry (1972), 9-22; Frontisi-Ducroux (1986a), 24-25; for these as a ' reflex of 
focalisation through Achilles', see Martin (1989), 235-236; Martin (1993), 239. 
I/. 16.796-800. To this extent, the twin emphasis on the armour and the divine unmaking 
of the warrior has a rationale here that does not depend only on 'original' motifs like 
the invincibility of Akhilleus's armour; cf. Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.777-867; more fully, 
Edwards (1987), 115-116, 264-265, drawing upon J. R. Wilson (1974). Janko cites I/. 17.13, 
125 and 205 as indicating Patroklos's armour is still on him; but what these lines reflect 
is the pattern that when a warrior is unmade by death, the body and the arms become 
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level, to quote Janko, 'the contrast between effortless divine action and its 
drastic effects'.130 But it also places a particular emphasis on the physicality of 
the god's power to act. In accordance with this emphasis the poet pays lavish 
attention to the joint physical-emotional consequences of this blow with 
downtutned hand. 
One opportunity presented by Apollo's action here is that of connecting 
the starkly physical properties of a sequence such as this more closely with 
other instances of divine hands which are in this respect less startling, but which 
nonetheless display the emergent logic of such a presentation of divine power 
and presence at work. Attention to divine hands is of particular interest for the 
significant role that hands play within the Homeric epics in communicative 
contexts. Particularly significant in this respect within the world of the Homeric 
epics are those intense and intimate moments mainly involving mothers, wives 
and gods (mostly goddesses) that are the recurrent contexts of xnpl TE IJ.LV 
KaTEpE(Ev, always in association with speech, and again of the formula EV T' apa 
ot cpD xnpl, likewise in association with speech.131 Lateiner draws attention to 
hands as 'the most versatile organ of in-awareness [sic] nonverbal 
behaviour'.132 I would place particular emphasis here on the presence of the 
hands 'in-awareness': as such, hands function as particularly conscious physical 
extensions of subjective agency in the world, and in this respect the role of 
hands as the lea9ing 'organ of action' is far from coincidental.133 Accordingly, 
130 
131 
132 
133 
separable objects over which to contend: here, although Apollo has unmade Patroklos 
as a warrior before his death, thus separating Patroklos and his arms, when his death 
is actually brought about by Euphorbos and Hektor then Patroklos's corpse and armour 
are treated in more usual ways. 
Janko (ed .) (1992), on 16.791-804. Compare Griffin (1980), 136 n. 56, comparing Il . 15.361 
'for the contrast of the effortless action of the god and the catastrophe it produces for 
man'. On the formula xnpl. KaTmrpTJVEL in the Homeric poems, see Lowenstam (1981), 
20, 68££. 
For xnpt TE flLV l<aTEpE/:Ev, see 11. 1.361, 5.372, 6.485, 24.127; Od . 4.610, 5.181, 13.288. 
For i:v T' c'ipa o\. <f>v xnpt, see I!. 6.253, 6.406, 14.232, 18.384, 18.423, 19.7, Od. 2.302 
(Antinoos to Telemakhos in an abusive use of the intimate gesture, characteristic of the 
Suitors' nonverbal behaviour, for which see Lateiner (1995), 206), 8.291, 10.280, 11 .247, 
15.530 (Theoclymenos to Telemakhos) . On these two formular phrases and their 
association with speech, see Martin (1989), 18-20: 'the physical quality of speech' is 
well illustrated by these '"hand and word" descriptions [which] can also occur 
whenever one speaker establishes contact with a speaker for an emotional private 
conversation'. On the gestures, see also Levine (1982), 100-101; Lateiner (1995), 57 and n. 
48; but note van Wees (1998), for criticism of Lateiner in terms of the relationship 
between gestures and their description/ evocation in Hon1eric contexts. 
Lateiner (1995), 71. 
Compare Gross (1970), 365: 'Nachst dem Gesicht sind die Hande die ausdrucksvollsten 
und symbolkraftigsten Teile des menschlichen Ki:irpers'. Note also Bremmer (1991), 22: 
'In Greece, the hand was considered the organ for action and therefore could only be 
shown by real males'; also Scarry (1985), 173, 252-254, 364 n. 74, for the hand, 'the direct 
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the emergence of a divine hand as an object of poetic attention constitutes a 
significant realisation of a god's status as agent, and a realisation which places 
particular emphasis on the physical and emotional dimensions of action within 
the Homeric world. 
Certainly it is the case that instances other than the interaction of Apollo 
with Patroklos show further possibilities for the dimensions of divine presence 
as realised in their hands. Several of the instances of the two characteristic hand 
and speech formulae mentioned above are relevant in this respect. Thetis, for 
instance, recurs as one who extends her hand and one to whom hands are 
extended. This reflects in particular the roles Thetis plays as mother and as 
goddess, as she mediates between Akhilleus and Zeus and secures new armour 
for Akhilleus,l34 But more closely connected with both the long arm of Zeus 
and the downturned hand of Apollo are those instances where the divine hand 
appears as an embodied instrument of force.135 This occurs in the context of god 
fighting against god in Iliad 21. At one point Athene picks up a rock with her 
XELPL 'TTaXELllL to throw at Ares; at another Athene strikes Aphrodite across the 
breasts with this same xnp'L 'TTaXELllL.136 Then Here seizes the hands of Artemis 
in her own left hand and uses her right to take Artemis's bow and quiver and to 
hit her about the head with them:137 
~ pa, Ka\. a!-l<floTE:paS' E:n\. KapnwL XEI.paS' Ej.lapnTEV 
490 CJKaLfjL, 8E~LTEpfjL 8' ap' an' Wj.lWV a'LVUTO TO~a. 
---QlJTOLCJLV 8' ap' i'8nvE nap' OUQTQ j.lfl8L6waa 
EVTponaAL(Oj.lEVllV' TUXEES' 8' EKTILnTOV OLCJTOl. 
In these instances strength is embodied in the hands of the gods, even for comic 
effect. For this comic reversal of the embodied force of divine hands, compare 
further a passage a little earlier in Iliad 21 where Aphrodite takes Ares by the 
hand in his distress after being struck by Athene's rock.138 Again, when Iris 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
agent of making', and its extension into/by tools and weapons: this is the body part of 
greatest interest to Marx and the Bible. 
See I/. 1.361 (Thetis to Akhilleus), 18.384 (Charis to Thetis), 18.423 (Hephaistos to 
Thetis), 19.7 (Thetis to Akhilleus), 24.127 (Thetis to Akhilleus). 
Compare I/. 5.854, the hand of Athene; I/. 16.704, the hand of Apollo; cf. I/ . 15.355, the 
feet of Apollo. See also M. Clarke (1999), 247, in favour of the vulgate reading XEI.paS' at 
Jl. 21.548, which thus offers the heavy hands of (D)eath: onwS' 8avciToLo ~apdaS' 
XELpaS' aAciAKOL . 
11 . 21.403 A.t8ov E'LA.no xnp\. naxdTJL; 21.424-425 npOS' CJT118w xnp\. naxELTJL I ~AQCJE ; 
compare also Poseidon at 11 . 20.143: ~j.lETEPTJLS' uno XEPCJLV avayKUL ll<flL 8aj.lEVTaS'. On 
the phrase xnp\. naxdllL, see esp. Nagler (1993). 
11 . 21.489-492 . 
Aphrodite and Ares: 11. 21.416-417: TOV 8' ayE xnpOS' EAOVCJQ L':.LOS' 8uyaTllP 'A<flpooLTll 
I nUKVU j.lclAQ CJTEVclXOVTQ. 
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leads Aphrodite away in Iliad 5 there is no immediate reference to the hand, but 
of course it is her hand that Diomedes has wounded shortly before that 
point.139 The embodiment of power in the hands of the gods is laid open in one 
particular image of Zeus:140 
TOTE 8~ pa TIUT~p av8pwv TE 8EWV TE 
"] 8T]S' EV KopucpijLCJL Ka8E(ETO m8T]EOOT]S' 
oupav68EV KQTQ~US' ' EXE 8' aaTEpOTI~V jJ.ETa XEPOLV. 
Zeus's power has an externalised, objective form that itself rests in the hands of 
the god: the extension of strength from the god's will through his hands into 
the objective encapsulation of that power is set out in clear terms. Divine hands 
play significant parts in contexts where strength and power are at issue among 
the gods. 
But I want to pick out one particular appearance of the hand of a god, 
namely Poseidon's use of his hand to propel Aineias into the air and out of 
combat with Akhilleus in Iliad 20, as Akhilleus rampages across the battlefield:141 
325 Atvdav 8' EOOEVEV arro xeovOS' utj;6a' adpUS'' 
rroAMS' 8E- aTLXaS' ~pwwv, rroA"-aS' 8E- Kal. '(rrrrwv 
ALVELUS' urrE:paho 8EOV arro XELPOS' 6pouaaS', 
lCE 8' E:rr' E:axan~v rrot--vaLKOS' rroAEiJ.OLO' 
This baroque image provides a useful point of comparison with the 'long arm 
of Zeus', especially since this passage also appears within a larger sequence of 
---interaction between gods and mortals. Compare particularly the earlier events 
of Iliad 20, where Apollo appears to Aineias in the guise of Lykaon to urge him 
on verbally and physically.142 In Aineias's reply to Apollo/Lykaon, he refers to 
Zeus's support and then to the likelihood of being overcome by the hands of 
Akhilleus and Athene: ~ K' E:oaiJTJV uno XEpa\.v 'AxL>J...fjos- Kat 'A8~v11s- .143 Aineias 
also offers an explanatory coda on the assistance of Athene for Akhilleus which 
itself modulates into a statement of the general presence of one of the gods by 
Akhilleus's side: ai.EL yap nap' EELS' YE 8EWV, Os- A.oLyov QIJ.UVEL.l44 Apollo replies 
with an exhortation for Aineias to pray to the gods, since he is the son of 
Aphrodite, and Akhilleus is the son of a lesser goddess: KE1vos- oE- XEpdovos- El< 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
Iris and Aphrodite, 11 . 5.353-354: T~V j.l.EV ap' '>' ] PLS' EAOvaa no8~VE'j.l.OS' £cay' Oj.l.LAOV I 
axeoj.l.EVT]V 68UVT]LCJL, j.l.EAQLVETO 8E- xp6a KUAOV. Aphrodite's hand, I/. 5.336: aKpT]V 
olhaaE XE'Lpa. 
I/ . 11 .182-184. 
I/. 20.325-328 . 
I/. 20.79-85 . 
Hands of Akhilleus and Athene: Il. 20.94. Zeus's support: 20.92-93: auTap EiJ.E ZEuS' I 
dpuaae·, OS' iJ.OL E:rrwpaE iJ.EVOS' t--mtJ;TJpci TE yovva . 
I/. 20.98. 
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8Eou E-anv.145 In this fashion a contest of power and strength is prepared: the 
hands of Akhilleus and Athene are pitted against Aineias, and he himself is 
assisted in the event by the hand of Poseidon. The physicality and presence of 
this hand seems assured by the fact of Aineias's superhuman leap to the edge of 
the battle: It is in this place that Poseidon comes to stand near Aineias again.146 
But just like the long arm of Zeus this divine hand has uncertain dimensions: is 
Aineias transported the whole way in the hand of Poseidon as if in a cherry-
picker, or does he leap from the hand as springboard? Such questions are 
scarcely to the point. The significance of the hand to this extent lies precisely in 
its embodiment of divine strength, not in its visual dimensions. The play of 
hands in such contexts gives a specific focus to interaction between the gods, 
and between gods and mortals, in terms of 'feltness', of the physical and 
emotional concomitants of action: the hand of god. But this embodiment is not 
a limitation on the operation of divine power, but instead an extension of this 
operation in ways that add 'sense' and sensation to the play of divine power 
and presence on the Iliadic battlefield. These are the dimensions to which the 
'sensual' aspect of the long arm of Zeus draws our attention, how the presence 
and power of the gods may emerge in its figuration as felt, evident, and 
peculiarly significant. 
There are two specific aspects of the language used of the long arm of 
Zeus that I want ,to draw attention to in this regard, not because they are 
unusual, but rather the reverse, because these are small yet still significant ways 
in which the poetic texture of Homeric language reinforces the immediacy of its 
narrative in speech. In the first place, the position of xnpl. fl.Ma wyaA.T)L in 
runover at the beginning of the hexameter line contributes to the 
foregrounding of this long arm: Zeus's action is presented verbally in the 
previous line, and now the long arm emerges as the objectified instrument of 
this action in a movement from verbal expression to concrete realisation.147 
Comparison may be made with other instances of the divine hand being 
145 
146 
147 
I/. 20 .106-107. 
Il. 20.329-330. 
This is runover of the 'progressive' or 'adding' type, which is less marked than other 
types, but it is here additionally marked by a following sense pause (characteristic of 
the 'runover word'): see Kirk (ed.) (1985), 31-33; Edwards (1966), esp. 137-148; Higbie 
(1990), 32-41. Runover is not emphatic a priori; emphasis emerges out of a convergence of 
semantics and metrics: for this basic point, see Bassett (1926), 120-121, but more 
constructive is Edwards (1966), 140. Compare Higbie (1990), 41: 'In adding enjambement, 
the structure of the sentence is satisfied with verse end, so what follows, be it an 
embellishment of the clause or the joining of another clause, is both unexpected and non-
essential.' For a survey of the terminology applied to runover, see Edwards (1986), 223-
229. 
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foregrounded as the embodied instrument of divine action, some in runover, 
some at line and clause beginning.148 Where the 'hand and speech' formulae 
mentioned above couple the hand with speech in evoking the emotive 
physicality of gesture and speech in contexts of communication, the interest in 
these instances lies in how the function of the divine hand as a realisation of the 
presence of divine strength and power is underlined in the rhythmic texture of 
the Homeric narrative. 
In the second place, the phrase iJ.aA.a iJ.EYGAllL lends a particular 
communicative emphasis to the emergent physicality of Zeus's arm. The 
particle iJ.GAa has been characterised in its use with adjectives like iJ.Eyas- in terms 
of an intensifying function, and its use is heavily weighted towards speech over 
narrative_l49 As such, in Griffin's view, it gives a nuance of 'informality' and 
suggests 'a sort of emphasis which would have slightly blurred the uniform and 
dispassionate mode of presentation which the Muse's narrative called for'. 150 
This particle focalises narrative in certain ways. As such, the phrase iJ.GAa 
iJ.EYGAllL lays stress how Zeus's arm comes to the attention of the narrator and 
audience as physically perceptible, as something that could be 'felt'. For iJ.GAa as 
a marker of communicative emphasis in such contexts, compare several 
instances of the iJ.GAa IJ.Eyas- phrase. Two occur in the context of Hekuba's 
distress at the sight of the abuse of Hektor's body in Iliad 22.151 In the first 
instance Hekuba's~ distress is described, as she tore her hair, ripped off her head-
covering, and cried out at the sight of her son: KWKUO"EV 8E iJ.GA.a iJ.Eya TTa18' 
E-aL8ouaa.l52 Hekuba's grief is expressed in strong physical terms, and the vocal 
instantiation of her grief is characterised by the 11-aA.a iJ.Eya phrase. The emotion 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
Runover: I xnpl. KaTalTpT]VE'L, Tl. 16.792 (Apollo), Od. 13.164 (Poseidon). I XELPL rrci:\w 
f:pu(Ja(J',Il. 5.836 (Athene). Line and clause beginning: I xnpl. KaTarrpT]VEL, hyAp. 333 
(Here); I xnpl. 8'/8E, If . 3.385 (Aphrodite: xnpl. 8E: VEKTapE-ou E-avoD htva~E 
:\a~ou(Ja · I ypT]t 8E- f.J-LV E"LKu'La; the juxtaposition of the divine hand and the disguise as 
an old woman is the pivot of the whole scene), 14.272 (Hypnos' instructions to Here) . 
Similarly emphatic, but evocative of an embodied mutuality of divine action, is I/ . 
21.285-286, where Poseidon and Athene stand hand in hand to assist Akhilleus: (JT~TTJV 
f:yyus l6vTE, 8E flUS' 8 ' av8pW(JLV ELKTT]V. I XELPL 8E XELpa AQ~OVTES' ElTWTUJ(JQVT' 
ElTEE(J(JLV. 
Thesleff (1954), 55, charac terises the Homeric use of flciAa in relatively negative terms, 
even if ' [q]uite often, however, it has an emphatic position.' But see Griffin (1986), 45-
46: the usage of flciAa is predominantly in speech not narrative; by comparison with the 
very common usage of f.lci:\a with adjectives in speech, it is 'in narrative almost wholly 
limited to the 3 phrases f.lciAa flEyas, f.lciAa rrtovos and flci:\a rro:\Aci '. 
Griffin (1986 ), 45-46. 
Other instances: I/ . 9.303 (Odysseus on the honour the Greeks will do Akhilleus); 10.172 
(Nestor on the evident need of the Greeks); 15.321 (Apollo's shout); 17.595 (Zeus's 
thunder-lightning); 17.723 (lifting corpses up on high); Od. 18.4 (description of Iros) . 
Jl. 22.407. 
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of the moment of perception (rrcii8' E-aL8ouaa) is realised in its concrete 
expression, and the f.lciAa IJ.Eya phrase contributes a communicative emphasis on 
the perceptual tangibility of this grief. In the second instance, shortly 
afterwards, the phrase reappears in Hekuba's own lament. For Hekuba, Hektor 
was her prayer, for the Trojans he was their boon and great glory:153 
o tJ-OL vuKTaS' TE Kal ~flap 
ElJXWAll KaT a clCJTU TIE AEGKEO, na.at T' ovnap 
Tpwat TE wl TpwLi'jwL KaTa TITOALV , o'l aE 8£Cw WS' 
435 8n8EXaT '· ~ yap wt mfJL tJ-clAa tJ-Eya KD8os ET]a8a 
Here Hekuba underlines Hektor's significance for Tray and the Trojans, in her 
stress upon the quasi-divine reception and perception that Hektor received 
from the Trojans, and in the IJ.ciAa IJ.Eya Ku8os- that he embodied for them. In this 
context f.lciAa IJ.Eya Ku8os- marks the emotive stress that Hekuba places upon this 
status, and reinforces her statement of his significance to Troy. Elsewhere 
Apollo will shout wi>-.a IJ.Eya and Zeus's own thunder-lightning resounds IJ.Ma 
IJ.Eycif.a, both times in contexts where each god wields the aegis: in both place 
the f.lciAa IJ.Eyas- phrase underlines the perceptible quality of their actions.154 In a 
similar way, in Zeus's xnpl. IJ.Ma IJ.Eyaf.llL the agency of the god is given a 
communicative emphasis that reinforces the emergence of this arm as a kind of 
bodily presence. 
Zeus's long arm is presented in these lines in terms of an emergent 
embodiment of action, but it is still not clear how this embodiment is to be 
perceived. In Iliad 16, where Apollo wields his downturned hand to such evident 
effect, questions about presence and physicality have been somewhat obviated 
by an explanatory rationale: Apollo himself is 'present', but concealed in the 
first place from Patroklos by a covering layer of 'mist': NPL yap rroAf.f)L 
KEKaAVIJ.IJ.EVOS' avTE~OAllaEv.155 The presence of the god is not in doubt, and the 
circumvention of visual perception can be seen as part of the emphasis in this 
sequence on how divine presence may impact upon a person, may be directly 
153 
154 
155 
I/. 22.432-435. Janko (ed.) (1992), on 22.433, notes that ovnap in sing. is elsewhere in 
early epic associated with 'gods or their gifts'; for the divine comparison, to Janko's 
citation of I/. 22.394 and Od. 7.71-72 add the parallel passage, where Odysseus holds 
out to Akhilleus the prosp ect of such honour, at I/. 9.302-303: o'L aE 8£Cw ws I Ttaoua'· ~ 
yap KE acpL tJ-ciAa tJ-Eya KU80S' apmo . 
Apollo: I/ . 15.321, GELa', ETIL 8' QlJTOS' aDaE tJ-clAa tJ-Eya. Zeus: 11. 17.595, aaTpatj;as 8E 
tJ-clAa wya>-- ' EKTUTTE, Tljv [se. alyt8a] 8' E-Ttva~Ev. Compare Logue ([1981-1994]2001), 
160-164, for an attempt to realise in typography the perceptual immediacy of Apollo's 
cries of warning to Patroklos and subsequent blow. 
I/. 16.790. For n1ist as a recurrent motif in the Homeric poems, see Kakridis (1971), 89-
107; Kakridis declines to discuss the use of mist by gods to cover themselves or humans, 
since he regards it, 92, as used 'for purely practical purposes'. 
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'felt', given that the physical and emotional effects of Apollo's blow are 
attended to in such detail. After the blow, Patroklos knows what has happened 
to him, and this knowledge should not be explained away in terms of the 
prophetic abilities associated with the point of death; this knowledge should be 
seen as a reflection of the existential impact of this point of contact between god 
and mortal.156 But in the case of the long arm of Zeus, there is no corresponding 
degree of attention to its effects upon Hektor. Our ability to construct a 
'theology' of Zeus's action here in terms of a physical distinction between the 
exercise of power by the god and the god's actual presence remains 
significantly underdetermined. Granted that we know both that gods can act 
from afar and that gods may exercise their power in more explicitly physical 
terms, in Zeus's long arm what we find is a situation where there is a slide 
between these two ostensibly distinct modes of divine action. The physicality of 
Zeus's action, for all the potential bodiliness of Zeus's long arm, fluctuates 
between these points. In this respect, Lesky's caution seems justified. But, more 
than this, this apparent degree of undecideability has important consequences 
for a central question of this chapter, namely the consideration of the boundary 
between the absence and presence of gods: the operation of the long arm of 
Zeus blurs precisely the criteria on which a god might be said to be 'absent' 
from a situation where that god is exercising power. 
If this passage destabilises questions of presence and absence in relation 
-~ 
to the exercise of divine power, what bearing does it have upon the discussion 
of divine presence and absence in relation to epiphany? From one perspective 
this might seem a surprising question, since even when the potential physicality 
of Zeus' s long arm in this passage has been conceded, as by Pucci or by Erbse, it 
has not been specifically discussed in relation to the problem of divine epiphany 
in the Homeric poems.157 In such a reading, Zeus's long arm, even if physicat is 
still 'invisible', and there is no suggestion that Hektor has recognised at this 
point the particular physical presence of the god; thus there is no 'epiphany'. 
But what I would like to suggest is that if this peculiarly embodied 
manifestation of Zeus's active role in the battle narrative of this section of the 
156 
157 
I/. 16.849-850: ci>J..a IJ.E Mo'Lp' OAOTJ Kal AT]TOUS' EKTaVEV VLOS', I av8pwv 8' Eucpop~OS'' CJU 
8€ IJ.E Tpt TOS' E~Evapt(ELS'. Pelliccia (1995), 276-277 n. 295 suggests that the precognition 
a t the point of death (Patroklos on Hektor's fate a t 16.852-854, for which see Janko (ed.) 
(1992), on 16.852-854) should be extended to include Patroklos's statements about his own 
death in the lines immediately before . 
Erbse (1986), 219-220. Pucci ([1985]1998d), 72, uses this as an example of the invisibility 
of gods when they s tand behind a hero: 'Naturally [!] Zeus is invisible; some 
commentators even take the expression as metaphorical and assume that the god is not 
in fact present on the battlefield at all.' 
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Iliad is read as part of a larger sequence, then its epiphanic ramifications become 
more suggestive. 
The events of Iliad 15 include several sections that are relevant. I will 
focus first on two sections that offer themselves as significant comparanda for 
Zeus's later action with his long arm. In the first place, the problematic presence 
of Zeus's long arm can be contrasted with the earlier presence of Apollo 
alongside Hektor earlier in Iliad 15.158 There Apollo comes to Hektor on the 
instruction of Zeus; after identifying himself, he states in strong terms the fact 
and purpose of his ongoing presence:159 
TOV 8' afJTE TTpOCJEEL TTEV ava~ EKclEpyos- 'A TTOAAWV' 
.. 8apCJEL vvv · TOLOV TOL CtOCJCJT]Tfjpa Kpovtwv 
255 E~ "I 8TJS' npOETJKE napECJTclf.J.EVaL KaL Ctf.J.UVELV, 
<l>o'L~ov 'An6\Awva xpuaaopov, OS' CJE napos- TTEP 
puof.J. ', Of.J.WS' ain6v TE KaL al nnvov TTTOALE8pov. 
a\\' ayE vvv l TTTTEUCJLV ETTOTpuvov TTOAEECJCJLV 
VT]va\.v E'm y\a<j>upfjwLV E\auVEf.J.EV wdas- '(nnous-· 
260 aiml.p Eyw nponapOL8E KLwv '(nnowL KEAEu8ov 
na.aav \navEw, TpEtj;w 8' flpwas- 'Axmous-. " 
ws- El nwv Ef.J.TTVEUCJE f.J.Evos- f.J.Eya TTOLf.J.EVL \awv. 
Apollo says that he will literally 'smooth the way' before Hektor, and this 
presence (aoacrrrrf)pa .. . TTapEcncqJ.Evm KaL a1.1uvnv ... os- aE mipos- TTEp puo1.1 ') of 
the god alongside Hektor will culminate in Apollo's decisive destruction of the 
Achaean wall, which will then allow the Trojans in among the Greek ships in 
execution of Zeus' plan to bring fire to the ships before he allows a reprieve. 
Compared with the ostensible physicality of Apollo's presence in this lengthy 
sequence of divine action on the Iliadic battlefield, the long arm of Zeus is a 
momentary trace. 
In the second place, once Apollo has disappeared from the battlefield, 
Zeus takes over again as Hektor's primary divine helper. Subsequently, at a 
critical juncture that is marked as such by the narrator, Zeus acts in this role to 
protect Hektor from the deadly arrows of Teukros, by breaking Teukros's 
bow-string.160 This event is followed by various observations by the characters 
involved as to who was responsible-a 8ai.1.1wv, a 8E6s--culminating in Hektor's 
158 11. 15.236-262. 
159 ll. 15.253-262. 
160 I/. 15.458-464. 
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assertion that it was Zeus, to which he adds that such divine assistance is easy to 
recognise: 161 
8~ yap '(8ov 6<j>8aAjJ.OLCJLV 
av8pOS' apwTflOS' b.L08EV ~Aa<j>8EVTa ~fAEiJ.Va. 
490 pE'la 8' apLyVWTOS' b.LOS' av8pciaL YLVETaL aAK~, 
TJ!J.EV OTEOLCJLV KD8os- i.mE:pTEpov E:yyvaAL~T]L, 
1']8' 1hLVaS' iJ.LVU8T]L TE Kal. ouK E:8EAT]LCJLV aiJ.vvnv· 
WS' vvv 'ApyELWV iJ.LVU8EL iJ.EVOS', cliJ.iJ.L 8' ap~yn. 
This statement on Hektor's part is read, particularly by de Jong, as an 
'unwittingly' correct observation, based on his earlier knowledge from Iris of 
Zeus's support_l62 In fact, this suggestion of unwittingness runs directly counter 
to what Hektor does say, namely that he saw with his own eyes (8~ yap '[8ov 
6<P8aA.IJ.ol.ow) how the arrows were disabled by Zeus (6.L68Ev ~A.a<P8E-vTa 
~EAEIJ.Va), which leads Hektor precisely into the statement that the might of Zeus 
is easy for men to recognise: P<:"l.a 8' apl. yvwTOS' 6.u)s- av8paol yl.vnm aAKT).163 
The suggestion of 'unwittingness' would requires some further explication that 
de Jong fails to provide if it is not to seem mismatched with the directness of 
Hektor's statements themselves. Notwithstanding this directness, I would 
argue that there is an important sense in which the dynamics of this phrase, P<:"l.a 
8' apLyvwTOS' 'easily to be recognised', are somewhat less than straightforward 
here, if in a different way from that conceived by de Jong. In particular I would 
compare the use, of similar phrasing by Aias, son of Oileos, of the departing 
Khalkhas/Poseidon whom he has just recognised as divine, if not as a specific 
161 
162 
163 
I/. 15.488-493. See de Jong (1987), 157ff.; Pelliccia (1995), 87-89; Collins (1998), 53-57, 61-
65. Compare Janko (ed.) (1992), on I/ . 15.461-470, on the distinction between 8aLiJ.WV and 
8E6S' in such contexts. 
Hektor's earlier knowledge: T/.11.200-209. See de Jong (1987), 159: 'Of course, he has not 
actually seen Zeus intervene, but like Teucer and Ajax he infers from the unexpectedness 
of the event that a god must have had a hand in it. For rhetorical purposes, and also 
because since A 207-9 he knows hin1self continually supported by Zeus, he mentions that 
god, unwittingly telling the truth'; compare Janko (ed.) (1992), on I! . 15.490-493. 
Pelliccia (1995), 88, cri ticising de Jong, stresses that Hektor does clearly have 'insight' 
into what has happened here, but still only as earlier mediated by Iris and Apollo. See 
also Collins (1998), 61-65, arguing for a conventional status for Hektor's explanation in 
terms of 0.~ from Zeus. 
Contrast Pelliccia (1995), 88-89: 'The problem is ... that he is witnessing the work of a 
god who operates invisibly through magic. So his language is skillfully adjusted to 
conceal the problem of conceptualizing just what it is that he claims to have seen .. . in 
short, because Zeus wasn't there to see, Hector has no more concrete information to offer 
about the means of Zeus' intervention than did the poet in his original description'; 
accordingly, 'L8ov only represents the product of an ' informed inference' . But precisely 
the point here is what Hektor does 'see', which he recognises (somehow) for what it is; 
the audience of the epic know that he is right. 
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god.164 Given Aias's later exploits, both in the Iliad and beyond its temporal 
frame, the phrase is ironic in Aias's mouth at this point, and hints that on a 
deeper level the opposite of what Aias states might be the case. In a pointed 
comic scene later in the epic, Aias will perceive correctly and make complaint 
about the fact of Athene's assistance to Odysseus in the funeral games, even as 
he spits out the dung into which he has planted his face when tripped up by the 
goddess:165 
780 cnfl 8E KEpas- iJ.ETU XEpal.v i!xwv ~oos- ciypavf.oLO, 
ov8ov UTTOTTTVWV, iJ.ETU 8' 'ApydowLV EELTTEV' 
" w rr6rrm, ~ 1-1' i!~f.m/JE 8Ea rr68as-, ii To m:ipos- TTEp 
iJ.TJTTlP ws- '08vaflL rrapl.amTaL ~8' E-rrapTjyn. " 
WS' i!<f>a8'· OL 8' apa TT<lVTES' E-rr' aimilL ~8u y£f.aaaav . 
Similarly, the dynamics of Hektor's 'easy recognition' have a grimly ironic 
overtone here, since Zeus's aid to Hektor and the Trojans will only be 
temporary: this has been marked out for the audience shortly before with the 
prayer of Nestor and the favourable response of Zeus.l66 Accordingly, one 
might modify the import of Hektor's 'unwittingness' here: he is indeed aware 
of Zeus's assistance as he himself states in bold terms, but he is not aware of the 
larger plan into which this assistance fits. The play of recognition between the 
various characters, among whom Hektor is most correct, is thus offered as a 
challenge to the audience's own awareness of the plan of Zeus, which the 
narrator has flagge_d for the audience's attention at the beginning of the incident 
in the form of a 'reversal passage', which marks, as elsewhere, a significant 
juncture in the plot-structure of the epic:167 
164 
165 
166 
167 
TEVKpos- 8' aAAOV OLGTOV E-<P' "EKTopL XGAKOKOpVaTflL 
a'lvvTo· Kat KEV i!rravaE iJ.clXTJS' E-rrl. VT]val.v 'Axmwv, 
fl. 13.72: pE'L' i!yvwv ... cipl.yvwTOL 8E 8EoL TTEp . See Janko (ed.) (1992), on If. 13.72, for 
the ironic resonances of Aias's assertion here in comparison with Od. 4.499-511; see also 
Pucci (1987), 122; MacCary (1982), 176: 'The per is our indication that to call the gods 
"recognizable" is against expectation, a contradiction in terms, as it were'. Compare 
Menelaus at Od. 4.207, when he compliments Peisistratos as his father's son; an ironic 
reading is possible, given that the scene takes place in the home of Menelaus and Helen, 
the arch-adultress. 
I/. 23.780-784. Shortly before Athene has responded to Odysseus's prayer, first 
strengthening Odysseus, 23.768-772, then tripping up Aias into the dung from the oxen 
which Akhilleus has earlier sacrificed for Patroklos, 23.774-777. On the scene, see N. J. 
Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 768-779, and Kolmken (1981). For Aias's actions in I/. 23 as 
foreshadowings of Aias's story beyond the frame of the Jlind itself, see Dowden (1996), 
55. 
Il . 15.370-378. 
I/ . 15.458-462; cf. de Jong (1987), 157. For the structural importance of reversal passages, 
see esp. de Jong (1987), 68-81; also Fenik (1968), 175; Morrison (1992); Bakker (1997), 178-
179. For the language of these passages, see Lang (1989), esp. 7-12 and 23-24. 
460 Et !J.LV apLCJTEUOVTa ~aAWV E~clAETO 6UjJ.OV" 
aM' ou Afj6c .C.L<)S' TIUKLVOV v6ov, OS' p' EcpUAUCJCJEV 
"EKTop ', a Tap TcvKpov TcAU!J.WVLOV EVXOS' cinT]upa 
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This TTVKLVOV v6ov of Zeus is what Hektor does not perceive, for all the 
professed ease of recognising the might of Zeus at work.168 Hektor's 
recognition of the assistance of the god is marked by the discordant overtones 
of the 'easy to recognise' phrase as correct yet crucially incomplete: to recognise 
the dynamics of a god at work actually remains a fundamental problem for 
Hektor here, as it does more generally for the other characters of the Iliad. 
Crucially, the issues inherent in such processes of recognition constitute a 
challenge for the epic audience as well. 
What can be drawn from these two sections are two points of 
comparison that underline certain possibilities: the first offers the seemingly 
unambiguous presence of the god, the second suggests how the possibility of 
recognising the dynamics of a god at work remains a fundamental problem 
even when the fact of the god at work is correctly recognised.169 Against this 
backdrop, the thematisation of Zeus's relations with Hektor continues to 
develop as the narrator renews the focus on the support of Zeus for Hektor, 
and the physical effects of the god upon the Trojan hero find stark illustration in 
the simile of Hektor raging like Ares or fire .170 Next in the sequence comes 
Zeus's long arm; and here Zeus's involvement in Hektor's action is suddenly 
characterised in ~pparently physical terms. Viewed as the culmination of what 
has gone before and with the specific points of comparison in mind, this image 
constitutes not simply a particular vivid reinforcement of Zeus's support, but 
also a particular problem for the audience: they perceive the potential 
physicality of Zeus's assistance at this point, but are given no obvious directions 
168 
169 
170 
Compare the nuKLvov ETIOS' of Zeus at I/ . 24.75 and its 'haunting repetition' by 
Andromakhe at 24.744; see esp. Lynn-George (1988), 232-233; Martin (1989), 35-36; and 
cf. below, pp . 159-162. Il . 15.461 is the only instance of the nuKLvov v6ov of Zeus, and 
gains resonance in relation to these later instances; Janko (ed.) (1992), on 15.461-465, 
compares .C.LOS' .. . v6ov at I/. 16.688 (stronger than the ETIOS' of Akhilleus in respect of 
Patroklos) and 17.176, and compares phrases like nuKLvov ETIOS', !J.iJ8ca nuvKci (I/. 3.202) 
and ZT]VOS' nuKw6cppova ~ov>--i]v (HyHerm 538); to which add Zeus's nuKLVciS' cpptvaS' at 
I/. 14.294 (overcome by eras), and the nuKLv~v ... E-cpET!J.TJV that Thetis has given to 
Akhilleus at I/. 18.216. 
At HomHymnAph 167, ou acicpa cL8wS' marks the extension of this motif of human 
ignorance of the purposes of the gods into a pointed instance of divine ignorance of the 
purposes of Zeus. See the discussion of Clay (1989), 166ff., esp. 180: Anchises does not 
'know clearly', but neither in this instance does Aphrodite herself recognise the epoch-
ending dynamics of Zeus's purpose here; thus Aphrodite's speech at 192-291 'involves 
more than merely recognising what stands before her eyes, but a realisation of the trap 
into which she has fallen'. 
See esp. I/ . 15. 603-612. 
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as to how to resolve the question. Compared with the earlier 'epiphanic' 
presence of Apollo, Zeus's long arm is on one level only a trace of what might 
be possible; nevertheless, the dangers of not fully recognising the nature of 
divine assistance have already been highlighted as a significant problem, for the 
Iliadic characters, but also for the audience of the epic. Hektor is not said to see 
Zeus' s long arm behind him or feel its contact, though he has earlier declared 
the ease of recognising when Zeus gives might to men. By contrast the 
audience themselves can 'see' the long arm of Zeus in its emergence into 
embodied action across the slide between power and presence, but it remains a 
basic question what this long arm actually signifies. 
Confronted by the possible 'epiphanic' implication of this situation, the 
potential presence of Zeus at this point of the narrative becomes something of 
an interpretative challenge. Potentially relevant are two other prominent 
instances of a god's hand at work behind a mortal in the Iliad. First is Athene's 
pull on Akhilleus's hair in Iliad l, and second is Apollo's stunning blow on 
Patroklos's broad back in Iliad 16, discussed above.171 In the first instance, what 
Athene's pull on Akhilleus's hair ultimately sets in motion is the rest of the 
action of the Iliad, and so the outcome of Athene's intervention is not the triple 
amount of compensation gifts from Agamemnon that is the explicit prospect 
held out by Athene, but instead the death of Patroklos and the anguish of 
Akhilleus. Lynn-george has observed that Akhilleus's decision in the face of this 
intervention is ETTOS' dp{x::mau8m, 'which, in certain senses, both preserves and 
structures the epos as narrative', but its unforeseen consequence is also the loss 
of Patroklos.172 To this extent, Athene's pull on Akhilleus's hair is not so much a 
token of Akhilleus' status as divine favourite, as it is the beginning of his fateful 
quasi-deception within the framework of the plan of Zeus.173 Akhilleus himself 
will gloss his own actions, and those of Agamemnon, in terms of c'iTll.174 In the 
second instance, Apollo's blow on Patroklos's back begins that hero's 
unmaking; its effects on Patroklos are striking, but more important is the way 
that it underlines Patroklos's failure to have taken appropriate heed of the 
171 
172 
173 
174 
11. 1.197-198; 16.791-792 
Il . 1.216. See Lynn-George (1988), 45-46; also 168-169, on the ironies of Akhilleus's 
acquiesence in Athene's 'promise of recompense as a future certainty': 'the 
accomplishment of the plan of Zeus leaves the hero prostrate in its telos, which 
coincides with loss'. Compare also Pucci ([1985] 1998d), 77: 'It is only by condenming 
Achilles to impoten t rage that the Ilind fulfills itself as a poem'. 
Note esp. Akhilleus's own summation at I/. 18.79-93, esp. 82, TClV (Patroklos) cinwA.ECJa, 
with Edwards (ed.) (1991), on I/ . 18.82; cf. Slatkin (1991), 50-51. On this whole complex, 
see Murnaghan (1997), esp . 26-28. 
See Nagy (199Gb), 254 with n . 29. 
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epiphanic presence of Apollo in the battle scenes that preceded this fatal one. 
Earlier, Apollo openly pushed Patroklos back three times, and then the fourth 
time, instead of a fatal blow, told Patroklos to yield; the later, fatal scene 
resumes this motif, explicitly repeating the formulaic frame, but this 'fourth 
time' Apollo; now concealed in mist, actually delivers the crucial blow that he 
earlier delayed. 175 Something of a motif emerges: a god's hand behind a 
mortal's back does not bode well. If the 'long arm of Zeus' is read against these 
examples, it takes on a more sinister overtone, which underlines Hektor's own 
failure in this instance to perceive the physical presence of the god despite his 
earlier confidence in being able to identify the god at work.176 The potential 
'physical presence' of the god at this point gains a particular significance in 
direct comparison with these other 'epiphanic' interactions between gods and 
mortals on the plain of Troy. When viewed in its context, the potential slide 
between the exercise of power by a god and that god's physical presence 
functions not just in terms of a 'figure of speech', but as a specific conundrum 
offered during a sequence of events in which the poem explores the possibilities 
of mortal perception with specific reference to the question of what the power 
and presence of the gods signifies. Even though the audience are directly aware, 
as Hektor is not said to be, of Zeus's activity in this instance, the challenge still 
remains to read Zeus's activity for its 'epiphanic' implications in the play of 
power and presence that arises out of the emergence of Zeus's long arm. In the 
specific context of the. Trojan advance to the Greek ships this will, within the 
frame of the plan of Zeus, lead to the reintroduction of Akhilleus into battle and 
the death of Hektor; in such a context the embodiment of Zeus's agency in his 
long arm can be read as an 'epiphanic' marker foreshadowing Hektor's death. 
What we end up with, then, is a scenario in which both the degree of 
physical presence and the extent to which this should be viewed as an 
'epiphanic' event-and accordingly be compared with similar events-function 
as implicit challenges to the audience. To this extent, the question of 'epiphany' 
as such becomes something that depends in this instance upon the interplay 
between god, character and audience in relation to a problematic example of 
175 
176 
I/ . 16.702-710, 786-787. For the ' three times, then a fourth' formula, see Bannert (1988), 
40-57; Janko (ed.) (1992), on I/. 16.698-711, 702-6, and 784-6; Fenik (1968), 46-48; Bakker 
(1997), 79 n . 65: 'a sure sign of impending failure and doom'. For the climax-building 
sequence of events leading up to this point, see Fenik (1968), 216-217: 'The poet is 
elevating Patroclus' final combat and death into the realm of the gigantic and 
supernatural' ; also Collins (1998), 41-45. 
Compare Murnaghan (1987), 70: 'The failure to recognise a god represents the point at 
which, for reasons he cannot know and which may have nothing to do with him, a hero 
has lost the gods' suppor t' . 
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the presence of a god, rather than something to be determined from the self-
evidence or otherwise of the physical presence of Zeus at this point. This 
proposition has important ramifications for how we conceive of 'epiphany' 
more generally. For if on the one hand the questions of visibility, perception 
and recognition are to be taken as crucial to a definition of what constitutes an 
epiphany, then an 'epiphany' as such will be treated as an object whose frame is 
constituted mainly in terms of the subjective awareness of a human subject. Yet 
on the other hand it is also the case that the rhetoric of situations involving 
divine presence stresses something quite different, namely the transgressive, 
transformative power of the gods, who operate as intentional subjects on 
objectified humans in ways well exemplified by Apollo's blow with downturned 
hand on Patroklos's back. How are these two perspectives to be reconciled? In 
practice the first mode, which takes the human subject as the constitutive 
perspective on epiphany, has tended to dominate the discussion of epiphany: 
the descriptive catalogue of visible 'epiphanic' features is the scholarly template 
of this perspective. But if one considers Zeus's 'long arm' for a moment in terms 
of the second mode, then alternative possibilities are thrown open. The 
modalities of divine presence reveal an important point here about the 
possibilities of failing to recognise the presence or absence of the gods in the 
world, about failing to identify a potential 'epiphany'. What this passage offers 
us, in particular, through the agency of the narrator, is the possibility for the 
audience to perceive. the epiphanic play of the physical presence of a god in a 
situation where an 'epiphany' as such is not necessarily realised by the mortal 
character involved. 
What the long arm of Zeus shows is that 'epiphany' should not be tied to 
unequivocal perception and recognition, and that the figurative capacity of 
language is vital in enabling such an unsettling moment to be brought within 
the narrative. The modalities of divine presence in relation to the perceptual 
abilities of mortals are such as to destabilise boundaries, both between the 
absence and presence of gods, and between the perception and non-perception 
of this by mortals: figurative language instantiates this destabilisation. The long 
arm of Zeus is not 'just a metaphor', but is a figuration of presence in a 
compelling and perplexing form. Some instances of divine presence might be 
less equivocal, but by exploring a limit-case like the long arm of Zeus the 
Homeric text challenges us to an awareness of the basic contingency of other 
ostensibly more straightforward examples. One particular implication is that 
too great a distinction has been maintained between divine epiphany and other 
modes of characterising the intersection of gods and humans in the world; that, 
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in more positive terms, 'divine epiphany' should be regarded as part of a 
continuum of ways of realising divine absence and presence that also 
encompasses the interpretation of signs and omens, as well as contexts such as 
those where power is breathed into mm·tals by gods, and also the forms of 
ritual practice and speech, such as prayer, through which the presence and 
absence of gods are mediated and realised. In this respect, 'divine epiphany' is 
not a recurrent class of event, but a loose label applied to a process that is 
variously instantiated in an unstable interplay of presence and perception at 
particular moments of interface between mortals and gods . 
• 
• • 
... and other divine 'figures' 
The long arm of Zeus points towards a set of problems within the dynamics of 
presence and absence of the gods, and it does so in a way that is specifically 
oriented towards forms of emergent physicality. This embodiment of the gods 
is a problem that warrants closer attention in several sections of the Iliad. One 
sequence that is particularly significant in this respect comes in Iliad 5, where the 
delimitation of the peculiar physical potentialities of the gods is explored in 
various ways.177 I have suggested in discussing the long arm of Zeus that point 
of view is fundamental to the problematic of divine epiphany: the presence of 
gods emerges variously as a function of the differing sets of perspectives and 
powers of perception available to gods, mortal characters, narrator and 
audience of the epic. In this respect, figurative expression of divine presence 
plays across the boundaries of the actual and the metaphorical: what is 'seen' in 
such moments reflects specific (un-)awareness of the potential of divine 
presence and absence to substantiate metaphorical impertinence as actual. What 
177 For this point, see Andersen (1997), 36: 'The action around Diomedes in the fifth and 
sixth books is paradigmatic ... a kind of experiment in human experience'; also Kirk 
(ed.) (1990), 51 : 'an almost philosophical interest in the confrontation between heroic 
nature at its highest and divine nature at its most carnal and demeaning'. For this as an 
aristein, see Krischer (1971), 26-27. 
94 
Iliad 5 offers is a particular experiment in breaking down divisions between 
perspectives, especially the disjunct between characters and audience: Diomedes 
is given a special form of vision by Athene that replicates in key ways the 
perceptual ability given to the audience by the narrator's power to name and 
describe the actions of the gods, even when they are ostensibly unperceived by 
mortals within the frame of the epic itself. Diomedes' vision is given particular 
emphasis by the actions that it enables, with Athene's urging and assistance, 
especially the wounding of Aphrodite and Ares.178 These encounters dramatise 
questions of mortal perception and divine presence in provocative ways-not 
least of which are parodic overtones-that have particular relevance for the 
embodied presence of the gods in contexts of encounter between mortals and 
gods. 
One particular moment in this sequence underlines the importance of 
this section of the Iliadic narrative for considering perception and presence. 
Diomedes has earlier been repulsed by Apollo, and now Hektor is on the attack 
accompanied by Trojans. The narrator adds to this the accompaniment of Ares, 
in the lead together with Enyo 'holding' (Exovcm) Kydoimos, even as Ares 
himself goes now in front and now behind Hektor, wielding a monstrous spear 
in his hands.l79 Diomedes reacts to the sight with fear (Tov 8f: L8wv pl. YllO'EV) and 
speaks to the Greeks:180 
600 ws~ TOTE Tu8d8T]s avqci(no, Et TTE TE AUWL 0 
" w cpLAOL, olov 8~ 8au[lci(owv "EKTopa &ov 
alxflTJTTJV T' f[lEVUL KUL eapaaA.tov TTOAE[lLGTTJV' 
TWL 8' alE\. nap' EELS YE 8EWV, os AOLyov G[llJVEL. 
KUL vvv ol ncipa KELVOS "ApT]S' ~pOTWL av8p\. EOLKWS 0 
605 aAA.O. npos Tpwas TETpUflflEVOL alEV OTTLGGW 
E'LKETE, [1T]8E 8EoLS [lEW:ULVE[lEV tcpL flUXEa8UL. " 
Diomedes makes an expressly inclusive statement of what it is that he and the 
Greeks are facing when he begins with Greek wonder at Hektor as warrior. 
The marker of evidentiality (8~) underlines the shared nature of this general 
178 
179 
180 
The wounding by Diomedes of Aphrodite, and its aftermath: I/ . 5.329-430; of Ares: 5. 
846-909. 
I/. 5.591-595. See Kirk (ed.) (1990), on I/. 5.592-595, for his and the scholias t's 
speculations on how Enyo 'holds' Kydoimos. This is another instance in relation to 
figures of this sor t where the not-said of Homer's narrative is tantalisingly suggestive 
of the far more baroque images offered by the Hesiodic Shield; the Hon1eric narrative 
is restrained, but in a way that evokes this potential for specific detail. Compare the 
comment of M. Clarke (1999), 242 n . 25, on the figure of 'AxA.us on Hes. Shield 264-270: 
'There is no telling whether such exotica represent late decadence of the epic tradition 
or stem from old traditions which Homer draws on but does not usually make explicit.' 
I/ . 5.600-606. Diomedes' fear, with simile: I/. 5.596-599. 
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perception and reaction (8auiJ.ci(oiJ.EV) to Hektor's evident qualities in the field of 
battle.l81 Diomedes follows this with a general statement of the frequency (aLEl) 
of divine presence by Hektor's side, but then exemplifies this statement (KaL 
vvv) with the particular observation that KEl.vos- "ApT)S' in mortal guise stands 
beside Hektor in this instance.182 Here the participatory evidentiality in the 
general statement otov 8il 8auiJ.ci(owv is overtaken by the specific deixis of 
KELVOS' "ApT)S', and the implicit shift of emphasis from 'our' perception to 'my' 
perception precipitates the commands that Diomedes now gives to his men, no 
longer addressed as 'we' but now as 'you'. This statement by Diomedes 
explains to the other Greeks his fear (Tov & L8wv pLYlfCJE), since, although for 
them the most apparent referent of Tov would be Hektor, for Diomedes it is 
actually Ares.183 The play with point of view is crucial here: the audience will 
initially share Diomedes' perspective and take Tov as Ares, but then be slightly 
disconcerted by Diomedes' opening evidential emphasis on Hektor, before 
seeing that this shift exemplifies exactly the point that Diomedes is making to 
the Greeks.184 Athene's enhancement of Diomedes' sight takes particular effect 
at this moment in the ability of Diomedes to see Ares in mortal guise as Ares 
the war-god, and the poet's text plays upon this differential. 
181 
182 
183 
184 
See Bakker (1997), 75-79, on 8~ and its evidential and socializing function, esp. 76: 'The 
involvement of the speaker and addressee is less a matter of actually shnring nn 
environment than a matter of cooperation: ... conducting the discourse becomes an 
activity aimed at shared seeing, a being together in the situation created by the 
speaker's phrasing'. The syntax of the infinitive after otov 81'] 8au1J.a(owv is awkward 
in the view of Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.601-602: he takes otov as exclamatory and 
8au1J.ci(owv as imperfect, presumably in contrast with the following KUL vvv . Is there a 
particular virtue, in the context of Diomedes' immediate fear, in shifting the Greek 
wonder at Hektor into the past? I take it as a general statement predicated upon the 
present moment, and for otov 8~ with the present tense compare Menelaos's exclamatory 
reproach to Zeus at I/ . 13.633: OLOV 81'] dv8pEaaL xapl(cm u~pwTijWLV; and Zeus's 
exclamation at Od. 1.32: otov 8~ vu 8cous ~poToL aln6wvTm. On the phrase, see Janko 
(ed.) (1992), on 13.633-635; Edwards (ed .) (1991), on 17.586-588; N. J. Richardson (ed.) 
(1993), on 21.57. 
For the apodotic use of Kal, cf. Bakker (1997), 73, 79 n. 65. 
The flow of I/ . 5.590-596 foregrounds Ares, esp. 5.594-596: "ApT]S' 8' E:v rraMIJ.T]WL 
TIE A.wpLov £yxos EVWIJ.a, I cpol Ta 8' dAA.oTE IJ.EV rrp6a8' "EKTopos, dAA.oT' 8ma8cv. I Tov 
8E- lowv pl YT]Gf ~OTJV ay a 8os l:.LOIJ.~OT]S'. 
Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.596, misses the productive nature of the potential ambiguity 
here: 'Hektor perhaps, or Ares according to Ameis-Hentze, since Diomedes sees him 
too'. Pelliccia (1995), 86-87, considers the question of reference in more depth, but only to 
suggest that the poet is 'stonewalling', e.g. 82: 'he simply toughs out the problems 
raised'. By contrast, for ' [s]uch self-conscious mirroring, the reflecting of our gaze in that 
of the young hero', see Martin (1993), 234, on the first appearance to the audience of 
Telemakhos at Od. 1.113, as 8con8~s at the very moment Telemakhos himself first sees 
Mentes/ Athene. 
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What does Diomedes designate when he points to KE1vos- "ApY]s-? Kirk 
observes that KE1vos- "ApT]S' suggests in its deixis that Ares is a physical presence 
visible to all, at least insofar as there is an (apparently mortal) figure beside 
Hektor.185 Presumably for Kirk it is this physical form which Diomedes alone 
can distinguish as a god through the medium of Athene's assistance to him. 
Pelliccia has taken Kirk up on precisely this point.186 For Pelliccia the problem is 
one that the poet ultimately 'stonewalls', namely: 'whether or not there was a 
warrior visible to all, but only revealed as Ares to Diomedes, or an invisible 
Ares in the form of a warrior seen by Diomedes where his companions saw 
nothing'.187 But should we simply acquiesce in Pelliccia's invitation to silence? 
There is a problem with Pelliccia's criticism of Kirk on the grounds that he 
'wrongly assumes that Diomedes is scrupulously observing all the time just 
what is visible only to him, and what to everybody else', since the potential for 
differential perception is precisely what the text plays with in this sequence.188 
The poet does not 'stonewall', but actually foregrounds this as a problem. 
Pelliccia's underlying observation may be true, namely that the poet does not 
explain everything in complete detail, but it need not follow that in instances 
such as this the poet is merely trying to avoid raising problems. On the 
contrary, such problematic aspects of divine presence and its recognition are 
offered in the Homeric poems precisely as live questions in contexts where 
mortals come into contact with gods. What Pelliccia regards as evidence that the 
poet, and thus the audience, must already see Ares in human form can be read 
differently: the juxtaposition of Ares wielding a spear in his hands alongside 
Enyo 'holding' Kydoimos underlines the point that the embodied forms of the 
gods are realised only to a certain extent, and with specific purposes and 
effects.189 The details of the text present only Ares' hands and his spear, features 
185 
186 
187 
188 
189 
Kirk (ed .) (1990), on I/. 5.603-4. Earlier, Ares goes among the Trojans as Akamas: I/. 
5.461-462, EL801J.EVOS' 'AKciiJ.UVTL 8owL ~Y~TOpL 8pT]LKWV. 
Pelliccia (1995), 87: 'I find it hard to believe that Hector progressed with some ordinary 
Trojan prancing around in front and in back of him with a gigantic spear; we do not see 
warriors thus accompanied by their own men elsewhere.' 'Hard to believe' is not a 
particularly useful cri terion to invoke here; on 82 n. 135, Pelliccia cites with approval 
Dietrich (1983), with specific reference to questions of plausibility; on such notions, see 
above, pp. 23-25. 
Pelliccia (1995), 87; for his 'stonewalling', see above, p. 95 n. 184. 
Pelliccia (1995), 87. 
See Pelliccia (1995), 87: 'The point missed by Kirk is that Ares is in the form of a human 
to the poet also, as he (and Athena etc .) also are at 4.439-445'. But in this I/. 4 passage 
nothing is said of the form of Ares and Athene; Eris does emerge in fuller detail, but 
precisely in a form which confounds 'human' corporeality. Compare also I/ . 5.355-363, 
where Aphrodite and Iris come over to Ares sitting at the left side of battle and 
Aphrodite borrows his horses for her return to Olympos: note here the peculiar detail 
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which together embody his strength in battle: the physical presence of the god 
emerges initially only to this extent, and that of Enyo and Kydoimos emerges 
only as far as their names and the problematic Exouo-a. In this respect, the 
question of what KELVOS' "ApT)S' ultimately designates is something that will 
remain a problem to be further explored with the tip of a spear when Diomedes 
is urged on by Athene to wound the war-god later in Iliad 5. 
The terms of Athene's initial removal of the mist from Diomedes' eyes 
early in Iliad 5 suggest that her assistance is designed to enable Diomedes to 
look past the visible appearance of a god disguised as a mortal in order to 
recognise the god as such:190 
axA.Vv 8' a'& TOL an' 6cp8a?\f1-GlV fAOV, il TIPLV ETiflEV, 
ocpp, ED YLVL~lO'KllLS' llfl-EV 8EC:W 1']8€ KUL av8pa. 
TW vuv, a'L KE 8EOS' TIELPWfl-EVOS' E-v8'6.8' 'LKllTaL, 
130 fl-tl TL CJlJ y' a8avchmcJL 8EOLS' clVTLKpu fl-clXEG8m 
TOLS' a?\AmS'· a Tap d KE C':.LOS' 8uyciTTlP 'Acppo8l Tll 
E'A811a' ES' TIOAEfl-OV, Tijv y' oinciwv 6/;E-L xa?\KwL. 
Several terms are key here: Athene wants Diomedes to be able 'to recogmse 
clearly', ED yLyvwo-KELV, god from man, in the case that a god comes to put 
Diomedes to the 'test', nnpWf-LEV05'. 191 The implication of the latter is not entirely 
clear, but it might be thought to point to the presence of gods in disguise on the 
battlefield.192 What then might 'to recognise clearly', ED yLyvwo-Knv, mean here 
so far as Diomedes is concerned? Will his specially privileged sight be able to 
penetrate the mortal disguise to see through to the 'true' body of Ares, 
whatever that might be? Or will his privileged sight be able to recognise only 
the fact that this apparent mortal (~pOTWL av8pl. EOLKWS') is a disguised god, 
whose visible man-like form appears ir\ other respects no differently to 
Diomedes than it does to the other participants in the battle? A solution remains 
obscure. We might also wonder what is at stake in attempting to decide 
190 
191 
192 
that Ares' spear and horses are 'leaning on air', 5.356: T]E-pL 8' EYXOS' EKEKALTO KaL 
mxE-' 'Lnnw. Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.356, takes this to imply 'the idea of a war-god 
isolatecj. in a cloud of invisibility on the edge of battle'. 
I/. 5.127-132. 
For the absolute use of nnpciofJ-aL, which LSJ s.v. nnpciw, B.II.3, glosses as 'to try one's 
fortune, try the chances of war' while citing this passage. See also Jl. 16.590 with the 
gloss given by Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.588-592: 'nnpWfJ-EVOS' means "trying his 
strength'" . 
Sch. A on I/ . 5.129 glosses TIELPWfl-EVOS' with alternatives: an6nnpav TIOLOVfJ-EVOS', fl 
TIELPWfl-EVOS' ?\av8civnv E-v av8pwnou fl-OPtPllL; Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.127-130, repeats and 
amplifies the second: 'For gods often come in disguise-that must be the implication of 
TIELpWfl-EVOS' in 129, since a god does not make trial of a mortal by appearing manifestly 
on the battlefield'. 
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between such alternatives: each possible response will imply certain 
propositions about the modalities of the physical presence of gods. 
The deixis of Diomedes' language here reinforces the problem of 
denomination that is introduced by the figures of Ares, Enyo and Kydoimos, 
but does not resolve it for the audience of the epic, nor indeed for the Greeks 
on the battlefield before Troy. Certainly his words have a specific effect on their 
primary audience: the audience of the epic knew already of the presence of 
Ares through the narrator, but now the Greeks themselves know of the 
presence of Ares on the battlefield. A little later, this knowledge on their part is 
made explicit: 193 
'ApyEI.m 8' i.m' "Apr]L Kal. "EKTopL xa\KoKopvaTfjL 
700 oihE- TTOTE TTPOTpETTOVTO w>--mvawv ETTL VT]WV 
oihE- TTOT ' UVTE<f>E-poVTO ~clXT]L, a\\' alE-v OTTLO'O'W 
xa(ov8', WS' ETTlJ80VTO ~ETa TpwwaLV "ApTja. 
Here the Greeks are said to be aware (E-m)8ovTo) of the god, just as Diomedes 
has told them, as they tactically retreat in the face of Ares and Hektor.l94 But the 
force of this verb is to suggest that their knowledge of Ares as such is 
dependent not upon their own perceptions, but upon Diomedes' 'recognition' 
which is itself dependent upon the special conditions that Athene has created, a 
point that Diomedes makes himself in response to aggressive words from 
Athene later in Iliad 5.195 There the key term of Diomedes' 'recognition' of the 
...._ 
gods is repeated: ywwoxw CJE ... ywwaKw yap "ApT)a.196 Again perception is 
foregrounded as a basic problem in contexts of divine presence, though in this 
latter instance the problem is raised in the specific context of Diomedes' 
competitive claim that he can recognise the gods, a claim that recalls in a 
suggestive fashion the competitive interaction between Athene and Odysseus 
on the shore of Ithaca in Odyssey 13.197 There also the perspicuity of mortal 
vision is a central topic, not least how to recognise the goddess, as Athene 
193 
194 
195 
196 
197 
Jl . 5.699-702. 
Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.699-702, notes the consistency of this passage with what has gone 
before and what will come after, as also remarked by sch. bT; cf. Pelliccia (1995), 87 n . 
143. 
I/. 5.815-824. See Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.815-824, for the point that Diomedes 'defends 
himself ... partly by quoting back at Athene her earlier instructions'. 
I/. 5.815, 824. For the Odyssean parallels in this speech, esp. yLyvwaKw aE, 8Ea with 
Athene's words to Odysseus, ov8E- av y' EyVWS' I TTa\Aci8' 'A8TjVULTtV, at Od. 13.299-300, 
see Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.816. 
See esp. Athene's speech, Od. 13.287-310, and Odysseus's response, 13.311-328. Note 
13.312-313: apya\Eov O'E, 8Ea, yvwvm ~POTWL avnaaavn I Kal ~a\' ETTLO'Ta~EvWL' O'f 
yap avT~V TTUVTL E-taKns-; and Odysseus's reproachful continuation that Athene had 
not stood by him after Troy was sacked; see esp. Clay (1983). 
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surrounds Odysseus with an obscuring veil of air (m:p't. ... T]E-pa XEUE), just as in 
this Iliadic instance she has removed the mist (ax~uv ... crrr' 6<j>8a~IJ.wv) from 
Diomedes' eyes.198 But here, by contrast with the superior knowledge of the 
audience of Odyssey 13, what Diomedes' competitive claim reinforces is the 
audience's exclusion from full access to this particular set of privileged 
interactions between mortal and god. In key respects this is similar to the 
Akhilleus-Athene scene in Iliad l, whose exclusionary modalities I have 
discussed earlier. The impact of that scene lies in its play across the different 
perceptual abilities of the various participants in the narrative, not least the 
audience of the epic. In a similar way, Diomedes' deixis of KE1vos- "ApT)S', ~poTwL 
av8p't. E-ou<WS', constitutes a challenge to the audience to imagine what this might 
actually be, rather than a simple revelation of how Diomedes actually perceives 
the presence of the god. 
A characteristic moment m the dynamics of the competitive scene 
between Athene and Diomedes comes when Diomedes refocuses attention 
upon the Greeks around him:199 
TOUVEKU vvv UlJTO') T' avaxa(Oi-!UL ~8€ KUL clAAOU') 
'ApyEtous- E'xE-AEuaa aATJI-lEvm E:v8a8E rravTas- · 
YLVW<JKW yap "ApT]a i-!UXTJV ava KOLpavE:ovTa. 
Here Diomedes makes explicit the physical context of his exchange with 
Athene, which has been latent from the point when the two goddesses Athene 
-..,_ 
and Here came 'like doves' into the midst of the Greeks where they stood 
'massed' around Diomedes: o8L TIA.E'LCJTOL Kal apLCJTOL I ECJTaCJaV GIJ.<j>L ~LT)V 
.0.Lo1J.Tj8Eoc;- 'LTino8ci1J.oLo I ELMIJ.EVOL. 200 There is a significant point here: the 
exchange between Athene and Diomedes does not take place like that between 
Athene and Odysseus within an obscuring fog on the deserted shore of Ithaka, 
but in the midst of a defensive massed retreat on the plain of Troy inspired by 
Athene's own instructions to Diomedes. It is to this fact that Diomedes draws 
attention when he tells Athene how he ordered all the rest 'to mass together in 
this place' (aAT]wvm E-v8ci8E), repeating as he does the key term 'massed' 
(ELAOIJ.EVOL) from the earlier description of the situation into which Here and 
Athene inserted themselves.201 Contrary to what Kirk and Pelliccia have 
suggested, the other Greeks are not left out of account throughout the 
198 
199 
200 
201 
Odysseus: Od. 13.189; and its dispersal, 13.352. Diomedes: 11 . 5.127. 
If . 5.822-824. 
Doves: 11 . 5.778. The massed Greeks: 5.780-782. 
For the verb and its m eaning in the passive (aATJI-lEVm is 2nd aor. pass. in£.), see LSJ s.v. 
ELAW B. 
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encounter between Athene and Diomedes, but are specifically reintroduced by 
Diomedes at this point_202 Diomedes' words are an invitation both to Athene 
and to the audience themselves to refocus attention upon the situation at hand, 
and in doing this Diomedes reinforces his own special status: ywwoxw CJE, 8dt. 
What, by contrast, can the Greeks see of Athene? Apparently nothing, even as 
the goddess herself shoves Sthenelos with her hand out of Diomedes' chariot 
and gets in herself:203 
835 WS' <j>aiJ.EVTJ l:8EVEAOV IJ.EV a<j>' '(mrwv WGE XUIJ.U(E 
xnp\. TTClALV E:puaaa', 0 8 ' dp' EIJ.IJ.UTIEWS' an6pouaEV' 
i'] 8' ES' 8t<j>pov E:'~mvE napa\. t.Lo1J.T]8w 6Lov 
EIJ.IJ.EI-laul.a 8E6. · IJ.Eya 8' E:'~paxE <j>TjyLvos- d~wv 
~pL80GUVTJL · 8ELVTJV yap ayE V 8EOV av8p6. T' apWTOV. 
The narrator highlights the physicality of the goddess's presence m the 
externalised, objectified detail of the groaning axle, even while the question of 
how the presence of the goddess is realised is left largely unresolved. The 
audience shares Diomedes' privileged perspective here, in contrast to the other 
Greeks, but they share it only so far. 
The narrator's ability to control what the audience 'see' takes on a 
similarly competitive edge elsewhere in Iliad 5. Before Here and Athene descend 
to the battlefield, the narrator tantalises with a glimpse of Athene disrobing in 
Zeus's house before her arming scene on Olympos:204 
202 
203 
204 
' 
atnap 'A811vat 11 KoupTJ t.L os- al yL6XOLO 
1TE1TAOV IJ.EV KCLTEXEUEV i:avov TIUTpos- E:n' ou8n 
7 35 TIOLKLAOV, ov p' a1n~ TIOL i]aaTo KUL KaiJ.E XEPGL v · 
Pelliccia (1995), 275-276, criticises as 'inadequa te' Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.794-795, where 
Kirk cites Fenik (1968), 75, and comments that the thronging Greeks are disregarded 
since ' it is an epic narrative convention that long, isolated conversations can take place 
in the midst of battle'. Pelliccia sees the isolated nature of the exchange be tween 
Athene and Diomedes (i .e. that Diomedes alone sees Athene) as a result of syncope (in 
this instance, Diom.edes's wound), which he argues, 273-277, is the key circumstance in 
which heroes see gods; Pelliccia cites the encounter between Akhilleus and Athene in I/. 
1 as the exception to the rule, where the poet explicitly states that the goddess was 
visible to Akhilleus alone; by Pelliccia's reasoning this encounter needs explanation 
because Akhilleus is not wounded at that point. Pelliccia argues that "'twilight" 
periods of consciousness are in later tradition regarded as time ripe for visions', and that 
this 'belief presumably lies behind the timing of many Homeric interventions in 
general' . This is too reductive. 
I/. 5.835-839. For the h eightened language, see Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.835-836 and 838-
839. 
I/. 5.733-737 = 8.384-388. See now Llewellyn-Jones (2001), 244: these lines sh ow the 
'reluctance of Athena to display her body'; he suggests that the swiftness of the change 
means that 'there is no place for dwelling on what happens in the moments between the 
nE-nA.os- hitting the floor and the fastening of the XLTwv', but this d esire to 'dwell' is in 
fact the larger point that he is illustrating, esp. 254-257. This applies no less here. 
i'j 8E- XLTWV' £v8vaa 6u)s VEcpEAT)yEpETao 
TEVXEULV E-s rr6\qwv 8wpfiaano 8aKpu6EvTa. 
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The daughter of aegis-bearing Zeus lets her peplos fall to the father's floor 
before she takes up the cloud-gatherer's khiton and arms for war. Kirk observes 
that the point is Athene's transformation for war in these and the following 
lines, but the details are curious. 205 What does the audience see here? The 
goddess's nE:nA.os- is foregrounded, by its initial position and its runover 
adjective, but her body emerges at this point only so far as the hands: it is with 
these hand that the goddess has made the nf:nA.os-, and it is the description of 
this handiwork that conceals her in the flow of narrative even as it falls to the 
ground.206 What follows is an arming scene, albeit with divine accoutrements, 
and over the structuring frame of the goddess's hands, shoulders, head and feet 
the image builds up of the goddess's martial power embodied in the terrifying 
objects that she wears and bears: the dread tassled aegis, wreathed with Terror, 
on which stand Strife, Strength, Rout, and the Gorgon-head; the helmet 'fitted 
with the foot-soldiers of a hundred towns'; the flaming chariot into which 
Athene steps; the huge spear.207 The extravagance of detail in the depiction of 
Athene in this arming scene is counterbalanced by the provocative reticence of 
her disrobing: the sight of the goddess herself is concealed first by the nE:nA.os-
itself and then by her father's XLTWV, then she is subsumed beneath the arms 
themselves. The goddess emerges in embodied form, but only so far and for 
particular effect, e.ven within the frame of Olympos and the house of Zeus. 
Questions about the anthropomorphic forms of the gods take on a 
greater urgency in the scenes where Diomedes wounds Aphrodite and Ares. 
That the two gods manifest a basically anthropomorphic form in these passages 
is evident. Diomedes strikes and wounds Aphrodite on the hand: aKprw otnaaE 
205 
206 
207 
See Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.734-737, for discussion of the ancient critical reactions to 
these lines here and at 8.384-388. 
Compare Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.734-737: 'a voluptuous description and movement, 
tempered by the reminder that she had made it herself, i.e. as goddess of handiwork' . 
Perhaps what this detail suggests is Athene's virgin status; contrast the TTETTAOS' that 
Aphrodite wears at I/ . 5.338, made by the Graces . With Athene here, compare and 
contrast the appearance (in maidenly guise) of Aphrodite before Ankhises in 
HomHymAphr 81-90 (8au~-ta l8Ea8m); but again the narrator is reticent at the moment 
of disrobing, 164-167, playfully marked with a comment on the ignorance of Ankhises 
(ou aacpa El8ws) which applies equally well to the audience of the hynm; as if to point 
up the contrast, when Aphrodite rerobes at 171-175 she reemerges in an embodied form 
as the goddess: auT~ 8E- XPOL EVVUTO E'L~-taTa KaM. I E-aaa~-tEVTJ 8' ED TTaVTa TTEpL xpot 
8La 8Eawv I EOTTJ apa KALaLTJL, EUTTOLrlTOLO wMSpou I KVpE KGpTJ, Ka\Aos 8E-
rrapnawv cmE\a~-tTTEV I c'l~-t~POTov, ol6v T' EOTLV E-ilaTEcpcivou Ku8EpELTJS . 
I/. 5.738-747. On the elaborate details of these objects see Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.738-742, 
743-744, 745-747. 
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xElpa.208 Athene drives Diomedes' spear on at Ares, vEi.aTOV ES' KEVEWVa, o8L 
(wvuCJKETO !JhpT)v, a serious site of wounding in the battle-scenes of the Iliad.209 
On the most prominent instance of such a wound, Janko comments laconically 
that 'the blow to Patroklos' flank is typical'.210 This typicality is quite specific: 
that such a blow is a mortal wound is the point of what Pandaros has said earlier 
in Iliad 5 about a wound KEVEwva 8LaiJ.TTEPES', and of what Paris/ Alexandros will 
say later in Iliad 11 of a wound VELaTov ES' KEVEwva, and this will be exactly the 
effect when Hektor drives his spear into Patroklos, vEi.aTov ES' KEVEwva. 211 To 
this extent Ares's wound here may be expressed in typical language, but its 
connotations are pointedly not 'typical'. Instead, the use of this phrase focuses 
the problem of the wounding of the god in a particular way, as the narrator 
uses the body language of mortal combat in describing the wounding of Ares by 
Diomedes and Athene. The adoption here of mortal body language marks the 
wounding of Ares specifically in relation to the paradoxical question of divine 
mortality, a theme already raised in Iliad 5 in the consolation speech made by 
Dione to Aphrodite.212 In the context of such pointed usage, what is being 
suggested here about the body of the god? 
A scholion on the Ares passage responds to a similar question when it 
highlights a potential problem in the wounding of Ares in accordance with the 
familiar ancient critical principle, "OiJ.T)pov E~ 'OiJ.i)pou aa<PT)vl.(nv, since in the 
view of the scholi~t there is an apparent contradiction between the human 
warrior-like figure of the god which the adoption of the 'typical' formulas of 
battle-narrative here presupposes, and Ares' huge size when he is later knocked 
down by Athene in the battle between the gods in Iliad 21:213 
208 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
I/. 5.336. 
11 . 5.857. The phrase vdaTov f.s KEVEwva recurs also at ll. 11.381, 16.821 (Hektor 
striking Patroklos); KEVEwva at 11. 5.284 and Od. 22.295. 
Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.818-822. 
Pandaros's words: I/. 5.284-285, ~E~AT]UL KEVEwva 8La!J.TTEpEs, ou8£ a' 6tw I 8T]p6v h' 
avax~aweav EIJ.OL 8E !J.EY' EDXOS £8wKa<;. Paris/ Alexandros's words: I/. 11.380-381, 
~E~AEOL, ou8' aALOV ~EAOS EKcpvyEV" ws ocpEAOV TOL I VELOTOV ES KEVEWVO ~OAWV EX 
8U!J.OV i:A£a8UL. 
Ares: I/. 5.385-391, esp. 5.388, Kat vu KEV £v8' arr6AoLTo "ApT]s ihos TTOAEIJ.OLO. On 
Di011e's catalogue, see below, pp. 108-111. 
Sch. bT on ll. 5.857. The maxim is commonly associated with the Alexandrian scholar, 
Aristarkhos; Pfeiffer (1968), 225-227, concludes that the words themselves go back only 
to Porphyry (see Schrader (ed.) (1880), 297.16f.: a~Lwv 8E f:yw "O!J.T]pov /:~ 'O!J.~pou 
aa</JT]VL(ELv avTov E~T]youwvov E-avTov UTTE8dKvuov, TTOTE IJ.EV rrapaKELIJ.EVWS, UAAOTE 
8' l:v anms); cf. N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), 46-47; others speculate further back than 
Aristarkhos, towards an unknown fifth century sophist: see N. G. Wilson (1971); G. Lee 
(1975); N. G. Wilson (1976) . 
El ovv ETTTOTIEAE8pos 6 "ApTJS (cf. <t:> 407), rrws <f>8avn TO 86pu 6.LO!J.~8ous 
TpLa rrAE:8pa; OTL v\Jv av8p\. E'LKaaTaL. .. KOL v\Jv OL rrapa KELVOS' "ApT]s 
~pOTWL av8p\. fOLKWS " (E 604). 
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In the rhythm of didactic question and response, a solution is quickly presented 
by the scholiast, namely Ares' man-like disguise as he advanced earlier in Iliad 5 
at the side of Hektor. The scholiast thus articulates a contrast between the 
'mortal' and 'divine' forms of Ares in these two passages, and the 'mortal' 
wounding is rendered possible by Ares' mortal guise. But if we compare the 
two divine wounding scenes in Iliad 5, this attempt to rationalise Ares' body-
language becomes complicated, since Aphrodite, by contrast, is not in disguise 
when she comes to rescue her son Aineias. In that instance, although what 
Diomedes 'recognises' is specifically Aphrodite's particular identity as a 'might-
less' goddess, YLVWO'I<WIJ 0 T' avaN<LS' ET]IJ 8E6s-' instead of a particular aspect of 
the goddess's physical presence, the bodily presence of the goddess does 
emerge into focus. 214 When Aphrodite protects Aineias from Diomedes, this 
protection is embodied in her white arms and the fold of her bright mhrA.os-:215 
UtJ.<f>\. 8' EOV <f>LAOV ULOV EXElJOTO ~XEE AEUKW, 
315 rrp6a8E 8E: oL TrETrAOLO <f>anvo\) TrTIJYfl' EKUAUtj;Ev 
E' pKos EflEV ~EAE:wv, fl~ ns t.avawv Taxurrw/-wv 
xai-Kov E:v\. aT~8waL ~a!-wv EK 8Uf.LOV EAOLTO. 
Kirk notes the unusual form of this rescue, especially the 'pouring' of her pale 
arms around Ai!leias. 21 6 Here the goddess's rescue is expressed in a particular 
form that has continued significance, since when Diomedes attacks her he 
drives his spear through Aphrodite's ambrosial TTbrA.os- and into her wrist 
(TTpUiJ.VOV tmEp 8E-vapos- ).217 The specificity of the wound picks up the unusual, 
embodied form of Aineias' s rescue, as if to highlight the goddess's vulnerability 
to Diomedes' spear. But what now of the distinction made by the scholiast on 
the Ares passage between the 'real' and disguised forms of the divine body in 
explicating such mortal body-language? In the case of Ares the scholiast 
explained the anthropomorphism of the wounding in terms of the mortal guise 
214 
215 
216 
217 
11 . 5.331-332: YLVWGKWV 0 T' QVOAKLS ETJV 8E6s, ou8E: 8EUWV I TUWV a'C T' av8pwv 
TrOAEflOV KUTU KOLpavE:ouaw, I oih' ap' 'A8TJVULTJ OUTE TrTOALrrop8os 'Evuw. The term 
avaAKLS is coupled with am6AEflOS at 11. 2.201 and 9.35; for aAK~, see Collins (1998). 
Il. 5.314-317. 
Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.314-315: 'Aphrodite's rescue technique is unparalleled', citing 
Fenik (1968), 39, where Fenik discusses the concentration of unusual 'supernatural ' 
events in Tl . 5. 
If . 5.335-339: Ev8' E:rropE/;awvos f1EyU8Uf10U Tu8E:os uL6s I aKpTJV OUTaGE XELpa 
flETUAf.LEVOS 6/;E:L 8oup[ I cl~ATJXP~V' EL8ap 8£ 86pu xpoos clVTETOpTJGEV I Ufl~poa[ou 8La 
TrETrAOU, OV oL XapLTES' KUflOV auTaL, I TrPUflVOV VTrEp 8E:vapos . For the detail that the 
Graces have made this rrE:rr/-os, contrast Athene's rrE:rr/-os at 5.735; see above, pp . 100-
101. 
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adopted by the god. Here, by contrast, there is no such disguise. So is what 
Diomedes attacks here actually the 'real' body of the goddess? 
A scholion on this very passage where Diomedes wounds Aphrodite 
suggests exactly this, and in doing so operates with the same implicit distinction 
between 'real' and 'false' bodies that is developed in the scholion on the 
wounding of Ares. The scholiast comments that the nature of the wound to the 
tip of Aphrodite's hand is due to the great stature of the goddess: TOt!To npos-
To f1EyE8os- Tf)s- 8EOll" KaL ElTClAflEVOS' yap fl.OYLS' Ti)v ciKpT)V XE1pa hpw0EV, OTL 
flETEwpos- ~v f) 8E6c;-.218 Here, the scholiast is inferring from the absence of any 
explicit disguise that the object of Diomedes' attack is in fact the authentic body 
of the goddess, and that the language used here of Aphrodite is 'divine' body-
language that is to be distinguished in terms of its sheer size, at least, from the 
'mortal' body-language used in the case of Ares in Iliad 5. For the scholiast, 
Aphrodite's body-language is to be understood like the 'divine' body-language 
of Ares in the battle between the gods in Iliad 21.219 The problem which the text 
raises for the scholiast here is the opposite of that which puzzled the scholiast 
quoted above on the wounding of Ares: where the wounding in the latter 
passage was regarded as being made feasible by Ares' mortal guise, here the 
wounding is to be explicated by the converse situation, namely Aphrodite's lack 
of mortal guise. The two solutions are consistent with each other in their 
respective explica~ions of the body-language of the two gods in terms of the 
presence or absence of disguise in either case, and what is implied is a 
distinction between the authentic and the false bodies of the gods. But, given 
that the outcome of both attacks is largely identical, we might wonder what 
significance such a distinction actually has for the bodies of the gods? 
In the event itself, the distinction between authentic and false bodies is of 
little consequence in respect of the physical outcomes of Diomedes' attacks on 
both gods. Whether Aphrodite and Ares have different types of body at this 
point does not result in any distinction between the types of wound they 
receive from the spear of Diomedes: both suffer a penetrative wound from 
which their afl~POTOV alfJ.a then flows. 220 If the body of Aphrodite here is to be 
understood as 'authentic' and the body of Ares as 'false', what does it mean that 
Diomedes' spear can in both cases penetrate in this way and release the flow of 
218 
219 
220 
Sch. bT on I/. 5.335-336. 
I/. 21.407: hm1 8' E:rrE:o-xE 1TEAE8pa rrmwv; cf. sch . bT on I/ . 5.857, quoted above, p. 102-
103. 
Aphrodite If. 5.339-340. Ares: I/ . 5.870. 
t• 
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this divinely corporeal substance? There is a basic problem here: how do we 
understand the 'anthropomorphism' of divine guises, given the fluidity that is 
inherent in the divine potential for rnetamorphosis?221 In situations of 
(dis)guise, where is the 'body' of the god located exactly? 
Such questions direct attention towards the persistent complexities that 
recur in the interaction between divine corporeality, divine power, and divine 
presence. The importance of this complexity is underlined by its persistence 
even in a situation like this where Diomedes has been granted a special form of 
vision-which might have been supposed to offer particular insight into the 
ontology of divine presence.222 On one level this ontology is precisely what the 
episodes in Iliad 5 explore, but even as the (divine) bodies of Aphrodite and 
Ares are subjected to the exploratory tip of Diomedes' spear new questions 
present themselves. Of course, it cannot be questioned that the gods are 
frequently presented in the Homeric epics in terms of a bodily code that is 
closely related to that exhibited by the mortal characters of the epics. Vernant 
observes how 'in order to think of the divine life and body, the required 
reference or point of departure for the Greeks is this defective body' .223 In 
related forms, this is not a new theme of Homeric scholarship. We may 
compare key elements of Eustathius' summary of the features of the Homeric 
gods: O'Wj.lQTLOOELS' QlJTOUS' TIAO.TTEL Kal av8pwnona8E'ls.224 And long before this 
lies the critique of___ Homeric and Hesiodic anthropomorphism, as it is pithily 
formulated by Xenophanes, for example. 225 But antiquity's concern to uncover 
221 
222 
223 
224 
225 
See Severyns (1966), 56, and Fauth (1975), 235, for 'le pouvoir de la metamorphose' and 
'die Macht der Metamorphose'; but for the further point that what underlies this power 
is in fact a radical absence of a 'true' or 'normal' appearance, see W. Smith (1988); 
Smith seeks, 161, to maintain a sense of 'the utter alienation of divine from mortal in 
appearance and nature'; cf. Vernant ([1986] 1991a), 43: 'In order to manifest his presence, 
the divinity chooses to make himself visible in the form of a body, rather than his or 
her body'. For divine (dis)guise as precisely the adoption of humnn body and voice, viz. 
8EIJ.as- and au8T], see Clay (1974); for more on the different 'voice' words in Hom.er, see 
Ford (1992), 172-197. Implicated here is the dispute over gods as powers and gods as 
personalities (and thus 'bodies') as mapped out between Vernant and Btu·kert; see 
Bremmer (1994), 22-23, and compare e.g. Vernant ([1986) 1991a) and Burkert (1985), 
183££. 
The supposition, e.g. Clay (1983), 171, that 1/. 18.517-519 shows the gods as perceived by 
gods, oversimplifies the scene. The gods are gold, wear gold, are beautiful and large 
'like gods', are 'conspicuous' : awpw xpuadw, xpuana 8£ E'liJ.aTa E08T]V, I KaAW Ka\. 
IJ.EYciAW avv TEUXEOLV, WS' TE 8E<.0 TTEp, I clf.l</J\s ci.pL(i]:\w. This is ekphrastic punning, 
and in this play of object and image the ontology of the gods is not simply revealed: see 
Barkan (1986), 10. 
Vernant ([1986) 1991a), 33-34. 
Eustathius 38, 4ff. van der Valk, on If. 1.43. 
See esp. Xenophanes B10, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16 D-K; for discussion and bibliography, see 
Lesher (ed.) (1992), 81-94, 114-119. 
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the rationale behind the forms of the Homeric gods should not mislead us into 
assuming that this recurrent anthropomorphism necessarily has the character 
of an ontologically denominative description. 226 For the apparent relationship 
between divine and human bodies is of a peculiar character in these contexts. 
Divine body language is marked in particular by the negation of basic aspects of 
the human body: this has been a key contribution of the analyses of the divine 
body by Clay, Loraux and Vernant.227 Thus when Diomedes wounds Aphrodite 
and Ares, what flows is their CliJ.~poTov atiJ.a, their 'Nichtblutsblut', which is itself 
then named as Lxwp.228 In the case of the wounding of Aphrodite this substance 
is further explicated by the Homeric narrator in terms themselves marked by 
the repetition and shift into the generalising present tense of the verb that is 
used to characterise the liquid flow of this 'Nichtblutsblut':229 
pEE 8' a~~pOTOV at~a 8EOLO, 
340 LXWP, ot6s- 1Tfp TE pEEL ~aKapwaL 8EOLGLV . 
ov yap a'LTov E8oua', ov rrlvoua' a'( Sorra olvov· 
TOUVEK' aval~OVES' ELGL KGL ciScivaTOL KGAfOVTaL. 
Negatives cluster here, in consequence of the 'difficult state' that immortality 
constitutes.230 This negative logic is highlighted by Loraux, especially in the play 
latent in aiJ.~pOTO\.J GliJ.G, between ~pOTOS', designating specifically the blood from 
a wound, and ~poT6S', the characteristic epithet of mortality:231 
226 
227 
228 
229 
230 
231 
Dusangquin'en est pas, de la substance de mortel a l'etat immortel: entre la glose 
etymologique_ et la reflexion sur l'essence negative du divin, qui distinguera jamais? 
See esp. Frontisi-Ducroux (1986b), 193: 'L'anthropomorphisme constitue la 
caracteristique majeure de la figuration, pour les Grecs, du divin. Mais ni !'affirmation 
d'Herodote ni la dominante effective de l'anthropomorphisme ne signifient que les 
Grecs consideraient que les hommes et les dieux etaient semblables. Toute la religion 
grecque s'attache, au contraire, a marquer les ecarts et a dessiner les frontieres entre la 
race des dieux et celle des hommes.' 
Clay (1981-1982); Loraux (1986b), 335-354; Vernant ([1986]1991a), 27-49. 
Aphrodite: Il. 5.339. Ares: 5.870. On a~~pOTOV at~a see Leumann (1950), 124-127; 
Bernadete (1968), 34; Clay (1981-1982), 113-114; Clay (1983), 143-144 and n. 26; Loraux 
(1986b), 352-3 and n. 49. Kirk (ed.) (1990), on I/. 5.416, suggests that lxwp might have 
seemed a 'suitable pseudo-technical term'; cf. Heubeck (1949-1950), 212-214. In any case, 
the doubled naming here, a~~poTov at~a and lxwp, must be considered in relation to 
divine and human namings in Homer (even if it is not 'explicitly ascribe[ d) to the 
language of the gods'; for this point and a subtle discussion of divine/human naming, see 
Clay (1972), esp. 127, 131): it is precisely lxwp and not a~~poTov at~a that Dione wipes 
away at I/ . 5.416 when Aphrodite is back among the company of the gods. By contrast, 
Jouanna and Demont (1981), 199-204, maintain that the use here is technical, and 
consistent with the usage in the Hippocratic corpus. 
11. 5.339-342. 
This phrase is used by Vermeule (1979), 121-122. For such negative language, see esp. 
Clay (1981-1982); cf. Chantraine (1968-1977), s.v. ~poT6s-, VEKTap. Note also the formula 
ciScivaTOS' KGL ciyf]pws- at Od. 5.218, with Janko (1981) on its linguistic ancestry. 
Loraux (1986b ), 353. 
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The divine body according to this analysis constitutes something of an anti-
body, which is marked by both its proximity to and difference from the human 
body. Vernant puts it this way: 'the result is that the gods actually transgress 
the strict corporeal code by means of which they are represented in their 
relations to humans'.232 But in this combination of proximity and difference, this 
transgression is of a special character. The point is that the divine body is not so 
much the opposite of the human body in a dialectical sense, as it is instead a 
pervasive negation of the validity and power of the human body and corporeal 
code: the divine body precedes, exceeds and supercedes. In this negation, 
opposites do not stand in a dialectical relation that confirms their mutual places 
in the world, but rather they approach one another in a state of far greater 
unease, in which 'opposites are not reconciled, but held together in their 
belonging apart'.233 This is a negative relation that persists in its negativity to 
the extent that it ultimately denies the validity of the relation itself. Divine 
substance and presence are analogous to human substance and presence, and 
yet they fundamentally transcend the terms of the analogy. The 'divine body' 
constitutes simultaneously an inversion and a denial of human bodily values. 
Accordingly, the (ana)logic of anthropomorphism leaves a gap, and in this gap 
lies much that is fundamental to the potentialities of divine presence and 
substance. In the presence of this gap, the modalities of divine presence always 
have the potential to exceed a simple physicality or corporeality.234 These scenes 
in Iliad 5 explore how divine presence may draw directly upon the human 
corporeal code, even as it overturns the terms of the analogy. 
The emergent embodiments of Aphrodite and Ares, and the special 
vision and assistance afforded Diomedes by Athene, come together on the 
battlefield in moments of direct confrontation between mortal and divine. This 
is a theme which will not recede in importance later in the Iliad, especially in the 
key sequences of combat between Apollo, Patroklos, Hektor and Euphorbos, 
and between Akhilleus, Hektor and Athene. The suggestion that the position of 
the gods can somehow be maintained (only?) by the reinforcement of the 
mortality of humans, and in particular the mortality of Akhilleus, is a live 
232 
233 
234 
Vernant ([1986]1991a), 31. 
For the quotation, see Taylor (1999), 32, on 'denegation' . A classic dialectical 
formulation of divine/human relations is that of Reinhardt ([1960]1997a), 179-181; but 
Reinhardt does approach its pervasive negativity, 181: 'The "as if" of human exis tence 
is permanence, the "as if" of divine existence is annihilation'. 
The gods are not incorporeal either: see Renehan (1980), 108-109, on the cap of Hades at 
Il. 5.845. 
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current flowing through the depictions of such encounters between divine and 
human in the Iliad. 235 Compare what Aphrodite says to Dione:236 
ou yap i:'n Tpwwv Kat 'Axmwv cpv\oms- alv~, 
380 a\\' T\8T] t.avaol YE KaL a8avaTOLaL ~cixovTaL. 
Aphrodite implies that the battle is somehow exceeding its designated bounds, 
namely Trojan against Greek. 237 That a larger context of divine-human conflict 
is active in the encounters between Diomedes, Aphrodite, and Ares in Iliad 5 is 
marked at several points. Aphrodite complains to Ares that Diomedes in his 
present form would fight even Zeus: Tu8El8T)S', os- vvv yE Ka'L av L1LL 1WTpL 
f.lcXXOLTo.238 Dione's consolatory speech to the wounded Aphrodite lists several 
similar incidents and points darkly to possible consequences. 239 And this theme 
of human conflict with the gods is picked up by Diomedes himself in his 
subsequent encounter with Glaukos, when he raises the example of 
Lykourgos.240 The scene between Dione and Aphrodite is of particular 
235 
236 
237 
238 
239 
240 
See esp. Murnaghan (1997); Slatkin (1991), esp. 101-102: 'The price of Zeus's hegemony 
is Achilles' death'; Redfield ([1975]1994), 241: 'Achilles is ... the consequence of a 
onetime solution to a problem of cosmic order'. On the potential for change in the 
ordering of the cosn1os, see Heiden (1997), 228-229. For the epochal role of the Trojan 
War in the demarcation of mortal and immortal, see Nagy ([1979]1999), 219-220; Scodel 
(1982), 35-40; Clay (1989), 166-170; but esp . Slatkin (1991), 118-122, for the distinctive 
Iliadic approach: 'a paradigmatic explanation of why human beings, in order not to 
threaten to be greater than their divine parents, must die'. Other than the llind 
compare esp. Hesiod fr. 204.95ff. MW; for discussion of this problematic fragment, see 
M. L. West (196'1), 133-136; Stiewe (1963); Koenen (1984), 26-34; M. L. West (1985), 119-
121; but Scodel (1982), 37-38, is right to underline the difficulty (West and Koenen are 
less diffident) of resolving the reference of the f!UKapEc;- in Hes. fr. 204.102-104 MW: the 
gods themselves, or the heroes? 
Il. 5.379-380. 
The entry of the gods into battle with its cosmic effects, Il. 20.1-74, and the ensuing 
battle between the gods in Il. 21, are developments of this . Griffin (1980), 185, compares 
I/. 20.56-65 with Hes . Theog. 847-852, to point up what he later, 199, terms a 'sublime 
frivolity'; cf. Schein (1984), 51, 65 n . 16. Likewise Burkert (1985), 122, calls it 'a 
harmless farce'; cf. Pucci (2002), 27. But these verdicts should not obscure the potential 
for perturbation of the cosmos that is an active theme at these points; note esp . the 
reply of Apollo to Poseidon, 11 . 21.462-469. 
I/. 5.362. Her complaint as a whole, 5.359-362, mobilises this theme of human/ divine 
conflict: Aphrodite seeks Olympus, '(v' a8avaTwv E8os- E-aTl, as a refuge from the wound 
which this ~poToc;- av~p has inflicted upon her. Nagy ([1979]1999), 143-144, comments 
on the designation 8al~ovL laoc;-, used of Diomedes (5.439, 459, 884), Patroklos (16.705-
786) and Akhilleus (20.447): 'the deployment of this epithet coincides with the climax 
of ritual antagonism between the god and hero'; cf. Scodel (1992), 81 : the phrase 'seems 
thereby linked to theomachy' . 
Dione's speech: 11. 5.381-415. The consolatory power of the speech itself is instantiated 
immediately by Dione in the wiping away of the '(xwp and the self-renewal of 
Aphrodite's hand at 5.416-417. See Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.417, for the expression a\8no 
xdp. 
Diomedes on Lykourgos: 11. 6.130-140. Diomedes' words mobilise the audience's 
awareness of Dione's speech. Andersen (1978), 98, points to the verbal parallelism of I/. 
5.407 (ou 8T]VaLO'), OS' ... )with 6.130-131 (ou8E- yap ou8E ... 8~v ~V, OS' ... )and 6.139-
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importance, where Dione catalogues several examples of gods who have 
endured the attacks of impious mortals.241 This scene may well reflect other epic 
material as well as a specific Near Eastern heritage in its form and content, but 
more important here is how this material functions within its immediate Iliadic 
context as part of a demarcation of divine and human 'spheres of action'.242 
Andersen may be right to stress the ad hoc applicability of the examples Dione 
provides, and in particular Ares' near-death experience, as part of the strategy 
of paradigmatic consolation. But we should not downplay the theological 
dimensions of such an incident by subordinating them beneath the 'poetic 
reasons' that Andersen posits for the scene's inclusion.243 By contrast, I would 
stress how the examples provided by Dione-not least Ares' near-death 
experience-participate in a pervasive theme of the Iliad, namely the 
exploration of the nature of mortality, especially m interaction and 
confrontation between humanity and the gods. In an important brief 
discussion, Bernadete saw the import of the wounding of Aphrodite: because it 
restores awareness of the difference between gods and mortals, it 'makes it 
impossible for men any longer to compete with the gods'.244 Just so, it is not as 
a warning to Diomedes that Dione contemplates the irreversible sorrows of 
mortality when she envisions a grieving Aigialeia as the coda to her catalogue. 
241 
242 
243 
244 
140 (ov8' ap' ETL 8~v ~v). See also Alden (2000), 130 n. 29, for Dionysos's flight to 
Thetis as a doublet of Aphrodite's flight to Dione. Alden (2000), 112-152, discusses this 
entire sequenceuf scenes in I/. 5 and 6 as a debate in 'para-narrative' over the 
desirability of divine assistance. See Scodel (1992), 77, for a defence of Diomedes' 
caution concerning fighting gods when first he faces Glaukos, as not 'out of character' in 
view of Athene's explicit role in the attacks on gods in I/. 5. 
See Andersen (1978), 61-70; Andersen (1981); Lang (1983), 155-156; Andersen (1997); and 
now Alden (2000), 21-22, 123-126, with further bibliography at 126 n. 22. For conflicts 
between gods and mortals in the past and present of the Iliad, see Kullmann (1956), 141-
146; on divine precedents, esp. of conflict, see Alden (2000), 38-42. 
For the naturalisation of this story within the Iliad, see esp. Andersen (1997), 36. For 
NE parallels for the consolation of Aphrodite, esp. in. the Gilgamesh epic, see Burkert 
(1992), 96-99; Andersen (1997); M. L. West (1997), 361-362. For a neoanalytic perspective 
on the binding of Ares at I/ . 5.385-391, see Kullmann (1956), 12-13; for a NE parallel see 
M. L. West (1997), 362-363; cf. Kirk (1970), 195, 198, 200, on the mythic motif. For the 
attack on Hera by Herakles at Il . 5.392-394 as part of a Herakles-epic, see Kullmann 
(1956), 26-27. Likewise, for Diomedes as 'eine Gestalt der vorhomerischen Dichtung', 
including his encounters with Aphrodite and Ares, see Kullmam1 (1960), 85-89. An 
alternative line is offered by Griffin (1980), 185, on the binding of Here in I/ . 1: 'The 
poet of the Iliad even invents archaic-sounding myths of divine conflict in the olden 
days' . For such 'invention', see Willcock (1964); Braswell (1971); Willcock (1977); Alden 
(2000), 21-22. But conversely for the potential for Homer to interact with other story-
traditions, see Lang (1983), and now Dowden (1996) with further bibliography. For 
models of traditional interaction building on an oral poetics, see esp. Nagy ([1979]1999), 
with the preface to the 1999 edition, vii-xviii; Nagy (199Gb); Slatkin (1991) . 
Andersen (1981), 326-327 (his italics); this article is a response to Levy (1979), who 
argues for an earlier tradition of mortal gods. 
Bernadete (1968), 34. 
I 
I 
I 
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Instead, the prospect of Aigialeia's grief in the face of Diomedes' mortality is 
itself a further source of consolation to Aphrodite, precisely because it reasserts 
the hierarchical pattern of divine contemplation of mortal pain-a hierarchy 
momentarily overturned by Diomedes.245 That the normal valency of 
confrontations between gods and humans is reversed in the previous examples 
that Dione cites, as indeed it has been in Diomedes' attacks on Aphrodite and 
Ares, reinforces the fundamental importance of the exploration of these 
potential relations-and above all of control over the possibilities-for the gods 
themselves. In this respect, at least, this scene between Dione and Aphrodite is 
far from being 'on the whole, functionless', as Burkert puts it at the conclusion 
of his discussion of the Near Eastern heritage of the consolation scene between 
Aphrodite, Dione, and Zeus.246 Precisely what Burkert neglects is how the 
specifics of Dione's speech thematise confrontation between mortals and 
immortals in ways that are directly relevant to the confrontations between 
Diomedes, Aphrodite and Ares. If, in the wounds of Aphrodite and Ares, we 
are invited at the tip of Diomedes' spear to contemplate the simultaneous 
potential and insufficiency represented by anthropomorphic analogies for 
understanding the nature of divine presence, such reflections are extended by 
Dione's speech into the wider Iliadic concern with the operation and 
maintenance of boundaries between gods and humans. 
The Olympian scene between Dione, Aphrodite and Zeus is immediately 
' followed by Diomedes' attempt to attack Aineias, despite the protection that 
Aineias now has from Apollo. 247 In repulsing Diomedes, Apollo takes the 
245 
246 
247 
I/ . 5.410-415. Compare this bleak view (from a divine perspective) of the consequences 
of mortal relationships with what Helen says to Aphrodite at I/ . 3.406-409: ~ao nap' 
aiJTov lovaa, 8Ewv 8' aTTOELKE KEAEv8ous-, I fl-118' i!n aol.aL n68waLV unoaTpEtjlnas-
"OA.uf.mov, I aAA.' ald TTEpl KELVOV 6t(uE Kal i: <j>vA.aaaE, I ElS' 0 Kf a' ~· aA.oxov 
TTOLTjanm ~· o YE 8ouA.11v. For connections between Athene's mocking words at Il. 5.420-
425 and the earlier scene between Aphrodite and Helen, see Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 5.422-
425. 
Burkert (1992), 99: 'What has remained in Homer is the narrative thread of a genre 
scene, all the more carefully preserved because it is, on the whole, functionless.' 
Perhaps what Burkert momentarily overlooks is a central implication of his and other 
discussions of the NE heritage of early Greek literature, namely that the presence of 
this heritage tends to be associated with cosmological concerns, for which Hesiod's 
Theogony is paradigmatic: see M. L. West (ed.) (1966), passim, but esp. 18-31; Burkert 
(1992); M. L. West (1997), 107-167, 376-305. 
Il. 5.433: yLVwaKwv o oL a\nos- UTTELPEXE XELpas- 'An6AA.wv. On this 'cognition' of the 
god at work, note Kullmann (1956), 142: 'Wie weit die Gestalt des Gottes dem Diomedes 
sichtbar ist, wird nicht gesagt' . For Diomedes' unusual disregard for Apollo here, see 
Fenik (1968), 45-46 . 
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opportunity to assert the inequality between the races of immortals and of 
humans:248 
" cf>pa(Eo, Tu8d8TJ, Kat xa(Eo, l-lTJ8E: BEo'LaLV 
la' E8EAE cppovE-nv, E-nd ov TTOTE cj>v>-.ov Oj.lo'Lov 
aeavaTWV TE 8EWV xaj.laL EPXO j.lEVWV T 0 av8pwrrwv. 
What Apollo asserts is a crisp formulation of the negative relation that persists 
between gods and humans, even in the midst of Diomedes' heroic exploits. This 
is a sharp reminder to Diomedes that, even if the presence of the gods is 
currently apparent to him through the assistance of Athene, there is no ground 
of equality between the immortal gods and humans who go about upon the 
ground. Of course, several points of contact between gods and humans are 
exactly what are explored in Iliad 5, but this exploration takes a form that does 
not produce straightforward results. If Aphrodite and Ares here take on specific 
'mortal' features, especially in respect of an emergent corporeality, this is not a 
simple statement about divine ontology but a particular embodiment of the 
problematic, negative relation between gods and humans that is both facilitated 
and concealed by the anthropomorphic analogy. 249 In these scenes in Iliad 5, the 
body-the corporeality of presence-is the ground over which this conceptual 
conflict between gods and mortals is played out, precisely because the body is 
so fundamental to the mortal state. But even here, as Aphrodite's arm is grazed, 
as Ares is struck a fatal blow that fails to kill, and as their '(xwp is spilt, the effect 
is to underline how,fundamentally gods exceed mortals. 
What is depicted here is the complex relationship between divine 
presence and divine embodiment as it emerges in the particular context of 
narrative. These incidents from Iliad 5 are not alone in exploring this 
relationship. A frequent problem in such contexts is that of 'disguise': some 
aspects of this emerged in my discussion above of Ares' and Aphrodite's 'false' 
and 'authentic' bodies. To talk of divine disguise entails the use of certain sorts 
of language that mobilise an opposition between outward and inward forms: 
the language of disguise implies that the exterior aspect might change while the 
interior form remained intact.250 We might compare the opening formulation of 
248 
249 
250 
I/ . 5.440-442. See esp. Bernadete (1968), 34. 
Compare Kullmam1 (1956), 146: 'Dort stand der Gott dem Menschen Auge in Auge 
gegenuber .. . , hier haben wir Distanz des Gi::ittlichen w1d Spielraum flir menschliche 
Entscheidungs- und Wirkungsfreiheit.' 
It is the rhetoric of a 'true' interiority that underlies the impact of the removal of 
disguise; on Odysseus's revelation in Od. 21-22, see esp . Murnaghan (1987), 11: 'the 
equation, as the hero's disguise is shed, of heroic performance with the es tablishment 
of an unchanging truth gives that performance a definitive, conclusive character that it 
otherwise lacks' . For more on recognition as a process, see Murnaghan (1987); Goldhill 
112 
Clay in her important article on divine transformation: 'In his masked 
appearance on the stage of action, the god is introduced by EOLKWS', daaf.1EVOS', or 
some such expression'.251 Yet despite this initial theatrical frame, during the 
course of the article it becomes clear that Clay is in fact discussin.g 'complete 
metamorphosis', and not masking or some other such process of disguise at 
all.252 Likewise Vernant begins a section discussing the leaky transformations of 
Poseidon and Aphrodite in similar terms: 'As well-camouflaged as a god may 
be in the skin of a mortal'.253 In using such language, Clay and Vernant reflect 
something of the difficult conceptual ramifications of divine metamorphosis: 
how fundamental can transformation actually be? Surely something of the 'real' 
god must remain constant? Confronted by such complications, the temptation 
is to fall back on the familiar terms of the mortal bodily code, and the 
persistence of identity is conceived in corporeal terms-as the corporeal 
presence, such as it is imagined to be, that underlies the outward semblance of 
the god. Arguably, use of the language of disguise in such contexts engenders a 
false confidence in the prima facie comprehensibility of transformation. This is 
the crux, in particular, of the appearance of gods in both the Iliad and the 
Odyssey in the form of birds, which has become a scholarly limit case in the use 
of' disguise' as a framing concept in discussions of divine transformation.254 This 
false confidence also underlies why the 'disguise' of Demeter in the Homeric 
Hymn to Demeter has taken on a canonical status in the explication of divine 
transformation.255 I ---will discuss divine bird-appearances in Homer in more 
detail below, but first I want to turn to two instances of gods in mortal guise in 
the Iliad that seem to show unstable disguises and thus to offer insights into the 
'corporeality' that we might imagine to underlie the outward semblance of 
gods in disguise. 
The first of these moments comes with Aphrodite's appearance to Helen 
in the guise of an old serving-woman:256 
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ypT]t 8€ flLV ElKu'La naA.m YE VEL npoaEEL TIEV 
ElpoKOflWL, ~ ol AaKE8aLj.lOVL vmETWDGTJL 
~GKELV E'lpLa KaAa, j.lclAWTa 8E j.lLV cj>LAEEaKEV' 
(1991), 5-24; Henderson (1997); and esp. Pucci (1987), 76-97, on how disguise destabilises 
the 'natural' or 'authentic' in the case of Odysseus also. 
Clay (1974), 129. 
Clay (1974), 136. 
Vernant ([1986] 1991a), 43. 
See below, pp. 136-137. 
See e.g. D. T. Steiner (2001), 96-97; Karanika (2001), 279. 
I/ . 3.386-388. Pucci mentions this exchange between Helen and Aphrodite in Iliad 3 only 
briefly, as a 'partial vision': Pucci ([1988]1998b), 83 n. 7. 
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But this strategy is short-lived, and, when Aphrodite stirs her desires, a moment 
of clear perception comes upon Helen:257 
395 we; <flcno· TflL 8' apa 8UjJ.OV EVL CJTT]8wow OpLVEV" 
Kat p, we; ovv EVOTjCJE 8Euc; TTEpLKUAAEa 8npf]v 
CJTT]8ni 8' LiJ.EpOEVTa Kal. OiJ.iJ.aTa iJ.apiJ.al.povm, 
86.jJ.~TjCJEV T' ap' ETTELTa ETTO<; T' /::<flaT' EK T' OVOj.la(EV" 
Emotions frame the moment of perception: the stirring of Helen's 8uf1.6S' IS 
supplanted by wonder, 8ci[J.~OS', as Helen 'realises' the presence of the goddess; 
the emotion-laden character of such perception is apparent.258 A key issue here 
is how Helen perceives Aphrodite-I almost write: 'how Helen sees Aphrodite 
showing through beneath the disguise', but this is to assume more than the text 
states. To be sure, Aphrodite's TIEpLKa!J...E:a 8np~v, aTI]8m 't[J.Ep6EvTa and O[J.[J.aTa 
[J.ap[J.aLpovTa are fitting attributes to betray the presence of this particular divine 
body.259 Clay comments: 'The love goddess, it appears, cannot be other than 
lovely and desirable' .260 But a multiplicity of questions present themselves.261 
How is it that these features become visible to Helen when divine disguise is 
notable precisely for its efficacy? Are we supposed to recognise something 
about the efficacy of Helen's powers of perception? Or, conversely, something 
about the potential for overflow in divine corporeality, a leak of divinity that 
belies Aphrodite's guise? Athetesis of this section was one solution proposed in 
antiquity to avoid such complexities.262 For the Homeric focus on Helen's 
perceptual abilities-a forerunner of Stesichorus' s and Euripides' deceptively 
double Helens-compare her recognition of the disguised Odysseus in Troy, as 
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I/. 3.395-398. 
On 8aiJ.~E"lv, see esp. Prier (1989), 87-89. 
With Aphrodite's CJTT]8w LiJ.Ep6EvTa, compare HomHymAphr 73: E- v aTT]8waL ~ci.A.' 
'liJ.Epov; also what Anchises beholds at HomHymAphr 88-90: OPIJ.OL 8' cliJ.</J' cmaA.flL 
8npflL TTEpLKaAAEEc; ~aav I KaAOL XPUCJELOL TTaj.lTTOLKLAOL" we; 8E CJEArlVTJ I CJTf]8wLV cliJ.</J' 
cmaA.o"laLv E"MiJ.TTETO, 8auiJ.a l8E-a8m . The focus on what is worn on the body in these 
lines is carefully framed for what it suggests about the body itself; see Allen and Sikes 
(edd.) (1904), on HomHymAphr 90, on the problematic subject of E"MiJ.TTETO. The absence 
of Aphrodite's eyes here suits her maidenly guise; the eyes here are all Anchises': 
HomHymAphr 83-84. 
Clay (1989), 175. 
Compare Kirk (ed.) (1985), on 3.396-398: ' [H]as the goddess abandoned her disguise? Or 
do these features resist transformation? Or does Helen see through the outward 
disguise?'. 
For Aristarkhos's athetesis, see Kirk (ed.) (1985), on 3.396-398. On such athetesis, cf. 
Martin (2000), 55, discussing Od. 3.199-200: 'Athetizing ... as Aristophanes of 
Byzantium and Aristarchus did, avoids some awkwardness, but at the cost of 
eliminating the irony that may have been central to traditional conventions for 
representing Nestor in epic.' 
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told by Helen herself to Menelaus and Telemachos in Odyssey 4.263 There, she 
alone recognised Odysseus 'such as he was': E-yw 8E flLV o'LT) avE-yvwv To1ov 
E-6vTa.264 Stephanie West declares that '[i]t makes little difference' just what 
To1ov E-6vTa implies here: "'as the man he was" or "though thus disguised"'.265 
But such ambiguity is important in relation to noA.tJTponos- Odysseus, and 
already the point has been made by Helen here that the figure of Odysseus's 
disguise is something of an anomaly:266 
a>J..wL 8' aim)v </JwTL KUTUKp{nnwv ~·LaKE 
8EKTT]L, OS' ov8i:v TOLOS' ET]V E1TL VT]VGLV 'Axmwv. 
Odysseus, the av8pa noA.{JTponov of the Odyssey, and in many respects the 'other 
man' of the Iliad contrasted with Agamemnon and Akhilleus, here likens 
himself to an 'other man'-a beggar, or 'Dektes'?267 The difficulties of exegesis 
do not end with the noun, and the appended relative clause further complicates 
matters. Is the OS' Odysseus or the beggar/Dektes? And what does ou8E-v TOLOS' 
ET)V then signify? Alternatives: 'who was not at all like this among the Greek 
ships'; 'a person who was not there at all among the Greek ships'; even, 'a type 
of person such as was not at all among the Greek ships'.26S The Tol:os- of this 
clause is picked up by the ambiguous To1ov of the disguised Odysseus whom 
Helen recognises a few lines later. Are we then to conclude that there is 
something anomalous about Odysseus's disguise itself? Perhaps it is somehow 
too total, a disguise that takes Odysseus either too far from himself or too close 
263 
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Od. 4.242-264. Helen's story is swiftly undermined by Menelaus's counter-narrative (was 
she motivated by a 8a(f1wv? Od. 4.274-275) of her deceptive strategem when the Greeks 
are inside the Wooden Horse at Od. 4.271-289. See Schmiel (1972); Bergren (1981); 
Goldhill (1988), 19-24; Boyd (1998); Worman (2001), 30-34. For the relation of the 
Odyssey with cyclic epic at this point, see Severyns (1928 [1967]), 334-336, 347-349. See 
also Andersen (1977), 8-9, declaring the 'utterly Odyssean' character of this narrative 
of 'hide and seek'; for the 'low' status of disguise, and for this as an Odyssean 
retrojection into the Iliadic story, see Goldhill (1991), 101-102; Bassi (1995), 13-14; 
Doherty (1995), 171. 
Od. 4.250. 
S. West (ed.) (1988), on 4.250. 
Od. 4.247-248. For the epithet, 1TOAtJTp01TOS', see Od . 1.1; 10.330, ~ av y' '08vaaEUS' EGGL 
noA.uTponos-; Pucci (1987), 24-25; Goldhill (1991), 3 and n. 3. 
For Odysseus as an anomaly in the Iliad, see now Pache (2000). On the reading 8EKTTJL or 
MKTTJL, seeS. West (ed.) (1988), on 4.246-249. The word would be hapax as 'beggar' 
(Aristarkhos), but who is this Dektes? Sch. HMQT on Od. 4.248 comments: 6 KVKALKOS' 
TO 8EKTTJL ovofJ.UTLKWS' aKOUEL (see also Alien (ed.) (1912), Ilins Pnrva, fr. 11); and then 
declares that this Dektes is the person from whom. Odysseus takes the rags in question. 
For various alternatives, seeS. West (ed.) (1988), on 4.246-249. See esp. sch. E on Od. 
4.248: ~ yap Tmo\hov nTwxov KUTEGTTJGEv i:avTov, otos- ou fl.Tl EupE8f\L a>J..os- Els- To 
OAOV 'EAAT]VLKOV" T\ TOLOUTOS' EYE VETO, ot6v TLS' 6pwv EL 1TfV av fl.Tl ELVUL '08vaata; cf. 
Eustathius 1494.55££., 163.33-36 Stallbaum, on Od. 4.248. 
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to the out-of-place figure of the beggar /Dektes?269 The result is that Helen, 
singularly perceptive as she is (E-yw 8E: fl.LV o'CT) cwE-yvwv), recognises this 
anomalous figure precisely as Odyssean in its flux between 'the man he really 
was' and 'the man as he was disguised'. 
A similar flux between an identifiable form and a disguised form is what 
Helen perceives in this scene in Iliad 3. As I suggested above, the text does not 
so much explain the mechanism of Helen's perception as present Aphrodite's 
presence in its perceptual 'felt-ness' to Helen. The use of the verb voE-w here 
privileges perception over sight, as it marks a momentary shift of initiative and 
signals an act of 'realisation' instead of 'seeing'; the correlation of EVOT)CJE and 
8afi~T)CJEV underlines the felt character of perception at this point,270 In this focus 
on perceptive emotion, the text does not allow us to see Aphrodite 'showing 
through beneath the disguise' as such. But what the text does do is to juxtapose 
the double presence of the old serving-woman and the beautiful neck, desirable 
breasts and mesmerising eyes of the goddess. The attributes of Aphrodite that 
provoke Helen's astonishment are signs of presence that are somehow 
incorporated into Aphrodite's guise as an old woman. It is as if these features of 
desire present themselves amidst the old woman's guise, a prospect which 
undoubtedly offers a surreal and oxymoronic combination in the Greek cultural 
context; the juxtaposition might itself express the power of Aphrodite, as it 
manifests in this v~sion of a strangely desirable old woman.271 These signs of 
Aphrodite are in themselves sufficient for recognition when placed amid her 
guise as an old serving-woman. The figured presence of the goddess is 
functionally complete in this moment of startling juxtaposition. 
For all the numerous instances of divine (dis)guise that seem relatively 
unproblematic, it is characteristic that in moments such as this the Homeric 
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271 
Compare Boyd (1998), 3: 'The hero who is a mainstay of the Achaean army has become 
"Nobody" for the first time-and yet Helen recognises him at once'; and Worman (2001), 
32: Odysseus ' is so unlike himself 000 that he slips into Troy 00 0 unnoticed, except by Helen 
herself'. 
For voEw as marking a change in the initiative, see Nagy ([1979]1999), 51, §13n. For the 
correlation of emotion with perception in the use of voEw, see von Fritz (1943); on 
cognition, cf. Lesher (1981), (1994). A similar stress on this 'feltness' of perception occurs 
a t Od. 1.320-323, where Athene departs like a bird, and gives Telemakhos llEvos KaL 
8aprros in his 8u~-t6s; recognition ensues, with a correlation of the activity of cppEvEs and 
8u~-t6s in lines 322-323: 6 8E. cppwLv ~wL vo~rras I 86.~-t~llCJEV KaTa 8u116v· 6trraTo yap 
8EClV ELVUL. 
Worman (1997), 163, stresses how Helen's body remains cloaked from the audience's 
eyes during this scene, whereas the audience 'see' Aphrodite through Helen's eyes; 
while this contrast holds, the visibility of Aphrodite in fact remains limited to her 
guise as an old woman and these three signs of desirability. 
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poems offer their audiences dramatisations of uncertainty in the play of divine 
appearance. Pucci has contributed signally to the understanding of the 
indeterminacies and destabilising effects of the Odyssean disguises of Odysseus, 
in terms which point up the difficulties of recovering 'his' stable identity in 
Ithake, and Pucci's analysis goes on to discuss the appearances of Athene in 
Odyssey 13 as evidencing 'The Unreadable Figure of Metis' .272 A key point in his 
discussion is the suggestion that 'the phenomenology of the gods-their 
epiphanic forms-eludes all ontology'.273 It is in relation to this claim-compare 
my discussion above of anthropomorphic analogies and the bodily presence of 
the gods-that I am focusing upon these examples in which moments of faulty 
disguise might at first seem to offer clearer perspectives on the persistence of 
corporeal identity, but, when more closely read, offer instead traces of presence 
whose modalities point again towards the figurative status of divine 
corporeality. The metamorphosis of Aphrodite to this extent is not a 'disguise', 
but a (partial) opening up of the goddess's presence in the world for specific 
ends. 
Poseidon's appearance in the guise of Kalkhas to the two Aiantes in Iliad 
13 is another intriguing example.274 The scene ends with the god darting away 
'like a hawk'; at this point, Aias son of Oileus recognises a god at work, and he 
observes to Aias son of Telamon:275 
Al_av, E1Tcl TLS' vw·L 8EWV o'L "0AUf11TOV EXOVCJL 
flclVTL El86wvos- d >-.nm rrapa VlJual. flclXEa8m-
ov8' 0 YE Ka>-.xas- EOTL, 8Eorrp6rros- OLWVLOT~s- · 
L xvw276 yap f.LET01TL08E rro8wv ~8E- KVT]flclWV 
pEt ' Eyvwv cl1TLOVTOS'" aptyvwTOL 8E- 8EOL 1TEP" 
What betrays to Aias the presence of the god in the semblance of Kalchas are 
the '(xvw Tio8wv T]8E- KVT)f..Lciwv of the god as he departs. Again the verb is not one 
of seeing so much as of perception, Eyvwv, and the use of the aorist suits Aias's 
rhetoric at this point: pEL. ... apt yvwTOL 8E- 8EoL TIEp. But what are these '(xvw, and 
what would it be to recognise them? Janko wonders about the relevance of 
'shins', if we are to understand '(xvw as footprints. 277 The status of these traces 
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Odysseus: Pucci (1987), esp. 94; note the unexpected colour of Odysseus's beard or h air at 
Od. 16.176, and see Hoekstra (ed.) (1989), on 16.176. Athene: Pucci (1987), 102-123. 
Pucci (1987), 107. For this point, see also W. Smith (1988). 
I!. 13.43-65. 
Il. 13.68-72. Hawk-simile: 13.62-65. 
West (ed) (1998-2000) prints 'lxf.LaTa . 
See Janko (ed.) (1992), on 13.70-72: 'Gods are often recognized only as they depart ... but 
Aias' recognition of a god from the '(xvw of his "feet and shirts" is odd. If he is known 
from his "footprints" why mention his shins?'. At Od . 2.406, 3.30, 5.193, and 7.38, ei ther 
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of the god's presence is further complicated by the juxaposition of these 'Lxvw 
hard upon the heels of the hawk-simile that accompanies Poseidon's departure: 
&:; T' 'Lpll~ WKVTTTEpos- ilipTo TTETECJ8m.278 This instance becomes further grist to 
the mill of those who discuss the avian likenesses of the gods in Homer, to 
judge one way or the other about the form of the god at this point. 279 More 
productive is the comment of Vernant on this collocation of images as reflecting 
the 'disorienting, paradoxical, and prodigious character of a body that is 
"other"'.280 But it is perhaps more significant again that the juxtaposition of 
images here is mediated by point of view: what is presented to the audience by 
the narrator as the departure of Poseidon 'like a hawk' is restated by Aias son 
of Oileus in terms of an easy recognition of the traces of the god's feet and 
shins. This shift underpins an important point: the presence of Poseidon's '[xvw 
as such is dependent upon the perception of Aias, and thus it is in the shift from 
Poseidon 'like a hawk' to the traces of his feet and shins that Aias sees that the 
problem for the audience of the epic lies. Are we in fact all seeing the same 
thing? 
Perhaps this is not a question that can receive a satisfactory answer on its 
own terms, but it raises a question of point of view that has pertinent 
ramifications when considered in relation to another notable element of this 
scene. For curiously, despite Vernant' s insistence upon its 'disorienting, 
paradoxical, and proc!_igious character', there is nothing here of the physical-
emotional reaction of 8af.i~OS' that is frequently felt by mortals at such 
disorienting points. Aias son of Oileus and Aias son of Telamon do not react as 
Helen does to Aphrodite, where her act of perception is correlate with a 
physical-emotional state of wonder, 8af.i~OS'. This point is well made by Pucci, 
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Telemakhos or Odysseus follows in the tracks of a goddess: 6 8' i!nnTa !.lET LXVLU 
~al.vE 8Eo'Lo; the phrase is only used in these instances, and must signify the special 
degree of favour in each case. 
Il. 13.62. 
Janko (ed.) (1992), on 13.70-72, discounts the suggestion of Pollard (1977), 158, that these 
might be bird tracks, reflecting an avian transformation; the idea is also pursued by 
Dietrich (1983), 58: 'Whether or not the god actually transformed himself into that 
bird, the image is bound to confuse the hearer ... '. But Janko (ed.) (1992), on 13.62-65, is 
confident that Poseidon has the speed of the hawk, not its shape; cf. his comment on 
13.70-72: 'in the swirl of battle his speed, which the poet indicates at 65 and 90, would 
be far more obvious [than bird-tracks]' . 
Vernant ([1986]1991a), 43, draws particular attention to the extremes of weight and 
lightness in the presence of gods: here Poseidon departs 'like a hawk'; at I/. 5. 837-839, 
Athene's great weight has marked effect on Diomedes' chariot; cf. Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 
5.838-839. 
118 
when he contrasts this Poseidon-scene with Athene's similarly odd departure 
from Nestor's Pylian banquet in Odyssey 3:281 
Nothing of the thea trical event in Pylos occms here: no amazement (thnmbos, 
thnumn); no collective recognition of the god (the other Ajax recognises after the 
first Ajax's recognition); no visible miracle, but a trace of the god's past presence; m 
recognition of the individual god. 
What then is the dynamic of this scene? Certainly, the encounter has an 
effective outcome, in that the two Aiantes are at its conclusion xapfl.'flL Y'fl86auvoL, 
even as Poseidon is rousing the other Greeks who have found respite by the 
ships.282 But is it as straightforward as this? A basic strategy here must be to 
follow up the suggestion of irony in the 'ease' of Aias's recognition of Poseidon 
here: as Janko points out, Menelaus tells in Odyssey 4 how Aias fails to recognise 
the agency of Poseidon in his survival of shipwreck, and the god kills him for 
his boast,283 Accordingly, the ease of Aias's recognition here possesses an ironic 
aspect, and the fact that Aias does not recognise Poseidon as such in these '(xvw 
TTo8wv Tj8E: KV'flfl.cXWV itself gains an added significance. Aias's perception at this 
point is thus pointedly partial. But more than this, the problem of point of view 
is in a sense turned on its head: as it turns out, the audience are in fact in a 
position to recognise more than Aias, namely the presence of Poseidon as such, 
the hawkish departure of the god and the ironies of Aias's confident boast. 
Despite our initial impression that in seeing the '(xvw of the god Aias had the 
decisive privilege of autopsy, Aias's perception of these traces of the god is itself 
implicitly problematic, and not simply through the narrator's juxtaposition of 
these traces alongside the image of the hawk, but also by the ironies of Aias's 
own later lack of perspicuity. 
The situation is thus the converse of Helen's recognition of Aphrodite. 
There the scene draws, in its play with Aphrodite's appearance as a 
disconcerting object of desire, upon Helen' s wider significance in the Iliad and 
Odyssey both as an object of perception herself and as someone whose own 
specially perceptive abilities are repeatedly explored. Helen' s paradigmatic 
status as both the subject and object of desire is one to which Greek writers 
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Pucci (1987), 121-122; cf. 115-122. On this scene, see below, pp. 138-146. 
I/ . 13.82-84. 
Od. 4.499-511, esp . 504-505: <Pfl p' UEKllTL 8Ewv <fluy£nv f.LEya \a'lTf.La 8aMaCJllS'· I Toil 
8!: TToan8clwv f.LEYG.A' EKAVEV av8~aavTQ<;; see Janko (ed.) (1992), on 11. 13.72. See esp. 
Todorov ([1971]1977), 56, on Aias and 'the risk of speech'. Compare the comic depiction 
of Aias at I/ . 23.780-784: see above, pp. 87-88; and see below, p. 123 and n . 300, on the 
Homeric antecedent of the visible disfavour of Athene at Aias upon the rape of 
Kassandra in later poetic versions. For the story of Aias, see esp. Graf ([1978] 2000); in 
vase painting, Connelly (1993). 
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return again and again as a touchstone for thinking about the possibilities of 
perception and presence, but it is a status whose ramifications have already 
begun to develop in Iliad 3.284 Here, by contrast, Aias's boastful status as a 
(partial, belated) misrecogniser of the purpose and presence of the gods at 
work underpins the shift in point of view that results in the confusing 
collocation of Kalkhas, the hawk and the 'Lxvw no8wv rp'E KVTJ~ciwv. But in both 
cases, what is explored is not so much a leaky corporeality on the part of these 
two gods as the problems of sight presence and perception which Helen and 
Aias personify in their respective roles within the larger narrative of the Trojan 
war. The figurations of divine presence are thus the arena in which the audience 
of the epic are invited to explore the implications of Helen's and Aias's 
respective perceptual capacities. Accordingly, what these scenes offer us are not 
moments of privileged access to an authentic corporeal presence of the gods, 
but two further instances of the problematic relations between divine presence, 
corporeality, and (dis)guise, instances which themselves recapitulate important 
aspects of the referential narrative economy of the Iliad. 
In these instances, then, the leakage of signs of Aphrodite's and 
Poseidon's divinity turns out not to give us access to an authentic divine 
ontology beneath a 'masking' disguise, but instead to point again to the 
figuration of divine corporeality and anthropomorphism. The theatrical 
metaphor frequently_ adopted in such contexts is not an accurate approximation 
of the dynamics of divine appearance and disguise because the divine 'anti-
body' always has the potential to offer both less and more than is possible in a 
simple masking of the human body.285 The figure of Odysseus in the Odyssey 
shows us a divinely assisted extension of what is normally possible within the 
confines of a human corporeal code, but in this respect Odysseus constitutes a 
significant anomaly, a radically polytropic man-with disquieting consequences, 
Pucci has argued, for the stability of Odysseus's own narrative of identity.286 
The gods, by contrast, are free of such consequences, and their capacity for 
mutability reflects something more profound than a metamorphic body-the 
gods transcend the very terms within which such a body might be humanly 
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See N. Austin (1994); but esp . Worman (1997), 155: '[a]s both subject and object in this 
viewing process, Helen's body comes to be used as a structuring element' . On Helen's 
verbal contributions in I/. 3, see Worman (2001). 
Note Ingold (2000), 94: 'The greater the person's powers of metamorphosis, the wider 
the range of their practical possibilities of being, and hence the more extensive the 
breadth of their experience and the scope of their phenomenal presence.' Ingold builds 
on the acute discussion of Viveiros de Castro ([1998] 2002), 319-320. 
See above, p . 116. 
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understood. Thus, even in these moments of leakage, the 'body of the gods' 
operates in a fashion more figurative than denominational. What I mean by this 
is that the body of the gods gains significance in such moments precisely in 
relational terms-by a relating of divine bodies to those of mortals in terms that 
negate and exceed mortal corporeality. In this respect, the bodies of the gods 
emerge as objects of human perceptions within specific relational frames, but 
they are not limited by these particular configurations. What has shaped up 
initially to offer a special perspective on the modalities of divine presence, and 
especially the body of the gods, actually turns out to offer another disconcerting 
formulation of divine presence in terms of a relation with the human corporeal 
code that negates the basis of comparison. This disruptive capacity is a key 
feature of the problematic of divine presence. While such a sequence underlines 
the importance of figuration as a relational means to express the modalities of 
divine presence, nevertheless this figuration embraces its own incompleteness. 
As such, it offers a way of framing what cannot be expressed in simple 
denominational terms. This is the particular realm of divine presence, namely 'a 
world in front of the text'.287 
Coda: present images and images of presence 
In discussing interaction between gods and mortals in the Homeric poems, I 
have laid stress upon the elusive potential of divine presence. The body of the 
gods is unlike that of mortals, and conceptions and perceptions of how the 
presence of a god is framed are permeated by this unlikeness. The example of 
the long arm of Zeus shows in particular the flux of power and of presence. This 
flux is not well described by typologising definitions of divine epiphany in 
terms of a self-evident presence, especially as expressed in the adaptation of 
type-scenes of mortal travel and arrival. The examples of Aphrodite and Ares, 
and of Aphrodite and Poseidon, likewise point towards the figurative status of 
anthropomorphism in contexts of divine presence. These configurations of 
287 See White (1991), 313: '[t]he tension between these two elements projects a "world" "in 
front of" the text, a world which is the metaphorical reference'; White is discussing 
Ricoeur ([1975]1978) and the formulation of sameness and difference-'is like' and 'is 
not'-as a tension between the metaphorical referent and the literal referent (itself 
'impossible') . See esp. Ricoeur ([1975]1978), 247-256. 
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presence are framed in relation to their context, not by any exigencies-could 
there be such?-of divine ontology, and in this respect they present narrative 
challenges to the audiences of these epics. Nonetheless, it is still possible for 
such configurations to attain a certain stylisation. 288 This is particularly 
important in contexts of ritualised activity, which often express their 
effectiveness in repetition and other kinds of rhetorical regularity in the 
performance of relations between m01·tals and gods.289 But however important 
ritual is in offering strategies of control over relations between mortals and 
gods it does not in fact close down the multifarious potentiality of divine power 
and presence. The process of interpretative relating-above all, of narrating the 
event-remains fundamental, if always incomplete, in situations of encounter 
between mortals and gods. In this coda, I want to consider this relation of ritual 
and divine embodiment in relation to two notable Homeric images of divine 
presence, before passing on to larger questions about ritualisation in the next 
section of this chapter. 
Something of this potential for stylisation in the embodied form of the 
gods may be seen in the case of the famous nod of Zeus in Iliad 1, where the 
ritualised claim of suppliance that Thetis lays upon Zeus is positively 
acknowledged in a famous image:290 
~. Kal. KvavET]LaLV ETT' 6cppvaL VEVCJE Kpovtwv, 
c'q.l~pOCJLal 8' apa XGLTaL ETTEppwaaVTO avaKTOS' 
530 KpaTOS' c'm' a8avaTOLO " [l.Eyav 8' EAEl\L~EV "OAV[l.TTOV. 
In these lines Zeus's decision is presented in powerfully evocative terms that 
highlight the significance of this moment for the plot of the Iliad. Zeus's will is 
figured at this point in an embodied form that picks up and amplifies the 
physicality of Thetis's supplication, and it does so in terms that renders Zeus's 
embodiment here a consummate expression of divine power.291 Not for 
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Compare Pucci (1987), 244, on the figure of Athene at Od. 13.288-289: this image 
'maintains or supports the illusion or the domesticated belief in a specific, visible, 
describable image of the goddess'; thus 'the imaginary is made visible, and the temples 
and theater will be quick to use the device of an eidolon of the god appearing in the 
sacred precinct or theater' . 
For stereotypy as a feature of ritualised activity, see Rappaport (1979); Tambiah 
(1981), 119; Rappaport (1999), 24-25, 28-31, 33, 36. 
I/ . 1.528-530. 
For the physicality of Thetis's supplication, see I/ . 1.500-501: Kal. M~E yovvwv I CJKaLfjL, 
8E~LTEpfjL 8' ap' lm' av8EpE<DVOS' l:A.ovaa; 512-513: WS' f\tj;aTO yovvwv, I WS' i:'xn' 
Efl.TTEcpvv"La; on the language here, see Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/. 1.512-513. In response to 
Thetis, Zeus sits long in silence, 1.511-512, T~v 8' ou n npoaEcpT] vEcpEAT]yEpha ZEvs-, I 
aAA.' aK£wv 8~v ~aTo, which is the cue for a reiteration of Thetis's touch and her second 
plea 1.512-516. For this silence as Zeus reviewing the rest of the plot of the Iliad, see 
Bernadete (1968), 25; as a sign of resistance, see Lynn-George (1988), 40. On supplication 
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nothing do the terms cif!~p6awL and a8avaToLo frame the central image of Zeus's 
flowing locks, and these super-human aspects of the god themselves flow 
through into the shaking of Olympos.292 Important here is how Thetis's 
supplication of Zeus reconfigures the physical contact between Thetis and 
Akhilleus on a new level.293 Viewed as a part of this sequence, Zeus's act of will 
comes as a climactic moment of emotive physicality that in its embodied power 
decisively transcends mortal corporeal limits. Supposedly these lines will later 
be taken by Pheidias as the model for his statue of Zeus at Olympia.294 
Whatever the status of this anecdote, it suggests how iconographic traditions 
play with the potential of language and sculpture to offer significant tokens of 
the substantial physical presence of a god.295 This is the embodiment of the 
gods in a starker form than poetry, perhaps, but the physical forms that result 
still offer themselves ambiguously as 'created' objects of human skill, as 
figurations of the gods, and as embodiments of the gods that are in themselves 
significant presences.296 This process is well illustrated by this 'Pheidian' move 
to encompass the embodied and subjective act of will of the Homeric Zeus of 
Iliad 1 within the dual frames of temple and statue. 
292 
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in the Iliad, see esp . Lynn-George (1988), 200-209; note 200: 'At every significant stage 
across the epic narrative ... the voice of the suppliant returns'; at 201, 287 n. 27, Lynn-
George argues against the over-emphasis on supplication 'as a ritual rigorously 
determined by physical contact', as it is taken in Gould (1973) : speech is fundamental to 
Iliadic supplication. 
Compare Hera'·s shaking of Olympos at Il. 8.199. 
Thetis embraces Akhilleus, mother and son, at I/. 1.361: xnpt TE iJ-LV KUTEpE~Ev (for 
this phrase, see esp. Martin (1989), 18-20, and above, pp. 79-80); then Akhilleus 
demands this contact be passed on in formal supplication at 1. 394 and 407: E-A8ova' 
Ouf..uiJ-n6v8E ~ta t..tam ... napE(Eo KGL t..a~E- yovvwv . Thetis's role as conveyor of 
Akhilleus's demands is then reiterated at 1.495-496: 8E:ns- 8' ou t..T]8n' E:cpETIJ-EWV 
nm8os- i:ov; shortly afterwards, Thetis supplicates Zeus, 1.500-502: Kat pa ncipOL8' 
avTo'lo Ka8E:(no, KG\. Aci~E yovvwv ... t..waoiJ-EVTJ . 
The anecdote is told by Strabo 8.3.30: anoiJ-VTJiJ-OVEvouaL 8E- Tov ct>n8Cou, 8ton npos- Tov 
Ticivawov El nE ... on npos- T~v 'OiJ-T]pou [se. ELKOVTJV] 8L' E:nwv EKTE8E'Laav; Strabo 
shortly afterwards adds a 'nice' saying about Homer and the likenesses of the gods: 
KOIJ-~WS' 8, E'lpT]TUL KUL TO 6 TU') TWV 8EWV ELKOVUS' f\ iJ-OVOS' l8wv f\ iJ-OVO') 8d~as-. For 
ancient reactions to the statue of Zeus at Olympia, see Overbeck ([1868]1959), nos. 692-
754. 
It is precisely this potential that Kallimakhos exploits for comic effect in Iambus 6 on 
the Pheidian statue of Zeus at Olympia. See Kerkhecker (1999), 150: 'The playful 
identification of the god and statue lies at the heart of Iambus VI. The statue is "the 
god himself' (37£.)'. On the broader question, see Gordon (1979); Gladigow (1986); 
Schnapp (1988); Gladigow (1990); Vernant (1991d); now D. T. Steiner (2001), esp. 79-134. 
For such significant presence, compare the substantial effect created by the size of the 
statue that is noted by Strabo 8.3.30: cl1TTOIJ-EVOV 8E- axE86v TL TfjL KopucpfjL TfjS' opocpfjs-, 
waT' EiJ-cpaaw noLE'lv, E:av 6p8os- yEVTJTUL 8wvaaaTaS', anoaTEycianv Tov vnbv; see 
Pausanias 5.11 .9 for the god bearing witness to the TEXVTJ of Pheidias. For the 
"'enlivening dynamization'" of literary descriptions of this statue, see Kerkhecker 
(1999), 164-165, citing I/ . 1.528-530 as 'the best "description" in this sense, creating a 
living image of the living god'. See also D. T. Stein.er (2001), 99-100. 
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Yet it must be pointed out that already the Iliad plays with such 
possibilities, and foreshadows this stylisation of the presence of the god that 
Pheidias will offer in his sculptural (re)enactment of Zeus's nod. But, 
significantly, it does so in a way that reinforces above all the contigency of 
divine presence and its perception. In a noted scene in Iliad 6, the Homeric text 
presents us with the ambiguous status of a statue as both an objective and 
subjective embodiment of presence. Moreover, this ambiguity plays out in a 
situation where questions of presence and epiphany are being reformulated in 
the context of ritualised action, namely the plea for divine assistance-for 
Athene, E-puCJL TITOAL, to defend Troy- when Hekabe leads a procession of Trojan 
women to the acropolis temple of Athene to pray for protection for Troy from 
the spear of Diomedes.297 The critical moment comes when Theano, the 
priestess of Athene, makes the offering and prays before the goddess:298 
fi 8' apa TTETTAOV E:A.ovaa 8Eavw KUAALTTclpT]OS' 
8fjKEV 'A8TJVULTJS' ETTL youvaaLv r'jDKOf.!OLo, 
EVXOilEVT] 8. rlPUTO i1LOS' KOUpT]L f.!EyclAOLO' 
305 " n6TvL • 'A8rwat11 E-puat TTTOAL, 0La 8Eawv, 
a~ov 8~ EYXOS' i1LOilrl8EOS', r'j8i: Kal UVTOV 
npTJvEa 8os- TTEa€nv LKmwv npomipoL8E nuMwv. 
ocjlpa TOL UVTLKa vvv 8UOKaL8EKa ~OVS' EVL VT]WL 
TjvLS' r'jKEaTas- \.EpEuaOf.!EV, a'( K' E- AErlUTJLS' 
310 aaTU TE KUL Tpwwv aMxous- Kal vr'jma TEKVa. 
w~ EcpaT' EVXOf.!EVT]' clVEVEUE 81: TiaA.Ms- 'A8r'jVTj. 
The offering is laid on the lap of Athene, the prayer is made, and the goddess 
indicates refusal.299 Is this an epiphanic presence? On a linguistic level there is no 
distinction between the goddess and the cult image: 'A8rwal.T)s- E-nl. youvacnv 
T)DKOIJ.OLo .. . n6TvL' 'A8T)val.T) ... a.vE-vEuE 8E TiaA.Ms- 'A8T)vT).300 Likewise the verb in 
297 
298 
299 
300 
I/. 6.286-312. For the important observation that Theano does not narrate the relation 
between Athene and Troy except in the future, see Lang (1975), 310. For others critical of 
the 'bribe', see e.g. Morrison (1991); Lateiner (1997), 262. For more on Homeric prayer, 
see below, p. 107 nn. 405, 407. On the divine patronage and protection of Troy, see Scully 
(1990). 
I/. 6.302-311 . For the suggestion that r'jpuTo denotes 'un sens d'appel a une presence 
"actuelle'", see Aubriot (1992), 305-307, 319; but also Pulleyn (1997), 75-76. 
For nodding-up refusal, see Lateiner (1995), 78, and I/ . 16.250, 252, 22.205; Od. 9.468, 
21.129. Note Scully (1990), 39-40: 'In contrast to the extended descriptions of 
supplication and sacrifice as the Trojans try in vain to invoke their goddess ... her 
denial comprises one half of one hexameter and is unflinching' . 
The reaction by the goddess/ statue of Athene in Troy is specifically reworked by later 
poets in the context of the rape of Kassandra by Aias son of Oileus. See Kallimakhos, fr. 
35, Pfeiffer (ed.) (1949-1953) [= sch. AD on Il. 13.66; not in Erbse]: T~v 8Eov Tovs-
6cjJ8aA.f.!OVS' TOV ~oavov ElS' Tfjv opocp~v TpEtj;m. Compare ps.-Lycophron, Alexandrn 
361-364, where the language does not distinguish between the goddess and the 
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line 311 suggests a physical gesture on the part of the goddess/ statue.30l This 
prompted objections from ancient commentators: yEA.ota 8E m't. "h avavEuoucm 
'A8rwa.3o2 However we read this gesture, what is certainly the case is that the 
audience are able to perceive here what the ritual participants themselves 
seemingly do not, namely the convergence in this act of refusal of the decision-
making presence of the goddess and her physical representation.303 Athene's 
act of will is encompassed in the embodied form of her statue, and at this 
moment the goddess becomes apparent. The passage presents a convergence 
between the physicality of the goddess as represented in the temple and the 
physicality of her refusal to hear this prayer, but this is a convergence that the 
actual participants in the ritualised offering fail to perceive. The significance of 
this failure must not be underestimated. Morrison, for example, discusses 
Homeric prayer scenes as a form of narrative foreshadowing, and is concerned 
that from this scene 'the audience learns nothing'.304 But the scene itself must 
recall for audiences of the epic the absent figure of the Palladion.3os While the 
Iliad tends to exclude cyclic epic motifs of a magical or uncanny nature, here it 
reintroduces the motif of the Palladion in another, subtler guise; thus, in place of 
a magical talisman, the basic importance of Athene and Athene's statue for the 
protection of Troy is here realised in the convergence of refusal and presence 
that this scene presents and which the Trojans fail to perceive.306 The absence of 
301 
302 
303 
304 
305 
306 
Palladion; and Quintus of Smyrna 13.425-427, where the goddess and the image are not 
distinguished until the end of 13.427, when 8E'iov a:yUAfl.U raises the question. 
Against Morrison (1991), 310 n. 28. 
Sch. A on I! . 6.311, going back to Aristarkhos, who athetised the line; see Kirk (ed.) (1990), on I/. 6.311-12; also Morrison (1991), 310 n. 28. 
Athene's status as an 'activated agent' is clearly visible in Attic black-figure vase 
paintings of this story; in red-figure painting the status as 'statue' receives more stress: 
see Connelly (1993), esp. 90, 101; D. T. Steiner (2001), 158-160. 
Morrison (1991), 145. 
For the Palladion, see Dion. Hal. 1.68-69= Allen (ed.) (1912), Iliou Persis fr . 1. For the 
importance of reading Homer in terms of multiple story-traditions, see the 
programmatic statements of Nagy ([1979]1999), esp. 4-9, 40-58; Nagy (199Gb), 53. Nagy 
eschews 'intertextuality' as such; contrast Pucci (1987); but see also Edmunds (1995), 4-7; 
Dowden (1996); Martin (2000), esp. 61-65 . 
For this exclusion, compare the reference to the TEKflWP of Troy by Akhilleus at I/ . 9.418-
420=684-687 E-rrd ovKETL 8f]nE TEKflWP I 'I f-lou al TTELVilS'. Compare 7.30-31 (Apollo) ElS' 
o KE TEKflWP I 'I Alou Eupwo'LV, with Kirk (ed.) (1990), on 7.30-32; and 9.48-49 (Diomedes) 
ElS' o KE TEKflWP I 'I f-lou Eupwwv. Eustathius 760, 32 van der Valk, on I/ . 9.418f., glosses 
thus: TEKflWP Elrrwv To E-v 'Axmo'LS' CYKOTTLflthaTov TEAOS', T~v af-waw; commentators 
concur; cf. Chantraine (1968-1977), s.v. TEKflap. On the topic, see Griffin (1977), 40, 46; 
Scully (1990), 36: 'Troy's mysterious tekm8r, "mark," which Achilles equates with the 
city's security (I/. 9.418-20), gives way more commonly than not to anthropomorphized 
explanations of city defense. Hektor, rather than the Palladion, keeps Troy safe.' But 
note Scully's subsequent comment, 37: 'In Homer, latent references to magical tales are 
often detected ... If these, usually older, magical or cultic elements commonly give way 
in Homer to more naturalistic and heroic explanations of city defense, we should not 
125 
the Palladion from this Iliadic story of Troy becomes pointedly apparent at this 
moment, and in lieu of its talismanic force the fall of Troy is here obliquely 
foreshadowed in Athene's refusal to accede to Theano's prayer for the death of 
Diomedes.307 Even if the text of this scene does not offer the audience any 
certainty about what this convergence might have looked like exactly, it offers 
instead, in the contrast between the audience's perception of the physical 
reaction of the goddess and the failure of the ritual participants to observe this 
presence, the suggestion that some kinds of presence or 'epiphany' can go 
unrecognised as such. The significance of this failure of perception is again, like 
Hektor's failure to perceive the long arm of Zeus later in the Iliad, one with 
profoundly negative implications for the Trojans themselves. The physicality of 
divine presence is again formulated as a problem that operates across 
divergences of knowledge, perception and sight. Like the long arm of Zeus, the 
wounds of Aphrodite and Ares, and the leaky guises of Aphrodite and 
Poseidon, it is within a specific frame that the goddess emerges in the embodied 
form of her statue, namely her decisive rejection of the ritualised supplication 
that the Trojan women carry out and the radical transformation in this scene of 
the role as protective talisman that the Palladion elsewhere fulfils for Troy. The 
ritualised forms that the Trojans mobilise call forth an epiphanic response, like 
Diomedes' prayer to Athene in Iliad 5; but this time, as in the case of Zeus's long 
arm, the presence of the god remains elusive to very people for whom its 
realisation might--have mattered most. 
307 
• • 
overstress Homeric tendencies to purge all superstitious or magical elements'. More 
broadly, see Faraone (1992). 
Together with Odysseus, Diomedes is a key figure in relation to the Palladion, and 
their partnership is replayed in a very different form in the night-time raid in Iliad 10; 
see Nagy ([1979]1999), 34-35 with §9n4, and note the comment of Hainsworth (ed.) 
(1993), on 11. 10.243: 'Diomedes' choice of Odysseus is eminently sensible but also 
thematic'. 
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Framing epiphany 
In shifting the focus of attention towards the role played by ritual in the 
contexts of epiphany, I want first to extend the perspectives on presence and its 
perception that are afforded by the examples of Zeus's long arm and the refusal 
of Athene by returning to the spectacular descent of Athene in Iliad 4 once 
more .3os In the previous section I have considered the fundamental importance 
of multiple perspectives. In such contexts questions of who constructs or 
controls the epiphany must be seen as live issues. Viewing 'divine epiphany' as 
a process that is variously instantiated in the interplay of presence and 
perception at particular moments points to the importance of the constituting 
frames of 'epiphanic' events. Athene's spectacular descent provides further 
perspectives on this problem that will orient my discussion towards the 
question of the relation of ritual and epiphany, and will show how epiphany 
and ritual become increasingly imbricated. This is not to lose sight of the 
disruption that interface between mortals and gods brings in its wake, but to 
show how such disruption need not be simply paralysing, but can even be 
productive within its specific contexts. I argued earlier that Athene's spectacular 
descent invites a response from all present, based on differently privileged 
degrees of perception, in such a way as to destabilise the notion of a 'true 
epiphany'. But I did not go very far in exploring this particular example, despite 
gesturing towards the shifting modalities of divine presence that lie behind the 
inequalities of perception in this case. My point there was to suggest that 
questions of perception and recognition were better thought of as problems 
inherently bound up in the contexts of divine epiphany rather than as possible 
criteria by which to limit the field of epiphany down to a subset of 
comparatively unproblematic instances. What I want to do now, by contrast, is 
examine in greater detail how the play of epiphany and presence, of appearance 
and embodiment, finds articulation in various strategies of relational response. 
In the first place, how is Athene's presence manifested in this instance? 
This divine appearance is doubly marked out as being omen-like, both by the 
narrator and by the response of the Greeks and Trojans.309 I observed earlier 
how there is a slide of perception across the boundary of the simile itself: the 
308 
309 
See above, pp. 56-60. 
She is both a TEpas- Aal-lnp6v for the audience, Jl . 4.76-77, and an ambivalent sign of 
either war or peace for the Greeks and Trojans, 82-84. 
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meteor is aTE-pas- in the simile, and it is as such that the Trojans and Greeks read 
it ambivalently in the following lines.310 But this presentation of divine presence 
simply as a sign is complicated by the narrator's perspective on the event, in 
which the presence of the goddess is cast in the form of a simile; and then 
Athene herself makes an appearance amid the Trojan army in the form of 
Laodokos:311 
75 olov 8' Q(JTEpa ~KE Kp6vou mils- ayKUAOJl.TJTEW 
Ti vaVTTJWL TEpas- T]E- aTpaTwL EvpE"L A.awv, 
AUJ1.1Tp6v, TOU 8E TE lTOAAOL am) amv8fjpES" 'LEVTUL, 
TWL ElKUL' ~(~EV flTL x86va TiaAA.as- 'A8l'JVTJ, 
Ka8 8' E8op' E-s- Jl.Eaaov· 86.J1.~os- 8' EXEV Elaop6wvTas-
~ 8' av8p\. lKEAT] Tpwwv KUTE8UGE8' OJl.LAOV, 
Aao86KwL 'AvTTJVOpL8TJL KpaTEpwL alxJl.TJTfjL, 
TI6.v8apov avTL8Eov 8L(TJJ1.EVTJ, E'L rrou E-cpEvpOL. 
How far does the visual image extend here, in the transition across the formal 
frame of the simile into the presence of an Athene in the guise of the Trojan 
Laodokos?312 Kirk, for instance, is particularly concerned here to observe that 
this sequence does not suggest 'that she still had the appearance of the "star"' at 
the point when the goddess leapt into the midst of the Greeks and Trojans, and 
that consequently their amazement does not stem from this; he wishes to avoid 
'the improbability of a meteor still trailing a tail as it strikes the earth'.313 But the 
text does not in fact offer any specific perspective on the modulations of 
Athene's appearance other than the fact that suddenly Athene is in the guise of 
Laodokos. At one point Athene is 'like' a meteor; at the next _ she is 'like' 
Laodokos.314 
In the interpretative response offered by the Greeks and Trojans the 
narrative already offers one strategy to overcome this problem of 
denomination, namely to treat Athene's meteoric descent as an omen, as 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
See de Jong (1987), 134-135, who characterises I/ . 4.75-80 as 'focalized doubly', which is 
to say: 'what for the NF1 and his addresse has the status of a simile only, is reality for 
the soldiers as F2. ' 
I/. 4.75-79, 86-88. 
Athene as Laodokos, I/ . 4.86-88 . Compare Leaf (ed.) (1900-1902), vol. 1, on Il. 4.75: 'It is 
not easy to make out exactly what the people saw and marvelled at'. On this passage, 
see also Kullmann (1956), 90-91;, Stockinger (1959), 20-21; Erbse (1980), 262-263; 
Dietrich (1983), 56; Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I!. 4.78-84; de Jong (1987), 134; W. Smith (1988), 
162-163. 
Kirk (ed.) (1985), on I/. 4.78--84. 
See below, p . 129 n . 321, on the terms that express these various 'likenesses'. 
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suggested by the terms of the simile.315 Treated as such, the meteor is in fact a 
sign of something other than itself, at which the Greeks and Trojans can only 
grasp in equivocal terms: n6A.Ef-LOS' KaK6s- or <j>LAOTf1S'? In this response there is an 
implicit shift away from the problem of ontological denomination towards an 
interpretative process: the ontology of the TEpas- itself ceases to be a question to 
the extent that it has been accepted as the basic ground of the interpretative 
strategy. The surface features of the wonder are brought under control insofar 
as they become available for interpretation. But the soldiers' interpretative 
response is unsatisfactory from a denominational point of view, and the 
audience are in a position to know this. The ambivalence of the Greek and 
Trojan response underlines the difficulties of interpretation and control. By 
contrast, the audience know something of what the image constitutes-that is, 
the presence of the goddess, and the resumption of battle that Athene is to set 
in motion-and the interpretative response framed by the narrative offers a 
specific focalisation of events that the audience know to be defective. 
Yet for the audience, if the interpretative response is insufficient, the 
ontological problem remains: how far does the image extend across the frame 
of the simile? A resolution in the terms framed by Kirk remains elusive, not 
least because the denominative value of Athene's similitudinous appearance 
remains indeterminate. Insofar as the image is explicitly framed as a simile, it 
does not offer a s_!mple denomination of how Athene's presence appears.316 But 
equally, it is not an option simply to treat the operation of the simile as entirely 
figurative, since this would suggest that there is a 'predicative impertinence' in 
likening a goddess to a meteor, but who is to say that the goddess is not 
actually and substantially meteoric at this point?317 'Likeness' in such contexts 
can encompass both 'appearing like' and 'appearing as'.318 Just as was the case 
315 
316 
317 
318 
For the intimate connection between similes and omens, see Lonsdale (1990), 113-115; 
Muellner (1990), esp. 75 n. 27, 98-99; and esp. Ahnhalt (1995), on I/. 24.314-321 where, 
294, 'in employing a simile to describe a bird of omen, the passage explicitly places the 
audience of the poem in the role of ~civns- who must attempt to divine the purposes of 
the comparison in order to interpret the omen'. 
See W. Smith (1988), 162-163: 'Such a scene ... passes back and forth between simile and 
transformation'. Most scholars are determined to minimise such problems: see Erbse 
(1980), 263, 'Zwar ist sie nicht Stern, aber sie erscheint als solcher'; de Jong (1987), 134, 
comparing I/. 17.547-552. But note Stockinger (1959), 20: 'Das Erscheinen einer Gottheit 
ist ein Vorgang, den adaquat zu schildern, die menschliche Sprache nicht ausreicht. So 
greift der Dichter zum Gleichnis.' 
On the operation of metaphor in terms of 'predicative impertinence', see Ricoeur ([1979] 
1991), 123-124. 
See esp. Bushnell (1982); Pucci (1987), 110-122; W. Smith (1988); C. G. Thomas (1996). 
For the opposite view, see e.g. Dirlmeier (1967), 14: 'Es ist also uberall zu verstehen: er 
gleicht einem X, is t aber nicht X.' 
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with the long arm of Zeus, the image operates across the boundary of the 
figurative and the actual in its display of divine potential. The contrast with the 
Hom.eric Hymn to Apollo helps underline this point.319 There the arrival of Apollo 
at his temple in Delphi is described similarly meteoric terms:320 
440 E:'v8' EK VT]OS" opoUGEV ava~ EKclEpyos 'An6/J..wv 
aaTEpL El86!-1EVOS 1-1-EGWL fl!-laTL · Tou 8' a no noA.A.a\. 
amv8apl8ES" TTWTWVTO, a£\as- 8' fls ovpavov tKEV' 
E-s 8' a8vTov KaT£8uaE 8u1 TpLn68wv EpLTLI-1-WV. 
i!v8' dp' 0 YE cj>A.6ya 8a'LE mcj>avaKOI-1-EVOS" TU ii KfjA.a, 
445 naaav 8€ KpLGT]V KclTfXEV a£\as-· at 8' 6\6\u~av 
Kpwalwv dA.oxoL KaA.A.l(wvol TE SvyaTpEs 
<l>ol~ou uno pLTTfjs · 1-1-Eya yap 8£os El-1-~aA.' E-KciaTwL. 
The effects of this meteoric epiphany are far from equivocal. The similitude of 
Apollo to a meteor is expressed in brief: aoTEpL EL86wvos- ~ECJWL f1~an.321 But 
the characteristics of this meteoric status extend beyond the immediate context 
of the simile-expression itself, and where the phrase TOU 8E .. cm6 in Athene's 
case refers ostensibly to the star within the formal bounds of the simile, here it 
refers to Apollo himself-it is from the god that sparks fly. 322 This insistence 
upon the concrete embodiment of the god as meteor finds a logical extension in 
the ritual sphere: it is Apollo's fiery presence that lights the sacred hearth at 
Delphi, and thus his meteoric form is transformed into an ongoing presence 
within his temple.323 Thus this sequence realises Apollo's divine potential in the 
319 
320 
321 
322 
323 
---
Allen and Sikes (edd.) (1904), on HomHynmAp. 441, 442 see the relationship as one of 
imitation (cf. Dietrich (1983), 71: 'poor imitation'), but it is better framed in terms of 
interaction between traditions. On the Panhellenic ambitions of the HomHynmAp, see 
Nagy ([1979]1999), 7-8; Clay (1989), 92-94; and Nagy (199Gb), 375-376. Compare Burkert 
(1979), who argues for a specific connection with the Panhellenic pretensions of 
Polycrates. Note also the simile for Apollo's movement at HomHymnAp 448, 'like 
thought', cf. 186; compare esp. Il. 15.80-83, with Janko (ed.) (1992), on 15.80-83. 
HomHymnAp . 440-447. For the sequence within which this occurs, see Forstel (1979), 
268-271; Miller (1986), 92-94; Clay (1989), 82; Detienne (1996-1997), 17-18. 
The participle El86wvos I -11 is one in a cluster of simile-expressions: ws, TjuTE, olov, 
ELKu'La, EOLKWS I -6TES, E'LKEA.os I -T], Elacii-1-Evos-; see W. Smith (1988), 161-162, for the 
fluidity of their use; note also Vernant (1991b ), 187 n. 7, on the language of similitude. 
Compare 11. 4.77, Tou 8£ TE no\A.o\. ana amv8fjpEs 'l.EvTm, with HomHynmAp. 441-
442, TOU 8' ano no\A.a\. I amv8apl8Es TTWTWVTO. Allen and Sikes (edd.) (1904), on 
HomHynmAp. 441, 442 also note the difference of tense in this respect. See Miller 
(1986), 93-94: the 'latent energies' of Apollo in his dolphin guise 'are released with a 
sudden violence that is all the more dazzling for the contrast with what preceeds'; 'The 
first two metamorphoses seem to mark the lower and upper limits, so to speak, of 
Apollo's divinity'. 
See Forstel (1979), 270: 'das kult-begri.indende ewige Feuer'. Also Clay (1989), 82; 
Detienne (1996-1997), 17-18 and 26 n. 118, contrasting Hermes' earlier role in introducing 
fire in a technological form on Delos at HomHynmAp. 108-142. Compare Apollo's ritual 
instruction to the Cretans at HomHynmAp 486-501, and the subsequent procession to the 
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progress from simile to embodiment to an ongoing presence in the context of 
ritualised activity.324 The 'ironic disparity' that ensues in the exchange between 
Apollo in his guise as a young man and the Cretan sailors is soon resolved by 
Apollo's markedly formal announcement of his identity.325 In this respect the 
multiplication of metamorphic images plays a basic role in the performance of 
Apollo's identity.326 Apollo not only appears 'like' a meteor in the middle of the 
day, but he also appears 'as' a meteor, and this divine potential for seeming and 
being is integral to the god's display. 
By contrast, Athene's meteoric presence disappears from v1ew as 
suddenly as it appeared.327 In its place Athene takes on a concealed form whose 
strategies of misdirection achieve a concrete outcome with Pandaros's action in 
breaking the truce .328 Athene's mission from Zeus is thus fulfilled, and since it is 
precisely this misdirection that is Athene's goal the denominative problem 
presented by her meteoric descent is in keeping with her purpose. There is no 
call for the transformation of this presence in ongoing terms like those of the 
Homeric Hymn to Apollo-or rather, there is a positive need for her presence to 
remain a trace-and with the completion of her purpose Athene immediately 
drops from sight. Here the fluidity of the goddess in transformative terms 
leaves underdetermined the verbal distinction between 'appearing like' and 
'appearing as' that would underpin the normal figurative operation of the 
simile. Thus the im~ge of the goddess collapses the distinction between simile 
and actuality in the same way as the image of the long arm of Zeus collapses 
the distinction between the god's power acting from afar and the presence of 
the god. If the audience have privileged knowledge about the presence of 
Athene, in light of which the Greek and Trojan response is seen to be 
insufficient, it is still the case that their own perception of Athene is bedevilled 
by the indeterminacy of appearing like a meteor. Here the question of who 
'controls' the epiphany functions as an interrogative counterpart to the 
324 
325 
326 
327 
328 
temple, 514-523. For the sense in which the Homeric Hymns offer the god's perspective 
on epiphany, see Sowa (1984), 241. 
Compare Garcia (2002). 
HomHymnAp. 451-485, esp. 480: cliJ.l. 8' E-yw ilu)s- ul6s-, 'Arr6\Awv 8' EVXOiJ.UL Elvm. 
For the point that such self-naming is unusual in epic speech, see Muellner (1976), 74-75 
n . 9; for EVXOiJ.UL as 'say (proudly, accurately, contentiously)', and not 'boas t, claim', 76-
78. For the 'ironic disparity', see Clay (1989), 82. 
For the 'omnipresence' of Apollo in the HomHymnAp ., see Thalmann (1984), 15, 64-73. 
Compare Zeus's instruction, I/ . 4.70: altj;a iJ.UA' E-s- o-TpaTov E-A.8E. 
I/. 4.92-126; note 104: TWL 8E: <jlpEvas- a<jlpovL TTEL8EV. Athene's misdirection goes so far 
as to include the instruction to invoke Apollo, 101-103, carried out at 119-121; for such a 
s trategy, compare Od . 3.41-62: Athene in disguise instigates a prayer to Poseidon which 
she fulfills herself. 
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narrative slide across the frame of the simile. The characters of the ep1c see a 
meteor; the audience of the epic perceive the goddess descending 'like' a 
meteor; and in a meaningful sense both perspectives are correct and inherent 
features of the performance of Athene's descent. 
The responses of audience and participants all contribute to the play of 
Athene's presence here. In terms of evocation of interpretative response, signs 
or omens are to the characters within the poems as similes are to the epic's 
audience; but an instance such as this is confusing to the extent that it functions 
simultaneously as sign, simile and image and thus implicates both audience and 
characters in a response that is similarly interpretative.329 The potential 
overflow of the image across the boundaries of the simile confronts the 
audience with a break in signification that correlates with the teratological 
challenge posed by Athene's appearance for the Greeks and Trojans.330 This 
reinforces the point I raised earlier, namely the extent to which an 'epiphany' is 
something to be realised in the play between divine presence-across the 
breadth of potential this represents-and the perceptual capacities of mortals. 
But more than this, it raises as a live issue the sort of response it is possible to 
make in the face of such epiphanic play. The strategies of omen-response are 
one means- relatively unsuccessful in this case-of recreating the signifying 
potential of such images within a more manageable structure.331 In this respect, 
it is significant tha~ omen-responses are found in the Homeric poems that are 
expressed in the formal terms of a simile: the analogical form in such cases 
offers an interpretative strategy and thus a means of controP32 This 
329 
330 
331 
332 
On the relationship between signs and similes in Homer, see esp. Muellner (1990); 
Ahnhalt (1995). Note de Jong (1987), 123ff.: the majority of comparisons and similes in 
the Homeric poems are oriented towards the audience. See also Moulton (1977), 15; 
Wofford (1992), 33-39; Watrous (1999), 174-175. 
Challenge: see Nagy (1990a), 206-207, 211, on the need 'to decode the various signs 
encoded by Zeus, which is a hard thing to do', citing Hesiod Works and Days 483-484: 
aA.A.on: 8' clAAOLOS' ZllVOS' v6os- at YLOXOLO, I apyaAEOS' 8' av8pwcn KUTa8VllTOLOL 
vofjam. 
For recurrent features in such 'Deutungsreden', see Stockinger (1959), 147-152. 
See e.g. If . 2.326-329 with Muellner (1990), 75 n. 27, and Od. 15.174-178 with Bushnell 
(1982), 3-5. See further Stockinger (1959), 147-148; N. Austin (1975), 115-118; Lonsdale 
(1990), 112-115. For the effectiveness of the language of analogy, compare the w8E ... ws-
formula (cf. w8E .. . ws- at 1/. 12.217-227 in Poulydamas's omen-interpretation) used in 
the self-curse that forms the coda to the treaty between the Greek and the Trojans at I/. 
3.300; this is similia similibus, on which see Faraone (1991), 8; Faraone (1992), 118-119. 
For this type of persuasive analogy more generally, see Tambiah (1973) and Lloyd 
(1979). On the interpretative aspects of analogy, see Bell (1992), 111-112: 'For Tam.biah, 
... the situations modelled in ritual act either like "signals," which evoke certain 
responses, or like "signs," which can explain other activities in the same way that a 
blueprint can explain a house or the building of a house.' 
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interpretative process can amount to a literal reworking, or what might be 
termed an 'adaptive narrative', carried out by a character within the epic on the 
narrative of the omen that the epic's narrator has just told.333 But here, the 
image of Athene's meteoric descent seems to have the potential to trangress its 
frame, and accordingly its significance remains an interpretative challenge.334 
Scholarly responses to such images not infrequently deploy strategies 
that are similar to those applied to the reading of omens within the text, in that 
the series of images that the text offers is reworked interpretatively for what it 
points to, for what the image tells.335 I discussed some scholarly responses to 
the image of Athene's descent earlier in this chapter, in particular the 
meteorological formulations offered by Kullmann and Dietrich.336 The stories 
that they tell in response to Athene's descent are predicated upon naturalistic 
frameworks, and they gesture at a conflation of divine activity and 'natural' 
phenomena that goes back to a view of ancient religion as a kind of pre-
scientific mentality. Interestingly, their versions are different: Kullmann 
valorises Homer by comparison with the more primitive 'beliefs' that lie behind 
the image precisely because Homer expresses the image as a comparison; 
Dietrich by contrast elides the simile form in writing confidently of an epiphany 
in the form of a natural phenomenon, whose very naturalness valorises the 
Homeric description of Athene's descent within the terms of Dietrich's search 
for plausibility.337 '[he reading strategies deployed by Kullmann and Dietrich 
offer transformations of the image itself, and they rewrite its form and thus its 
significance in accordance with priorities oriented towards the contexts of their 
own writing. This is not wrong in itself: interpretative strategies are a basic part 
of our ability to make sense, and the adaptive narratives that emerge in such 
contexts constitute a fundamental, if perilous, form of the ethnography that this 
333 
334 
335 
336 
337 
For 'adaptive narra tive', see Abbott (2002), 100-122. This term is less exact than those 
used by Genette ([1982]1997), esp. 1-10; it could be regarded as a combination of Genette's 
'metatextuality' (glossable as commentary) and 'hypertextuality' (glossable as 
transformation) ex tended beyond the sphere of ' literariness'. Compare also Todorov 
([1971]1977), 238-241, on reading, interpretation and description. For an exantple, see 
esp. Bushnell (1982), 4-5, on Poulydamas's reworking of the narrator's narrative in his 
interpretation at I/ . 12.210-229: there is repetition of 200-203 in 218-221, omission of 203-
207, and the addition of a new ending in 221-222. On prophecy and n arra tive, see esp . 
Peradotto (1990), 59-98; Dickson (1995), 53-56, 60-64. 
Ahnhalt (1995), 294, characterises I!. 24.314-321 in similar terms: 'in employing a 
simile to describe a bird of omen, the passage explicitly places the audience of the poem 
in the role of j.lci.vns- who must attempt to divine the purposes of the comparison in order 
to interpret the omen'. 
For 'misreading' in such contexts, see Bushnell (1982). 
See above, pp. 58-59. 
Kullmann (1956), 90-91; Dietrich (1983), 56. 
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sort of academic work must involve.338 But what are the most appropriate 
frames? What are the appropriate limits on what we may make connect? 
Contestation over legitimacy and authority is the inevitable concomitant of 
such choices. 
The underlying currency of such interpretative strategies- what is 
manipulated and put at risk in the hope of return-is the ordering of people's 
values and commitments.339 Hektor's irate assertion in reaction to the omen-
interpretation given by Poulydamas in Iliad 12 is exemplary for the significance 
that contestation over 'appropriateness' may take on in such a context: ElS' 
oLwvos- apLCJTOS', cqJ.VVE08aL TIEpL TI<lTPTlS'. 340 But such contestation is no less a 
feature of the reception of the Homeric epics, and the treatment of religion is a 
particular problem area in this respect where our reading practices are 
eloquent, if often unwitting, testaments to what is 'appropriate'.341 Compare, 
for example, a well-known moment in Odyssey 21:342 
338 
339 
340 
341 
342 
410 8E~L TEpfjL 8' apa XELPL AU~WV TIELp~GUTO VEUpfjs-· 
For a critique of ethnography, see Sperber (1985a), 9-34; Clifford and Marcus (1986). On 
the future of ethnography, see Marcus and Fisher ([1986]1999) with the introduction to 
the 2nd ed. On the presentation of ritual as a 'text' to be interpreted, see Bell (1992), 15-
16. 
This process involves the 'misrecognition' characteristic of strategies of ritualisation . 
See Bell (1992), 108-110, esp. 109: '[Ritualization] is a way of acting that sees itself as 
responding to a place, event, force, problem, or tradition. It tends to see itself as the 
natural or apprOpriate thing to do in the circumstances . Ritualization does not see how 
it actively creates place, force, event, and tradition, how it redefines or generates the 
circumstances to which it is responding.' For the 'politics of interpretation', see 
Mitchell (ed.) (1983); note esp. the response to H. White (1983) by Eagleton (1983), who 
stresses that politics (morals, values etc.) are not simply chosen by people, but are also 
demanded by how they are acted upon. 
Jl. 12.243. The whole exchange: Il. 12.200-251. Note Hektor's comment at 232: olaea w\. 
aA.A.ov iJ.D8ov cliJ.ELVova ToD8E vofiam. The omen and Poulydamas's interpretation opens 
up the ground of dispute; cf. Murnaghan (1987), 82: '[Hektor's obtuseness] represents an 
unavoidable conflict built into the heroic system'; differently, Bushnell (1982), 6, sees 
Hektor's response as a secularisation, but her opposition of the sacred to the 
cultural/human obscures the shared ground of dispute her over what is appropriate. For 
Poulydamas's role, see Redfield ([1975]1994), 143-147; Schofield (1986), 26-30. On the 
sequence of Hektor/Poulydamas scenes, see Dickson (1995), 12, 134-139. A reversed 
version of this contestation is found in the exchange between Priamos and Hekabe at Il. 
24.191-321, where Hekabe's verbal and physical dissent from Priamos's plans 
constitutes an opvLs- KUK6s-, 219, for Priamos as he prepares to set out; but this omen is 
superceded by the eagle-omen from Zeus for which Priamos prays, 308-321, in order to 
confirm his purpose to the Trojan community. See below, pp. 160-161. 
For a pertinent example from a different time and place, see Loraux (2002), 19, on the 
exclusion of the account of the gods fighting alongside the democrats in Xen. Hell. 2.4.14 
from the scholarly history of 404-403 BCE; this exclusion is counterbalanced by its 
inclusion within an anthropologically framed discussions of the 'politico-religious', but 
this counterbalancing itself confirms the distance between the political and 'the myth 
of the political' . Apropos history and literature, see Goldhill (1999). 
Od. 21.410-415. 
~ 8' imo KGAOV anac' XE AL80VL clKE- AT) a v8r1v. 
f.l.VTJGTijpaLV 8' ap' axos- yE-vno f.l.Eya, TTUGL 8' apa XPWS' 
hpaTTCTO. ZcVS' 8E wya;\.' EKTUTTE Grlf.l.GTa cpalvwv· 
yr18TJGEV T' ap' fTTEL TU TTOAlJTAGS' Oi.os- '08uaacUS'' 
415 (hn pci o\. TE-pas- ~KE Kp6vou TTaLs- ayKUAOf.lrlTEW. 
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In the midst of a series of signs and reactions of signs, at a pivotal moment of 
the epic, the image of the bow-string's swallow-like voice has demanded 
interpretation here.343 In the swallow-simile, scholars have read a signal of the 
hero's return that is framed as such both by reference to a specific pattern of 
bird-imagery associated with Athene in the Odyssey itself, and by appeal to the 
symbolism of the swallow across a range of texts and contexts found within a 
very broadly conceived Greek cultural world, ancient and modern.344 Simile 
assumes the status of omen, and the fineness of the bow-string's swallow-voice 
assumes the mantle of implicit narrative foreshadowing: 'surely KaMv here can 
have the overtones of a favourable omen'.345 Even the bow conspires as a sign of 
Odysseus's return, yet still the Suitors fail to realise.346 But not all agree. 
Fernandez-Galiano expresses suspicion of these excessively signifying lines and 
downplays interpretative readings of the swallow-simile: 'we may say, simply, 
that the simile implies the same animistic tendency to endow inanimate objects 
with life as we saw in the simile in xxi 48' .347 So Zeus's thunder 'is a 
melodramatic interpolation', and of particular concern here is how some lines 
'seem to anticipate future events in an unnecessary way': Fernandez-Galiano 
~ 
cites von der Muhll for the premature nature of the suitor's fear, since they will 
still at the beginning of Odyssey 22 suppose that Antinoos's death might have 
been accidentaP48 Of course, one might reply that this is precisely the point: the 
Suitors are unable to interpret even their own fear correctly, just as they were 
343 
344 
345 
346 
347 
348 
Signs: the right hand with which Odysseus grips the bow, Od. 21.410; the swallow-like 
voice, 411; the emotional leakage (xpws- hpcinno) of the suitor's axos-, 412-413; Zeus's 
thw1derous sign, both ar1f1.aTa, 413, and TE-pas-, 415; Odysseus's rejoicing, a sign of doom for 
the Suitors, 414. 
See N . Austin (1975), 246-247; Moulton (1977), 183-139; Losada (1985); Borthwick ([1988] 
1998). On the 'singing' in Od. 21.411, seeR. B. Rutherford (1985), 142-143. 
Borthwick ([1988] 1998), 16. For the basic importance of bird omens in signifying the 
return of Odysseus, see Od. 15.160-178 (eagle and goose, with Helen's interpretation), 
15.525-534 (hawk and pigeon, interpreted by Theoklymeos to Telemakhos here and to 
Penelope at 17.157-161), and 19.536-558 (Penelope's dream of eagle and pet geese, with 
Odysseus's interpretation). A good discussion of the polysemy of the last instance, even 
against the narrative flow, has been made by Pratt (1994); see also Katz (1991), 146-147; 
Felson (1994), 31-33, 59-60, 157 n. 48 . 
For the Suitors' systemic failure to interpret, see Murnaghan (1987), 56-90; Reece (1993), 
181-187, 200-201. 
Fernandez-Galiano (ed.) (1991), on Od. 21.411 . 
Od. 22.31-32. See Fernandez-Galiano (ed.) (1991), 131-132, and on Od. 21.412-415. 
135 
earlier unable to interpret the 'unquenchable' laughter that Athene inflicted 
upon them.349 And the narrator will later focalise the Suitors' failure to realise 
the significance of events in no uncertain terms: To oE vfjmOL ouK E-v611aav, I ws-
of] CJc/>LV KQL TT<lCJLV 6A.E:8pou lTELpaT' E-cpfl1TT0.350 But more important here is how 
each of these readings enacts a particular set of choices about what material 
beyond the immediate context it is legitimate to connect with the bow-string's 
swallow-song. In this respect, readers of the Odyssey engage in a process of 
interpretation that is the positive counterpart of the Suitors' failure of 
interpretation, a failure which is presented within the narrative frame of the 
epic as being of the greatest importance, as another marker of the Suitors' 
impending death. In realising the import of such signs within the Odyssean 
narrative, audiences of the epic realise the Suitors' abject failure in this respect. 
The audience's own practice points up the apparent inadequacy of these figures, 
with the specific narrative and ideological consequences that this connotes. 
What we find in such contexts are practices of interpretation that are on 
the one hand authorised by status and convention, yet also seek to demonstrate 
their own legitimacy by close reference to the demands of the immediate 
context, at least as these demands are formulated in the process of 
interpretation itself. Such interpretation is framed in such a way that its 
apparent authority is derived from a mutually-confirming interpenetration of 
speech and the W<2_rld. 351 In this respect, both omen-interpretation and the kinds 
of inter- and intra-textual reading found in classical scholarship may each be 
understood as adaptive narratives.352 At such points, narrativisation approaches 
ritualisation: both constitute ways to articulate the world and an orientation 
within it, and thus to structure the structures of our activity in that world. In this 
emphasis on practice and structuration, I follow Bell's arguments on ritual when 
I underline how narrativisation and ritualisation are each not so much things 
that we do in the world, but ways of doing that reshape the world m our 
relation to it.353 Ritualisation connotes practice, and what ensues is the 
349 
350 
351 
352 
353 
The divinely caused laughter: Od. 20.345-358. On the thematics of the scene and the 
role of Theokly;nenos, see Erbse (1972), 51-54; Fenik (1974), 241-242; Levine (1982); 
Colakis (1985-1986); R. B. Rutherford (ed .) (1992), on Od. 20.346-386 and 346; Cook 
(1995), 148; Guidorizzi (1997). 
Od. 22.32-33. On such comments, see esp. Dickson (1995), 179-181; also de Jong (1987), 86-
89; Janko (ed.) (1992), on 16.46-48. 
Compare Dickson (1995), 56-58, on the interpenetration of textual and cultural 
frameworks in the authority of Khalkas's prophecy in Il. 1. 
For broader discussions of such reading strategies in classics, see esp. Edmunds (1995) and 
Sharrock and Morales (edd.) (2000); in reading Homer, see above, p . 124 n. 305. 
See esp. Bell (1992), drawing on Bolll·dieu (1977). 
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'reactualization of the ordinary world amid the virtuality of the rite'.354 In 
preferring to speak of ritualisation rather than ritual what is stressed is the 
undesirability of defining ritual within a categorical typology of formality, 
stereotypy and repetition, however much such features may be frequent 
concomitants of ritualised activity.355 As such the term ritualisation denotes a 
way of acting among other ways of acting, not least of which is narrative. I 
should make this clear: ritualisation and narrative are not reducible one to the 
other, but both are modes of practice whose strategic purposes within the 
world actually obscure their constitutive force in framing that world.356 For the 
Suitors, as for Poulydamas and Hektor, such interpretations and failures to 
interpret always implicate the immediate contours of action: the consequences 
are real. Likewise, for audiences of the Iliad and the Odyssey, what is at stake is 
nothing less than the contours of the narratives in which they are participating. 
In images such as the meteoric descent of Athene, or indeed the long arm of 
Zeus, our interpretative endeavours have consequences for the worlds in which 
we live. 
Some of the issues involved here, particularly in response to the slide of 
manifest divine presence into the operation and interpretation of signs and 
omens, have been raised in various forms before now. Particular cases in point 
are the bird-like divine appearances and bird-omens in the Homeric epics.357 I 
raised this issue br~fly above in relation to the use of the theatrical metaphor of 
disguise when discussing the appearances of the gods.358 The addition of bird-
354 
355 
356 
357 
358 
See Kapferer (1997), 179-181; note the particular dynamic of actuality and virtuality: 
virtuality is a concentration and magnification of actuality, and thus 'is its own reality 
and is lived as such'; this is distinct from the Geertzian conception of models of and for 
reality. 
For stereotypy, see above p. 121 n. 289; but, on adherence to formality and stereotypy as 
definitive characteristics of ritual, note the criticism made by Kapferer ([1983] 1991), 3-
4, 330 nn. 1-2; and Kapferer (1997), 178: such stereotypy is a part of the technology of 
ritualised activity, as opposed being constitutive of ritualised activity itself. 
See Bell (1992), 69-92, and 140. For a recent discussion of potential relations of narrative 
and ritual in the Odyssey, and narrative and legal practice, see Jamison (1999). 
Bird-like appearances: Athene and Apollo, Il . 7.58-61; Hypnos, 14.286-291; Thetis, 
18.614-617; Athene, 19.350-351; Athene, Od. 1.319-324; Athene, 3.371-372; Hermes, 5.51; 
Leukothea, 5.351-353; Athene, 22.237-240. For bird-omens as the manifest will of a god, 
note the following instances: Zeus sends eagle, Il. 8.245-252; Athene sends heron, 10.274-
282; Zeus sends eagle, 24.315-321; Zeus sends eagle, Od. 2.146-156; for other bird-omens, 
see I/ . 2.299-332; 12.200-251; 13.821-823; Od. 15.160-178; 15.525-534, cf. 17.157-161; 
19.536-558; 20.235-246. For discussion, see Dirln1eier (1967); Fauth (1975), 248-249; 
Bannert (1978); Dietrich (1979); Erbse (1980); Schnapp-Gourbeillon (1981), 185-190; 
Bushnell (1982); Dietrich (1983), 57-60; Easterling (1987); Pucci (1987), 114-119; Bannert 
(1988), 57-68; C. G. Thomas (1996); Friedrich (1997). 
See above, pp . 111-112. For the language of thea trical disguise in relation to bird-like 
appearances of the gods, see Erbse (1980), 273: 'Der Dichter hat die Tiergestalt ... zur 
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omens to the mix further complicates the situation. That there is a relationship 
between these various forms of bird(like) appearance has been recognised, but 
an interpretative problem has remained, namely to explain how exactly these 
appearances relate and what this relation signifies. Podlecki, for example, writes 
of bird omens 'branching off' to bird similes on the one hand, and to bird 
epiphanies on the other; thus Athene's appearances in Odyssey 1 and 3 'are to be 
understood as a sub-class of omen'.359 Nilsson explored the implications of this 
slide within an influential history of Greek religion that appealed to Minoan and 
Mycenean background as the basis for later Greek religious practice: the 
relation of birds and gods in Homeric poetry could be understood in terms of 
an underlying history of belief.360 In following this historically framed approach 
to the divine bird-similes, later scholars such as Scott are not alone: when the 
poet 'sang of gods, similes of birds were at hand and easily adaptable to the 
actions of divine figures'. 361 The underlying logic of this explanation has been 
pursued to its full extent in what Pucci has called the 'long-winded querelle' over 
the degree of theriomorphosis indicated by the set of instances in the Homeric 
epics where gods appear like birds, and its relation to religious practices: 
various versions are possible, from simple similes through to theriomorphosis 
itself, even if temporary .362 More productive are responses which give closer 
attention to the problems of point of view raised at a narrative level by the 
passages concerned.363 In the wake of Pucci's contribution, there is no need to 
rehearse the terms~of this debate as such. Pucci is right to stress the 'irreverent 
or edifying innuendos that are complex and undecidable' in such instances, 
when he teases his readers with the reticence of the epic narrative that 
confronts them.364 But I think that he is too schematic when he makes a contrast 
between the supposed knowledge of the poet, the sight of the epic characters 
concerned, and the contrasting delusion or blindness that lures the audience of 
the epic to try 'to make sense of the story as though we were really present at 
359 
360 
361 
362 
363 
364 
bloBen Maske gewissermaBen degradiert .... Homers Olympier komwn in solche 
Kosttime schlupfen, wenn sie, auf Wahrung ihrer Heiligkeit bedacht, verborgen bleiben 
und ihre Nahe nur ahnen lassen wollen.' 
Podlecki (1967), 14-15. 
Nilsson (1968), vol. 1, 290-292. 
W. C. Scott (1974), 78. Compare Kullmann (1956), 91-92; Pollard (1977), 155-161; Erbse 
(1980), 273: 'die Tiergestalt, Residuum einer alteren, aber im archaischen Griechenland 
noch immer lebendigen Form des Gottesvorstellung'; Schnapp-Gourbeillon (1981), 185-
190; Dietrich (1983), 57-59; Lonsdale (1990), 115-116. 
Pucci (1987), 114; cf. Erbse (1980), 259: 'Das Problem ist so alt wie die Homererklarung' . 
Arguing that they are similes: Dirlmeier (1967). Against this in various forms: Bannert 
(1978); Dietrich (1979); Erbse (1980); S. West (ed .) (1988), on Od. 3.371-372. 
See esp. Bushnell (1982); Pucci (1987), 110-120. 
Pucci (1987), 120. 
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the events'.365 In fact, the long arm of Zeus, and the divine various appearances 
in Iliad 5 show that these configurations are liable to take different shape at 
different moments in the epic, and for specific narrative effect. 
A major part of the poet's narrative practice lies precisely in the interplay 
between, and continual reconfiguration of, various points of view within the 
epic and our various responses to them. In this respect, at least, the narrative 
has no less to offer us than it might have offered 'Homer and his audience'.366 
The unattainable prospect of uncovering the substantive 'belief' of Homer's 
contemporaries was never a key that would solve these puzzles. Epic narrative 
offers access to an exemplary past world that must have been strange for all its 
audiences, and for all its audiences the epic narrative is an education.367 
Education in this context is to be understood hyperliterally as a 'leading out' of 
audiences' senses into this world, by means of the power of the Muses, a power 
that is 'present' in ways that mortals can never be: herein lies an fundamental 
lack that is reiterated even as it is addressed.368 The Odyssey addresses itself 
metapoetically to this task: we are each of us a Telemakhos.369 The challenges 
offered by narratives of divine appearance are an integral part of this process. 
I want to look at one example from among the set of material comprised 
by these bird-like appearances and bird-omens, namely the bird-departure of 
Athene in Odyssey 3. What this illustrates in exemplary fashion is one way in 
365 
366 
367 
368 
369 
Pucci (1987), 119. 
For the comparative absence of occasionality as a feature of the Panhellenic scope of 
Homer, see esp. Nagy (1990b), 191-192; Nagy (1996a), 54-63. In relation to bird-
epiphany, Pucci (1987), 119, states: 'In our present text no empirical referent can be 
valid, since the religious narrative suspends all empirical reality ... the only valid 
referent might be the belief of Hon1er and his audience about the nature and 
theriomorphic power of their gods' . Pucci's basic point here about the inaccessibility of 
a point of reference is well taken, even if the prospect of 'the belief of Homer' is less 
useful. 
For epic as a process and a promise, see Lynn-George (1988), 37-41, 271-272. See also 
Martin (1993), for epics as 'products of an elegiac urge for touching heroic ages past', and 
the necessary complexity of education that results from this. For Homer in the history 
of Greek education, see above, p. 35 n . 135. 
For the Muses' present-ness, see esp. 1/ . 2.485-486: UflELS' yap emt EO'TE, mipcaTE TE, 
'LaTE TE mivm, I ~flELS' 8E KAEOS' olov UKOVOflEV ou8E TL 'L8~EV. See above, pp. 34-39. 
Peradotto (1990), 31, wants to assimilate poet and gods 'above history' in 'the narrator's 
sense of power over his materials', but see Bergren (1982), 84-85, for a difference of 
enunciation between epic and hymn: 'The epic is cast by its opening invocation as the 
voice of the Muse ... but the closing apostrophe makes the hymn the poet's own speech'. 
See most recently Minchin (2001), 161-180, with further references. For the Muses' 
presence, see Dodds (1951), 80-81, 100 n . 116; Nagy ([1979]1999), 16-17, 95; Rudhardt 
(1988), 49-52; Goldhill (1991), 69-70; Ford (1992), 60-62; Dickson (1995), 87-89, 99 n. 77. 
See esp. Martin (1993), 239-240: Telemakhos is both internal focalizer and emblem of 
the ending of epic art; also Pucci (1998c), 171-175; Murnaghan (2002). 
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which the process of recognising divine presence might be managed in 
practice.37o The strategies put into play by Nestor are ritualised and evocative of 
a set of narratives of immediate significance within the frame of Telemakhos's 
journey through his father's social world.371 Up to the moment of her 
departure, Athene has been accompanying Telemakhos in the guise of Mentor; 
but, immediately upon announcing her departure, the figure of Mentor 
disappears and Athene departs 'like a lammergeyer':372 
we; apa <f>wv~cma' CLTTE~TJ yA.auKwm<; 'Ae~VTJ 
<f>~vTJL El8o1J.EVTJ' 8ci1J.~oc; 8' EAE rrcivmc; 'Axmouc;, 
8au1J.U(Ev 8' 6 yEpm6c;, orrwc; 'L8Ev 6<f>8aAIJ.OLCJL · 
Pucci has discussed ably how this moment plays with the different perspectives 
afforded audience and characters: the privileged perspective of the audience on 
Athene's presence is suddenly overturned by the image with which she departs, 
which the characters of the epic see but the audience does not.373 Again, the 
figure of 'likeness' blurs the boundaries of metaphor and actuality and the 
mechanisms of transformation remain provocatively indeterminate. Pucci lays 
his stress almost entirely upon this undecidability of the figure from the point of 
view of the audience, and so he does not consider in detail what Nestor's 
example shows us as a response to the problems inherent in the image of 
Athene's departure; he simply characterises Nestor's response in somewhat 
dismissive terms as an 'accurate guess'.374 But what Nestor does in fact is to 
embark upon a p-rocess of negotiation between his perceptions and his 
knowledge both of the potential modalities of divine presence and of the 
possible narratives within which such presence might be comprehended.37S It is 
this process that I want to stress in considering how divine presence is 
370 
371 
372 
373 
374 
375 
For an alternative education in how to recognise a 'goddess', see Goldhill (1988), 24-26, 
on Odysseus and Nausicaa at Od. 6.149-152; on the simile, see Watrous (1999) . 
For Telemakhos's rrat8EUCJL<;, see Martin (1993), esp. 229-234, on Telemakhos's epithet 
8EOEL8~c;; 232: ' the formula marks out Homer's handling of this traditional theme, 
which we can call"the hero grows up'". See also Reinhardt ([1960]1997b), 222-225; H . 
W. Clarke (1963), 140-141; G. P . Rose (1967); N. Austin (1975), 182-191; Finley (1978), 
139-158; Apthorp (1980); R. B. Rutherford (1985), 138-139 and n. 34; Murnaghan (1987), 
158-166; Goldhill (1988), 19; Tracy (1990), 3-26; Dickson (1995), 181-195; Murnaghan 
(2002) . 
Od. 3.371-373. For the identification of the bird, seeS. West (ed.) (1988), on Od . 3.371-
372. 
Pucci (1987), 115-120. 
Pucci (1987), 117-118. Such a critical perspective on Nestor is frequent: see Falkner 
([1989]1995), 35-36; also Schofield (1986), 26-30. 
For Nestor and narration-Nestor's 'mnemonic art'-see Atchity (1978), 260-264; 
Falkner ([1989]1995), 14-22; Dickson (1995), esp . 81-85. On Homeric prayer and 
narrative, see esp . Lang (1975); Morrison (1991); Lateiner (1997), 265-270 . See below, p. 
147m1. 405, 407. 
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'recognised'. Nestor's adaptive narrativisation of this problematic moment 
recasts the eddy created by Athene's departure within. a specific, strategic 
frame. 
The response upon which Nestor embarks immediately following the 
departure of the uncanny bird-sign of Athene is structured in several ways. In 
the first place, Nestor relates Telemakhos's situation directly to the precedent 
offered by his father, Odysseus. The indeterminacy of Athene's bird-sign is 
given structure-and thus meaning and an implicit authority-by Nestor in 
relation to what he knows of Odysseus:376 
TT]AEIJ.axov 8' EAE x~:'i:pa, €nos T' €4>aT' EK T' 6v611a(~:v· 
375 " W 4>LAOS', OU GE Eo\na KQKCJV KQL avaAKLV EaEa8m, 
El 8~ TOL VEWL cil8E 8EOL TTOIJ. TTfjES' ETTOVTQL. 
ov 11£v yap n s 88' a\\os 'OM11ma 8w11aT' £x6vTwv, 
a\M t.u)s 8vyaTT]p, KU8LGTT] TPLTOYEVELQ, 
Ti TOL Kal naTEp' £a8\0v £v 'Apydmaw ETLIJ.a. 
The reasoning process through which Nestor negotiates the equivocal sign of 
divinity takes two steps: first IS Nestor's identification of the 
Mentor/lammergeyer complex as a god, by which Telemakhos has apparently 
been escorted; second is his identification of this god as Athene on the basis of 
the precedent of Odysseus.377 The first step is marked by the evidential particle, 
8Tj, and the deictic adverb, iil8E, each of which function as verbal gestures by 
which Nestor directs Telemakhos' perceptual capacities at what he cannot 
initially denominate any more precisely than as a 8E6S', in generalising 
statement.J78 The second step comes as a development of this denominative 
beginning. It is marked first by the sequential IJ.EV yap and the deitic o8E which 
together carry the previous verbal gestures forward, and second by the 
evidential TOL that marks the point at which the precedent of Odysseus is 
brought to bear upon the problem. At a moment such as this, the processes of 
memory and recollection-of making connections-and of perception are one 
and the same.379 The complex sensory and cognitive eddy induced by the flux 
of Mentor into the departing lammergeyer is thus given a specific shape and 
376 
377 
378 
379 
Od. 3.374-379. 
Compare Od . 3.201-224, esp. 218-222: El yap a ws £8EAOL 4>L\Env y\avKwms 'A8~v11, I 
ws TOT' '08vaafjos nEpL~8no Kv8aALIJ.OLO I 8~1J.W L EVL Tpwwv ... I ou yap nw 'L8ov cil8~: 
8EOVS' ava4>av8a 4>LAEUVTaS', I WS' KELVWL ava4>av8c'r napLGTaTO Da\\as 'A8~VT]. On the 
dynamics of the exchange between Nestor and Telemakhos, see Nagy (1990a), 298. 
'Gods': Od. 3.376. For evidential 8~, see Bakker (1997), 75-79; see also above, p. 95 n . 181. 
For the assimilation of memory and perception, recall Ford (1992), 53: 'The function of 
this memory is .. . a psychological experience, to change the present frame of awareness'; 
see above, p. 36. 
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meanmg m the denominative statement o8' . . . L1LOS' 8uyaTT)p, KU8LCJTT) 
TpLToyE-vELa. The interpretative circle that comprises the 'epiphany' is not joined 
up until this point, when Nestor utters the denominating epithet of the goddess, 
in the absence of the departed goddess herself. 
Immediately after this realisation of the epiphany of Athene in relation to 
Telemakhos, Nestor then extends the circle he has created to encompass himself 
and his own family .380 The ritualised speech-act Nestor puts into play to achieve 
this aim is that of prayer:381 
380 a>..Aci, avaou', L\T]8L, 8C8w8L 8£ f.LOL KAEOS' E:o8A6v, 
atJTWL wl. rral8ECJCJL Kal. al8o[ T]L rrapaKol n · 
ool. 8' aD E:yw pE~W ~ouv ~VLV EVpUf.LETWTTOV, 
U8fl~TT]V, TtV OU TTW lJTTO (uyov ~yayEV QV~P' 
T~V TOL E:yw pE~W x puoov KEpaoLV TTEPLXEUUS'. 
385 WS' EcpaT' EVXOflEVOS', TOU 8' EKAUE na>..Aas- 'A8~VT] . 
The ritualised language into which Nestor launches here constitutes an 
alternative take on the mode of structuration that was initially exemplified in his 
recognition of Athene by specific reference to the life-narratives of Telemakhos 
and his father Odysseus. This time, Nestor negotiates the epiphany in relation 
to himself and his family by means of the performative language of prayer, and 
his offer of sacrifice sets up another circle, this time encompassing Athene and 
the household of Nestor. In doing so, Nestor begins another emergent 
narrative in the sequences of ritualised action that follow his promise of 
sacrifice, within which the presence of the goddess can be realised further in its 
'epiphanic' dimensions. 
The ritualised process of prayer that Nestor engages in here offers a 
template for the ensuing narratives of libation and sacrifice.382 This future action 
will become a counterpart of the reference to Odysseus and his past that Nestor 
made in his initial recognition of Athene's epiphany in relation to Telemakhos. 
But the libation and sacrifice also consitute a further actualisation of the relation 
between Nestor, his family and Athene that Nestor has introduced by means of 
the performative language of prayer. Nestor takes control, within limits. In this 
respect, Nestor finds a means to assert himself over a situation that might, in 
380 
381 
382 
For Nestor's hyper-awareness of prayer, compare Jl . 15.372-374, where he invokes 
another's prayer within his prayer to Zeus, a recursive embedding of prayer within 
prayer. On this prayer, see Ml.ilder (1930), 8; Lang (1975), 311. 
Od. 3.380-385. 
Od. 3.386-472: there is a libation, 390-395, night intervenes, then the next d ay is taken 
up with preparations, sacrifice and feasting, 404-472 . 
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other circumstances and if it had remained unrecognised, have seemed far 
more sinister; success and failure in the recognition of divine signs and divine 
presence is a fundamental theme of the Odyssey that will be developed most 
explicitly in relation to the return of Odysseus to his palace on Ithaka with its 
overtones of theoxeny.383 The success of Nestor's strategy is marked initially by 
the narrator with the 'hearing' by Athene of Nestor's prayer: Tau 8' EKAUE.384 It 
is this 'hearing' that Nestor's libation immediately follows in the sequence of 
exchange. But the next day when Nestor and the household carry out the 
promised sacrifice this success will be even more explicitly underlined by the 
renewed presence of Athene to receive the offerings: ~A.8E 8' 'A8~VT) I \.pwv 
avn6wcm.385 Nestor's realisation of the presence of the goddess in association 
with Telemakhos is marked by the 'hearing' of Nestor's prayer. The goddess's 
return is a further reciprocal confirmation of the ritualised strategy by which 
Nestor has sought to extend the circle of epiphany to himself and his family. 
This narrative sequence that follows upon the arrival of Dawn is vital for 
how this renewed presence of the goddess is framed . Presented successively are 
the arrival of Nestor's household in preparation for sacrifice, the arrival of the 
goddess Athene, the course of the sacrifice itself, and the seating of Telemakhos, 
newly bathed, at the side of Nestor.386 Of particular interest are the staged 
instructions of Nestor concerning the sacrificial preparations: Nestor rises from 
his bed and takes,his place, sceptre in hand, near the ceremonial white stones 
situated before his doors, where Neleus had sat before him; a catalogue of sons 
gathers about him, with Telemakhos.387 In his ensuing speech, surrounded by 
383 
384 
385 
386 
387 
See esp. Kearns (1982); Murnaghan (1987), 56-90; Reece (1993), 181-187, 200-201. On the 
Suitors, see above, pp. 133-135; for bird-omens and the return of Odysseus, see above, p . 
134 n. 345. 
Od. 3.385. Muellner (1976), 22 n. 11, suggests that this phrase is neutral, i.e. 'hear' not 
'hearken', even if there is only one partial exception, at I!. 16.249-250, to the fulfilment 
of prayers that have been so 'heard': he explicates this neutrality in terms of Mauss's 
'formal pretense and social deception' in the context of obligated gift-exchange. 
Muellner's stress, e.g. 57, on prayer as an exchange more than a petition or promise, i.e. 
reciprocity, is now orthodox; see further J.-M. Bremer (1998a); Parker (1998). 
Od . 3.435-436. 
Dawn: Od. 3.404; preparations for sacrifice: 3.405-445; presence of Athene: 435-436, 438; 
sacrifice: 3.445-463; Telemakhos' bath and installation at the side of Nestor: 3.464-469. 
On the Pylian episode as a paradigm of (overzealous) hospitality, see Apthorp (1980); 
Reece (1993), 59-69; Dickson (1995), 181-185. 
Nestor rises and sits: Od . 3.405-412. The stones, 406-409: KaT' ap' E(ET' E1TL CEaTOLCJL 
f.(8owLv, I o'L ol i!aav 1Tpomipm8E 8upciwv utJ;T]Mwv I AEUKOL, aTIOCJTlA~OVTES' 
af.d<j>aTOS' ' ola' E1TL ~EV 1TpLV I NT]AElJS' '((EaKEV, 8E6<j>LV ~TJCJTWP clTclAUVTOS'. Nestor's 
sons gather: 412-416. On the stones, see Faraone (1992), 5-6, 14 n . 23; and S. West (ed.) 
(1988), on Od. 3.407, 408, for the uncertainty of which doors or gates might be meant: 
megn ran or courtyard. For the character of the overall description, see Falkner ([1989] 
1995), 35-36. 
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these trappings of authority, Nestor scripts the scene of sacrifice and feasting 
which is to follow with a series of imperatives.388 Nestor here operates at the 
literal centre of the relational circle that he has developed to structure the 
epiphany of Athene. By staging his action in this way, in this marked place, 
Nestor asserts his own authority to extend the relational circle of epiphany to 
encompass his entire household. The processional sequence that follows 
immediately upon Nestor's instructions is also of particular significance:389 
430 we; €cpa8', ol 8' apa TiaVTES ETIOLTIVVOV. ~A8E llEV ap ~oDe; 
EK TIE8tov, ~\8ov 8E: 8ofjc; napa v11oc; E:ta11c; 
TllAE!laxov ha pm wya\fJTopoc;, ~\8E 8E: xa\KEuc; 
on\' E:v XEPCJLV EXWV XGAKYJLG, TIELpaTa TEXVll<;, 
clK!lOVa TE acpupav T' ElJTIOLllTOV TE nupaypllV, 
435 otatv TE xpvaov E:pya(ETo· ~\8E 8' 'A8~v11 
lpwv avTL6waa. yE-pwv 8 ' L1T1TllMTa NE-aTWp 
xpvaov l£8wx '· 0 8' ETIEL Ta ~ooc; KEpaCJLV TIEPLXEVEV 
aCJKYJCJU<;, 'Lv ' aya\11a 8Ea KqapOLTO L80UCJU. 
West has rightly drawn attention to the processional force of the repeated 
~A.8E /~A.8ov in her commentary.390 Notably, Athene's arrival is in this respect 
just that of another participant in the procession; the basic orientation of the 
procession towards her is given more explicit expression in the purpose of the 
gilded horns of the sacrificial ox: '[v' ayaA.f.la 8dr KEXGPOLTO L8oucm .391 Athene's 
arrival constitutes a fourth after three previous arrivals, each of which is a direct 
consequence of Nestor's script: the ox, Telemakhos's companions, the smith.392 
The emergent logic of Athene's arrival is not far to find: within the frame of 
Nestor's ritualisation this arrival constitutes an reactualisation of the very 
grounds on which Nestor has declared that the whole offering is based:393 
388 
389 
390 
391 
392 
393 
Kapna\t11wc; !lOL, TEKVa cpt\a, KPll~VaT' E:E-\8wp, 
ocpp' ~ TOL TIPWTLCJTa 8EWV lMaCJOfl' 'A81'JvllV' 
420 Tj !lOL E:vapy~c; ~A8E 8EOV E<; 8aLTa 86.\nav. 
Od . 3.421, hw; 424, ayE-Tw, ALTIETW; 425, KEAECJ8w; 427, flEVETE, ELTIGTE. 
Od . 3.430-438 . 
S. West (ed.) (1988), on Od . 3.430££. 
Od. 3.438. 
Od. 3.421-426. 
Od. 3.418-420. Poseidon is the 8E6c; of the 8Eov 8a'Lm here: see 3.4-9, 31-33, 331-336. For 
Nestor's piety on the beach, seeS. West (ed.) (1988), on Od. 3.5ff. Note also Athene's 
action there, 3.36-62, when she made prayer and libation to Poseidon and ' fulfilled ' it 
herself: 62, we; ap' ETIELT' TjpflTo KGL GlJT~ n6.vm TEAElJTa . Effectively, the ritualised 
action of Nestor and family towards Poseidon is diver ted by Athene over the course of 
the tv,ro days towards h erself, and the shift of the site of sacrifice from the beach to the 
palace of Nestor is significant in terms of this opposition; note Cook (1995), 128: 'Athene 
reigns within the city gates, Poseidon without them'. 
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The goddess's past arrival (~A.8E) is, within the terms of this repetition, directly 
related to the goddess's present arrival (~A.8E) within the ritualised frame that 
Nestor has set up to negotiate the fact and significance of Athene's presence. 
For West to comment on this arrival that 'Athena is present in person, but 
invisible' seems to beg the question.394 The dichotomy visible/invisible may not 
be the most useful criterion to bring to bear upon the presence of Athene at this 
point for two reasons.395 First, nothing is stated of the modality of Athene's 
presence at this point. An important Homeric point of comparision here must 
be the procession in Iliad 6 to the temple and image/person of Athene, a scene 
whose play with the possible ramifications of viewpoint in relation to divine 
presence and response I have discussed earlier.396 In both these Homeric scenes 
the processional frame is itself correlative with 'making present', whether the 
presence of the goddess goes unnoticed or not; such a correlation is manifest in 
other Greek religious contexts.397 Second, this entire sequence, within which 
Nestor has first realised the epiphany of the goddess in relation to Telemakhos 
and has then extended the epiphanic circle to encompass his own household, 
comprises an extended process recognising the 'presence' and favour of the 
goddess. As such, whether the goddess's presence is explicitly noted or not by 
the other ritual participants here, it is still the strategic basis of Nestor's entire 
ritualised performance, and not least of this sacrifice which Nestor himself has 
glossed as such: 'LMcmofl' 'A8~vrw I ~ f.l.OL E-vapyT]s- ~A.8E 8EoD ES' 8a1Ta 
8aA.nav .398 Thus~ the processional elements of this ritual scene underline its 
presentifying purpose. What this day of sacrifice and feasting offers is a further 
structuration of 'epiphany' to match Nestor's earlier formulation of the 
goddess's presence in relation to Telemakhos and Odysseus. 
In this way, the recognition of divine presence as 'epiphany' lS 
exemplified in this lengthy sequence as a process of negotiation that serves to 
394 
395 
396 
397 
398 
S. West (ed.) (1988), on Od . 3.435-436. 
Compare Vernant ([1986]1991a), 43: 'From a divine perspective, the opposition 
visible/invisible is no longer entirely pertinent'. 
I/ . 6.286-312; see above, pp. 123-125. 
See esp. Connor ([1987]2000); Sinos (1993); Kavoulaki (1999). For such presence of gods in 
the ritualised frame of procession, the Parthenon frieze is a striking depiction: see 
Castriota (1992), 214-218; Neils (1996b); Price (1999), 30-33; Neils (2001), 61-66, and esp. 
198-200. The Panathenaic procession which the frieze depicts is 'the supreme example 
... of a society on display before itself', as it is put by Parker (1996), 91, but Parker omits 
that this socie ty includes the gods. This Homeric scene in Pylos is a tantalising 
comparison, along with 11 . 6.286-312; for a provocative discussion of the Odyssey and 
Athenian ritual, see Cook (1995), who does not discuss this scene; for the epic 
antecedents of the rrhrA.oS' in the Panathenaia, see Lefkowitz (1996), 80; Karanika 
(2001), 281, 285-287. 
Od. 3.420. 
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structure the epiphany as two intercom1ecting interpretative circles. Within 
these circles the presence of Athene is shaped, managed, and evoked, and the 
significance of her presence realised in relational terms. Several overlapping 
narratives of past, present and future relations emerge as the driving forces of 
this process. In my earlier discussion of the long arm of Zeus, the sequence of 
appearances in Iliad 5 and the spectacular descent of Athene I underlined the 
extent to which an 'epiphany' is something to be negotiated between the play 
of divine presence across a range of possibilities and the perceptual capacities of 
mortals. Here I want to emphasise how Nestor's complex response to the bird-
departure of Athene shows how such a negotiation might be managed 
productively in relation to the specific narrative contexts of Telemakhos's 
journey. For Telemakhos, this is very much a lesson in practical logic, in the 
practical mastery of the problems of epiphany.399 But it cannot be definitive or 
complete, and this lack is inscribed from the outset in the textual eddies of 
Athene's bird-depature.400 We cannot take Nestor's performance here as a 
privileged paradigm of 'how epiphany works', only as a particular enactment of 
relational logic applied to the problematic that divine epiphany constitutes. 
Processes of 'relating' or narrativising epiphany do not overcome the 
incompleteness of either the characters' or the audience's perception of divine 
presence. In the epiphanic departure of Athene in Pylos the mechanisms of her 
flux of form between Mentor and lammergeyer remain unresolvable in 
denominational --terms, just as the long arm of Zeus fluctuated between 
presence and absence. These figures of divinity embrace their own 
indeterminacy. Yet precisely what this indeterminacy underlines is the 
supplementarity of epiphany. It is this potential for the generation of further 
narratives that Nestor harnesses when he realises the epiphany of Athene first 
in relation to Telemakhos and then in relation to himself and his household. 
399 
400 
As such this is part of a lengthy series, begun already in Ithaka: see Od . 1.319-324, 420; 
2.146-156, 260-297; 4.351-362, 363-425, 435-570, 4.654-656; 15.1-43, 160-182, 525-538; 
16.177-212; 18.346-348, 407; 19.33-46, 22.205-240; 24.502-520. For practical mastery and 
the logic of practice, see Bourdieu (1977), 87-95, 118-120, 124; Bourdieu (1990); Bell 
(1992), 98, 107-108; also Kapferer (1997), 176, 'The rite does not develop from a logic so 
much as it generates it in its practical motion', and 325 n . 54. 
This is Pucci's fundamental point; see above, p . 139. For an anthropological perspective, 
compare Kapferer (1997), 176: 'The practices embed the doxn of the rite, or the 
principles that underlie its direction. Adurn can and do reflect, independently of the 
contexts of their performances, on the meaning and structure of their practice. But like 
human beings everywhere, they cannot verbalize the significance of all that they do. 
Indeed, it is impossible for me to transform into a text all that I saw and heard and 
experienced. Exorcists are selective in what they reveal in words, like anthropologists 
who textualize ethnographic material .. . . All this is obvious. ' 
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What Nestor does here may appear, at first glance, to be simply reactive. 
But this is not accurate. The ritualised strategies that Nestor evokes are 
relational in a full sense, and the renewed presence of Athene is a direct 
consequence of this. While it might appear tempting within a more 
typologically oriented discussion to classify the first appearance of Athene 
separately from her second appearance, insofar as the first seems to be a spur 
to ritualised management and the second seems to be a consequence of 
Nestor's ritualised action, this would be misleading. In fact, the ritualised 
processes that Nestor puts into play evoke, as if already in existence, a circle of 
relations between Athene, Telemakhos, Odysseus, and Nestor and his family. 
This circularity is pervasive, and in the terms of the relational logic of these 
strategies there is no point where the circle can be said to have begun: at the 
moment that the relational claim is formulated, the world has already been 
rearticulated in its terms.40l This is the particular power of successful ritual.402 
But however much the indeterminacy of divine presence is temporarily 
encompassed within such a relational circle, it is not resolved: epiphany is not 
'ritualised' in this sense precisely because the problematic of divine presence 
remains even as strategies are put into play to structure it. We return to West's 
comment that 'Athena is present in person, but invisible' in the sacrificial 
procession at Pylos: this is to say more than can be said, both from the point of 
view of the participants about whose perception of the goddess the audience of 
the epic cannot be sure, even if the logic of the entire ritualised performance is 
oriented around the goddess's presence, and from the point of view of the 
audience of the epic, whose knowledge of the goddess's presence is assured by 
the authority of the narrator, but whose perceptions of the goddess herself are 
completely undetermined. But what audiences can do is to join with the 
participants and the goddess herself in admiring the gilded horns of the 
sacrificial ox-an ayaA.IJ.a for the goddess's pleasure, which in its delight might 
evoke a delightful response in the ongoing reciprocity of favour.403 The 
strategy of objectification that such an ayaA.IJ.a constitutes works in gratifying 
ways both for the participants and for the goddess herself. 
401 
402 
403 
For this structuring of structure, compare Bell (1992), 140: 'the strategic production of 
expedient schemes that structure an environment in such a way that the environment 
appears to be the source of the schemes and their values.' 
Pervasive anxiety about correctness reflects this fundamental potential of ritualisation. 
On the 'sense of ritual' integral in such contexts, see Bell (1992), 80, 213. In the Greek 
context, see e.g. Parker (1996), 50-53, 152-153, 218-222, on the imbrication of ritual and 
civic propriety in Athens; Price (1999), 67-88, on control and crisis; Parker (1998), 114-
118, on failures of XclPLS'. 
See esp. Parker (1998), 108-109, on the vocabulary of xcipLS'. 
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The dealings between Diomedes and Athene in Iliad 5 provide a 
complementary instance to set alongside Nestor's relational strategies in 
Odyssey 3. Diomedes' initial prayer to Athene comes after the beginning of his 
aristeia, which Athene herself has set into motion at the beginning of Iliad 5.404 
This prayer, framed in terms of Athene's prev10us presence, follows 
immediately upon Diomedes' wounding:4os 
8~ TOT' ETTELT' T]piho ~o~v aya8os- t.LOj.1~8T]S"' 
115 ·· KAll8t flOL, aL yL6xow t.Los- TEKOS", 'ATpvTWVTJ, 
E'L TTOTE j.lOL KUL TTUTpl <f>t\a <f>poVEOUCJa TTapECJTT]S" 
8TJLWL E-v TTOAEflWL, vvv a{n' E"flE <f>l.\m, 'A8~VTJ · 
TOVOE TE 1-l' av8pa EAELV KUL fS Opfl~V EYXEOS" EA8ELV, 
os- 1-1 • £~a>--E <f>Baj.lEvos- Kat fTTEvxnm, ovoE flE <f>TJaLv 
120 8TJp<'>v h' 8tj;w8m \afl TTpov <f>aos- i]E Atmo. 
ws- £<f>aT' Evx6wvos-· Toll 8' EKAVE Tia\Aas- 'A8~vTJ 
Diomedes prays for the goddess's assistance, and the key terms of his prayer 
speak of relationship and presence: E'L TTOTE f.LOL Ka't. TTaTp't. cpl.A.a cppovE'oucm 
TTapEOTT)S' ... vDv am' Ef.LE cpLA.m. This link between assistance and presence is 
underlined by Aubriot in a discussion of the language here, where past 
presence is made the basis for the present claim for assistance.406 The terms 
Diomedes uses are not a direct call for presence; contrast Odysseus in the games 
for Patroklos: KAU8L, 8d.t, ayafhl f.LOL ETTlppo8os- E-A.8E TT080LLV.407 But Diomedes' 
invocation of past presence and plea for divine 'friendship' is similar to that 
used by Odysseus elsewhere in a prayer to Athene: ~ TE f.LOL aLE\. I E-v mivTECJCJL 
TTOVOLCJL TTapl.aTaCJm ... I ... vDv aln-E f.LCIALCJTa f1E pLA.m, 'A8~VT). 408 The particular 
nature of Diomedes' request in Iliad 5 is reinforced by the broader comparison 
that can be made between his prayer and its aftermath, and that made by 
Glaukos immediately after the death of Sarpedon which results in the healing of 
Glaukos by Apollo.409 Diomedes is not healed here as it turns out, but a more 
significant difference between these two contexts is the evocation of (past) 
404 
405 
406 
407 
408 
409 
I/. 5.1-8. On this motif, see Krischer (1971), 24-27; Fenik (1968), 10. 
I/. 5.114-121. Diomedes' wounding: 5.95-113. For the language used to stage prayer in 
Homer, see esp. Muellner (1976), 17-67. Aubriot (1992), 302-319, discusses apaOflaL as an 
invocation of presence; but see also Pulleyn (1997), 75-76. For the content of Homeric 
prayers, see Beckmann (1932), 3-23; Ml.ilder (1929); Ml.ilder (1930); Keyssner (1932); and 
recently Lateiner (1997), 255-265. 
Aubriot (1992), 307-309. 
I/. 23.770. On E-\8E, see Pulleyn (1997), 136-137. For a selection of formulas 'audiendi, 
videndi, veniendi' in Homer and tragedy, see Ausfeld (1903), 516-517; cf. Keyssner 
(1932), 98-101. 
If. 10.278-280. Compare Telemakhos at Od. 2.262: KAll8t flOL, o xBL(os- 8Eos- Tj\v8Es-; 
then at 2.267, Athene comes in the guise of Mentor. 
If. 16.508-531. See Fenik (1968), 21-22; Lateiner (1997), 257-258. 
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presence and the ensuing presence of the god.410 This point will be reinforced 
by Pandaros a little later in Iliad 5, when Diomedes' desire to kill Pandaros 
comes closer to fulfilment. The boast that Pandaros had made earlier in 
wounding Diomedes will in this later scene be modified by the Trojan archer 
when Aineias prompts him to speculate on the evident connection with divinity 
manifested by Diomedes in his rampaging progress.411 In particular, Pandaros 
canvasses the possibilities either that Diomedes is in fact a god, or that a god 
stands by him:412 
aa<jJa 8' OUK o18' El 8EOS' ECJTLV. 
El 8' 0 y' av~p ov <PTJ~L. 8at<jJpwv Tu8EOS' UlOS', 
185 oux 0 y' UVEU8E 8EOU Ta8E ~atvnm, QAAcl TLS' ayxL 
ECJTT]K' a8avaTWV, VE<jJEAT]L dAU~EVOS' W~OUS' 
The terms that Pandaros uses here recall those used by Diomedes earlier in 
recalling the presence of Athene by Tydeus's side. This presence had been 
recalled earlier by Agamemnon in his abusive speech to Diomedes, and the 
paradigmatic nature of Athene's assistance to Tydeus within the larger story of 
Thebes recurs elsewhere.413 The mobilisation of this motif by Diomedes himself 
and the ensuing presence of Athene underline the basic appropriateness of 
Pandaros's speculations. 
But what I particularly want to stress in the present context is how 
Diomedes' claims for Athene's special assistance and her responses to Diomedes 
-... 
are articulated by a provocative telling and retelling of the relations between 
Athene, Diomedes' father Tydeus, and Diomedes himself. Such provocative 
comparison between Diomedes and his father was introduced by Agamemnon 
in Iliad 4, and Diomedes' aristeia is a response to this.414 The motif is then 
reintroduced several times. Diomedes' own prayer takes it as the basis of his 
plea for assistance, and Athene restates it when she says that she has filled 
Diomedes with his father's might.41S This stipulation by the goddess in one 
410 
411 
412 
413 
414 
415 
Fenik (1968), 21 n. 22, observes that Diomedes is not actually healed, but is right that 
this does not undermine 'the basic parallelism'. 
Pandaros's boast: Jl. 5.101-106, esp. 104-105, El ETEOV w I WpCJEV avaE LlLOS' UlOS'. 
Aineias: 5.170-178, esp . 177-178: El ~i] TLS' 8E6S' E-an KOTWaawvoS' TpwwaLv, I Lpwv 
~TJVLCJUS'' xaAnr~ 8E- 8Eou £m ~fjVLS'. Pandaros's response: 5.180-216. 
11 . 5.183-186. 
I! . 4.370-400, esp. 390: TOLT] oL hrtppo8oS' ~Ev 'A8i]vT] . Athene raises it at 11 . 5.800-813, 
esp. 808, TOLTJ oL E-ywv E-mTappo8oS' ~a. Diomedes raises it at Il. 10.284-294, esp. 290: 
oTE o\. rrp6<jJpaaaa rrapE-aTT]S'. On the sequence, see now Alden (2000), 112-152, as a 
'debate on the merits of divine patronage' . 
See Nagy ([1979]1999), 162-163. 
I/. 5.116-117, 125-126: E-v yap TOL aTi]8waL ~E-voS' rraTpwLov ~Ka I aTpo~ov, otov 
E XECJKE aaKECJTTaAOS' \. TTTTOTa Tu8dJS'. 
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sense simply picks up the terms of Diomedes' prayer. But she also uses it as a 
challenge to Diomedes to emulate his father, in the same way that Agamemnon 
did. This challenge is picked up by the goddess later in Iliad 5, when she returns 
to the battlefield to spur the flagging Diomedes back into action.416 What 
particularly emerges in this exchange is the degree to which Diomedes is being 
used by Athene as a tool to inflict humiliation on Aphrodite and Ares.417 Alden 
is right to stress the relevance here of the exchange on the fate of 8EOIJ.clXOL given 
by Dione in consolation to Aphrodite; perhaps Athene's assistance to Diomedes 
is not to be without profound cost? There are no immediate consequences 
within the narrative of Iliad, but it remains an undercurrent of immediate 
relevance to the thematic encounters between mortality and divinity that are 
staged in Iliad 5.418 When Diomedes invokes an existing set of relations between 
himself, his father and Athene, then his prayer is effective for reasons similar to 
those which underline the success of Nestor in Odyssey 3. The ensuing presence 
and assistance of Athene is structured in similar, relational terms to those 
deployed by Nestor with greater ceremony. But the terms of Diomedes' 
relational strategy are used by others, notably Agamemnon and Athene, as a 
specific provocation. In this way the effectiveness of Diomedes' strategy comes 
full circle in Athene's own provocative take on the nature of the relation 
between Diomedes and his father which spurs Diomedes on with Athene at his 
side against Ares. Relational narratives can be told in more than one way, and 
for more than one purpose. The control that such ritualised strategies offer can 
be manipulated for their own ends by those who are encompassed within the 
relational circle. The apparent success of Diomedes' strategy here is (only?) a 
reflection of Athene's own intentions. 
If reciprocity is the overt principle by which mortals continually assert 
themselves in their dealings with the gods, this is a superimposition upon an 
alternative negative relation which is much more disconcerting. What the larger 
narrative of Diomedes' exploits reinforces is the basic contingency of mortal 
strategies designed to overcome the disconcerting slide between divine 
presence and absence. On one level, by means of the ritualised strategies of 
prayer and sacrifice, and by the narratives that are generated in and around 
such ritualisation, the gods are drawn into an economy of reciprocity. Here the 
416 
417 
418 
I/. 5.800-813. 
See Erbse (1961), 161-164; Alden (2000), 123. 
See Alden (2000), 151-152 and n . 83, for realisations of this potential narrative. But 
Alden ignores another narrative in which Diomedes is immortalised: see Nagy ([1979] 
1999), 163-164, 174. On the broader theme, see above, pp. 108-111. 
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relation between gods and mortals is transformed into one whose terms can be 
be embraced and temporarily transcended in relationships of mutual delight, as 
the example of Nestor demonstrates. But this scenario is always and 
everywhere subverted by the sheer inequality of the non-relation that lies 
beneath it. 419 I discussed earlier how the relation between divinity and 
humanity in Iliad 5 may be understood as a relation which denies that there is a 
relation at all: the gods precede, supercede and exceed mortals. The stark nature 
of this non-relation is as radically destructive of humanity's claims as it is 
affirmative of the gods themselves. 
• 
• • 
Epiphany's ends 
Authority and legitimacy are always implicated in and around the interface 
between mortals ,and gods. There are several dynamics in play. One lies in the 
exercise of divine power and force, for which Zeus's thunderbolt is the 
inevitable archetype with its capacity for a bursting-asunder that radically 
transforms the ground of existence: for mortals this means immortality or 
death, for immortals this means a form of the 'binding' that is the only way to 
counteract the basic potential of the gods.420 This mode of hierarchical power 
relations is unashamedly authoritarian, and deploys an authority that does not 
justify itself, but instead appeals to its previous displays of strength as challenge 
and threat: Zeus's rule of Olympos is paradigmatic in its recurrent return to this 
threat of physical superiority.421 A second dynamic lies in the ethically framed 
relations of parentage and reciprocity that are manifested in the Homeric 
poems. Gods are fathers and mothers of mortal heroes, and the Iliad and 
419 
420 
421 
For a constitutive link between the delight of xapLS' and its unpredictability, see Lynn-
George (1996), 8-9. 
Mortals: see esp . Nagy (1990a), 139-140. For Zeus's thunderbolt and the 'binding' of a 
divine rival, note Typhon at If . 2.781-783, Hes. Theog. 853-868. On the binding of gods in 
m yth and ritual, see D. T. Steiner (2001), 160-168. 
See esp . I/ . 1.560-570, 8.5-27, 15.18-24. On the place of theogonic stories in I/. and Od., 
see Slatkin (1991), 14. 
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Odyssey are structured by such relationships.422 Gods also express ethical ties to 
mortals whose practices of honouring the gods bind them in relationships of 
reciprocal commitment.423 The relation of parent and child is a recurrent Diadic 
image of this care among gods, men and animals.424 The legitimation of action 
in this way is founded upon assertions of what is valued in the world. A third 
dynamic is found in the twin tropes of fate and justice. Theodicy is flagged in its 
opening scenes as a particular concern of the Odyssey, in the same way that the 
plan of Zeus is highlighted as a programmatic strategy at the outset of the 
Iliad.425 These tropes are complicit with fate even as they open up the space of 
the narrative itself. At points of contact between mortals and immortals 
throughout the Iliad and Odyssey these dynamics of authority and legitimacy 
are woven into the texture of the narrative, not as univocal claims, but as 
competing perspectives on the action. Here's comment to Zeus is apposite: E-p:)'· 
chap ov TOL lTCIVTES' ETTaLVEOfl.EV 8EOL aAA.oL.426 The ultimate rationale here lies in 
the maintenance of order-but a particular order, in which the structure of this 
narrative and this cosmology mutually cohere. 
Nowhere are these dynamics more important for the narratives qua 
narratives than at the ends of each epic, with our twin desires for the 'ending' 
and an understanding of the significance of the events in which we have 
participated as audiences.427 Consider first the end of the Odyssey. Much has 
been written on tl~ place of Odyssey 24 in the larger structures of the epic; I will 
not rehearse this material, but I do want to consider the ramifications of the 
final moments of the epic as closing frame. 428 In certain respects this scene of 
422 
423 
424 
425 
426 
427 
428 
Paradigmatic of motherhood is Thetis's lament for Akhilleus, Il. 24.83-88; see Slatkin 
(1991), 85 . Paradigmatic of fatherhood is Zeus's reaction to the death of Sarpedon, Jl. 
16.431-461,567-568, 666-583; see Nagy (1990a), 131-142, for Sarpedon's posthumous 
treatment. For the relation of Poseidon and Polyphemus and Poseidon's wrath at Od. 
1.19-21, 1.68-79, 9.526-536, see esp. Cook (1995), 49-56, 96, 123-127; but also Clay (1983), 
44-47, 51-52. 
Representative are Hektor, I/ . 24.33-38, and Odysseus, Od. 1.60-61; see esp. Lym1-George 
(1996), 9. 
See Mills (2000) . 
Plan of Zeus: Il. 1.5; see above, p. 90 nn. 172-173, p . 108 n. 235. Theodicy: Od. 1.28-79; see 
esp. Clay (1983), 213-239. 
I/.16.443. On divine maintenance of the status quo, see above, p. 108 n.235. This point is 
frequently missed, as e.g. Schein (1984), 50: 'such sufferings and battles of the gods are a 
thing of the past, which no longer occur, though they are occasionally recalled' . 
For the difference between closure of expectations and closure of 
understanding-Barthes' proairetic and hermeneutic codes-see Abbott (2002), 53-60. Of 
course, such questions of structure and meaning are mutually implicating, 'living, as we 
do, in the middle': Le Guin (1981), 195. 
Scholarly support for Od. 24 is now relatively widespread: for a representative view, 
see Heubeck (ed.) (1991), 353-355 and on Od. 23.297, 24.1-204, 205-412, 413-548; but seeS. 
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divinely inspired combat between the tri-generational band of warriors and the 
families of the Ithakan Suitors functions as a highly appropriate closing tableau 
that reinscribes the themes of patriarchy that run through the Odyssey in a 
startling image of inter-generational solidarity.429 But the sudden peace with 
which the Odyssey ends is imposed at an arbitrary point: resolution in this 
ending comes from without, with the decisive interventions of Athene and Zeus 
to halt fighting and impose peace. 
This divine control over the ending of the Odyssey is articulated twice, 
first in divine council and then in the action itself.430 It is this action that I want to 
consider briefly, especially how it forecloses on the potential for other 
narratives.431 In the first place, the solidarity of Odysseus, Laertes and 
Telemakhos does not have a direct outcome in battle with the Suitors' families. 
Despite Athene's action in urging Laertes on, his initial killing with the 
goddess's assistance actually marks the ending of battle. When Odyssey and 
Telemakhos both leap forward and join in the battle, the goddess intervenes:432 
E:v 8' E:nwov npo~J.axms- 'OouaEiJS' Kal. cpatoLIJ.OS' u\.6s-, 
TlmTov 8E: ~tcpwtv TE Kal. E:yxww a~J_cpL yuowL. 
KQL vu KE 8~ 1TclVTQS' OAEaQV KQL E8T]KQV UVOGTOUS', 
EL 11~ 'A811vat T], KoupT] t..u'ls- al yL6xmo, 
530 ~i.JaEv cf>wvijL, KaT a 8' E:axE8E t..aov anavTa · 
'' 'Laxw8E 1TTOAE"IJ.OU, '(8aK~GLOL, apyaAEOLO, 
w~ KEv avm 11wTt yE owKpw8ijTE Taxww. ·· 
The goddess's instruction is to halt: 'laxw8E. Again, when Odysseus is about to 
take advantage of the literal disarmament that Athene's voice has brought 
about, Zeus marks this point of ending with a thunderbolt and Athene's verbal 
instructions spell out the unequivocal message that this comprises:433 
West (1989); Seaford (1994), 38-42; R. B. Rutherford (1996), 74-77; Jones (1997), 38-41; 
Lowe (2000), 151: 'something seems to have gone awry in the narrative execution'. For a 
relevant provocation on reading for structure, see Goldhill (1988), 1-9. For the 'penumbra 
of secondariness' that still surrounds Od. 24, see Henderson (1997), 87 n. 3. 
429 Note esp. Laertes, Od. 24.514-515: TLS' vu IJ.OL ~IJ.EPll floE, 8Eol. cplf..m; ~ ~J_af..a xatpw· I 
u\.6s- 8' ulwv6s- T' apETijS' 1TEpl oijpLV EXOVGL; d. Goldhill (1991), 20-21. On the scene, 
see Thalmann (1998), 221-223; Felson (1999). 
430 Od. 24.472-488, 502-548. 
431 
432 
433 
The prophecy of Teiresias, Od . 11.100-137, is the most prominent of these: see Hansen 
(1977); Peradotto (1985) (d. Peradotto (1990), 60-82); Pucci (1987), 148-150; Falkner 
([1989]1995), 50-51; Ford (1992), 161-163. For the narrative function of the 'prophetic 
future' in the Odyssey, but omitting to consider Teiresias, see Todorov ([1971]1977), 63-
65. 
Od. 24.526-532. 
Od. 24.537-544. Com.pare the thunderbolt that halts Diomedes in I/. 8.130-144; Nestor 
correctly interprets:~ not..u cpE-pTEp6s- E:an . This is a conversation 'unlike any other': 
Fenik (1968), 222; d. Kirk (ed .) (1990), on 8.139-144. 
awp8aA.£ov 8' E-~ol]O"E rroA.{nA.as- 8Los- '08vaan)s-, 
o'Lj.ll]O"EV 8€ clAEL') W') T, alnos- utj;L TTET~ELS'. 
KaL TOTE 811 KpovL8l]S' a<flLEL tj;OAOEVTU KEpauvov, 
540 Ka8 8' i! rrmE rrpoa8~: y A.auKwm8os- 6~pLj.lomhpTJS' . 
8~ ToT' '08vaaila rrpoa£<PTJ yA.auKWTTLS' 'A8~VT]' 
" 8LOyEVES' Aa~:pn6.8l], TTOAUI-l~xav' '08vaaEv, 
'Lax~:o, rrav~: 8€ VELKOS' 61-lmtou TTOAEj.lOLo, 
1-l~ rrws- TOL KpovL8l]s- KqoA.waETUL ~:vpuorra Z~:us-. 
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From amid the smoke of the thunderbolt, Athene addresses Odysseus with a 
double naming that enacts once again his multiple narratives and his particular 
renown.434 But the goddess stages the hero here only to call a halt: 'LaxEo, TTaDE . 
The alternative is the anger of Zeus, and this threat constitutes a self-sufficient 
authority with which to cut short this story of familial revenge. 
More than this, the texture of this ending raises the possibility of another 
kind of narrative again. The language of Laertes' killing of Eupeithes is that of 
Iliadic battle:435 
520 W') <flaTO, KUL p' Ej.lTTVEUO"E j.lEVO') IJ.EYU na>-.Ms- 'AS~Vl]. 
~:v~awvos- 8 • ap • i!rrn Ta t.Los- KoupTJL wya>-.mo, 
attj;a j.lUA' clj.l TTErraA.wv rrpotn 8oALXOO"KLov i!yxos-
KaL ~6.>-.~:v Evrrd8m Kopu8os- 8La xaA-Korrap~LOu. 
T] 8' ovK i!yxos- i!puTo, 8wrrpo 8€ ~:'LaaTo xaA-Kos-· 
525 80UTTT]O"EV 8€ TTEO"WV, apci.~T]O"E 8€ TEUXE' E-rr' UVTWL. 
-._ 
The clatter of Eupeithes' arms about him marks out his death a little differently 
again from the earlier deaths of his fellow-Suitors .436 At this point where the 
end of this Odyssey threatens to become an Iliadic Ithalcialca, in which the status 
of Odysseus's own homecoming narrative will be at stake, Athene and Zeus 
intervene: TTaDE 8E VELKOS' OiJ.OLLou TTOAEiJ.OLo .437 It is ostensibly to avoid the 
434 
435 
436 
437 
Smoke: see Erbse (1972), 191, on tj;oA6~:vTa KEpauvov. Compare Il. 8.133-136, where the 
effect of the apyilm KEpauv6v is more explicit, esp. 135: 8nv~ 8€ <PM~ WpTo 8~:~:[ou 
KULOj.lEVOLO. On naming and referentiality, see esp. Bakker (1997), 156-163; also Dickson 
(1995), 20-25, for helpful comments building on Foley's traditional referentiality to 
describe the evocation of absent narratives. For the tension in staging Odysseus as 
TTOAVTAUS' then TTOAVI-l~xavos- at Od. 24.537, 542, see Peradotto (1990), 168-169. 
Od. 24.520-525. 
Od. 24.525: cipci.~T]O"E 8€ TEVXE' E-rr' avTWL. The clattering of arms is especially frequent 
early in I/ . (4.504, 5.42, 5.58, 5.294, 5.540, 8.260, 13.187, 17.50, 17.311) but only here in Od. 
For the Iliadic language in Od. 24, see Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.516-527; in this 
passage, see Falkner ([1989] 1995), 46. In the battle earlier against the Suitors, note esp. 
Od. 22.241-296, before Athene wields the aegis at 22.297-309; see the detailed analysis 
of Pucci (1987), 128-138; also Lowe (2000), 144: 'Even the studiedly Iliadic combat in 
XXII gives more weight to strategic advantage than is ever the case in the Iliad .' 
Od. 24.543. For this foreclosure of Eupeithes' apparently persuasive alternative version 
of Odysseus's story, note Od. 24.426-428 and see Haubold (2000), 107-108. 
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consequences of strife between the two groups that Athene intervenes, but a 
subtext here is the economy of honour and KA.fOS' which both the Iliad and 
Odyssey take as a central concern in their different ways and in which strife of a 
different sort has its place:~ IJ.MG xal.pw· I ul6S' 8' ulwJJOS' T' apni')S' TTEpL 8fjpLV 
EXOUO"L.438 Laertes has his moment of Iliadic aristeia, and the son and grandson 
leap forward to stake their own claims in the strife of battle.439 The Iliad takes a 
sorrowful view of the viability of father-son relations in the face of the 
exigencies of war and the battlefield; by contrast, the dynamics of this Odyssean 
father-son-grandfather ending are less bleak-so long as this Iliadic moment 
remains momentary?440 The Iliad returns again and again to the theme of 
intergenerational competition, notably in figures like Diomedes as I have 
discussed, but there is no place for such competition in this Odyssean ending, 
just as Odysseus had earlier suppressed Telemakhos's attempt to string the 
bow.441 
The final image of the Odyssey is a reiteration of the presence of Athene 
in the guise of Mentor once again as she imposes the opKLa between the warring 
parties that Zeus has earlier foreshadowed. 442 Athene has already been 
introduced as Mentor. Odysseus and Laertes seem to recognise her-we all 
imagine that we know what Mentor means by now.443 She brings about a 
disarmament by the power of her voice alone. And then comes this final 
reiteration of At~ene's guise amidst the instauration of peace. Her guise here 
438 
439 
440 
441 
442 
443 
Thus Laertes, Od. 24.514-515. But the Odyssey is Odysseus's poem, and he is 'bes t of the 
Achaeans': see Nagy ([1979] 1999), 26-41. The Odyssey does play at ' Iliadic' strife 
elsewhere: compare the VELKOS' of Odysseus and Akhilleus at Od. 8.72-82 that refigures 
the i:'pLS' of Akhilleus and Agamemnon at 11 . 1.6-8, with Nagy ([1979]1999), 22-23, 130-
131. 
See Thalmann (1998), 222: 'It is a measure of how carefully the idealizing s trategy must 
avoid any possibility of conflict between Odysseus and Telemakhos that the 
grandfather is the only one of the three given an individual exploit'. 
On the Iliadic father, see esp. Lynn-George (1988), 241-250. On the topic of 
intergenerational relations in both epics, see esp. Crotty (1994), 24-41; Thalmann (1998), 
206-223; Felson (1999); Felson (2002). Strauss (1993), considers solidarity and conflict in 
Athens, with its Homeric antecedents. Note also Lowe (2000), 151: 'This final 
settlement in both cases movingly juxtaposes the hero's lost reunion with his father 
(allowed in the Odyssey, pointed denied in the Iliad and surrogated instead through 
Priam) with the loss felt by the father(s) of his slain enemies.' 
Diomedes: Agamenon 'blames' him, VELKEOGEV, by comparison with Tydeus, Jl. 4.368; see 
esp. Nagy ([1979]1999), 161-162. Bow: Od. 21 .128-129; see Felson (1994), 84-86, with an 
emphasis on Telemakhos's complicity; Thalmann (1998), 207-209, 217-219, disputes 
aspects of Felson's positive spin on this mom.ent of tension. 
Note Od. 24.482-485, with Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.482-485: 'a slight inconcinnity ... 
surely deliberately introduced to emphasize the decisive role of the gods in the 
establishm.ent of the new order'. 
CompareS. West (1989), 130: 'we have a sense of her divinity being clear despite her 
disguise ' . 
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seems perfunctory, a reflex of her earlier action throughout the epic, yet it is 
insisted upon. Her presence seems hardly posed as a problem, especially since 
the goddess is vital to the action precisely qua goddess. Along with the univocal 
sign of Zeus's thunderbolt few questions remain for the audience about the 
gods' instrumentality in the ending. So why the reiteration of the goddess as 
Mentor? From one perspective, the repetition normalises the arbitrariness of 
the end, by recalling the past presence and actions of Athene in this guise once 
more.444 From another, the abuptness of this ending with the goddess 
compliments the sudden and corresponding absence of narrative(s) that the 
actions of Zeus and Athene serve to bring about: the repetition emphasises the 
arbitrary nature of the end. These perspectives can be taken together: the 
iterability of Athene as Mentor can be read a sign of both order and disorder, 
and as such it replays divine presence as a site of productive disruption. 
Audiences of the epic are in a narrative bind. On the one hand, in this 
reiterative 'ending' we are challenged to interpret, and thus narrativise, the end 
in accordance with the context as we have it. But, on the other hand, we have 
seen how certain narratives have been foreclosed through the decisive 
intervention of Athene and Zeus. One prominent answer to the challenge set by 
the end of the Odyssey narrates the ending as the institution of a new reign of 
divinely located justice to replace the savagery of blood-revenge.445 The 
Odyssey becomes -~ narrative 'of the greatest importance in the history of ideas': 
'LCJXECJ8E TITOAEf.l.OU ... I wr; KEV avaLf.l.WTL yE 8w~epw8f)TE TciXLCJTa.446 In place of the 
endless generation of stories through conflict, we are to have a means of ending 
narrative relatively bloodlessly.447 But to read in this way amounts to complicity 
on our part in the arbitrariness of the ending from without, since the 
motivation for this great leap forward is entirely framed in terms of Zeus and 
Athene, who shut down the potential for an Ithakiaka and impose a 
444 
445 
446 
447 
As do e.g. Wender (1978), 67; Thalmann (1984), 52; Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.548. 
For the end as a 'a new moral order', see e.g. Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.413-548. But see 
a lso Clay (1983), 213-246, who offers a sophisticated view of the Odyssey's 'double 
theodicy'. 
Od. 24.531-532. For the quotation, see Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.482-485. Note the 
suggestive similarity of language here and 24.543-8LaKpLv8flTE Tcixuna ... VELKOS 
Ofl.OLtou TTTOAEfl.OLo-with what Odysseus had said to Penelope about the Trojans, 
18.263-264: o'( TE Tci X LaTa I E.KpLvav 1-lEYa VELKOS Ofl.OLtou TTTOAEfl.OLO. But the context 
makes a grea t difference. 
At least: ink replaces blood in the battle over the Odyssey's end. On the rrE-pas or TE-A.os 
of the Odyssey, see esp. Erbse (1972), 166-177; Moulton (1974), 153-157; Heubeck (ed.) 
(1991), on Od. 23.297. 
,I 
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settlement.448 This is no mortal settlement, but a one-sided arbitration 
predicated upon the authority of a transcendent force, for all the picture that 
Zeus represents of wealth and peace:449 
E-nd 8T] ~-l.VllGTfj pas- h[aa TO 8Los- '08vaaEJJS', 
opKLa TTLGTQ TUfl.OVTES' 0 fl.EV ~aGLAEl!ETW ULEL, 
~fl.ELS' 8' a'& na[8wv TE waL yvf]Twv TE cp6vmo 
485 E'K>-.11aLv eE-wwv· Tol 8' a>--Afl>-.ovs- cpLAEovTwv 
WS' TO napos-, TTAOlJTOS' 8€ IWL Elpflvll GALS' EGTW. 
The families of the Suitors will not so much 'forgo revenge', as Heubeck puts it, 
but more simply 'forget' through the agency of Zeus and Athene: cp6voLo 
EKAT)OW 8E:wf1Ev.45° Things will be 'as before'. The authority of force is crucial 
here: we, like Phemius, will participate in a particular narrative as virtual eo-
conspirators in its structuring of the world.451 But what is the alternative? A 
refusal to participate as audience in the interpretative responses-the adaptive 
narratives-that will forge the significance of this ending? Or an Iliadic narrative 
that must end not in return but in death?452 Or some other narrative 
altogether?453 This coupling of narrative logic and illogic is figured m the 
puzzling yet perfunctory presence of the goddess at the very end of the 
Odyssey. The iterated presence of Athene as Mentor is the location of the 
authority of the end. But it is also the sign of an imposition from without, the 
marker of an authority of force upon whose ability to 'end' the actual ending 
rests. 
In this respect, the ending of the Iliad contrasts with Odyssey 24.454 Where 
the end of the Odyssey stages a foreclosure of narrative, the ending of the Iliad is 
448 
449 
450 
451 
452 
453 
454 
This framing has been recognised, if only to be domesticated thus, as a dea ex machina: 
see Wender (1978), 64, for various versions. 
Od. 24.482-486. 
Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.482-485. 
Phemius pleads for his life at Od . 22.344-355; note esp. 348-349: EOLKa 8€ TOL 
napa£L8nv I ws- TE 8EWL. See Pucci (1987), 228-235, esp. 230: 'This promise seems at any 
rate to be the fictional event from which the song of the Odyssey emerges as the version 
that triumphs over and silences all the others' . Compare S. West (1989), 132-134, for a 
brief provocation on Peisistratean politics and the foreclosure of narrative in Od. 24. On 
Peisistratos and Homer, see esp. Jensen (1980), 128-171. More broadly, for the seductive 
dangers of narra tive and beguilement, see Goldhill (1993), 142-144; and esp. Thalmann 
(1998), 272-305, who builds on the characterisation of the Odyssey as a relatively 
'closed' text developed by Doherty (1995). 
See esp . Pucci (1987), 127-142. 
For a belated narrative that does it differently, and does not s top even with Odysseus's 
death, see the Telegony by Eugammon of Cyrene: Allen (ed.) (1912), 109.5-27. See 
Hansen (1977); Peradotto (1985), 443-444; S. West (1989), 130-132. 
Conversely, on the links between Iliad 24 and the Odyssey as a whole, seeR. B. 
Rutherford (1991-1993), 45-46; N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), 21-24. Compare Seaford 
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worked out through the recollection and generation of narratives in and 
through the ritualised texture of Iliad 24.455 The connections between narrative 
and ritualisation that I have stressed above in relation to the disconcerting 
presence and absence of the gods are realised here in an emphatic form for a 
different purpose: narrativisation and ritualisation offer strategies of control in 
the face of profound loss and grief. In particular, the central moments of 
encounter and ritual supplicancy between Akhilleus and Priamos are structured 
by recollection and narrative. Priamos's first words to Akhilleus are an 
evocation: [1Vfpm TmTpos- cro1o.456 Akhilleus responds initially in silence and 
tears, as the two of them recall those they have lost; but then Akhilleus 
responds with a story about the jars of Zeus and his father Peleus; later he tells 
of Niobe.457 This Niobe narrative ostensibly moves the story towards its end 
when Akhilleus and Priamos seal their temporary reconciliation with a meat 
but it also offers a paradigmatic narrative that points to the lasting profundity 
of loss. As Lynn-George has emphasised, this is a narrative consolation that is in 
fact 'a recognition of the inconsolable' insofar as it narrates the indefinite 
continuance of mourning by the stone Niobe who broods on her sorrows 
yet.45S A complex of ritualisation and narrative concludes the funereal finale of 
Iliad 24 with the successive laments of Andromakhe, Hekabe and Helene, and 
the dawn narrative of Hektor's burial.459 Even as the Iliad itself ends, as Taplin 
has observed, the posting of lookouts in these final lines implicitly foreshadows 
455 
456 
457 
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459 
(1994), 154, on the importance of these ends: 'it is no accident that the process of 
d evelopment in both the Iliad and the Odyssey is detectable in particular in different 
ways of ending the narrative'. 
The language of recollection recurs throughout: 24.4, 9, 129, 167, 216, 428, 486, 504, 509, 
601, 602, 613, 745; see esp. Lynn-George (1996), 15. For iJ.LiJ.vrlCJKW as a key verb in epic 
narration, e.g. I/. 2.492, see Nagy ([1979]1999), 17; Nagy (1990b), 58-59. 
I/. 24.486; cf. 504. 
11. 24.527-551, 599-620; note 601 iJ.VT]awwea, 602 EiJ.V~aaTo, 613 iJ.V~aaT' . On Niobe and the 
disputed lines 614-617, see esp. Lym1-George (1988), 250-252; Seaford (1994), 174-175; 
Lym1-George (1996), 15-16. For various perspectives on the ' invention' of the paradigm, 
see Kakridis (1949), 96-105; Willcock (1964), 141-142; Braswell (1971); Willcock (1977); 
Macleod (ed.) (1982), on 24.596-620; Alden (2000), 21-22. 
Lynn-George (1988), 250; see also Seaford (1994), 175: 'Niobe represents precisely the 
impossibility of a complete return from the liminality of death-like sorrow'. The 
assimilation of the situation to the paradigm is particularly pointed in Niobe's 
diges tive 'brooding', 11. 24.617 TTECJCJEL, a metaphor from the meal: see Lynn-George 
(1988), 151; Lynn-George (1996), 16. Compare Apollo on Akhilleus at 4.513: E-rr\. VT]VCJL 
xo\ov 8viJ.aAyEa TTECJCJEL. 
I/. 24.719-804. Segal (1971), 71, sees the funeral as 'the natural close to a poem which 
has dwelt on the exposure and violation of the corpse'; perhaps 'appropriate' would be 
a better word than 'natural', by which substitution to stress that the ritualised practice 
of the funeral is a means to achieve an end to the anti-ritual that the mutilation 
constitutes; see Redfield ([1975]1994), 167-186, on funeral and antifuneral. 
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assimilation of the situation to the paradigm is particularly pointed in Niobe's 
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xof..ov 8vj.laf..y€a n€aan. 
Il. 24.719-804. Segal (1971), 71, sees the funeral as 'the natural close to a poem which 
has dwelt on the exposure and violation of the corpse'; perhaps 'appropriate' would be 
a better word than 'natural', by which substitution to stress that the ritualised practice 
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the end of the truce and the resumption of the larger story of Troy.460 Prefacing 
the entire book is the sudden resurgence of another narrative, neglected 
elsewhere in the Iliad, that suddenly now serves as a basic point of orientation 
for the gods themselves in their debate over the body of Hektor; this is the 
Judgement of Paris, itself an 'outgrowth' of the story of Peleus and Thetis which 
also surfaces here with all its uneasy connotations.461 In this way, the narratives 
that are told in Iliad 24 themselves point beyond their immediate contexts 
towards the persistent background and lasting consequences of the events that 
the Iliad depicts. 
Now the narrative complex of Iliad 24 is intensely familiar. 462 I want to 
focus in particular on how both the presence and the absence of the gods play 
fundamental parts in the generation of authority and legitimation at the end of 
the Iliad. If the end of the Odyssey is paradigmatic for how the end can be 
imposed arbitrarily through the active presence of the gods, the Iliad 
complicates this picture by exploring how the displacement of the gods at a 
point of intense encounter between mortals generates a legitimacy that the 
authority of power alone cannot quite achieve. In this respect the encounter 
between Akhilleus and Priamos works itself out in terms that are highly 
significant for my consideration of the play of presence and perception in the 
interface between gods and mortals . This encounter is a kind of negative 
epiphany, in which Akhilleus and Priamos seem to achieve a strange JJnttuality 
of otherness that could never quite be possible in an encounter between 
mortals and gods. But, of course, the active presence of the gods remains a 
fundamental boundary condition for the very possibility of this encounter. It is 
in this curious interweaving of divine and mortal action that much of the 
significance of the end of the Iliad lies. Closer attention to the play of the 
presence and absence of the gods shows the fundamental roles that these 
460 
461 
462 
Taplin (1992), 283: 'The Trojans look out from the eleventh day in anticipation of the 
twelfth.' 
Judgement of Paris: If. 24.24-30; for a survey of a passage contested since antiquity, see 
N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.23-30; but also Reinhardt ([1960]1997a); Stinton 
([1965]1990); Davies (1981); Taplin (1992), 261-262; Jones (1997), 18-20. For this story as 
an 'outgrowth' of the wedding of Peleus and Thetis, see Nagy ([1979]1999), 62. Peleus 
and Thetis: 24.59-63; see esp. Slatkin (1991), 53-84, and, on the narrative allusiveness of 
these lines, Scodel (1977). 
See recently Macleod (ed.) (1982), 8-35; Lynn-George (1988), 230-276; Taplin (1992), 260-
284; Crotty (1994), esp. 3-23; Lynn-George (1996); Kim (2000), 9-34, 130-151. Note also 
the d ebate on ethical practices in C. Gill, Postlethwaite and Seaford (edd.) (1998) 
between Zanker (1998), who builds on Zanker (1994), 127-154; Postlethwaite (1998); and 
C. Gill (1998), 312-313. There is n o longer a need to defend the place of 11. 24 in the Iliad : 
see Beck (1964); Deichgraber (1972); Macleod (ed.) (1982), 8-35; Edwards (1987), 301-
303. 
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epiphanic moments of productive disruption fulfill, both in achieving an end 
and in provoking the production of narratives through which to explore the 
significance of this end. 
In the first place, the presence of the authoritative word of Zeus operates 
as an index of his effective power to prescribe an end to Hektor's story that will 
somehow satisfy the competing allegiances that run through the Iliad. 
Reciprocity and its neglect, among both gods and mortals, is the theme around 
which the opening scenes of Iliad 24 revolve. In his unending defilement of 
Hektor's body in honour of Patroklos Akhilleus has 'destroyed pity' and has no 
shame; the honour that Hektor has done the gods demands recompense; the 
ties of birth and nurture demand due respect. 463 Zeus adjudicates that these ties 
of reciprocity are not to constitute a zero-sum game: ou 1-lEV yap TLI-lll yE ~1t' 
E-aanm.464 The god's next step is decisive as he moves to deploy his effective 
word, nuKLvov E-nos-, which, as Lynn-George has shown, structures the narrative 
of the end of the Iliad as it is passed on to both Akhilleus and Priamos.465 This 
word achieves a double resolution of the conflicting ties of divine parental care 
and reciprocal action between mortals and gods. This complex prefigures the 
reciprocal exchange that will later take place when Priamos and Akhilleus use 
father-son relations as the mode through which to structure their respective 
participation in ritualised supplication. An important aspect of this mirroring of 
resolution on botb divine and human levels is that it underlines how Zeus's 
adjudication and deployment of his word makes a judgement on the ending of 
the Iliad, with all the consequences that this brings for how authority and 
legitimacy will play out. The story of Troy itself has an 'end', but this is not to be 
the end of the Iliad as such, and what is evoked instead are paradoxical relations 
of care between mortals and gods. Compare Zeus's words to Poseidon in the 
divine cow1cil at the beginning of Iliad 20: 1-lEA.oual. 1-lOL 6AA.u1-1Evol. nEp.466 An 
alternative perspective is offered by Akhilleus later in Iliad 24: auToL 8E T' 
463 
464 
465 
466 
Akhilleus's actions: I/. 24.3-18. See esp. Redfield ([1975]1994), 203; Lynn-George (1988), 
230. Apollo on Akhilleus: I/ . 24.44-45, WS' 'AXLAEl.IS' EAEOV flEV ClTTWAECJEV, ou8E: oL 
alows- I ytvnm; cf. Kim (2000), 12, 32. Compare Hekabe on Akhilleus at 24.207-208, 
with Segal (1971), 58-59, 61. Reciprocal care for Hektor: 24.33-35, 66-70. Hera on the 
ties of birth: 24.56-64. On the significance of the scene: e .g. Taplin (1992), 262. 
I/. 24.66. 
Zeus's word: I/. 24.75. Iris brings it to Priamos: 24.159-188. Thetis brings it to Akhilleus: 
24.121-140. For ' the word of the father' in the structure of Iliad 24, see esp. Lynn-George 
(1988), 231-233. For the semantics of TTUKLv6s- , see esp. Lynn-George (1988), 232; Martin 
(1989), 35-36. 
I/. 20.21; but note Zeus's continuation, 22-23: at..A' TlTOL flEV E-yw flEVEW TTTUXL OuAUflTTOLO 
I Tjwvos-, i!v8' 6p6wv cppE:va TE:ptJ;of.iaL. For such divine 'enjoyment', see Burkert ([1960] 
1997), 258: 'an expression of a dreadful, uncanny superiority' . 
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<1Krl8EES' ELatv.467 A further perspective is given expression in the context of the 
battle between the gods in Iliad 21, when Apollo refuses to fight Poseidon for 
the sake of mortals, whose lives are like leaves in their flourishing and dying.468 
But why then are they there at Troy at all? Apollo turns away and remains 
silent in the face of Artemis' abuse.469 Yet shortly afterwards he is to be found 
defending Troy itself, taking care that the wall does not fall on that day imE-p 
f16pov, 'contrary to fate' :470 
j.lEj.l~t..no yap o\. TELXOS' E-u8j.l~Tow n6t..TJOS' , 
j.l~ t.avao\. TTEpanav i.mE-p jJ.6pov TJj.lUTL KELVWL. 
This is 'care' for the end of Troy, for an appropriate end of Troy, and it 
functions, like all such avoidances of what is imE-p fl.Opov, just as much a trope of 
narrative control as an expression of the gods' intense involvement in the fate 
of Troy.471 Against the backdrop of these varying reflections on the gods' own 
participation in the Iliadic narrative, the forms of care for Hektor and for 
Akhilleus that Zeus expresses in his adjudication gain a particular poignancy.472 
Conflict between these mortal endings and divine endlessness becomes acute in 
these concluding stages of the Iliadic narrative. The presence of Zeus's effective 
word enacts a particular response to this challenge of endings as it structures 
the end itself. 
Zeus's word is passed on by divine intermediaries to Priamos and 
Akhilleus. The cl1_allenge of encompassing the present authority of this word 
within a community is demonstrated in the exchange between Hekabe and 
Priamos that follows Priamos' s announcement of his intention to ransom 
Hektor from Akhilleus himself.473 In the face of Hekabe's horror, Priamos at 
first simply insists on the presence of the god (Iris, but Priamos does not 
specify) and the effectiveness of the word:474 
467 
468 
469 
470 
471 
472 
473 
474 
I/. 24.526. See esp. Lym1-George (1996), 6-9. Compare Macleod (ed.) (1982), on I/ . 24.525-
6: 'the gods, who in this book show their pity for men and demand that men pity each 
other, also will human suffering and never share it.' Contrast the relative weakness of 
N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.525-6: 'the point is ... that the gods' troubles do not 
strike deep'. 
Il. 21.462-467. 
Artemis's abuse: 1/. 21.471-478. 
Il. 21.516-517. 
See esp . Lowe (2000), 54-59, 103-128; but what his game-like model of narrative 
necessarily downplays is the extent to which rules and end-game themselves develop 
and structure each other as the narrative progresses. 
Compare Whitman (1958), 228: ' the view of the gods, who know the end, poignantly 
juxtaposed to the efforts of the mortals who do not'. 
Priamos and Hekabe: 1/. 24.191-227. 
1/ . 24.223-224. 
vuv 8', Ul!TOS' yap aKouaa 8EOU KUL EGEOpaKOV aVTTlV, 
ELIJ.L, KUL oux clALOV ETTOS' EGGETaL. 
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Zeus's word now is now Priamos's word as well.475 But in explicit deference to 
Hecuba's request and in implicit response to the opVL') l(ai(O') that Hecuba's 
earlier objections constitute, Priamos resorts to strategic ritualisation, and 
before setting out he makes a libation and prayer for a favourable omen- the 
only time in the Iliad an omen is prayed for. 476 The unusual nature of this prayer 
reflects the w1usual self-consciousness of Priamos's presentification of Zeus's 
word. Priamos's strategy aims to make present the communicative authority of 
Zeus's TIVKLvov E-nos- to the Trojan community at large. The flight of the omen-
eagle through the city of Troy renders this presence apparent to all, and its 
unusual form, presenting a simile within an omen, demands an active response 
from the audience of the epic that assimilates us with the Trojans as interpreters 
of this presence, manifest in the form of an eagle, TE-f. .. n6TaTov TIETETlvwv, the 
'most perfect' or 'accomplishing' of birds.477 
Still, it must be remembered that Priamos does no more here than 
extend the relation between himself and Zeus that Zeus has earlier initiated. The 
relational circle which Priamos extends here by his ritualised strategy to 
encompass the rest of Troy already animates Priamos himself. His words to 
Hekabe reflect this animative power: Elfl.L, KaL ovx aALOV E1TO') ECYO'ETaL. But later 
in Iliad 24, the star~ difference between the gods and mortals in their respective 
abilities to generate this kind of effective presence is given a distressing 
emphasis in the funeral of Hektor. Lynn-George has rightly stressed 'the 
inconsolable echo' of Zeus's word when Andromakhe concludes her lament 
over the corpse of her dead husband Hektor with the absence of an 'intimate 
word', nvKLvov E-nos-, from Hektor himsel£:478 
475 
476 
477 
478 
ou yap IJ.OL 8vr'!wKwv AfXEwv EK XE'LpaS' opE/.;aS', 
ou8€ TL IJ.OL E1 TTES' TTUKLVov ETTOS', ov TE KEV atd 
Compare Thetis's reply to Iris when she brings Zeus's summons, If. 24.92: ELIJ.L IJ.EV, ou8' 
clALOV ETTOS' EGGETaL, OTTL KEV E'LTTllL. 
Hecuba's reques t: ll. 24.286-298. Priamos's deference: 24.300-301. Ill omen: 24.219. 
Libation and prayer: 24.302-314. For the prayer for an omen, compare Od. 3.173, 20.97-
104; note N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.292-298. Such requests have been seen, as by 
Stockinger (1959), 50, as evidence of a radically different religious mentality, but this is 
to disregard narrative context. 
T/ . 24.315. See esp. Ahnhalt (1995). For TEAELOTaTov, compare If . 8.247; see Stockinger 
(1959), 49 n. 91; Macleod (ed.) (1982), on 24.315; N . J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.314-
316. 
Il. 24.743-745. See Lynn-George (1988), 232-233. For this 'intimate' word, cf. Taplin 
(1992), 281 : 'she has no intimate last memory'. 
I I I 
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In the face of the exigencies of mortal fate, here expressed in the implicit 
opposition between dying in one's own bed and dying in extremis, 
Andromakhe contemplates the absence of a word which might have provided a 
consolatory presence in the form of continuous recollection: ou TE KEV- aLEL 
iJ.EiJ.VllLiJ.llV. The index of the end returns as an absence at the end. This absence 
reasserts lack even in the midst of the actualisation of closure that the funeral 
narrative comprises: this 'fracture' points again to the basic difference between 
gods and mortals, which the structuring presence of Zeus's word at the end of 
the Iliad only partially offsets.479 
In contrast with this affecting absence, the effectiveness of Zeus's word in 
Iliad 24 is more fully realised in the role that Hermes fulfills in escorting Priamos 
to Akhilleus. As Priamos sets out from the city, his family follow him out and 
lament his journey as if into a world of death: cpLAOL 8' C4J.a mivTES' E:novTo I 
n6\A' 6\ocpupoiJ.EVOL Ws- EL 8cwaT6v8E KL6vTa.480 This prospect prompts Zeus's 
instructions to Hermes:481 
'EpJ.lda, CJot yap TE J.lUALCJTa YE <PthaT6v E-CJnv 
335 avop\. hmpLCJCJaL, Kal T' EKAUES" tilL K' E-8fA.llLCJ8a, 
~aCJK' '(8L w\. TiptaJ.lov Kot\as- E-rr\. vfjas- 'Axmwv 
ws- c'iyay', WS" J.liJT' c'ip TLS" '(811L J.liJT' c'ip TE voiJCJllL 
TWV c'i\Awv t.avawv, rrp\.v nll\dwva8' LKECJ8m. 
In getting Priamos to Akhilleus unperceived by the Greeks at large, Hermes' 
power is several ti~es essential, when he puts the Achaian guards to sleep and 
lifts the bar on the door to Akhilleus's compound.482 Akhilleus later comments 
on the evident necessity of such divine assistance.483 In mediating Priamos's 
movement across these domain-boundaries, as has been observed, Hermes 
functions as a quasi-tJ;uxonoiJ.TIOS', a role he fulfills in Odyssey 24; the journey 
across the plain of Tray, especially, takes on the features of a transitional zone 
479 
480 
481 
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483 
The specific, programmatic effect of this reappearance of Zeus's word is subsumed 
beneath a broader point about epic by Lynn-George (1988), 232-233: 'The iteration 
fractures the word of the father, opening the enduring, irreducible gap in and of 
language in the epos for which there will be no final word, only the fragile 
reverberations of language in the void'. 
11. 24.327-328. Elsewhere, the gods call Patroklos and Hektor 8avaT6v8E: Il . 16.693, 
22.297; for the comparison, see N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.327-328; for this as a 
portent, see Deichgraber (1972), 58-59. 
I/. 24.334-338 . On the motivation, 'nur scheinbar neu', for Zeus sending Hermes as escort, 
itself already anticipated at 24.152-158=181-187, see Beck (1964), 192-193. 
Guards: 1/. 24.445-447. Akhilleus's compound: 24.453-457. On this compound as a House 
of Hades, see Stanley (1993), 239; on its unexpected constructedness, see Lynn-George 
(1988), 236-237. 
I/. 24.563-567, esp. 563-564: Kal Of CJE YLVWCJKW, Tiptaw' <f>pECJLV, ou8E- J.lE \i]8ELS"' I lhn 
8Ewv TLS" CJ' ~YE 8oas- E-rr\. vfjas- 'Axmwv; cf. Ahnhalt (1995), 284-285. 
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into another world.484 The basic function of Bermes here is precisely to render 
what would otherwise have been a journey for Priamos to a literal death into 
another kind of journey altogether. Redfield even glosses this 'rite of departure 
and crossing over' as an inclusion in the divine world.485 Bermes is directly 
engaged in constructing the boundary conditions that enable Priamos and 
Akhilleus to meet and fulfill their parts in the execution of Zeus's structuring 
word. 
Even though Priamos has earlier been told by Iris that Bermes will 
escort him, it is not tmtil they reach the threshold of Akhilleus's hut that 
Bermes actually reveals himself to Priamos:486 
460 w yEpov, ~TaL E-yw Seas GiJ.~poTos dAi]Aouea, 
'EpjJ.ELUS' ' GOL yap iJ.E 1WT~p cliJ.U 110j.l110V onaaaEV . 
clAA' ~TOL iJ.EV E-yw miALV c'LaOiJ.aL, ov8' 'AXLAfjos 
o<f>8aAiJ.OUS' c'laELjJ.L · VEiJ.EaGTJTOV 8E KEV E'LTJ, 
aeavaTOV 8EOV W8E ~POTOUS' ayana(EIJ.EV GVTTJV. 
465 n)vTJ 8' dacA8wv Aa~E- yovvaTa TITJAdwvos. 
Kat iJ.LV imE-p naTpos Kat iJ.TJTEpos r1DKOIJ.OLO 
ALGGEO KUL TEKEOS' , 'Lva ol auv 8UiJ.OV 6pl.VT]LS'. 
With his first words Bermes reiterates the polarity between mm·tals and gods. 
He then declares that it would be VE!-1EO'CJTlT6v for him to go into the hut of 
Akhilleus alongside the suppliant Priamos, a86.vaTOV 8EOV iiDE ~pOTOUS' 
ayarra(E:wv aVTT)V. What exactly is this that prompts the god to speak of a 
constraint upon his actions in terms of VE!-1EO'LS'? Discussions of these lines have 
tended to focus on the meaning of ayaTTa(E:wv and the potential for ambiguity 
in the syntax-who is greeting whom and what such 'greeting' here might 
entail-with the explanation that for Bermes openly to receive Akhilleus's 
hospitality here would be inappropriate.487 But more interesting is the reference 
of c18E, which may on the one hand point back to the prospective 'eyes of 
Akhilleus', but more specifically directs attention forward to Bermes' specific 
instructions to Priamos on ritualised supplication in the following lines. It is 
484 
485 
486 
487 
Od . 24.1-4; cf. Heubeck (ed.) (1991), on 24.1-4. For Priamos's journey as katabnsis, see the 
summary by Nethercut (1976), 5, but esp. Stanley (1993), 237-240. See also Whitman 
(1958), 217-218; Segal (1971), 66-67; Nagler (1974), 184-185; Redfield ([1975]1994), 214; 
Frame (19.78), 153-155; Mackie (1996), 290-291. Compare Seaford (1994), 166-176, on the 
liminality of death-like sorrow. For Hermes as mediator of boundaries, see Kahn 
(1978), esp . 178-179; Sourvinou-Inwood (1995), 103-106. 
Redfield ([1975]1994), 214: 'As Priam separates himself from his own world, he is, in a 
limited but real sense, included in the divine world.' 
Il. 24 .460-467. West (ed .) (1998-2000) deletes 24.466-467. 
On the syntax and meaning, see N . J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.462-70; LfrgE, sv. 
ayana(w, ayanaw; also Cairns (1993), 54; M. Scott (1980), 28. 
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precisely the supplication of Akhilleus that is the specific context for this 
prospective VEf-LECJLS' and not hospitality in some more general sense. Hermes' 
concerns are more specific: to play even a peripheral part here would interfere 
with the negotiation of claims in this supplication in an unconscionable way.488 
Having come so far already in facilitating the recovery of Hektor's body, 
Hermes will not himself cross the threshold into the gaze of Akhilleus in this 
context of supplication. This is a crucial moment in the dynamic of divine 
presence and absence in Iliad 24. 
The precise terms of Zeus's nomination of Hermes for this role as guide 
across the plain of Troy offer a curious gloss on Hermes' reticence to appear 
before Akhilleus:489 
'Epf!da, ao\. yap TE f!af-wni yE cpthaT6v Eanv 
335 av8p\. hmptaam, KUL T' EKAUES' <1L K' E8EAT]La8a, 
~aaK' t8L 
Zeus stresses precisely Hermes' propensity to associate with mortals however 
he wishes. Hermes' peculiar abilities as a mediator of boundaries fil1ds 
expression here in relation to the hierarchical boundary between men and gods. 
The phrase avop't. hmplcmm is of particular interest. In the few other occurrences 
of this particular verb in early epic, it serves to underline a likeness between the 
two parties implicated, as in Iliad 13 when Deiphobos wonders whether to find a 
companion in the,battle or go it alone, or in the Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite when 
the Graces are said to associate with the gods on terms of parity: d( TE 8EoLCJL I 
TTQCJLV hmpl(oUCJL KaL a8avaTOL KaA.E-ovTm.490 But here the two parties are a 
'man' and a god, and to this extent Hermes' mediating role is given a gloss by 
Zeus that is highly specific to the situation, insofar as it foregrounds the 
question of how men and gods relate.491 These are favourable conditions that 
1.mderpin Hermes' crucial role il1 facilitating the ritualised supplication of 
Akhilleus by Priamos; but they emphasise all the more strongly the god's 
choice to reject the possibility of his stepping over the threshold with Priamos 
into the gaze of Akhilleus, and thus to be present avnw, 'face-to-face', while 
Priamos's supplication of Akhilleus takes place. At this key point, it is not 
appropriate even (or especially?) for Hermes, mediator par excellence, to be 
488 
489 
490 
491 
See esp. Could (1973), 93-94, on the close rela tionship of hiketeia and xenia, yet their 
crucial inversion of each other. 
ll. 24.334-339. 
Deiphobos: I/ . 13.456. Graces: HomHyn111Aph 95-96. 
The association is not between av8pw1TOS', 'human', and god, which might be to push a 
lexical boundary too far : for the categorical distinctions avilP/av8pwlTOS' and 
8EOS' /av8pw1TOS', see Bernadete (1963), 1-5. 
165 
present, despite the fact that the gods themselves are responsible for the 
conditions of possibility of this ritualised rapprochement between bereaved 
father and his son's vengeful killer. The exchange of ransom for body has been 
set in motion by Zeus's authoritative word; the two mortal participants are 
acting in explicit obedience to this word; Hermes' role as escort is the last of the 
conditions necessary for the meeting to take place. The possibility of 
supplication is explicitly dependent upon the active facilitating presence of the 
god as Priamos's guide, but nonetheless for the god to be present at the ritual 
itself would apparently be to step beyond bounds of due order. 
What results when Priamos himself does take the step that the god will 
not take? The lengthy scene that ensues as Priamos secures Akhilleus's 
acceptance of the ransom and then eats with the Greek warrior is structured 
above all around two moments of face-to-face encounter.492 Priamos first 
eludes the gaze of Akhilleus and his attendants, until he is in the very position 
of suppliancy:493 
TOUS' 8' EAa8' ElCJEA8wv Tipl.a~OS' ~EYGS', ayxL 8' apa CJTaS' 
XEpal.v 'AxLAf.-i'joS' M~E yovvam Kal. KVCJE XE'LpaS' 
8ELVUS' av8pocp6vov<;'' a'( ol TTOAEGS' KTavov ULGS'. 
480 WS' 8' ih' av av8p' UTll TTUKLV~ Aa~lll, OS' T' EVL TTaTpllL 
cp6ha KaTaKTELVaS' a\\wv E~LKETO 8i'j~ov, 
civ8pOS' ES' cicpvnou, ea~~OS' 8' EXEL daopOWVTaS', 
w<; 'AXLAEUS' 8a~~llCJEV lowv Tipl.a~ov 8EOEL8Ea · 
ea~~T]CJGV 8£ Kal. UAAOL, ES' ci\M\ov<;' 8£ 'l8ovTo. 
Akhilleus' amazement and wonder at the sudden appearance of TTpl.allOS' llEyas-
is compared to the amazement and wonder provoked by the arrival of an 
exiled homicide.494 There is altogether something strange in his appearance; this 
strangeness is realised for the audience of the epic in what Lynn-George terms 
'a sudden spiralling of associative relations' evoked by the simile of supplication 
in the midst of 'this spectacle of supplicating'.495 Akhilleus looks at Priamos and 
is amazed; the others with him are amazed and look at one another. Priamos is 
now TTpLallOS' llEyas- and TTpl.a1.1ov 8Eon8E-a.496 The strangeness of this encounter 
492 
493 
494 
495 
496 
Compare Knox (1988), 5 n. 12: 'what moves Achilles throughout this scene is his own 
response to Priam's condition, and this is virtually immediate with Priam's 
appearance'. 
I/. 24.477-484. 
On the simile and the refractive challenges it poses, see esp. Heiden (1998); also Could 
(1973), 96 and n. 111: 'the monstrous tension of the moment'; Lynn-George (1988), 239-240; 
N . J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.480-4; Seaford (1994), 70. 
Lynn-George (1988), 239. 
Tipl.a~OS' ~EyaS' occurs only here: see N. J. Richardson (ed.) (1993), on 24.477-9. 
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1s staged a second time when, their transaction and meal now complete, 
Akhilleus and Priamos sit and wonder at each other:497 
aimrp hrEt rr6aLos- Kat €8T]Tuos- €~ ifpov E!vTo, 
~TOL .0.ap8avl8T]S' TiplaiJ.OS' Sauj.la(' 'AXLAf)a 
630 oaaos- ET] V o\.6,;- TE 0 8EOLO"L yap avTa EWLKEL 0 
aimrp o .0.ap8avl8T]V TiplaiJ.OV SaviJ.a(Ev 'AXLAAEus-
Elaop6wv otj!LV T' ayaSiw KUL iJ.DSov clKOUWV. 
In this moment the language of divinity and the shock of presence is further 
amplified. Here the mutuality of the encounter between Akhilleus and Priamos 
reaches a pitch where it come to embody a kind of reciprocal epiphany between 
two 'godlike' mortals.498 This is a fitting seal upon the significant action that 
Akhilleus and Priamos have just made complete. But more than this, it 
constitutes a negative of epiphany, where epiphany is understood to denote the 
dynamic of divine presence and absence and mortal perception. What Akhilleus 
and Priamos achieve is a state without flux or dynamic, a singular moment of 
intersubjectivity that fills an indefinite length of time with the simple fact of 
their encounter. In the midst of a sequence in which the Iliad places most 
emphasis on the radical difference between mortal and immortal versions of 
the scope for authoritative action, Akhilleus and Priamos appropriate from the 
gods the tropes of presence and share this presence instead between 
themselves. The absence of Hermes takes on a peculiar character when the 
encounter betweer~. warrior and king is understood in this way. His absence is 
the condition of this negatively epiphanic moment between mortals. 
This moment is the focus of many readings of the Iliad, especially insofar 
as the encounter is understood to offer an affirmation of deep humanity amid 
death and despair.499 The mutual 'epiphany' of Akhilleus and Priam is a 
touchstone in readings of the legitimacy of the end of the Iliad, as a profound 
meditation on the nature of humanity, on the possibility of significant care, or 
even an affirmation of the fundamental importance of ritual in the history of 
civilisation.500 The play of divine presence and absence as a force of disruption is 
crucial here, in the interplay between the authority of the gods to end our 
narratives and the potential for mortals to generate specifically human 
497 
498 
499 
500 
If . 24.628-632. 
Compare Stanley (1993), 243: 'Priam and Akhilleus part in an atmosphere of mutual 
respect that has revealed something of divinity in each'. 
An elegant statement of the case remains the key achievement of Macleod (ed.) (1982). 
Compare Seaford (1994), 71: 'Ritual has created a miracle, a unity of opposites'. In 
accordance with this emphasis, Seaford resolutely downplays the role that the gods' 
presence, as word and as escort, plays in making this ritualised moment possible. 
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meanings m and around these narrative-ends. There is a stark contrast 
betweeen this Iliadic end and the dynamic of presence at the end of the Odyssey, 
which I discussed above. There Athene's reiterated presence marked the 
authority of the end in its unequal arbitration of claims and foreclosure of the 
narrative; here the presence of Hermes before and after the encounter between 
Akhilleus and Priamos serves to frame the strange mutuality of their presence 
in the absence of the god, a moment in which much of the legitimacy of the end 
of the Iliad is understood to lie. In each case, the play of divine presence and 
absence is a crucial part of the process of the end, but each in strikingly different 
ways. These endings offer different provocations to their audiences that arise 
out of the dynamics of presence as figured in interactions between mortals and 
gods. The juxtaposition of narrative end and the tropes of presence provides a 
particular opportunity for considering how the strategies of epic narrative 
relate to the strategies of narrativisation that I locate in the contexts of divine 
epiphany. In both cases, we are drawn into judgements about the legitimacy of 
the actions in which we participate as audiences and participants in these 
institutional monuments of epic speech. 
• • 
In this chapter, I have tried to destabilise 'divine epiphany' as a category, to 
show how divine epiphany is constituted in a play of presence and absence in 
which perception and interpretation are always problems. If we can talk of a 
grammar of epiphany at all, this grammar is fractured . The long arm of Zeus is 
a potent example of this play of presence; for characters like Hektor the ensuing 
problems of perception and interpretation entail profound consequences. But I 
have also tried to show how this is a productive process. Divine epiphanies 
constitute moments of anti-structure around which cluster structuring 
responses. The resources of language to encompass anti-structure in figurative 
terms is vital to the communicative project of Homeric epic, and instances like 
the meteoric descent of Athene illustrate the participatory challenges that such 
figuration holds out for its (multiple) audiences. In this respect, epiphany is not 
constituted by ritual, for all that ritualisation is a frequent concomitant of the 
structuring responses that are evoked in and around the flux of divine presence 
and absence. Contingency is everywhere introduced by the gods' potential for 
being and acting; the narratives that are told and the rituals that are enacted are 
'I I 
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all ways of making 'sense' of indeterminacy. Sense in such contexts 
encompasses both perception and significance, since what people perceive and 
how they perceive it are fundamentally implicated in how they constitute value 
in the world; the demands of sense, as understood in this way, are particularly 
pressing when it comes to confronting the anomic, the counterintuitive, the 
disruptive. The poetic exploration of such situations offers particular techniques 
for working out how this confrontation affects the world, as we might 
understand it to be. The poetic speech of epic narrative elucidates fundamental 
aspects of the formation of the present world in the heroic past for our 
appreciation and wonderment. In and around such narratives of divine 
presence and absence the most basic and the most complex aspects of human 
existence are reflected, constructed and explored. 
3. Refractions of presence: 
a con cl us ion 
A light is moving down the beach. 
It wavers. Comes towards the fleet. 
The hulls like upturned glasses made of jet. 
Is it a god? 
No details 
Yet. 
Christopher Logue, War Music. 
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My first chapter began with two stories. The first became a central instance in 
showing how epiphany in Homer is not itself a ritual event, but is made sense 
of through productive practices of narrativisation and ritualisation. The second 
was about a certain Sostrata and how an initial failure of ritual was overturned 
by the unexpected presence of Asklepios:1 
Tav TE rrapouatav Tav aino[u rr]apEvE<PcivL~E 6 'Am<A.amos- Kal. 
'LaTpa EKEAETO cm[ohTE~TTELV ELS' 'ErrU8a]up[ov.] 
Just how Asklepios 'indicated his presence' is not told. The vagueness of 
rrapEvE<PcivL~E conceals much, even though it utilises the vocabulary of 'showing' 
often found in contexts of divine presence.2 In the iconography of Asklepios, his 
2 
IG IV2, 1, 122.34-35; for the full text as given by LiDormici (ed.) (1995), 104, see above, p. 5. 
See e.g. Pucci (1987), 110 n. 1, on cpa(vw8m. For a focus on what is seen in healing 
experiences, compare IG IV2, 1, 121 .113-119: a double vision of snake and man, as external 
and internal views on the same event; and see also the relief dedicated by Archinos to 
Amphiaraos at Oropos (Athens Nat. Mus. 3369): see Herzog (1931), 87-89; Hausmarm 
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presence is often envisaged as that of a dignified bearded man, not inconsistent 
with his initial description in Sostrata's story as a EimpElTi)S' aviw.3 But this 
vagueness is effectively obviated when Asklepios demands ritual 
acknowledgment of his presence. This demand integrates his extra-ritual 
performance within the more familiar sequence of ritual plea, healing, and 
thanks that the Epidaurian healing-stories offer as paradigm.4 In this way the 
initiat unsettling absence of the god from the centre of the ritual frame is 
overcome, in a movement from divine absence and the ineffectiveness of ritual 
action to decisive divine presence that prescribes recognition of the same ritual 
contexts that have apparently failed in the first instance. Asklepios's appearance 
subverts the conventional practices of this incubation-cult, even as the narrative 
as a whole functions as a kind of limit case of the effectiveness of the cult-
practice at Epidauros. What this story shows emerging from the anti-logic of 
epiphany is a patently strategic imbrication of epiphany and ritual. This 
dynamic of structure and anti-structure is the central process that this thesis has 
set out to explore. 
Some of the features of this story raise further questions. In particular, 
the interaction of bodies and gods in a narrative such as this-namely the 
surgical intervention of the god-speak of the implications of divine presence 
and absence for basic aspects of human bodily existence. In the previous 
chapter I discuss~d the effects of Apollo's embodied hand on Patroklos as an 
unmaking of Patroklos as a warrior by reducing him to a passive body that is 
entirely vulnerable in its battlefield 'nudity'.s I also touched on the mutability of 
the body of rro\{!Tporros- Odysseus, as a kind of limit-case of what is possible for 
humans by contrast with the mutable figuration of form that is the basic 
3 
4 
5 
(1948), 55-58, 169, no. 31, pl. 2; van Straten (1976), 4-5; Boardman (1995), 131-132, fig . 142; 
Depew (1997), 256-257; Osborne (1998), 211, fig. 127; note esp. van Straten (1981), 125: 'one 
might perhaps consider the possibility that Archinos had the eyes added to his relief, 
not in gratitude for the recovery of the power of sight (opacns- ), but to render thanks for 
the vision (opa[la .. . ) he saw in his dream'. 
IG IV2, 1, 122.30. For the iconography of Asklepios, see Holtzmann (1984), and within the 
Epidaurian iamata, compare IG IV2, 1, 121 .118-119: vcavLCJKOV dmpnrfj; 122.61-62: TTa'Ls-
TLS' wpa'Los-; though in both cases it is possible that one of Asklepios's associates is present 
rather than the god himself. 
For the didactic ftmction of the Epidaurian healing-stories, see Dillon (1994), and cf. 
above, p. 14 n. 38. For backgrOLmd, see Herzog (1931), 46-64; Chaniotis (1988), 19-23; 
LiDonnici (1992), (ed .) (1995), 40-49. For ritual practice at Epidauros, see IG IV2, 1, 121.41-
42, and LSCGS 22, a fragment of 4th cent. BCE cult regulations; note also LSCGS 11 (IG u z, 
47) and LSCG 21 (IG II 2, 4962) : respectively, sacrifices to Asklepios in a festival context 
and prior to incubation, early 4th cent. BCE Athens; cf. Parker (1996), 181-182. For an 
early (comic) accow1t of incubation (in the Asklepieion in Piraeus?), see Aristophanes' 
Ploutos with Sommerstein (ed.) (2001). 
See above, pp . 77-79. 
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potential of gods.6 In a similar way, the 'long arm of Zeus' played a central role 
in opening up the problematic of divine presence and absence, and in 
underlining the consequences this problematic brings for figures like Hektor in 
'sensing' what is really at stake in the presence and absence of Zeus, namely his 
own life. Examples like these underline the deep implications of the presence of 
gods in the world, not just for 'cosmic' order and other aspects of significance 
conceived in more or less intellectualist terms, but for the specific existential 
basis of people's dwelling in the world. 
In Sostrata's case, the specificity of the narrative comes down to a couple 
of washbasins of [something] removed from her body by the god. Editors, in 
medical mode, restore 'creatures' .7 But such considerations should not obscure 
the direct importance of what is concealed in this textual break within the 
healing process that Sostrata undergoes: the removal of these putative 
'creatures' from Sostrata's stomach constitutes, in her restoration to well-being, 
an objective correlate of the god's presence that Sostrata might then live out 
each day.s From a state of despair (E-1-1 -rravTl. E-oDaa) Sostrata is made healthy by 
the god (no~aas- u[yvf1]) .9 What could be more immediate than this (potentially 
ongoing) bodily realisation of the efficacious presence of the god as manifest in 
the absence of illness? What better testimonial? The narrative does not extend 
beyond the point of Sostrata's healing and Asklepios's self-revelation and 
command, since for its readers the narrative itself constitutes the correlate of 
---.. 
Sostrata's return to health, as encountered in the monumental context of the 
Epidaurian healing-stories. It is the narrative as experience-in-itself that opens 
up the effectiveness of Asklepios-cult to those who stop to read . 
The history of the reception of the Epidaurian healing-narratives m 
modern scholarship is intriguing in this respect. Edelstein and Edelstein sketch a 
transition from a face-value acceptance of Asklepios-cures in 17th century 
Europe into more naturalistic frameworks of explanation, a process further 
6 
7 
8 
9 
See above, pp . 114-116, 119-120. 
IG IV2, 1, 122.32-33: Tay KOLALaV avTas avaxtaas E-cmpEL 1TAfj8os ([wu1Jtwv 1Tclj.l]1TOAU, 
[8u]E rro8avLTITfjpas. On ([wu1Jtwv or ([u'llwv, see LiDonnici (ed.) (1995), 104 n. 14; cf. 20 n. 2 
for the influence of Herzog's ideas about actual medical practice on his tex tual 
restoration; on this healing narrative, see Herzog (1931), 80: 'Parasiten im Lieb', with a 
discourse on Greek names for such. 
IG IV2, 1, 122.33-34: auvpcit~as 8E- TG.[v y]aaTE-pa KaL 1TO~aas u[yLfj] TUV yuvaLKa TclV TE 
rrapovatav Tav atJTo[u rrlapEvE1JcivLcE 6 'AaKAamos . 
IG IV2, 1, 122.27, 33. For the meaning of fj.l 1TQVTL E-ouaa, contra the translation given by 
LiDonnici (ed.) (1995), 105 and n. 15, see LSJ s.v. rrus, D IV. Thanks to Pat Easterling for 
drawing this to my attention. 
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precipitated by the publication of the Epidaurian stelai in 1883.10 These 
frameworks alternate between seeing the priests of Asklepios as elaborate 
tricksters and as caring physicians operating under a religious cover; temple-
sanctuaries become sanatoria, dreams become doctors' prescriptions, and so 
on: 11 
Only a few scholars still dared to insist that from beginning to end the cmes of 
Asclepius to the ancients had been a religious experience beyond all human 
understanding, and must be interpreted as such. 
In this way, Sostrata's narrative can be subsumed beneath implicit or explicit 
histories of medicine that discredit the supernatural to uncover what really 
happened or read the supernatural as allegory to re-narrativise the intervention 
of the god in medical terms. Such histories read through cultural mystifications 
to uncover a biologically grounded substrate. But the only alternative that 
Edelstein and Edelstein offer is to privilege the cultural with a familiar appeal to 
'religious experience', in this case glossed as 'beyond all human understanding'. 
None of these alternatives is sufficient. A better approach might lie in a medical 
anthropology which seeks to show 'how cultural meaning is intrinsic to 
embodied experience' and which thus provisionally overcomes the disabling 
dichotomy between biology and culture upon which such inadequate responses 
to the Epidaurian narratives rely.12 The point is that the cultural formation of 
Sostrata's narrative and the bodily transformations she undergoes are not 
separate but one and the same. Readings of Sostrata's narrative must do justice 
to this specific grounding in the body of the dynamic of epiphanic anti-structure 
and ritual structuration as it is told in this instance, with all the strategic framing 
that this telling brings. 
What this late fourth century inscriptional narrative from a highly 
ritualised context shows is that the problematic of epiphany that I have 
explored in Homer continues to play out in very different contexts of speech 
and action from those of the performance-reception of epic poetry. It is possible 
to multiply contexts in which the problematic of divine epiphany can be 
considered in terms of the dynamic of structure and anti-structure that I have 
10 Edelstein and Edelstein (edd.) (1945), vol. 2, 142-144. For naturalism, see e.g. Herzog 
(1931). 
11 Edelstein and Edelstein (edd.) (1945), vol. 2, 144. 
12 For a specific example, see e.g. Csordas (1994b), esp. 270, 272-273, on a yow1g Navajo man's 
struggle with brain cancer and the after-effects of treatment, esp . loss of linguistic ability; 
the man formulated a particular strategy in this struggle which 'originated in a direct 
encoLmter with the Navajo deities or Holy People, who inspired him with words of 
prayer' . The broader approach is exemplified in Csordas (1994a); for how the paradigm 
of embodiment might be further nuanced, see Ingold (2000), 170-171. 
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discussed in the Homeric poems. In my first chapter I focused on the narrative 
of Pausanias as a touchstone for uncovering the strategic effects of the appeal to 
'experience' within Pausanias's exploration of a Greek cultural present through 
its past.13 In this exploration the Homeric enactment of epiphany in battle was 
an integral part of the presence of gods in Pausanias's Greek world. I also 
discussed how this evident continuity represented a substantial problem for 
those like Dietrich who would approach divine appearances in Homer in 
rationalising terms.14 The ongoing place in Greek culture of the Homeric poems 
in performance and reception underpins the relevance of Homer in considering 
the modalities of the gods in the Greek world: Homer remains a basic point of 
reference, a framing exploration. 
Key testimony to the ongoing influence in religious matters of Homer 
and Greek epic in classical Athens is given in similar terms by Herodotos.15 The 
place of Homeric epic (in some form) within the Panathenaic festival offered a 
specific institutional context for these explorations of the presence and absence 
of the gods.16 Homer was at the heart of Athenian civic ritual and culturallife.17 
Nonetheless, the development of new genres of narrative-performance, 
especially Athenian drama, presented new challenges.18 The enactment of the 
presence of gods in actual bodies upon the stage introduces a different 
performance medium: the embodiment of presence in the form of an actor 
brings new po~sibilities and new constraints, especially for encompassing 
moments of anti-structure on the stage.19 That exploration of the dynamic of 
anti-structure and structure within these constraints was still very possible is 
shown, for example, by the powerfully ideological transformation of the Furies 
from confusing seen/unseen presences at the end of the Khoephoroi into an 
orderly ritual procession and civic cult by the end of the Ewnenides.2o But other 
practical solutions are in evidence. One is the narrative mise-en-abyme offered 
by the messenger speech: a pertinent example is the appearance of Herakles 
13 See above, pp . 11-15. 
14 See above, pp . 23-25. 
15 Hdt. 2.53. See also below, p . 47 n . 1. 
16 See esp. Nagy (1999b); Haubold (2000), 149-152; see also above, pp. 336-37 n . 143, p . 39. 
17 Compare e.g. Karanika (2001) for the intersection of epic and civic ritual . 
18 For drama as narrative, albeit a 'more restricted dialect', see Lowe (2000), 164; also Could 
(2001b), 333-334. 
19 On the ramifications of this 'theatrical body', see Bassi (1998), 19-23, 99-143. 
20 See Goldhill (1984), 198-205, 271-279 . See also the prologue of Soph. A ins, Falkner (1999) 
on the metatheatrical implications of divine presence. 
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and Hebe and the battlefield transformation of Iolaus in Euripides' Herakleidai.21 
The use of this more strictly 'narrative' form to obviate problems of presence 
and transformation on the stage is directly comparable with how violence and 
death are brought onto the tragic stage through narrative and tableau. Another 
practical strategy was offered by the deus ex machina, a particular technology of 
presence which brings about a break of narrative in a way that we have already 
seen exemplified at the end of the Odyssey.22 Even if the dynamic of presence 
and ritual structuration takes on a particular stylised form in these contexts, the 
problem still remains how to make 'sense' of these moments of presence.23 
Much has been written agonising over the interruptions and ends that the gods 
impose on the narratives of such tragedies as Euripides' Heralcles and Orestes. 24 
The evident mismatch between divine and human frames is a particular crux 
that, depending on scholarly inclinations, is a problem of, or an opportunity for, 
narrative closure. But it is better not to choose between these alternatives: this 
dynamic of sense and senselessness is integral to tragedy's vision of the 
relations of gods and men, who seek in each other forms of validation that are 
forever fractured by the disjunct of their respective forms of existence.2s 
Euripides' Bakkhai is emblematic of this fracture in its tragic realisation, but 
Homeric epic lies behind this tragic vision in multiple ways.26 One strategy 
associated with the appearances of gods at the ends of Euripidean tragedies is 
particularly intriguing, namely the aetiological institution of specific ritual 
practice by the god.27 At such moments the anti-structure of divine irruption 
into tragic narrative finds an objective, structuring correlate in the institution of 
ritual action: divine presence is re-narrativised in terms of ritual in a process 
familiar from my discussion of Athene's departure from the shore at Pylos.2s 
But it is even more intriguing that the actuality of these aetiologies remains a 
pressing question for scholarly readers.29 Here resurfaces the spectre of 
'experience' as a means of understanding such narratives of divine presence in 
21 Eur. H ern k I eid a i 849-863. On these narrators, 'metalogue speakers', see esp. Could 
(2001b), 325, 328-331; also de Jong (1991) . 
22 For this teclu1ology, see Hourmouziades (1965); Mastronarde (1990); Wiles (1997), esp. eh. 
8. 
23 Compare Lowe (2000), 159: the focus of narrative shifts in tragedy away from action 
(outcomes are relatively controlled) towards the generation of meaning. 
24 See e.g. Dunn (1996), (1997). 
25 Compare Easterling (1993), 81: 'by juxtaposing human and divine perspectives the 
dramatist allows us to approach issues that defy logical analysis-and indeed elude 
critical interpre tation.' See also Wildberg (1999-2000). 
26 On Homer and tragedy, see esp. Could ([1983]2001c). 
27 See e.g. Dunn (1996), 45-83. 
28 See above, pp. 138-146. 
29 See e.g. Parker (1997), 144-147; Scullion (1999-2000). 
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terms of a grounding in real religious practice. What is needed is a different 
understanding how such narratives participate in the world. I hope to have 
offered the beginnings of such an understanding in my exploration of the anti-
logic of epiphany in the Homeric poems. 
The close interplay of narrative, ritual and epiphany in such contexts 
points to the practical realisation of the claim that I made at the conclusion of 
my first chapter, namely that the relationship between 'historical' and 
'imaginative' forms of religious representation is explainable as that between 
different instances of a more general process of articulating how the world 
might be. Such articulation extends into the world as speech and as action; that 
is, as practices through which to explore the potential and significance of divine 
presence and absence in the world. Such presence and absence may implicate 
every aspect of people's being-in-the-world. But my point here must not be 
mistaken: precisely what I am not claiming is that this variety of narratives all 
tell the same story.30 Instead, as specific instances of a more general process of 
making 'sense' in all possible senses of the word, in which cognition and culture 
are inseparable in the continuum of human experience, what this approach to 
epiphany opens up is acknowledgment of the basic specificity and 
incommensurability of each fragmentary, partial, provisional narrative of 
divine presence and absence in the world. 
At the start of this conclusion I quoted Christopher Logue's re-writing of 
the death of Patroklos and its aftermath:31 
A light is moving down the beach. 
It wavers. Comes towards the fleet. 
The hulls like upturned glasses made of jet. 
Is it a god? 
No details 
Yet. 
Logue's narrative continues: this potential divine presence is in fact the 
processional return of the dead Patroklos. Thus Logue implicitly invites his 
audiences to consider the aftermath of Apollo's destructive intervention on the 
battlefield before Troy not in terms of the larger narrative of the Iliad, or the 
story of Troy that it rewrites, or the cosmic ramifications of this story for the 
30 See Prickett (2002), 257. 
31 Logue ([1981-1994]2001), 190-191. 
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present order of the world, but in the specific detail of the ritualised return of 
Patroklos's corpse into Akhilleus's care: 
Now we can hear a drum. 
And now we see it: 
Six warriors with flaming wands, 
Eight veteran bearers, and one prince, 
Patroclus, dead, crossed axes on his chest, 
Upon a bier. 
Gold on the wrists that bear the prince aloft. 
Tears on the cheeks of those who lead with wands. 
Multiple injuries adorn the corpse. 
And we, the army, genuflect in line. 
This sudden moment of first person plural focalisation IS crucial. We, as 
audiences of and participants in Logue's poetic speech, are invited-or, better, 
are compelled, given the ambivalent tone of 'we genuflect in line'-to 
participate in the significance objectified in the inert weight of Patroklos's 
corpse, which Akhilleus will tend as lovingly as he will later defile the corpse of 
Hektor.32 For concentrated in this corpse-a mortal body completely 
objectified-is all the specific, shattering weight of the gods' limitless being that 
is figured in Apollo's blow upon Patroklos's back:33 
His hand came from the east, 
And in his wrist lay all eternity, 
And every atom of his mythic weight 
Was poised beneath his fist and bent left leg. 
32 Compare Logue ([1981-1994] 2001), 158, where such focalisation is used in expressing the 
resistance of the army as they fight over the body of Sarpedon: 'We fight when the sLm 
rises; when it se ts we count the dead. I What has the beauty of Helen to do with us?' This 
plural, 'experiencing' focalisation is distinct from Logue's deployment of Homeric 
apostrophe, as e.g. Logue ([1981-1994]2001), 159, 161-164; cf. above, p. 78 n. 128. 
33 Logue ([1981-1994]2001), 164. 
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